In defence of an argument against truthmaker maximalism

Jerzy Gołosz



The paper analyses the argument proposed by Milne (2005) against truthmaker maximalism and shows that the objections raised to this argument by de Sa and Zardini, and Rodriguez-Pereyra are misguided because the first one misuses the vagueness of some terms; and the second one is based on a fallacy of petitio principii (this is exactly the same type of objection as it was raised by Rodriguez-Pereyra against the Milne’s argument).


truthmakers; truthmaker maximalism; Milne; de Sa; Zardini;Rodriguez-Pereyra

Full Text:



Armour-Garb, B., and J. A. Woodbridge, 2010, “Truthmakers, paradox and plausibility”, Analysis, 70:11–23. DOI: 10.1093/analys/anp123

Armstrong, D., 2000, “Difficult cases in the theory of truthmaking”, The Monist, 83: 150–160. DOI: 10.5840/monist200083112

López de Sa, D., and E. Zardini, 2006, “Does this sentence have no truthmaker?”, Analysis, 66:154–57. DOI: 10.1093/analys/66.2.154

Milne, P., 2005, “Not every truth has a truthmaker”, Analysis, 65: 221–224. DOI: 10.1093/analys/65.3.221

Milne, P., 2013, “Not every truth has a truthmaker II” Analysis, 73: 473–481. DOI: analys/ant037

Priest, G., 1979, “The logic of paradox”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 8: 219–241. DOI: 10.1007/BF00258428

Rodriguez-Pereyra, G., 2006, “Truthmaker maximalism defended”, Analysis, 66: 260–264. DOI: 10.1093/analys/66.3.260

ISSN: 1425-3305 (print version)

ISSN: 2300-9802 (electronic version)

Partnerzy platformy czasopism