Methodological Aspects of Pedagogy’s Two-Discipline Location

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Abstract
The area of pedagogy research penetration is situated in the disciplines of social sciences and humanities. The answer to the question what methodological consequences this brings to the practice of pedagogy favours the broadening of the methodological awareness of pedagogues. The author adopts a conventional starting point, established by W. Dilthey’s statement that some sciences explain the world and other understand it, in which the research practice of social sciences, which adapted the method of natural sciences, was diametrically different from the research in the humanities. This difference is expressed, among other things, in the different treatment of the method, as well as the different position of the researcher in the research process. Nowadays the methodology of social sciences is internally diverse. There is a current within it, referred to as qualitative research, in which the influence of achievements in the field of humanities is clearly visible, and which becomes a source of premises for the recognition of reality in empirical cognition.

Key words: methodology of social sciences, methodology of the humanities, understanding.

Introduction
In the currently prevailing ‘taxonomy of sciences’ pedagogy belongs to the realm of social sciences, and before that it was located in the humanities. The location of disciplines or decreeing the formal existence of particular academic
disciplines depends more on the ideas which manage science, than on the effects of substantial scientific analyses. That is why the author does not engage in a discussion on the criteria of a discipline location of pedagogy, and assumes (as do most of its representatives) that the area of scientific penetration of pedagogy remains both within the discipline of social studies and the humanities. This statement leads – among other things – to a question about the methodological consequences of this ‘two-discipline location’. One can agree, without too much argument, that they depend on the degree of similitude or the difference between the methodological perspective dominant in these sciences.

On the grounds of everyday research practice (i.e. not particularly reflective, copying the dominating patterns) the difference between social studies and the humanities seems obvious. Empirical studies are usually connected only with the former – they are meant to ‘describe’ the functioning of the real social world. The latter are associated with studies on human thought, materialised in the products of culture. Pedagogical research practice is usually divided this way, i.e. into empirical studies of the conditions and course of real educational-developmental processes and into analyses of the standpoints of prominent pedagogues, philosophers and representatives of other disciplines, which constitute ‘matter’ for reconstruction or building theories of education, models of educational activities at varying degrees of generality.

This simple differentiation loses its meaning in the context of modern philosophical and theoretical-methodological discussions on issues and dilemmas regarding the specificity of scientific cognition, regardless of discipline divisions. An expression of the change in research practice is, for instance, the relocation of hermeneutic, phenomenological and semiotic analyses – traditionally associated with the humanities – to the realm of empirical studies. History of science shows that distinct features of methods belonging to various scientific disciplines are at times exaggerated and, at other times, undermined. Exposing distinctness seems to be a legacy of the past, when it was believed that all specialist scientific research disciplines should display a separate subject and method (Kamiński, 1992; Piasek, 2006, p. 113). Characteristic of our times, on the other hand, is to blend genres and forms, use borrowings and connections – a trend also visible in methodology (e.g. triangulation, bricolage) (Denzin & Lincoln, 2009, pp. 40–44). As a result, an oppositional approach to the methodology of social studies and to the methodology of the humanities ceases to be so obvious, especially since the sciences belonging to each discipline are not internally uniform.

It is worth emphasising in the preliminary observations that a comprehensive conceptualisation of the methodology of scientific disciplines is a great
simplification, and only makes sense when referring to very general issues. As modern science is characterised by empirical cognition (meant to regulate metaphysical speculation, Amsterdamski, 1983, p. 67), attention is given to a ‘broader’ understanding of empiricism (i.e. transcending the norms of positive science) – a contribution by the methodology of the humanities. The next issue is related to the location of the cognising subject in the process of cognition. Both issues are also related to the question regarding the role of assumptions, theories or, to use a different language, previous knowledge or superstitions of the researcher in scientific cognition.

The main part of the article will begin with evoking the traditions of social sciences oriented towards a positive science model. Primary focus will be placed on the consequences of the method prevailing in this model for the specific reduction of the object of social sciences. Next, the author will provide a more precise characteristic of the scientific method of the humanities, as suggested by Wilhelm Dilthey. For though the scientific method of social sciences, which evolved from natural sciences, is generally known (its descriptions can be found in all textbooks on methodology and on research methods of particular disciplines), knowledge of Dilthey’s methodology is often limited to the statement that social sciences explain the world while the humanities understand it. Attention should be drawn to the twofold context of understanding due to its significance for the way of interpreting texts, treated as empirical material. For many pedagogues the declaration of ‘humanities research’ is grounded axiologically (i.e. is derived from a positive evaluation of the subjectivity of a human individual) and ontologically (assumptions on the essence of humanity), while the research method is considered secondary. A postulate to develop pedagogical methodology oriented towards the humanities has been formulated for years in source literature (Kubinowski & Nowak, 2006.). The main aim of the article is to solicit a broader methodological awareness among pedagogues. Janusz Gnitecki refers to this understanding as “a realisation of the research assumptions and their consequences for the structure of the research process” (Gnitecki, 2007, p. 286). The author would also include the realisation of the consequences of one’s choices for the ways of perceiving reality, and thus for the obtained results.

**Social Sciences as Positive Sciences**

Wilhelm Dilthey was the first to advocate for the treatment of the humanities as science (this topic is developed in further parts of the article), and he included
social sciences in them. However, if we consider sociology (for the purpose of this passage) to be a paradigmatic social science, one can easily notice that its major founders oriented this discipline more towards the model of positive, i.e. natural sciences, not the humanities. It is worth to mentioning the source of the name ‘positive sciences’, in order to mitigate the frequent negative evaluation of ‘positivism’ as a whole. According to August Comte, the positive phase is the third phase in the development of the human mind, following the teleological and metaphysical phases, when the mind “ceases to speculate on the unrevealed nature of objects (...) collects facts and is ready to surrender to them (...) tries to detect constant and general laws, according to which phenomena occur and succeed one another, and uses observation, experiment and calculus” (Kołakowski, 2003, p. 62). Comte perceived the value of scientific cognition in its utility and the collected scientific knowledge was to be used to improve living conditions. “If the formula of the law allows us to effectively predict and impact the phenomena included in its contents, we do not care about more precise descriptions in order to satisfy curiosity” (Kołakowski, 2003, p. 66). We should be able to use the results of empirical studies in a positive manner. This expectation is very close to the prescribed direction of pedagogical studies. In textbooks on research methods the necessity to realise practical objectives in pedagogical research is strongly emphasised (Pilch, 1995).

Throughout most of the 20th century sociologists conducting empirical studies, as well as representatives of other disciplines aspiring to scientific status, tried to adapt the object of their research to the requirements of the methods of natural sciences, deeming that “methods of acquiring valuable knowledge are essentially the same for all disciplines of experience, as are the main stages of processing experience through theoretical reflection” (Kołakowski, 2003, p.16). The scientific character of pedagogy in Poland after World War II was also built around the adaptation of the methodologies of more ‘scientifically mature’ disciplines, such as psychology and sociology, while marginalising the significance of analyses belonging to the realm of humanities. Let us recapitulate in short what operations are performed on the object of research so that it is pos-

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1 As part of his spiritual knowledge W. Dilthey highlighted studies on cultural systems and studies on social organisation. “The former describe forms of human activity – abilities related to creativity and expression (such as poetry, rhetoric, logic, art theory, worldview theory) while the latter “focus on human activity, stable human relationships, which allow individuals to form into social groups” (studies on state and law, ethics, pedagogy)” (Kuderowicz, 1987, p. 88). Apart from systematic sciences Dilthey also highlighted historical studies.
sible to employ the scientific method, which is based on objective observation, experiment (observation under controlled conditions) and measurement. The starting point is to reduce object complexity. This is done through choosing object features (important from a particular perspective) which constitute the object, and through determining the relationship between them. In technical terms this is referred to as variable selection and determination of their role in the study (in an optimal situation there is a tendency to build theoretical models, verified by empirical data). The variables need to be available for empirical identification, that is why those which are not directly observable (i.e. nearly all those which are important for pedagogical studies) have to be operationalised. Operationalisation of variables is usually understood in two ways: as a measurement and as an assumption of indicators which enable direct identification of variables and their value (Diekmann, 1995, p. 182). A reduction in complexity is usually followed by standardisation, understood as a unification of specific research situations (e.g. standardisation of acquiring data), which allows one to compare and count the studied objects, and this in turn facilitates statistical analysis (for more details see Rubacha, 2008, 2019).

One needs to remember that the object of the study, as part of the scientific method, belongs to a reality that is independent of and external to the researcher. That is why researchers can consider a class (a collection of students) in the same way a biologist would look at a colony of bacteria (Konarzewski, 1995, p.129). Even sensory experiences which initiate the cognition process are treated as an effect of something external, independent of human beings (Kudrowicz, 1987, p. 80). It is the external object that is the ‘originator’ of interest in it. This perspective allows one to frame the world as a set of facts existing independently of cognition, to frame it in accordance with the proper order of laws. This means that in empirical cognition based on experience, the experience of the cognising person is subject to far-reaching reduction. Collecting data cannot be ‘distorted’ by anything, i.e. it has to be free from bias, values, expectations, etc. People who learn the socio-cultural reality, which includes the pedagogical reality, are excluded from it, for belonging to it distorts the object of cognition.

Changes which broadly began taking place in the methodology if social sciences in the 1970’s consisted, among others, in including researchers of socio-cultural phenomena, including pedagogical phenomena, into the world which they study. It is an expression of a turn in social sciences from natural sciences towards the humanities.
The method of the humanities in the concept of Wilhelm Dilthey

The humanities are usually associated with the study of human thought, materialised in the products of culture (for more information see Kucner, 2006), whereas the social sciences, as mentioned earlier, are associated with empirical cognition, in which the source of data is experience, which is also the criterion of verifying the effects of cognition. Dilthey, who was the first researcher to concern himself with the scientific status of the humanities, undermining the rule of uniqueness of the scientific method, also tied all cognition to experience. However, he perceived it differently to positivist empiricists. He believed that it is dependent on human activity, on life, which he perceived as a collection of mental experiences that are connected and create a structure (Kuderowicz, 1987, p. 42). Thanks to this humans can not only experience the external world, i.e. nature, but also themselves. Human experiences are reflected in the constructs which they produce. Thus, one could say that constructs are a certain type of record of human experience which can be subject to reading or interpretation. It is important to remember that experiences are not a result of simple external determination. They are an expression of an active attitude of human beings towards the surrounding reality. This attitude is determined by and produces assessments of reality, making sense of its elements.

While natural science identifies the laws of nature and consequently leads to explaining its ‘activities’, facilitating its use according to human needs, the humanities, according to Dilthey, face a more important task. This task concerns a systematic reconstruction of a sense of life, reflection on its conditions and specificity (nowadays we can see that the exploitation of nature poses a threat to human existence, which clearly indicates a lost sense of human activity). Sense is recognised by understanding while Geisteswissenschaften – spiritual knowledge (described in Polish and English as the humanities) set out to increase human self-understanding and self-consciousness. Scientific understanding, as it were, is a second, higher degree of elementary understanding, which is an essential yet usually unnoticed ingredient of everyday life. As Dilthey remarks: “Understanding comes about, first of all, through the interests of practical life where persons rely on interchange and communication. They must make themselves understandable to each other. One person must know what the other wants.” (Dilthey, 2002, p. 228). A higher, scientific form of understanding is necessary with the increase of uncertainty, which results form an increasing distance between the expression of life and the understanding of that expression, as the construct which expresses experience from a given moment and
circumstances is interpreted at a different time and circumstances. The task of scientific understanding is also to detect ‘the order of life in the available data’, i.e. to recreate some form of regularity, generality.

It is worth noting that the humanities built by Dilthey at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries preserve the cognitive ambitions of natural sciences (Sojak, 2004, p. 201). Understanding was given a status which was analogous to that of the scientific method in natural science – it is meant to lead to a certain cognition\(^2\). This is noticed by Hans-Georg Gadamer, when he shows the analogy between the question put forward by Kant and that of Dilthey. The former inquired about the conditions of the possibilities of cognition, the latter about the possibilities of understanding (Gadamer, 1993). Expressions of life are the substance of understanding. “They appear in the worlds of the senses, but express something spiritual, which they make it possible for us to cognize. By manifestations of life I mean not only these expressions that intend something or are meant to mean something but also those that without such intent to express spirit nevertheless make it understandable.” (Dilthey, 2002, p. 226) Intentional and unintentional expressions assume the forms of various constructs and are an externalisation of individual experiences. Other people can understand them through imitative experience (Dilthey, 1987b, pp. 204 – 213). Thus we are dealing with a sequence: **lived experience – expression – re-experiencing**. It is worth realising that the imitation of experience is determined by a **common plane**, shared by the person revealing the experience through expression and the person interpreting it, who wants to understand it. It should be stressed that the framing of what is common determines the framing of the process of understanding.

In his initial creative period Dilthey devoted a lot of attention to descriptive psychology, juxtaposed with experimental psychology which reduced mental phenomena to simple elementary ingredients. He believed that descriptive psychology is the best plane for integrating spiritual sciences, and uses “written sources which relate personal experiences of prominent individuals such as memoirs, letters and confessions of the most intimate and authentic emotions” (Kuderowicz, 1987, p. 89). The philosophers of his time, Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert, already pointed out that the excessive focus of psychology carries with it a threat of reducing research in the sphere of humanities to the description of individual motives. They were also afraid of the dominance

\(^2\) R. Rorty noticed that after Descartes philosophy transformed from a reflection of wisdom into an endeavour directed at certainty (1994, p. 60).
of introspection or “empathizing”, the results of which are difficult to evaluate (Kuderowicz, 1987, p. 91). In later works Dilthey considered hermeneutics as a basis for the humanities, while on the other hand he ascribed greater significance to the idea of the objective spirit. He perceived it as “a union of experiences and bases characteristic of a certain period, manifesting itself both in the actions of individuals, and in social institutions and works of culture” (Kuderowicz, 1987, p. 57). Evoking the objective spirit, as opposed to exposing the significance of descriptive psychology, highlights what is a common achievement of a given culture at a given time. The “spirit” reflects that which is universal and recurrent, and in this sense objectivised. Interpreting the construct (materialised expression of experience) in this perspective also includes revealing its role in a given epoch, its cultural and social functions. Greater importance is given to the question about the relationship between what is common – general – and what is individual.

Thus, referring to the texts of Dilthey, we can frame understanding in a more subjective or a more objective manner. If we highlight the mental construction of human beings than both primal and imitative experience are primarily mental experiences in character. This exposes individuality, which can be identified with subjectivity. However, if we consider participation in the same culture and social life as the basis for what is common, life conditions which determine specific beliefs and behaviours move to centre stage. Individuality is the result of “choices” (usually unconscious ones) from among what is shared with others.

**Similarities and differences in empirical cognition, in the tradition of the humanities and social sciences**

Dilthey has a different understanding of experience from that which dominates in the positive sciences, however, it is based on living in the empirical world, thus it can be said that social sciences and the humanities are not differentiated by empiricism in studies or lack thereof, but by the position of the researching subject in the cognition process. It is either “narrowly formatted” through the subjugation of the researcher to the method or it basic for the entirety of the pro-

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3 The “Objective Spirit” is a term introduced by Hegel in order to describe the process of rationalisation of human life in history (Tatarkiewicz, 1988, pp. 214-215).

4 The author wishes to highlight the limited scope of the formulated conclusions, which refer only to the presented pattern of the method of social science and the method of the humanities.
cess. It is worth adding that Dilthey also underlined the significance of the cognising subject in the cognition of natural sciences. “The natural sciences supplement phenomena by adding thought. Although the properties of organisms and the principle of individuation of the organic world have up till now resisted conceptual comprehension by the natural sciences, nevertheless, the postulate of such comprehension will always remain alive.” (Dilthey, 2002, p.142). The underlined fragment evokes the rule of hermeneutics, that one cannot eliminate superstition, foreknowledge of the cognising subject. Moreover, these are prerequisites of cognition (Gadamer, 1993). In this context the completely neutral individual – i.e. one who knows and feels nothing – would not be able to conduct studies, for he or she could not differentiate the stimuli reaching him or her.

In social sciences, which belong to the model of positive science, experience is fundamentally limited to sensory experience, hence the necessity to indicate a means of sensory identification of the studied features of objects (using various tools, not just with the ‘naked eye’ or ear). The point is for the researcher who performs the same operations on the same types of objects to reach similar states of affairs, which – along with standardisation of the other elements of the research process – makes the results obtained by other people comparable. This method is the “carrier of objectivism” of cognition (Zamiara, 2007, p. 8). As a result the studied objects are adapted to the possibilities of the method, while objects which cannot meet that requirement remain outside the sphere of research interest; “…the method determined what could be studied in order to be scientific” (Ablewicz, 2003, p. 86). The research method in this ideal vision of science (Amsterdamski, 1983) is a set of unambiguously determined operations subject to specific normalisation. A researcher is expected to abide by these norms, for the assessment of the way in which they are followed constitutes the basis of criticism of scientific work.

The method of the humanities, as introduced by Dilthey, identifies the conditions which should be met in order for the understanding of expression to take place. Although in the following periods in history and cultural evolution there did emerge rules meant to facilitate the objectification of the process of understanding – primarily in philology, theology and historical studies – yet, their interpretation remained an art (Kunst), and not a reproduced or controlled

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5 These operations are described in Polish textbooks on methodology of social sciences (Nowak 1985), pedagogical studies (Pilch, 1993), methodology of studies on education (Rubacha, 2008), psychological studies (Brzeziński, 1980) etc. A disciple of a given discipline should gradually learn and master the successive steps which constitute a given method. He or she learns them primarily independently of the way in which a learned object is framed.
pattern. In this context we could say that the method of social studies, which is grounded in the premises of positivism, is normative, whereas the method of the humanities is not.

The special status of method in methodology based on premises of positivism is grounded, among other things, in a belief in a lack of assumption and a (fundamental) directness of cognition. This means that in optimal conditions the cognising subject has access to the object of cognition and can see it the way it is, because it exists independently of cognition. A further assumption is that collected scientific knowledge is formulated in experimental terms, thus constituting a neutral reflection of reality. The principle of a lack of assumptions has been subject to criticism from many perspectives (Siemek 1982; Motycka 1999; Motycka 2007; as well as from the perspective of hermeneutics, Gadamer, 1993) and today the dominant conviction is that of the assumption of knowledge, expressed, for instance, by the popularity of the concept of paradigm in science (Kuhn, 2001). In many contemporary publications by pedagogues, who conduct empirical studies, we learn of the assumed ontological and epistemological (seldom axiological) suppositions. This is the result of the popularity of qualitative studies in social sciences (and a stronger turn towards philosophy in the humanities). The modern qualitative methodological orientation in empirical studies has distinguished itself in opposition to the method of positivist research (Malewski, 1997). The inadequacies of the latter method for studies of the socio-cultural world were shown primarily through exposing its specificity (ontological suppositions). It was also highlighted that cognition, which does not want to deform it, requires different practice (epistemological and methodological suppositions). Philosophical positions – themselves reflected both in social studies and the humanities – are the source of the most general ontological and epistemological assumptions, which create the framework for objective discipline. Differences occur at a level of more detailed suppositions, derived from objective theories of particular disciplines.

The addition by Dilthey of internal experience to empirical experience did not equate the importance of types of experiences in both disciplines. In humanity studies the texts of more prominent individuals were considered to be more valuable expressions than texts which reflected what is common, for the “human spirit” is best objectified in works of “a great poet or explorer, a religious genius or real philosopher” (Dilthey, 1982, p. 294). Interest in what is common (i.e. repetitive) has been a feature of research in social sciences, despite the fact that this discipline saw to the creation of alternative patterns of conducting research, inspired by achievements in the humanities (including philosophy). For
example, the narrative interview technique makes use of developments in linguistics; phenomenography reconstructs empirical processes using the premises of phenomenology; the objective hermeneutics method uses the principles of hermeneutics (and structuralism) to reconstruct the structures of various empirical states of affairs; part of pedagogical research makes use of the achievements of literary biographies; ethnographic and cultural studies are also a source of inspiration.

To sum up the issue presented in this part of the article, it could be said that similarities between the methodologies of social sciences and humanities can be identified at a level of the most general suppositions, while dissimilarities increase at levels of greater detail. Thus we are dealing with the blurring of distinct boundaries between disciplines, which is not equivalent to the disappearance of differences or the loss of previously established norms of conducting research. The basic change consists in the fact that respecting norms and rules can no longer be treated as a platitude. Conscious adherence to them requires knowledge about the suppositions which justify them, and about other premises.

Conclusions

In conclusion the author wants to signal how these general considerations are connected with the practice of empirical studies in pedagogy. The lack of superordinate criteria, which we could use to evaluate coexisting research methods, makes choices difficult. An old rule, according to which a method can be evaluated solely in the context of its adequacy with regard to the object of study and the goal to be reached, can be of help. However, this critical potential of the rule disappears when we allow the existence of “ready” methods, the textbook description of which also indicates subjects which are the best “match” for this method (for example, the subject of a diagnostic survey are the opinions focused on a certain phenomenon). In numerous publications based on empirical studies the authors inform us that the aim of the studies is to answer the question or questions they put forward, which raises doubts regarding the aim itself. Researchers do not explain why it is worthwhile to obtain the answers they seek or how they can be used. Providing the formal aim does not add anything to the evaluation of the relationship between object and method.

Most subjects of pedagogical studies are theoretical in character, hence the necessity of their conceptualisation. This has various levels of generality, from suppositions which constitute the subject and means of its cognition, to its aspects which can be empirically identified. While many publications written by
pedagogues – especially those which relate qualitative studies – evoke ontological and epistemological assumptions, their relationship with a concrete object of study or a specific way of interpreting research material, is not clear. Typical research practice consists in administering a set of open questions to a small number of respondents, recording their responses and presenting fragments of these statements in the publications, as examples of issues foreseen in the research topic. The task of the evoked philosophical assumptions is to prove the ‘humanistic’ or ‘critical’ (if the suppositions were derived from critical theories) character of the research. This means that the value of the research results from the suppositions, not the results. Introducing the assumptions assumes a ritualistic character (on ritualization and more generally on methodological tolerance see Piekarski, 2010).

My observations are confirmed by the results of a systematic analysis of pedagogical research practice, carried out by Krzysztof Rubacha (2013). The author assumed several criteria of evaluating publications and applied them to 384 scientific papers written by pedagogues. According to his evaluation 38.9% of papers were based on qualitative analysis, 25.3% on quantitative analysis, whereas over one-third (35.8%) showed “no data analysis”. In the case of quantitative research the lack of data analysis was confirmed when the authors limited themselves to listing “absolute numbers or figures”. In the case of qualitative research this lack was asserted when “no operations on the text were performed but the researcher drew conclusions based on the quoted statements” (Rubacha, 2013, p. 73). I could add that asserting conclusions from statements is only a declaration, for they are in fact the result of the researchers prior knowledge. As in the case of positivist research, an external pattern is superimposed on the world of the respondents, not as a result of in-depth, thorough, methodical interpretation. Among the identified qualitative research Rubacha distinguishes analyses “which could broadly be described as ‘phenomenological’. These are mostly analyses of data collected from interviews, the scope of which explains whether that which can be understood through them is difficult to establish” (Rubacha, 2013, p. 74). Such texts are often the expression of a rejection of the “positivist paradigm”, deemed inadequate for learning the world created by people, and thus a rejection of a discredited traditional method of social sciences. However, this criticism, voiced at a level of philosophical assumptions, has no significance for the organisation of cognitively productive research practice. The value of pedagogical research should lie in the multitude of research perspectives, under the condition that we are aware of their limitations.
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