

For what we would have to do to decide whether something were true? We should have to inquire whether it were true that an idea and reality, perhaps, corresponded in the laid-down respect. And then we should be confronted by a question of the same kind and the game could begin again. So an attempt to explain truth as correspondence collapse. And every other attempt to define truth collapse too. For in a definition certain characteristics would have to be stated. And in application to any particular case the question would always arise whether it were true that the characteristics were present. So one goes round in a circle. [Frege 1968, p. 19]

It seems that the vicious circle always take place. But does it means that “true” definition of truth is impossible?

It is very instructive to trace further Frege’s course of reasoning. Firstly, he states the scope of application of the notion of truth or falsity — a sense of a sentence:

[...] when we call a sentence true we really mean its sense is. From which it follows that it is for the sense of a sentence that the question of truth arises in general. [Frege 1968, p. 19]

Then he introduces the notion of a thought dispensing with any strict definition. A thought might be the sense of a sentence, which does not imply that the sense of any sentence is a thought; a sentence just express some thought. Whether or not, to be true is a property of thoughts and not the things. Meanwhile, there are reasons to suppose that there is any opportunity to attribute some property to a thing without acknowledgement of the truth of the thought that present thing has present property is a case.

Is a thought an idea? Answer is negative and, as a consequence, we come to the conclusion that

[...] thoughts are neither things of the outer world nor ideas. [Frege 1968, p. 29]

Frege proposes to single out an area for thoughts: some particular third realm. Elements of this realm corresponding both ideas and things being neither perceived by the senses nor belonging to the contents of consciousness of some bearer.

Human beings are bearers of their ideas but not bearers of thoughts. In thinking we do not produce thoughts but apprehend them:

a particular mental capacity, the power of thought, most correspond to the apprehension of the thought. [Frege 1968, p. 35]

And what is of most importance, thoughts are tightly connected with truth. What I recognize as true is true quite independently of my thinking of those matters. As a consequence, truth would not come into world the other way than in the moment of its discovering. But it is precisely the way a thought act while being apprehended and taken to be true:

If, for example, I grasp the thought which we express by the theorem of Pythagoras, the consequence may be that I recognize it to be true. [Frege 1968, p. 38]

Thus, truth is now depends on thoughts, they determine its properties and it seems that the vicious circle is broken.

But this is not the end of a story. The matter of fact is that we study here our own interests concerning the course of Frege's reasoning. The crucial point for us appears to be the following passage:

Without wishing to give a definition, I call a thought something for which the question of truth arises. So I ascribe what is false to a thought just as much as what is true. [Frege 1968, p. 20]

Should we interpret it as an introduction of the thesis with the reservation "for a certain admissible meaning of the contention used" in Jaśkowski's style? That is, could Frege's words be paraphrased as "**For a certain admissible meaning of the contention used** a thought is something for which the question of truth arises and we ascribe what is false to a thought just as much as what is true"? On a superficial level of consideration it seems that we are entitled to do that. As a consequence, if we proceed in such a way then we should admit of the next rewriting of Frege's phrase

So I can say: the thought is the sense of a sentence without wishing to say as well that the sense of every sentence is a thought

as

if it is interpreted as (stated that) a thought is something for which the question of truth arises and we ascribe what is false to a thought just as much as what is true **then** the thought is the sense of a sentence without wishing to say as well that the sense of every sentence is a thought. [Frege 1968, p. 20]

Nevertheless, we need to make certain whether our discourse of interpretation would be inconsistent for the definition of the discursive systems of Jaśkowski's type intends mutual incoordination of pairs of particular contentions. But properly speaking this role is playing by the initial contentions

fixing a circle in reasoning, that is contentions of the type “in any definition of the truth indication of some characteristics is included” and “it is indispensable in any particular case to decide whether it is true that justifying characteristics are available”.

However, would it be true to consider Frege as a paraconsistent logician? The matter of fact is that a discursive logic from which point of view we analyzed Frege’s investigation of the problem of truth was completely unknown to him by virtue of the historical reasons. Hence, we are entitled to allege to him unconscious application of paraconsistent reasoning at the most and moreover, we ought to keep in mind that he is the one of the creators of modern logic which is by no means non-tolerant for contradictions.

Meanwhile, the recent investigations discovered the presence of paraconsistent structure within the depth of classical logics. As it was show by J.-Y. Béziau [Béziau 1999] it would be discovered in the fragment of monadic classical first-order logic with the only one variable. To that end it is enough to reformulate a negation in such a way that instead of “not- A ” statements just those which contained the negation of the kind “there is not- A ” would be considered. Béziau says:

In the same way that Mr. Jourdan of Moliere’s *Bourgeois gentilhomme* was making prose without knowing it, we can say that Mr. Frege and his successors were doing paraconsistent logic without knowing it. And if one argues that the founder of first-order logic is Frege or Peirce, one could argue therefore that Frege or Peirce is the real founder of the paraconsistent logic. Or even Aristotle, if one considers that monadic first-order logic with one variable is already contained within syllogistic. This kind of strange considerations are just to show that it is difficult to argue that the creators of paraconsistent logic were people who developed logics containing implicitly a paraconsistent negation. [Béziau 1999]

Concerning the conception of thought itself proposed by G. Frege for overcoming the circularity in the definition of truth it worth to denote that it was criticized on repeated occasions — small wonder if we take into account its importance for the developing of logic in XX century. In particular, L. Wittgenstein criticized her in connection with Fregean assertion sign, that is, judgment stroke (‘*Urteilstrich*’). Wittgenstein himself never spoke of judgement but only of thoughts while Frege, however, uses both words:

[...] I write the sign ‘ \vdash ’ before the name of the truth-value, so that in ‘ $\vdash 2^2 = 4$ ’ it is asserted that the square of 2 is 4. I make a distinction

between *judgement* and *thought*, and understand by *judgement* the acknowledgement of the truth of a *thought*. [Frege 1952, p. 156]

Frege argues that one ought to draw a distinction between the content of a proposition and its use (to assert it, suppose etc.) and this is the reason why he introduces the assertion sign in order to account suppositions. In this case a thought is identified with an asserted content, something which produces in us only the idea of a state of affairs. Thus, judgements are composed of two parts: the content and something which asserts either that the content is true or that it is false.

The main point of Wittgenstein's criticism is that there is any necessity to introduce such a division because, as Wittgenstein says, every proposition both shows how things stand and says that they do so stand. In order to make such an assertion one, as a matter of fact, would need a second proposition. As J. Griffin remarks, Wittgenstein

may be right that, when Frege splits propositions into content and assertion sign, he puts himself in a position where he has to say that the assertion in a proposition is something or other, however it should be expressed, about the content of the proposition. But the assertion is, clearly, nothing about the content; the assertion is already contained in the content, and this is why an assertion sign, Wittgenstein says, is logically altogether meaningless and is no more a part of a proposition than would be, say, the number we assigned to it. [Griffin 1964, p. 125]

By Griffin's opinion the distinction between the positions of Frege and Wittgenstein consists in that for Frege thought indicates a state of affairs, refers to it but says nothing about it (he considers thoughts as complex names) while Wittgenstein thinks that giving names a significant configuration produces something generically different from a name: a fact.

However, for the hermeneutic philosopher the most interesting is not a question of either Frege or Wittgenstein was right but rather a fruitfulness of conceptions and methods they used for resolving the task set. And it turns out that in this case the situation arises which is difficult to foresee comparing the positions of those thinkers.

Let us consider the well-known problem of the interrelationship between the language and the world in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. At 5.6 of *Tractatus* it is said: "The *limits of my language* mean the limits of my world" and then "Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits" (5.61). Giving comment on this Wittgenstein's pronouncement G. E. M. Anscombe writes:

The argument is: "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world; but all languages have one and the same logic, and its limits are



those of the world; therefore the limits of my world and of the world are one and the same; therefore the world is my world". [Anscombe 1959, p. 167]

Thus, when I am saying of the world of mine then I, in effect, am saying of the world in general.

Yet my language, as Anscombe argue, according to Wittgenstein means the language in general, some mirror of the world; it is invoked to manifest the all-comprehending and world-mirroring logic. Moreover, the world is a whole for in 1.2 it is said "The world splits up into facts" but it is only of a whole that we can say it splits up.

Since under such emphasis the language is a part of a world, a part of a whole, then the problem of understanding the mutual relations of world and language in *Tractatus* from the point of view of hermeneutics takes shape of the familiar circle structure since it concerns of the part-whole mutual relations. The language is understood through the world and the other way round which involves that one need to have in his disposal some pre-structure of understanding, some discourse which allows to interpret Wittgenstein's position and unlock the circle.

However, for Wittgenstein the language is a mirror of the world and there is any gap between them allowing to introduce some new discourse. For Wittgenstein the proposition indicates the fact and there is nothing more to say since the world consists of facts. But for Frege the proposition needs yet an assertion of its truth, the proposition have to be interweaved into world structure. And this function is accomplished by the thoughts which become the medium between the language and the world. The world of thoughts, this third world, which is revealed in the process of justification of the truth of propositions, allows one to comprehend the real world. In this case the circle is unlocked since the language is not alone the part of the world but it is immanent to the world of thoughts. The discourse of interpretation becomes more complicated and structured. It is not of an accident that Frege introduced the assertion sign in order to account for suppositions: following the course of our consideration the content of proposition becomes as it would be prefixed with the familiar reservation "for a certain admissible meaning of the contention used".

As to Wittgenstein then the arising for him an opportunity to unlock the emerging hermeneutic circle would be closely connected with the doctrine of "showing" which central theses in *Tractatus* look as follows: "Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must

have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it — logical form” (4.123), “Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them [. . .]. Propositions *show* the logical form of reality” (4.1213,d) “What *can* be shown, *cannot* be said” (4.1212).

As Anscombe writes

we must distinguish in the theory of the *Tractatus* between logical truths and the things that are ‘shewn’: logical truths [. . .] are the ‘tautologies’, and are ‘*sense-less*’ propositions (lacking TF poles), their negations being ‘contradictions’; attempts to say what is ‘shewn’ produce ‘*non-sensical*’ formations of words — i.e. sentence-like formations whose constituents turn out not to have any meaning in those forms of sentences. [Anscombe 1959, p. 163]

And further:

the connections between the tautologies, or sense-less propositions of logic, and the unsayable things that are ‘shewn’, is that the tautologies shew the ‘logic of the world’. But what they shew is not what they are an attempt to say: for Wittgenstein does not regard them as an attempt to say anything [. . .]. Not are they the only propositions which ‘shew’ anything, or which shew ‘the logic of the world’: on the contrary, every proposition at least does that. [Anscombe 1959, p. 163]

The ‘logic of the world’ is the ‘logic of facts’ and this logic the sentences cannot represent but only reproduce it.

Since logic precedes any experience and there are any logical facts then one can claim that logic would be thought of as something quite independent of the world either. But Wittgenstein counter such a claim:

It could be said: If there would be such a thing as logic, even if there were no world, then how can there be such a thing as logic, when there is a world? 5.5521)²

A transcendental character of logic by Wittgenstein’s opinion is manifested in that the propositions of logic show something that pervades everything sayable and therefore is itself unsayable.

This unsayable of which the most significant is the ‘logic of the world’ or the ‘logic of facts’ is capable in case of Wittgenstein plays the same role as the world of thoughts plays in case of Frege. For it might be said now

² Anscombe comments it as follows: “if logic comprised facts that the facts in the world had to be consistent with, then logic would no longer be logic, for it is logic that judges of the consistency of facts” [Anscombe 1959, p. 65].

that in the world-language problem the third part emerges — the world of unsayable. An unsayable is not beyond the world (because it pervades the world) but the world of unsayable does not coincide with the actual world since an attempt to say what it is the ‘logic of facts’ that is reproduced by sentences leads to stammering.

Now the language becomes “setting apart” the world being defined relatively the world of unsayable too. What does the phenomenon of such estranging means from the point of view of hermeneutics? Let us recall Frege’s statement

Without wishing to give a definition, I call a thought something for which the question of truth arises

which was used in order to introduce the notion of thought into discussion. By parity of reasoning Wittgenstein’s step should be characterized as

Without wishing to give a definition, I shall say that there is a something which can be just shown and which pervades everything sayable and therefore is itself unsayable

(properly speaking the lack of definition is precisely the consequence of unsayability). But the last might again be reformulated in Jaśkowski’s style as

For a certain admissible meaning of the contention used there is a something which can be just shown and which pervades everything sayable and therefore is itself unsayable.

And a characteristics of the connection between tautologies and unsayable might be respectively rewritten as

if it is interpreted as (stated that) there is a something which can be just shown and which pervades everything sayable and therefore is itself unsayable **then** the connections between the tautologies, or sense-less propositions of logic, and the unsayable things that are ‘shown’, is that the tautologies show the ‘logic of the world’ .

The further course of reasoning as in Frege’s case is obvious: one need to check the discourse of interpretation for the presence of inconsistencies according to the definition of Jaśkowski’s type discursive systems because the definition intends mutual incoordination of pairs of particular contentions. But in given case we deal with the “classical” hermeneutical part-whole contradiction: the world is determined by means of the language which is the part of the world, while the language is determined by the world comprising everything including the language.

It is interesting that Wittgenstein's estranging the language from the world above becomes more evident if we take into account the one more opportunity: an opportunity of changing logic. All logical devices combine according to Wittgenstein's (5.511) into an infinitely fine network, forming the 'great mirror' whose logical character makes it reflect the world and makes its individual sentences say that such-and-such is the case. But what would be happened if we shall use non-classical tautologies, i.e. change logical devices, logical network of the language? Concerning such an opportunity E. D. Smirnova writes:

There are possible, in principle, other different nets determining another ways of world image constituting. Possibly, the acceptance of another methods of the analysing of the language and logical structures determines another "net" and by that another ways of the world constituting. We obtain not single but different languages idealised with different language framework and it involves ontologies (commitments) connected with them. The knot in this case becomes an issue of the presuppositions of the acceptance of either language framework. [Smirnova 1996, p. 297]

Since an acceptance of other net immediately involves the acceptance of different logic which tautologies differs from classical ones considered by Wittgenstein, then in the world based on the other logic the connection between tautologies and unsayable which is "shown" becomes different. Tautologies describe the "logic of the world", hence an acceptance of other tautologies immediately forces the acceptance of another "logics of the world". The first opportunity concerning this choice consists in that unsayable pervading the world becomes different too. Even if it will stay the same and just the "logical" way of reference to it (the second opportunity) will change then such a variability of referentiality would be able somehow specify or "shed the light" on unsayable. The latter is completely impossible in case of the acceptance of the postulate of the exclusiveness of classical logic.

From a philosophical point of view the transition to the discussion of the ontological issues and presuppositions of which tell us Smirnova means a transition from metaphysical picture of the world, immanent to Wittgenstein, to the ontological issues and to the ontologisations of Wittgenstein-metaphysician. However, such an ontologisation just makes more clearer that Wittgenstein's introduction of unsayable ("shown" things) actually promotes to unlock the hermeneutical circle of the problem of world-language mutual relations leading to specification and structuring of the discourse of interpretation.



Finally, addressing to the fourth point of biblical hermeneutics considered at the beginning of the exposition and treating it as common hermeneutical statement one can (reposing on what was said above) rewrite it by adding the following new statements:

There would not be any contradictions in interpretation, but if two fragments contradict one another, then the third fragment must be found which reconciles them both. If such a fragment could not be found then one would pass to the (discussive) discourse of interpretation of Jaśkowski's type and admit an opportunity of appreciation of mutually contradicting statements preceding every thesis by the reservation "For a certain admissible meaning of the contention used". In further considerations instead of "if ... then ..." exclusively "if it is possible that ... then ..." or "if it is interpreted as (stated that) ... then ..." (discussive implication) and instead of "...and ..." exclusively "it is possible that ...and ..." or "it is interpreted as (stated that) ...and ..." would be used.

References

- [Anscombe 1959] G. E. M. Anscombe, *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, Hutchinson University Library, London, 1959.
- [Béziau 1999] J.-Y. Béziau, "S5 is a paraconsistent logic and so is classical first-order logic" (to appear in *Logical Journal of the IGPL*).
- [da Costa and Doria 1995] N. C. A. da Costa, F. A. Doria "On Jaśkowski's discussive logics", *Studia Logica* vol. 54, No 1, 1995, pp. 33–60.
- [Føllesdal 1981] D. Føllesdal, "Understanding and rationality", in *Meaning and Understanding*, eds. H. Parret and J. Bouveresse, Berlin – N.Y., 1981, pp. 154–168.
- [Frege 1952] G. Frege, "Begriffsschrift". Repr. in: *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, eds. P. Geach and M. Black, Oxford, 1952.
- [Frege 1966] G. Frege, "Der Gedanke: eine logische Untersuchung", in *Logische Untersuchungen*. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht in Gottingen, 1966, pp. 30–53.
- [Frege 1968] G. Frege, "The Thought: a Logical Inquiry", in *Philosophical Logic*, P. F. Strawson (ed.). Oxford University Press 1967.
- [Griffin 1964] J. Griffin, *Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964.
- [Hintikka 1997] J. Hintikka, "Contemporary philosophy and the problem of truth", in *Selected Papers*, Vol. 2. *Lingua Universalis* vs. *Calculus Ratiocinator: An Ultimate Presupposition of Twentieth-Century Philosophy*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht – Boston – London, 1997, pp. 1–19.



- [Jaśkowski 1948] S. Jaśkowski, “Rachunek zdań dla systemów dedukcyjnych sprzecznych” *Studia Soc. Sci. Torunensis, Sectio A*, Vol. I, No. 5, 1948. (English translation in: *Studia Logica*, XXIV (1969), pp. 143–157.)
- [Shulga 1985] E.N. Shulga, “A problem of ‘hermeneutic circle’ and dialectics of understanding” (in Russian), in *Hermeneutics: History and the Present*, I.S. Narsky (ed.), Moscow, 1985, pp. 143–161.
- [Smirnova 1996] E.D. Smirnova, *Logic and Philosophy* (in Russian), ROSPEN, Moscow, 1996.
- [Sperber 1982] D. Sperber, “Apparently irrational beliefs”, in *Rationality and Relativism*, 1982.
- [Urchs 1995] M. Urchs, “Discursive logic. Towards a logic of rational discourse”, *Studia Logica*, vol. 54, No 2, 1995, pp. 231–249.
- [Wittgenstein 1933] L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, German text with English trans. by C.K. Ogden, second edition, London, 1933.
- [Zaiss 1993] J. Zaiss, “Taking Frege’s name in vain”, *Erkenntnis*, Vol. 39, No. 2, 1993, pp. 167–189.

HELEN N. SHULGA
Department of Evolutionary Epistemology
Institute of Philosophy RAS
Volkhonka 14
Moscow 119842, Russia
vasyukov@logic.ru