Heidegger and the Ontological Status of Nothing

Duane Armitage

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/33064


This paper examines Heidegger’s thoughts on vulnerability by focusing on his conception of Dasein as fundamentally guilty and constituted by a lack. The argument put forth is that this guilt and lack condition the possibility of Dasein as a being who interprets both itself and Being. Such interpretations showcase Dasein as a being of primordial impotency and highlight the necessity of nothing, and nothing’s positive “ontological status,” as constitutive of such impotency, guilt, and lack.

Słowa kluczowe

Heidegger; Being; nothing; vulnerability; guilt

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Duane Armitage. 2016. Heidegger’s Pauline and Lutheran Roots. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Critchley Simon. 2012. The Faith of the Faithless. London: Verso Press.

Heidegger Martin. 1993. Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell. San Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers.

Heidegger Martin. 1962. Being and Time, transl. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson. New York: Harper and Row.

Heidegger Martin. 1979. Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Niemeyer.


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