Wilfrid Sellars and the Two Images of the World*

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The contrast between the ordinary or manifest image of the world and its scientific image or conception is one of the most frequently invoked distinctions in the debates concerning the role of scientific knowledge in our lives, in the practice of philosophy, and in the formation of our worldview. However, the gist of this distinction is seldom thoroughly discussed; usually it is provisionally and tentatively elucidated with the assistance of a few suggestive examples. Yet a careful reflection on the distinction shows that it can be interpreted in a variety of ways, and its delineation and substantiation is by no means simple and easy thing. In my brief contribution to this topic I shall first introduce a popular account of the opposition between the manifest and scientific images of the world, that is included in Daniel C. Dennett’s overview of tools for thinking. Subsequently, in the main part of the paper, I shall present in greater detail and as accurately as possible the way in which this distinction is drawn and elaborated by the American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars, whom Dennett has supposedly followed. In the conclusion of my con-

* I dedicate this modest exercise in Sellars’s scholarship to my cherished friend and former colleague Professor Urszula Żegleń, whose comprehensive book in philosophy of mind (Urszula Żegleń Filozofia umysłu: Dyskusja z naturalistycznymi koncepcjami umysłu. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2003) I take it to be Sellarsian in spirit, if not in letter.
siderations I will mention the main philosophical presupposition of the opposition under discussion and suggest a radical way of avoiding it.

The Popular Conception of the Distinction

While listing and describing his favorite thought tools for thinking, and freely digressing about them, Daniel C. Dennett\(^1\) discusses a certain contrast, according to him especially useful when we try to understand the nature of linguistic meaning and content of our mental states, but which “provides a valuable perspective on so many issues that it should be in everybody’s kit”.\(^2\) This is the contrast between the manifest image of the world, given in normal sensory perception, and the world image constructed from the conceptual resources of scientific theories. Briefly and roughly, it is the opposition between the ordinary and scientific conceptions of the world. On the one hand, we have

the world as it seems to us in everyday life, full of solid objects, colors and smells and tastes, voices and shadows, plants and animals, and people and all their stuff: not only tables and chairs, bridges and churches, dollars and contracts, but also such intangible things as songs, poems, opportunities and free will.\(^3\)

On the other hand, there is a world whose only components are atoms, molecules, electrons, quarks and other items of this sort, whose existence is endorsed in empirically justified scientific theories. Since it is through scientific research that we learn in what the world really consists, one has to answer the question of what to do with all the variety of things that we deal with in everyday life. An uncompromising thesis that all these things do not really exist seems highly implausible. It shouldn’t be supposed then it is the sheer illusion that the perceived objects are colored, that contracts are entered into, that we make promises, write poems and pay with dollars or other currency. It would be far-fetched and mind-boggling to stick to such an incredible idea. One should rather take inspiration from Sellars, Dennett maintains, and consider how these two world images were formed and how to combine them.

In a way distinctive for science enthusiasts and unrepentant advocates of scientism, Dennett proposes a strategy in which, as part of the scientific picture of the world, an attempt to explain the formation of the manifest or ordinary image is undertaken. The starting point of such an

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2 Ibidem, 69.
3 Ibidem.
explanation is the observation that every organism focuses its attention on the things that are crucial for its survival and growth. It is a kind of ontology of the organism or its environment, that is – using the German expression – its Umwelt. In the case of an animal, this environment consists of things that are may be useful or which must be avoided. These are things seen as opportunities or affordances (to borrow the term coined by James J. Gibson).

An organism Umwelt is in one sense an inner environment, a “subjective” and even “narcissistic” ontology, composed of only the things that most matter to it, but its Umwelt is not necessarily inner or subjective in the sense of being conscious”.

It is simply an objective environment of the organism interpreted from the perspective of its needs. In contrast to such an environment, our human Umwelt is a world that appears to our consciousness, a world of our experience, a world according to us. For this reason, the image of such a world is by the same token the manifest image. In this sense, it is fully self-oriented or subjective, although this does not mean that it does not contain any traits of objectivity at all. It has been partially shaped in the process of natural selection and in this respect it is genetically inherited. However, this is only its basic framework, which is filled by the results of individual experience, upbringing and participation in culture.

The principal message of Dennett’s understanding of the opposition between the manifest and scientific images of the world is as follows. Completely objective and impartial knowledge of what the world is like, what are its primary categories and structure, is provided only by special empirical sciences. All what philosophers need to do amounts to getting interesting ontological messages out of empirical sciences and constructing the scientific image of the world. The ordinary or manifest image of the world, which can be attributed to various organisms, is of pre-scientific character and it is a picture of the world from the point of view of these organisms. It is an image of the world that enables them to function successfully. In the case of simple organisms, this image is deployed by them without explicit awareness of its content. It is quite otherwise in the case of some animals and people: they are fully aware of it and for them it is the manifest image in the exact sense of the word.

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The Sellarsian Account of the Distinction

The contrast between the manifest and scientific images of the world that Wilfrid Sellars outlined and elaborated is much more complex and differs in many respects from what Dennett suggests. Sellars introduced and described this contrast in two lectures, delivered in 1960 on December 7 and 8 at the University of Pittsburgh as part of public lectures in the philosophy of science. Sellars was then a professor at Yale University, and Adolf Grünbaum, who was a professor at the University of Pittsburgh, in a letter of November 29, 1960, advised Sellars that around 400 people would be expected to attend lectures, but not all of them would be familiar with philosophy. The two lectures delivered at that time became the basis of one of the most known papers by Sellars. It was originally published in a volume containing the above-mentioned public lectures in the philosophy of science, delivered in the academic year 1960–1961. Other lecturers and contributors to the volume were Carl G. Hempel, Michael Scriven, Ernst Caspari, Adolf Grünbaum and Paul K. Feyerabend. Sellars’s paper was subsequently reprinted in his seminal book *Science, Perception and Reality* and was anthologized in other collections as well.

Sellars’s essays begins with probably the most famous and most quoted statements from his work: “The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hand together in the broadest possible sense of the term”. A brief exposition of his metaphilosophical views follows, which ends with the claim that this comprehensive understanding is hampered by the fact that philosophers ultimately have to deal with two images or conceptions of the world and the place of human beings in it: the manifest image and the scientific image. As conceptions they are of course

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5 The letter is available at the University of Pittsburgh, ULS Archives & Special Collections, Wilfrid S. Sellars Papers, ASP.1991.01, Box 160, folder 1.
both real, but this does not entail that what is envisaged or conceived in them is real as well.

Sellars gives twofold account of the manifest image. He describes it first genealogically, that is in a quasi-historical way, as “the framework in terms of which man came to be aware of himself as man-in-the-world”.\(^\text{10}\) He links the appearance of this framework with characteristically human conceptual abilities whose acquisition is, in his own words, “the last stand of Special Creation”.\(^\text{11}\) Sellars believes that this linkage is necessary since any act of conceptual thinking in the full sense can take place only within a whole framework of conceptual thinking that enables its proper assessment. He supports his belief as follows:

To be able to think is to be able to measure one’s thoughts by standards of correctness, of relevance, of evidence. In this sense a diversified conceptual framework is a whole which, however sketchy, is prior to its parts, and cannot be construed as a coming together of parts which are already conceptual in character. The conclusion is difficult to avoid that the transition from pre-conceptual patterns of behavior to conceptual thinking was a holistic one, a jump to a level of awareness which is irreducibly new, a jump which was the coming into being of man.\(^\text{12}\)

Sellars does not fully endorse this conclusion which apparently is difficult to avoid. He believes in the holistic character of this transition, but at the same time makes clear that the irreducibility of the jump to the new level in question is the matter of dispute between the advocates of the manifest image and the scientific image.

Sellars emphasizes that in describing the manifest image in the quasi-historical way as the conception in terms of which human beings encounter themselves, he does not want to suggest that it is the original, primitive, and pre-scientific image which should be replaced in the evolution of human thinking by the reflective, sophisticated, and fully scientific conception of humans and their environment. The manifest image is a successor of the crude and primitive original image; it is its empirical and categorial refinement. Here it is how Sellars describes the former refinement:

By empirical refinement, I mean the sort of refinement which operates within the broad framework of the image and which, by approaching the world in terms of something like the canons of inductive inference defined by John Stuart Mill, supplemented by canons of statistical inference, adds to and subtracts from the contents of the world as experienced.

\(^{10}\) Ibidem, 6.

\(^{11}\) Ibidem.

\(^{12}\) Ibidem.
in terms of this framework and from the correlations which are believed to obtain between them. Thus, the conceptual framework which I am calling the manifest image is, in an appropriate sense, itself a scientific image. It is not only disciplined and critical; it also makes use of those aspects of scientific method which might be lumped together under the heading ‘correlational induction’. There is, however, one type of scientific reasoning which it, by stipulation, does not include, namely that which involves the postulation of imperceptible entities, and principles pertaining to them, to explain the behaviour of perceptible things.\(^\text{13}\)

Sellars even goes as far as to claim that it would be perhaps less misleading and more accurate to call the scientific image the postulational or theoretical image, that is, the general conception of entities postulated by scientific theories. Nevertheless, with this warning issued, he continues to use the terminology of the manifest and scientific images.

Categorial refinement of the manifest image consists in specifying the ways in which it is permissible and justifiable to classify things and ascribe various characteristics to them. It also consists in sharpening and modifying the extent of categories commonly used, as well as in answering the question about the most basic and pervasive categories of the framework.

This leads us to the second, more structural description of the manifest image as the image which “includes persons, animals, lower forms of life and ‘merely material’ things, like rivers and stones”.\(^\text{14}\) One can also describe it, as Sellars does in one of his later publications, as follows:

The manifest world is primarily a world of things, animate and inanimate, and persons. Things belong to kinds which are characterized by clusters of powers, capacities, dispositions and propensities, or – to use a general term intended to cover all these, and more – causal properties.\(^\text{15}\)

Moreover, this is the world of changing things:

The objects of the manifest world change. They are involved in events or happenings. Of course, many of them, much of the time, are stodgy. Whether or not an object is changing, it endures. Endures, that is to say, as long as it exists. For, typically, these objects come into being and pass away.\(^\text{16}\)

In such a world of the manifest image the primary objects are persons. Indeed, the manifest image evolved from the original primitive image

\(^{13}\) Ibidem, 7.

\(^{14}\) Ibidem.


\(^{16}\) Ibidem, 39.
in which the world was populated only by persons and person-like entities.

Sellars insists that persons of the manifest image are not spirits or minds, or entities consisting of minds and bodies. In one sense they are not composite objects. But in the other sense they are. As he elaborates this point:

On the other hand, if it is to do its work, the manifest framework must be such as to make meaningful the assertion that what we ordinarily call persons are composites of a person proper and a body – and, by doing so, make meaningful the contrary view that although man have many different types of ability, ranging from those he has in common with the lowest of things, to his ability to engage in scientific and philosophical reflection, he nevertheless is one object and not a team.\(^{17}\)

Sellars also takes into account various ways of acting, and distinguishes between those that are expressions of a person’s character and those that are not, as well as between habitual and deliberate actions. His remarks about the nature of human actions allow him to explain what he means by insisting that persons are the primary object of the manifest image. It is simply a way of stating that it is “the modification of an image in which all the objects are capable of the full range of personal activity, the modification consisting of a gradual pruning of the implications of saying with respect to what we would call an inanimate object, that it did something".\(^{18}\)

At least two further things should be said about the manifest image. It is true that it is a way in which an individual thinker conceives of herself and her place in the world. Yet it has claims to universality, since it is taken to be a way in which any thinker conceives of herself and the world. Moreover, conceptual thinking for which the manifest image provides a framework has essentially social character. This means that “there is no thinking apart from common standards of correctness and relevance, which relate I do think to what anyone ought to think. The contrast between ‘I’ and ‘anyone’ is essential to rational thought”.\(^{19}\) Sellars draws from this idea the conclusion that conceptual thinking, that presupposes the framework of the manifest image, and in general is supposed to be responsive to the way the world is, must include the idea of a group mediating between the individual and the world. However, within the framework of the manifest image one is unable to explain this mediation and latching of conceptual thinking onto the world and its intelligible order. Sellars writes:

\(^{17}\) Wilfrid Sellars, “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man”, 11.

\(^{18}\) Ibidem, 12.

\(^{19}\) Ibidem, 16–17.
But any attempt to *explain* this mediation within the framework of the manifest image was bound to fail, for the manifest image contains the resources for such an attempt only in the sense that it provides the foundation on which scientific theory can build an explanatory framework; and while conceptual structures of this framework are *built on* the manifest image, they are not definable within it.\textsuperscript{20}

This passage may be read as the statement that the manifest image, and its various philosophical elucidations, are not sufficient and should be supplemented by the scientific image, or – to put it in the Sellarsian terminology – these two images should be fused into one synoptic vision.

This is the right point to introduce the idea of the scientific image in greater detail. Nevertheless, before doing that one critical comment on the Sellarsian account of the manifest image seems to be in order. As Sellars presents it, there seems to be almost seamless continuity between the crude original image in terms of which human beings become aware of themselves, its elaboration into the manifest image of the common sense, and philosophical construals or interpretations of the manifest image and even additions to it. He even introduces, or rather borrows from another philosophical movement, the idea of perennial philosophy which for him includes the Platonic tradition very broad construed, the common sense philosophy, and the ordinary language analysis. He takes it to be the tradition of fully endorsing the manifest image and holding it “to be the large-scale map of reality to which science brings a needle-point of detail and an elaborate technique of map-reading.”\textsuperscript{21}

It seems, however, that from the point of view of epistemic credibility and support, this continuity is not seamless, and perhaps there is even a gap between the manifest image, considered as a light improvement of the original image, and its various philosophical elaborations.

Having this in mind, let us return to the idea of the scientific image. While introducing it Sellars emphasizes again the following:

The scientific image of man-in-the-world is, of course, as much an idealization as the manifest image – even more so, as it is still in the process of coming to be. It will be remembered that the contrast I have in mind is not that between an unscientific conception of man-in-the-world and a scientific one, but between that conception which limits itself to what correlational techniques can tell us about perceptible and introspectible events and that which postulates imperceptible objects and events for the purpose of explaining correlations between perceptibles.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{20} Ibidem, 17.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibidem, 8.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibidem, 19.
In other words, the scientific image is the “postulational” or “theoretical” image of the world provided by current science. To be more precise, this image is not simply provided or given by science, but constructed out of several particular images of special sciences, such as physics, chemistry, biology, and others. Here as Sellars elaborates this point:

Thus the conception of the scientific or postulational image is idealization in the sense that it is a conception of an integration of a manifold of images, each of which is the application to man of a framework of concepts which have a certain autonomy. For each scientific theory is, from the standpoint of methodology, a structure which is built at a different ‘place’ and by different procedures within the intersubjectively accessible world of perceptible things. Thus ‘the’ scientific image is a construct from a number of images, each of which is supported by the manifest world.\(^{23}\)

By introducing the idea of different “places” at which particular scientific images are anchored within the manifest world of perceptible things, Sellars wants to make clear that scientific images are methodologically dependent upon the manifest image. However, this does not entail the dependence in the heavy substantial sense. Sellars writes:

Yet, when we turn our attention to ‘the’ scientific image which emerges from the several images proper to the several sciences, we note that although the image is methodologically dependent on the world of sophisticated common sense, and in this sense, does not stand on its own feet, yet it purports to be a complete image, i.e. to define a framework which could be the whole truth about that which belongs to the image. Thus although methodologically a development within the manifest image, the scientific image presents itself as a rival image. From its point of view the manifest image on which it rests is an ‘inadequate’ but pragmatically useful likeness of a reality which first finds its adequate (in principle) likeness in the scientific image.\(^{24}\)

We have then the conflict or clash of two broad images which should be somehow resolved.

There are at least three main ways of resolving the conflict: (i) to proclaim that the clash is illusory, and therefore both these images may be correct; (ii) to insist that the manifest image represents the way the world really is, and reject the idea of the scientific image, since scientific theories have merely instrumental value, without describing or giving an account of anything in the literal sense; (iii) to argue for the primacy of the scientific image. The third way is taken, with some reservations, by Sellars. It can be expressed in Kantian terminology in the following way:

\(^{23}\) Ibidem, 20.
\(^{24}\) Ibidem.
[T]he common-sense world, the world of the “manifest image” is, in the Kantian sense, phenomenal; the way in which things as they really are appear to minds endowed with a certain conceptual framework. The fact that this framework is a subtle one, particularly in those respects which concern action and practice, by no means guarantees that its ontology is an adequate representation of the way things are.\(^{25}\)

The crucial thing in the success of this strategy is an account of mind or person within the framework of the scientific image.

While giving an account of mind Sellars discusses separately the issue of conceptual thinking, and the question of sensory consciousness. He believes that the former is much easier than the latter. One should only realize that thoughts may be conceived, without any substantial loss, as internal “goings-on” analogous to overt speech. That is, having a thought that it is cold outside means nothing more than being in a state analogous to one expressed by the sentence “It is cold outside”. For Sellars this is of great relevance:

The point is an important one, for if the concept of a thought is the concept of an inner state analogous to speech, this leaves open the possibility that the inner state conceived in terms of this analogy is in its qualitative character a neurophysiological process.\(^{26}\)

Further clarification of this point leads Sellars to a functional account of thoughts in terms of their roles, and the declaration that since they do not have qualitative character \textit{sui generis} their identification with neurophysiological items is in principle possible.

For Sellars such a declaration in the case of sensory states would be premature. Though one can define sensory states in terms of their causes and effects, there is more to them than may be captured in definitions of this sort. They have intrinsic quality or character which somehow match sensory quality of their objects. That is to say, a state of experiencing blue surface of a physical object is conceived as being somehow blue, as having this intrinsic quality, and not the quality of experiencing something red, or any other quality. Sellars emphasizes that sensory qualities are ultimately homogenous in the sense in which objects and properties of the scientific image are not. Thus the answer to the question “can we reduce sensory states to neurophysiological states, or show that the former consist in the latter?” must be “no”. Sellars explains:


\(^{26}\) Wilfrid Sellars, “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man”, 33.
This is not say that neurophysiological states cannot be defined (in principle) which have a high degree of analogy to the sensations of the manifest image. That this can be done is an elementary fact in psycho-physics. The trouble is, rather, that the feature which we referred to as ‘ultimate homogeneity’, and which characterizes the perceptible qualities of things, e.g. their colour, seems to be essentially lacking in the domain of the definable states of nerves and their interactions. Putting it crudely, colour expanses in the manifest world consist of regions which are themselves colour expanses, and these consist in their turn of regions which are colour expanses, and so on; whereas the state of a group of neurons, though it has regions which are also states of groups of neurons, has ultimate regions which are not states of groups of neurons but rather states of single neurons. And the same is true if we move to the finer grained level of biochemical process.

We have then here the clear case of the ultimate homogeneity of the manifest image, on the one hand, and the ultimate non-homogeneity of objects and properties of scientific image, on the other. Thus the completeness of the scientific image, and even its primacy, is in jeopardy.

To save it Sellars suggests a major categorical amendment of the scientific image which consists in conjecture that particles are not primitive and ultimate entities but rather are “singularities in a space-time continuum which could be conceptually ‘cut up’ without significant loss – in inorganic contexts, at least – into interacting particles”. Such a categorical amendment, later developed by Sellars into the metaphysics of pure processes, would give us tools to account for intrinsic quality of sensory consciousness in terms of neurophysiology.

However, even the scientific image amended along these lines will not be fully complete. There is a clear need to supplement it by the framework of persons as beings forming communities, sharing intentions, and establishing standards of meaningful discourse and rationality. In the concluding paragraph of his seminal essay Sellars puts it as follows:

Thus, to complete the scientific image we need to enrich it not with more ways of saying what is the case, but with the language of community and individual intentions, so that by construing the actions we intend to do and the circumstances in which we intend to do them in scientific terms, we directly relate the world as conceived by scientific theory to our purposes, and make it our world and no longer an alien appendage to the world in which we do our living. We can, of course, as matters now stand, realize this direct incorporation of the scientific image into our way of life

27 Ibidem, 35.
28 Ibidem, 37.
only in imagination. But to do so is, if only in imagination, to transcend the dualism of the manifest and scientific images of man-of-the-world.29

There are many ways of reading this passage but not matter which one is taken as correct, it seems its general message is that in order to fuse the manifest image and the scientific image into one synoptic vision, one cannot replace the former by the latter, or *vice versa*.

**Concluding Remarks**

Sellars gave his account of the dichotomy between the manifest image and the scientific image more than fifty years ago, and some features of it appears today implausible and contentious. For instance, in his attempt to put human beings into the scientific image he differentiates heavily between thoughts and sensory states, and claims that the former constitute lesser obstacle in this enterprise than the latter. Nowadays this differentiation and its shape does not seem fully appropriate. On the hand, functional and linguistic accounts of conceptual thinking, as conceived by Sellars, have lost its aura of attractiveness. On the other hand, the ultimate homogeneity argument is no longer convincing, and thus although there might be other reasons to rethink and revise the ontology of the scientific image, this argument is not one of them. However, his idea of merging or fusing the manifest image and the scientific image is still a viable option, expounded by him with greater philosophical subtlety and lesser dogmatism than advertised and accessibly presented, or rather misinterpreted, half a century later by Dennett.

Still, even though it a viable option which finds its ingenious and ardent followers,30 it is not the only option. The other option, strongly endorsed by Bas C. van Fraassen31 is to discard completely the seemingly natural idea that ordinary practice and scientific enterprise requires us to think of them as producing pictures or images of the world. We simply have to reject the pervasive representational model of our various activities. Van Fraassen assures us that “clear thinking in local matters does not require that we have, either actually or potentially a global conceptual scheme, metaphysical system, or world view”.32 Our intellectual efforts should focus on understanding how this possible and why this does

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29 Ibidem, 40.
32 Ibidem, 50.
make our thoughts meaningless jumble. “It is the problem all of us have, being post-foundationalist, post-modern: to describe ourselves without resorting to or falling into what Kant called the illusions of Reason”. To what extent this deflationary or quietist option is defensible, and what are its ramifications, must be left for another occasion.

Bibliography


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33 Ibidem.
Summary

The contrast between the manifest and the scientific image of the world is one of the most frequently invoked distinctions in the debates concerning the role of scientific knowledge in our lives, in the practice of philosophy, and in the formation of our worldview. However, the gist of this distinction is seldom thoroughly discussed, and a careful reflection shows that it can be interpreted in a variety of ways, and its delineation and substantiation is by no means simple and easy thing. The paper begins with an introduction of a popular account of the opposition between the manifest and scientific image, included in Daniel C. Dennett’s overview of tools for thinking. The main part of the paper presents in greater detail and as accurately as possible the way in which this distinction is drawn and elaborated by the American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars, whom Dennett has supposedly followed. In the conclusion the crucial philosophical presupposition of the opposition under discussion is mentioned and a radical way of avoiding it is hinted at.

Keywords: the manifest image, the scientific image, the postulational or theoretical image, the synoptic vision, Daniel C. Dennett, Wilfrid Sellars, Bas C. van Fraassen

Streszczenie

Wilfrid Sellars i dwa obrazy świata

Przeciwstawienie potocznego czy jawnego obrazu świata jego obrazowi naukowemu jest jednym z najczęściej przywoływanych rozróżnień w debatach dotyczących roli wiedzy naukowej w naszym życiu, w uprawianiu filozofii oraz w budowaniu światopoglądu. Wszelako sedno owej dystynkcji jest rzadko dogłębnie rozważane, a bliższy namysł pokazuje, że można ją różnorako interpretować i bynajmniej nie jest łatwo ją przeprowadzić i wypełnić treścią. Artykuł rozpoczyna się od wprowadzenia popularnego ujęcia opozycji między jawnym a naukowym obrazem świata, które można znaleźć w zaproponowanym przez Daniela C. Dennetta przeglądzie narzędzi myślowych. Zasadniczy trzon artykułu przedstawia szczegółowo i w miarę dokładnie sposób, w jaki tę dystynkcję wyłożył i rozwinął amerykański filozof Wilfrid Sellars, do którego Dennett w zamierzeniu nawiązywał. W zakończeniu tekstu wskazuje się na kluczowe założenie filozoficzne rozważanej opozycji i sugeruje się radykalny sposób jego uniknięcia.

Słowa kluczowe: obraz potoczny lub jawny, obraz naukowy, obraz postulowany lub teoretyczny, wizja całościowa, Daniel C. Dennett, Wilfrid Sellars, Bas C. van Fraassen