ABSTRACT

After the 2016 Brexit referendum and the US presidential elections, the concept of post-truth has become influential within both the media and academic discourse. However, this discussion remained rather theoretical, with relatively few empirical studies applying the concept. This article aims to broaden the empirical scope of the post-truth concept by introducing it in the Hungarian context. Following Lewandowsky, Ecker and Cook’s (2017a) argument post-truth will be approached as an alternative epistemology. After this, the empirical analysis captures how this alternative epistemology has gained a dominant position within the Hungarian society through direct governmental support. The case study reveals that the primary aim of post-truth as a conscious political strategy is to preserve the division between social epistemologies, instead of creating an exclusive one. Thus, post-truth politics cannot only effectively support anti-establishment initiatives but should also preserve and strengthen already-existing power structures.

Key words
post-truth, Hungary, media, politics

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After the Brexit referendum and the US presidential election, the concept of post-truth was quickly popularized by the media and later it started to gain influence within the academic discourse as well. At the same time, it is difficult to find a single article on post-truth that does not construct its arguments around Brexit or President Trump. This is not to say that the study of Brexit or the Trump phenomenon are not essential to understand the theoretical pillars of post-truth. But the fact that our current knowledge of post-truth is constructed mostly from two cases leads to the emergence of a tautological, self-referencing circle in which a limited number of empirical studies diminishes the prospect of theoretical progress. This article aims to broaden the pool of empirical research by introducing post-truth into a Hungarian context. In contrast to Brexit or the election of Donald Trump, rightly seen as anti-establishment insurgencies, Hungary represents a case study in which post-truth emerged more centrally (as a top-down approach) through direct governmental support.

Building on McIntyre’s (2018, p. 6) insight, post-truth will be conceptualized as an irreducibly normative concept. Simultaneously, the text takes up Lewandowsky, Ecker and Cook’s (2017a) suggestion to treat post-truth as an alternative epistemology – understood as a theory that deals with the conception, nature, source and scope of knowledge (Moser, 2010; Rescher, 2003). With these theoretical pillars, the author moves to the empirical level and makes use of Hungary as a case study. Introducing post-truth into a Hungarian context will reveal how it can occupy the position of a dominant or central epistemology within society through governmental support. To capture this phenomenon, the author proposes that any social epistemology is dependent – although not solely – on the media ecology that articulates and rearticulates this epistemology. In line with this, the analysis of the media landscape can reveal the existence of competing epistemologies within society. Keeping in mind this link, the author develops the Hungarian case study in three stages. First, the so-called central field of force as a major political concept of the governing FIDESZ party is briefly discussed and this concept is adopted to describe the state of the Hungarian media. Second, the text highlights how this has led to the emergence of an alternative epistemology within the Hungarian society. Finally, post-truth is approached as a conscious political strategy derived from this alternative epistemology, with emphasis on the fact that the central aim of such a strategy should be to preserve the division between social epistemologies, instead of creating an exclusive one.
1. The post-truth society

Improving our empirical understanding of post-truth is a difficult but necessary task. Since most of the studies on post-truth focus on the American or British context, there is a danger that as a concept it loses its meaning outside of these societies. Therefore, the first task is to provide certain clarifications in order to know what we are looking for in an empirical analysis. Most importantly, a minimum agreement must be made on the interpretation of post-truth.

The Oxford Dictionary defined post-truth as an adjective “relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief” (Lexico, 2017). Thus, the definition assumes an ongoing state of affairs in which pristine truth can be found in objective facts that are primarily responsible for shaping public opinion. But as Steve Fuller (2017) warns us, truth as a concept is itself essentially contested: before asking whether something is true or false, we first have to decide what these concepts mean (p. 13).

It is important to keep in mind that it was not the academia but rather the media that popularized the concept of post-truth (see, for example, Davies, 2016; D’Ancona, 2017; Marcus, 2016). A wide consensus emerged in which post-truth has become a label for almost every event that can be interpreted as an anomaly from what is normally expected. These articles usually link post-truth to alternative facts, alternative reality, social instability, diminishing social trust and political chaos. This points to an important characteristic of post-truth that the concept is irreducibly normative (McIntyre, 2018, p. 6). As McIntyre (2018) frames it, “it is an expression of concern by those who care about the concept of truth and feel that it is under attack” (p. 6). It is difficult to debate the normative burden of post-truth, but McIntyre arrives at a problematic dichotomy between truth and post-truth. This is a trap found in almost every article, namely, that to describe it, something must be said about truth as well.

Focusing on this problem leads us to a longstanding positivist–post-positivist debate which has re-emerged again thanks to certain positivist critiques putting the blame for post-positivist relativization on the post-truth phenomenon. McIntyre himself argues that post-truth “has roots in academic debates over the impossibility of objective truth that have been used to attack the authority of science” (2018, p. 14). Others blame poststructuralism and/or postmodernism for the current situation of undermining the notion of truth within society (Pluckrose, quoted by Crilley & Chatterje-Doody, 2018). In contrast to this,
Crilley and Chatterje-Doody call for more post-structuralism to reveal how our social power structures and dominant discourses have led to the emergence of the post-truth era (2018, p. 4). According to Crilley, post-truth is not an age in which the focus of politics shifts from reason to emotions but an academic discovery of positivist scholars who realize that emotions matter (2018, p. 420). For Crilley, there is nothing new in post-truth and he proposes to turn our attention towards societal ills (like racism or xenophobia), gender theories and cultural values to understand its essence more deeply (2018, p. 423). Yet the task here is not to decide whether post-truth represents political novelty or a repackaging of old knowledge. The fact that post-truth is actively used in public discourse for descriptive purposes makes it part of our social reality. The problem is to clarify what it is that the public discourse wants to describe by this label.

Lewandowsky, Ecker and Cook (2017a, p. 360) argue that post-truth represents a societal change and, therefore, it cannot be understood on the individual level. Instead, they suggest turning the analysis towards the collective. In this way, they identify six social “mega-trends”: the decline of social capital, growing inequality, increasing political polarization, declining trust in science, political asymmetric credulity, and the evolution of the media landscape (Lewandowsky et al., 2017a, pp. 357–360). Their conclusion is that post-truth is an “alternative epistemology that does not conform to conventional standards of evidentiary support” (Lewandowsky et al., 2017a, p. 356). While the categorization of social mega-trends might seem a bit arbitrary – and indeed the authors admit this problem in their second article (see Lewandowsky, Cook & Ecker, 2017b) – it might be even more problematic to delineate “conventional standards of evidentiary support”. However, the central insight can reveal something important concerning the notion of post-truth, namely that it establishes a new epistemic space (Lewandowsky et al., 2017b, p. 420). Thus, post-truth signifies a qualitative societal difference, the emergence of a new epistemic space. This is a space where although social trust is destabilized, at the same time this does not lead to the establishment of a coherent model of reality (Lewandowsky et al., 2017a, pp. 360–361). To keep the focus of the discussion and avoid confusion, epistemology is broadly defined here as the theory of knowledge that deals with the conception, nature, source and scope of knowledge (Moser, 2010; Rescher, 2003). Building on this approach, the alternative epistemology of post-truth means that knowledge has a different conception, nature, source and scope within post-truth than outside of it.

This alternative epistemology within society is exactly what the public discourse aims to describe by the notion of post-truth. Approaching it from a social
perspective helps to overcome the truth–post-truth dichotomy as well. The question is not about the meaning behind these concepts, thus the focus can be turned away from the positivist–post-positivist debate. Nor is the question about the exact social mega-trends behind them. There are certainly technological, political and social processes in the background, but their analysis in this chapter would lead us again to fundamentally contested concepts. In other words, the argument is not that they should be completely disregarded, but they are not essential to reach a minimal agreement regarding the concept of post-truth.

A minimal agreement should be built on an understanding of post-truth as irreducibly normative (as proposed by Mcintyre) and an alternative epistemology (as proposed by Lewandowsky et al.) at the same time. The latter pillar also means that there are needs for a different epistemology within society as well. Thus, combining these insights leads to the conclusion that post-truth as a normative concept and an alternative epistemology must be articulated from this different position. It might be tempting to call this epistemology truth, but this would lead us back to a problematic definition on this concept’s meaning. Moreover, the truth/post-truth dichotomy would narrow down our conception of society as a binary space. However, it is also possible that there are many more parallel competing and mixing epistemologies present at the same time. But certainly, post-truth necessitates at least two epistemologies within society. If any of these disappeared, post-truth as a concept could not be interpreted anymore.

2. Post-truth in Hungary

The second section focuses on the empirical level and introduces post-truth within the Hungarian context. In other words, it needs to be proven empirically that there are at least two competing epistemologies within Hungarian society: one that can be labelled normatively as an alternative – post-truth – epistemology and one, which provides ground for its articulation outside of it.

To capture this phenomenon, the author proposes that any social epistemology is dependent – although not solely – on the media ecology that articulates and rearticulates this epistemology. In line with this, an analysis of the media landscape can reveal the existence of competing epistemologies within society. Keeping in mind this link, the Hungarian case study is developed in this paper in two stages. First, the text briefly discusses the so-called central field of force as a major political concept of the governing FIDESZ party and utilizes this concept to describe the state of the Hungarian media. Second, it highlights how
this situation has led to the emergence of an alternative epistemology within Hungarian society. Finally, it analyzes post-truth as a conscious political strategy aimed at preserving the division between social epistemologies instead of creating an exclusive one.

3. The central field of force and Hungarian media ecology

After 2010, the Hungarian media went through a structural transformation process that can be described as a reflection of the central field of force concept within the media ecology. The central field of force as a political concept describes a situation in which the ruling party can conserve its political power by holding middle ground and building on the fragmentation of opposition parties on either side (Juhász, László & Zgut, 2015, p. 6). The aim of this chapter is not to decide whether or not the central field of force as a political concept can precisely describe the political situation in Hungary. Instead, it treats the concept as a useful point of departure to understand the transformation of the Hungarian media landscape which, in turn, offers an insight into the social epistemologies that had existed and the post-truth epistemologies that have ensued.

The central field of force is not an ideology or a set of values but rather an effective power technique. In the central party system, only one political actor has a real chance to win elections, leading to the systemic dominance of this actor (Tóth & Török, 2014, p. 517). The aim of the strongest party is to build on a stable – median voter – foundation and keeps the rest of the political space fragmented (Tóth & Török, 2014, p. 518) The concept had already appeared in Hungarian politics when the now governing FIDESZ party was still in the opposition. In 2009, its leader Viktor Orbán argued that the dual political system (with two major parties) had started to disappear, leading to the emergence of a central political field of force (Orbán, 2009). In this system the strongest party is able to define and articulate a specific interpretation of the national interest without the need to permanently debate its content with other parties (Orbán, 2009). The central field of force in a Hungarian context means that the governing FIDESZ party has opposition from the right and from the left at the same time, including a relatively strong radical right-wing party (Jobbik) and several smaller parties on the left (Juhász et al., 2015, p. 6). In practice, the ideological differences between the leftist and the rightist oppositions are so visible that they are unable to reconcile and establish a common platform (Tóth & Török, 2014, p. 518). Thus, the opposition might have a cumulative majority within the society.
but will be paralyzed due to internal divisions. In other words, the ruling party (or the central force) is able to preserve its power in the long run.

Between 2006 and 2010 the governing Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and its coalition partner the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) faced various governmental crises, several corruption scandals, a permanent crisis of confidence and an emerging global economic crisis. Capitalizing on the situation successfully, FIDESZ was able to reach a two-thirds majority during the 2010 parliamentary elections, and with such concentrated power in hands, the government started to reshape several aspects of public life. Most importantly, a new constitution (Magyarország Alaptörvénye, or the Fundamental Law of Hungary) was adopted, structural changes were introduced into the voting system, and several checks and balances were removed from the political system (see e.g. Bozóki, 2011; FIDH, 2016; Policy Solutions, 2017).

Similarly, the transformation of the Hungarian media landscape started in 2010. Szczerle and Wessenauer (2017, pp. 21–22) argue that this transformation had three major pillars: the new legal architecture – including the establishment of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority and the Media Council – to effectively influence key decisions within the sector, financial legislation to put pressure on non-governmental media, and the facade of media pluralism in which pro-government media is spread across centrally-controlled channels and publications. Additionally, several financial incentives (most importantly massive state-financed advertisement campaigns) were established to support government-controlled media, which led to a complete distortion of the market (Mérték Médiaelemző Műhely, 2017).

Because of these developments, by the end of 2016 the pro-government media was maintained by 11 media companies. As Bátorfy (2017) summarizes, these included the largest online news site (Origo), the second largest commercial television station (TV2), 12 daily regional newspapers, all public media, and the sole state-owned Hungarian news agency (MTI) (p. 7). In the meantime, several independent or opposition media sources collapsed (most importantly Vs.hu and Népszabadság). After FIDESZ secured another two-thirds majority in the 2018 elections, the situation deteriorated further, most notably because Lajos Simicska – a previously pro-government oligarch who became one of the main opponents of FIDESZ in 2015 – has closed down or sold his extensive media interests (including the daily newspaper Magyar Nemzet, the weekly Heti Válasz, and the television network Hír TV). At the same time, the work of opposition media is restricted by administrative measures, such as selective access of journalists to the parliament building (Mérték Médiaelemző Műhely, 2017).
Governmental pressure affected not only “leftist” media, but also conservative journals (e.g. *Heti Válasz*) or Jobbik-related right-wing sources (e.g. N1TV) that were more closely related to Simicska.

On November 28, 2018 the separate pro-governmental media interests were pulled together into a giant media empire under the Central European Press and Media Foundation. The Foundation unifies different titles and rationalizes the previously fragmented governmental media channels that were owned by various pro-government businessmen before (Kovács, 2018). Once the integration process is complete, the Central European Press and Media Foundation will hold 200 media outlets in one hand (Kovács, 2018).

It is difficult to measure how large the predominance is of the pro-government media within Hungarian society. According to Bucsky (2018), approximately one-third of media consumption can be linked to pro-government sources. More importantly, the share of pro-government sources is over 50% within the media that deals with public affairs. The largest concentration was established within print media, in which at least 62% of newspapers sold are linked to pro-government media; in contrast, the greatest media plurality is on the internet, where governmental control is only around 20% (Bucsky, 2018). A similar conclusion was made by Bátorfy (2017) who adds that 65% of daily newspapers and 100% of regional newspapers are linked to the government. This ratio is around 62% within radio channels and approximately 60% in the media overall (Bátorfy, 2017). Ultimately, all of these figures are based on varying estimates. However, they point to a situation where the strongest voice is the government’s narrative, around which fragments of relatively independent media exist, thus reflecting the *central field of force concept* within the media ecology.

4. *Post-truth epistemology in Hungary*

The alternative epistemology of post-truth in Hungary is manifested through the governmental media. This has been established with the help of several tools, including the thematization of public life, conscious misinformation, character attacks, evocation of panic and general fear in order to destabilize social trust as well as to marginalize different non-governmental epistemologies.

Although pro-government media sources maintain separate editorial staff, reports around the most sensitive political topics are prepared within the advisory circles of the government, leading to a strongly centralized and well-synchronized system (Rényi, 2017). Importantly, the system is able to frame
the public discourse. The most visible attempt was the Hungarian anti-migration discourse in 2015. The government constructed the discourse as a civilizational battle for the survival of Christianity, in which Hungary protects Europe (see e.g. Orbán, 2015; Orbán, 2016). In the meantime, the government started to transform the anti-migration discourse into an anti-George Soros one. According to the governmental narrative, migrants and refugees with the help of George Soros aim to destroy Hungarian/European civilization, culture and identity, while the government is constructed as the last bastion of Europe (see e.g. Magyar Idők, 2017; Orbán, 2017a). The primary target of this discursive practice were civil organizations that tried to provide support for incoming migrants and refugees. Later the discursive scope was extended, with NGOs, liberals, the Central European University (funded by George Soros in 1991) as well as the whole opposition being portrayed as Soros agents (see, for example, FIDESZ, 2018). As the prime minister stated, “there is an important element in public life in Hungary which is not transparent and not open – and that is the Soros network, with its mafia-style operation and its agent-like organizations” (Orbán, 2017b). Both the anti-migration and the anti-Soros discourses aimed to describe an (imagined) existential threat for the Hungarian state and Hungarian society. They did not only aim to frame certain topics but to evoke panic, a perception of instability and general fear within society.

The thematization of the pro-government media was so successful that it could discursively entrap alternative voices. This is well captured by Eszter Katus through a micro-discourse analysis (see Katus, 2018). Katus analyses how Soros’ official statement concerning the accusations resonates in the Hungarian media (both on pro-government and non-governmental platforms), highlighting the differences between these media sources. While in pro-government outlets Soros’ official statement was framed as a lie or an attempt to interfere in Hungarian politics, Katus (2018) highlights that an important segment of opposition media was discursively entrapped in the process, because these media sources introduced the government’s framing in their reports while the pro-government media did not introduce non-governmental framing in the reverse (p. 12). Thus, the government thematized Hungarian public discourse. What Katus introduces on a specific case was the main pillar of the pro-government media strategy throughout the whole “migration” and “Soros” discourses. In general, opposition media sources harshly criticized several governmental decisions, but they were unable to resist the major framing of the events (Bernáth & Messing, 2015).

At the same time, the thematization of Hungarian public discourse is only one tool of the pro-government media. This is further strengthened by the intentional
spreading of misinformation. Misinformation includes the spreading of wholly false stories, while in other cases it operates through character attacks (Centre for International Relations, 2017, pp. 11–15; Political Capital – Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2017, pp. 16–18; Rényi, 2018; Szicherle & Wessenauer, 2017, p. 3). The falsification of politically sensitive stories has become a general practice in several pro-government channels. This can work in various forms, including the falsification of interviews, images, videos, the spread of completely untrue stories or the spread of satirical stories as real events (see e.g. Herczeg, 2018; Rényi, 2018; Sajó, 2018). According to Hungarian state television employees, the network consciously uses negative stories and incorrect reports about refugees and migrants, linking them to crime and terrorism (Noland & Walker, 2018).

In addition, pro-government media also utilizes synchronized, comprehensive and targeted character attacks that operate with the tools introduced above, including false or falsified stories (see e.g. Gergely, 2016; Gergely & Nagy, 2016; Rényi, 2018). To further disempower and discursively entrap opposition media sources, pro-government media channels as well as leading politicians (including the prime minister) consciously use expressions and labels like fake news or propaganda, thus further strengthening the division between social epistemologies. (see e.g. Oláh, 2018; Origo, 2018; Pesti Srácok, 2018)

The pro-government media also channels Russian disinformation into public life. The Corruption Research Center (CRC) analyzed more than one million online articles in Hungary between 2010 and 2017 and compared them to the largest Russian propaganda site (hidfo.ru). The results highlighted that the framing and the main messages of the pro-government media show close similarity with the Russian propaganda site, thus effectively helping to spread Russian disinformation in several cases (Corruption Research Center 2018). As a result of all these attempts, Hungary represents a case in which misinformation is centrally and intentionally spread through governmental channels.

The transformation of the Hungarian media landscape can be described as the establishment of a central field of force within the media. In this process a coherent, monolithic block of pro-government media emerged after 2010 and became the most influential source of information within Hungarian society. Its aim is not to silence all opposing voices but rather to maintain only the vestiges of a weak independent media, disempowered from reaching beyond a dwindling constituency. This process has two major consequences: first, it functions as an effective tool of power to maintain the pro-government narrative; second, bearing greater relevance to the theoretical discussion, it creates space for the emergence of parallel, competing epistemologies within Hungarian society.
This central field of force in the media represents an alternative epistemology in society, thus creating the very possibility of post-truth. More importantly, for 2018 (or probably already for 2016) this alternative epistemology could occupy a dominant position. In the meantime, a parallel social epistemology is also preserved – although in a limited capacity – by the fragments of a relatively independent media.

5. Post-truth as a political strategy

Hungary offers a special case study because it highlights how the alternative epistemology of post-truth can gain general dominance within society. In this sense, it fundamentally differs from the Brexit campaign or from the election of Donald Trump, since in both cases post-truth – as an alternative epistemology – came from outside of the established political structures. To put it differently, in both cases post-truth was originally a bottom-up initiative in which the alternative epistemology aimed to gain a central political position.

In contrast with this, the Hungarian case represents a more centralized (top-down) approach. In this context, the establishment of the alternative epistemology was facilitated by an actor in a central political position, since the Hungarian FIDESZ party won the elections in 2010, while the transformation of the Hungarian media landscape and the emergence of competing epistemologies started only later. As such, post-truth politics can not only be effective in supporting anti-establishment initiatives but also to preserve and strengthen power structures already existing. This is well proven by the process of how the Hungarian government centrally reorganized the media, thus providing room for the emergence of competing epistemologies within society.

As stated above, post-truth necessitates at least two epistemologies within society and if any of these would disappear, post-truth as a concept could not be interpreted anymore. This criterion was put into practice through the introduced central field of force concept within the Hungarian media. The creation of the Hungarian pro-government media aimed to establish an alternative epistemology within society. As the analysis above demonstrated, this process was from the beginning centrally organized and successful, since the government’s narrative became the most influential one.

On the other hand, the possibility of post-truth can only be maintained through the existence of competing epistemologies. In other words, post-truth can be dominant but not exclusive in the sense that it necessitates at least two
competing epistemologies. Thus, the goal of post-truth politics is not to create unity but to conserve social divisions in which the alternative epistemology of post-truth is generally dominant. Therefore, the Hungarian government does not aim to completely destroy every fragment of the opposition media. Keeping them alive – but fundamentally disempowered – is a necessary and existential condition for post-truth politics. Post-truth as an irreducibly normative concept is articulated from this disempowered and fragmented epistemology which is the very condition of post-truth at the same time.

Concluding remarks

The aim of this article was to turn attention away from Brexit and Trump when conceptualizing the notion of post-truth, approached here as an irreducibly normative concept and an alternative epistemology that necessitates the existence of at least two competing epistemologies within a society to maintain its very possibility. To capture this empirically in a Hungarian case study, the central field of force was applied in the article as a major political concept of the governing FIDESZ party in order to describe the Hungarian media landscape and demonstrate the existence of competing epistemologies in the society. Hungary represents a special case, since the alternative epistemology of post-truth was established centrally through the pro-government media, and has therefore successfully gained a dominant position.

Analyzing the Hungarian situation also revealed that post-truth as a political strategy does not aim to become a sole social epistemology, but rather to preserve the division between social epistemologies in order to maintain the very possibility of post-truth politics. This is again well demonstrated by FIDESZ’s central field of force concept, the main aim of which is not to completely destroy opposition (and media) but to keep it fragmented and disempowered. Thus, it preserves the dominant position of the alternative epistemology but maintains the possibility of competing epistemologies, (i.e. the condition of post-truth) at the same time.

REFERENCES


