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SULTAN MURAD IV’S POLISH CAMPAIGN (1634)

Abstract
The present study depicts the developments which took place at the Polish-Ottoman frontier and in the Ottoman imperial centre between 1633 and 1634, when a full-scale war between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire was imminent. Even though the major episodes of the conflict have been highlighted from the Polish perspective several times before, it is hard to say the same regarding the Ottoman vantage point. Therefore, this paper tries to make use of major European embassy reports from the Ottoman capital, with cross-references to the Ottoman archival documentation of the period. In this way the paper aims to expound the escalation and resolution of the conflict from the Ottoman point of view and seeks to fill the gap left by the already-established Polish stances. It will also serve the purpose of attracting attention both to the Polish diplomatic presence in the Ottoman capital and to the Ottoman diplomatic activity with regard to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the years specified.

Keywords: diplomatic history, Sultan Murad IV, Tatars, Aleksander Trzebiński, Polish-Ottoman relations

I
INTRODUCTION
The political stage of Europe during the first half of the seventeenth century was marked by a general atmosphere of conflicts all over the continent. Between 1618 and 1648, the Habsburg Empire was enmeshed in the Thirty Years War, while the Muscovite Kingdom and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were waging a war of their own between 1632 and 1634 (the war over Smolensk). During this time frame, the Ottoman Empire’s relations with Eastern Europe were also tense: a conspicuous Cossack threat to the Ottoman Black Sea shores was coupled with the Tatar threat to both the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Muscovite State, a conflict which loomed
large over the Black Sea. On more than one occasion Cossack and Tatar raids brought the Ottoman Empire to grips with the Commonwealth and Muscovy. One such episode – where the Polish Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire came to the brink of a full-scale war – took place in 1634.¹

The literature regarding the Polish-Ottoman conflict of 1633 (and 1634) has so far been limited to mainly Polish studies. Leszek Podhorodecki’s studies seem to be the standard works,² whereas Łukasz Pabich³ and Arkadiusz Bożejewicz⁴ also made new contributions. Furthermore, Dariusz Milewski’s studies shed light on the eve of the conflict and the Moldavian factor in it,⁵ while Paweł Duda evaluates the events by relying on the Papal nuntiature reports in Rome.⁶

Scholars and students of Ottoman history have so far, however, neglected the events leading to the 1634 nip-in-the-bud campaign, probably because they were overshadowed by the more critical Ottoman eastern campaigns against the Safavids in Iran between 1623 and 1639. Except for Katip Çelebi’s Fezleke and Kadri Efendi’s history,⁷

¹ I would like to thank Professor Dariusz Kołodziejczyk and the reviewers for their helpful remarks during the preparation of the present text, along with James Hartzell for his proofreading.


³ Łukasz Pabich, Wojna polsko-turecka w latach 1633–1634 (Oświęcim, 2019).


⁷ Even though Topçular Katibi Kadri Efendi’s account is quite detailed and informative regarding the 1634 campaign, the present study will not make any reference to either Katip Çelebi or Kadri Efendi (or Mustafa Naima, who relied mostly on the former) since they lack the accuracy of archival documentation.
the chronicles of the era remain silent regarding the 1634 campaign. The present study will therefore focus on the years 1633 and 1634 to expound on the escalation of the Polish-Ottoman conflict and its resolution. In doing so, Ottoman sources will be combined with contemporary European accounts.8

II
THE CONFLICTUAL FRONTIER

Ottoman frontier governors enjoyed a certain level of liberty in conducting their affairs in the early modern period. Cross-border activities and small-scale conflicts were a daily occurrence at the Bosnian, Hungarian and Eastern European territories of the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth century. The once-rebellious governor of Erzurum, Abaza Mehmed Pasha, also acted by the spirit of the time when he was appointed the governor-general (beylerbeyi) of the Silistra (Özü) province in the summer of 1632.9

It has been pointed out that the first year of Abaza Mehmed Pasha’s rule focused on interference with the Danubian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. In September 1632, Abaza Mehmed supported Matei Basarab’s confirmation by the Porte as the new Wallachian Voivode. The following year, he went on to unsuccessfully push for the official recognition of a new Moldavian Voivode (Miron Barnowski), a failure that partially reflected the mixed feelings held toward Abaza Mehmed at the Porte.10


8 Among the major monographs dealing specifically with the political atmosphere of the 1620s and 1630s are Alexander Hendrik de Groot, The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic: A History of the Earliest Diplomatic Relations 1610–1630 (Leiden, 1978); and Gunnar Hering, Ökumenisches Patriarchat und europäische Politik 1620–1638 (Wiesbaden, 1968). It must be pointed out, however, that de Groot totally omits the events discussed in this study.

9 The province was known both as Silistra and Özü (Očakiv).

The bilateral relations between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire became increasingly strained throughout 1633 as Abaza Mehmed was becoming ever more assertive in the region. In the summer of 1633, the Budjak (Budzhak) Tatars raided Polish territory. However, on their way back, the Polish forces took their revenge after catching up with the returning Tatar troops, saving some of their goods and prisoners: Polish Grand Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski caught the Tatars unaware at early dawn and even managed to take five mirzas (commanders) prisoner, as a weekly magazine of the time suggested.

The defeat of the Budjak Tatar forces actually coincided with an already tense atmosphere on the frontier. A large number of Ottoman troops, including the Crimean Tatars, had been preparing for a campaign on the northern frontiers of the Ottoman Empire. The Austrian resident agent at the Porte, Rudolf Schmid, referred to a rumour he received in mid-July that the Porte had ordered Abaza Pasha to start an operation against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, even though a Polish internuntius had recently been sent back from Istanbul (Constantinople) with nice words. Dutch representative

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12 Renaudot’s Gazette [Paris, 1634], 441: ‘Recit de la défaite des Tartars par les Polonais’. The literature refers to the event as the Battle of Sasowy Róg (4 July 1633), a detailed account of which can be found in Pabich, Wojna polsko-turecka.

13 The Habsburg agent in Istanbul Rudolf Schmid suggested 50, 000: Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (hereinafter: OeStA), Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv (hereinafter: HHStA), Türkei I, Turcica 112 (1633), 98r; Dutch ambassador Haga 80,000 (Cornelius Haga, ‘Brieven’, 440–1); the Venetian bailo Pietro Foscarini 60,000 (Hurmuzaki, Documente, 470); and a news collection of the time similarly suggested 80,000 troops at Abaza Pasha’s command (Renaudot’s Gazette [Paris, 1634]: De Constantinople du 20 Août 1633, No. 98, 425). However, all of these figures must be exaggerated. Hereby I express my gratitude to YÖK (Turkish Institution for Higher Education) for the six-month-long doctoral research grant (YUDAB) I benefited from during my research in the Austrian archives and National Library (ÖNB) in 2018–19, along with Prof. Cahit Telci (Izmir), Prof. Claudia Römer (Vienna) and Dr. Özgür Kolçak (Istanbul) for their help in the process.

14 OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica 112 (1633), 102v (15 July 1633). The name of the internuntius is not specified; however, he was (Stanislaw) Suliszewski.
Cornelius Haga went further into detail, claiming that Abaza Pasha had gathered both his soldiers and a coalition of Crimean-Moldovan-Wallachian forces, while Sultan Murad IV (1623–40) considered appointing the pasha as the Governor-General of Rumelia. In this position, Abaza Mehmed could start his activities against Poland with all the Ottoman forces in Europe.\footnote{Cornelius Haga, ‘Brieven’, 441 (1 Aug. 1633).}

The determination of the Porte was, however, soon broken. The Austrian agent suggested in early August that as soon as the Russian delegates, who wished to enlist the support of the Ottoman Empire against the Commonwealth during their on-going hostilities in the War of Smolensk (1632–4), departed from Istanbul, the Porte revoked its orders to Abaza Pasha regarding the operation: the Ottoman authorities merely wanted to buy time and to keep Russians at war against the Commonwealth. The orders to attack Poland had been given to satisfy the Muscovite embassy – now that they were gone, the Porte did not have to open another front against the Poles, because at the same time the conflict against the Safavids continued.\footnote{OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, T urcica 112 (1633), 113v–14r (5 Aug. 1633). The Muscovite emissaries can be identified as Afanasij Pronciscev and Tichon Bormosov, see A.A. Novoselyskiy, XVII. Yüzyınl Birinci Yarsında Moskova Devletinin Tatarlarla Mücadelesi (Ankara, 2011), 188.}

Around the same time frame, the Dutch ambassador remarked that the reason for cancelling the operation was the Porte’s willingness to wait for the arrival of a high-ranking Polish diplomat (in the quality of an ambassador) who was headed to Istanbul, before making any peremptory resolution.\footnote{Cornelius Haga, ‘Brieven’, 441 (1 Aug. 1633).}

The tide again turned in the following month: in early September, the reports of recent Cossack raids on Bałakława (Balıklava) and Kozłów (Gözleve/Eupatoria) in the Crimea had infuriated the grand vizier so much, Schmid believed, that Abaza Mehmed Pasha probably received orders to cross the Polish border.\footnote{OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, T urcica 112 (1633), 139r (4 Sept. 1633).} Haga similarly stated that Abaza Mehmed had gathered Wallachian-Moldavian and Tatar forces and supposedly started his operation at the instigation of the Muscovite envoys, who managed to take advantage of the Porte’s desire to avenge the Cossack raids in the Black Sea.\footnote{Bayerische Staatsbibliothek (hereinafter: BSB), Hss Clm 10369, 316v’ (3 Sept. 1633).}
The position of the Porte was subjected to yet one last change: around 20 September, both the Austrian and Dutch representatives stated that Abaza Pasha was commanded once more to cease military activities. Haga’s letters inform us that the Porte sent a secret message to Abaza Mehmed, ordering him to avoid starting clashes and to resolve the conflictual issues with Polish emissaries. Haga explained in further detail that the reasons why the formerly given order to move into Poland was thus revoked were twofold – the first was the preparation of the Ottoman central army troops for a campaign against the Safavids; and the second, and more important, was the intelligence that the Polish Hetman Koniecpolski would be waiting for Abaza Mehmed with 30,000 troops around Kamieniec (though the actual figures were far less). Rudolf Schmid similarly pointed to the first reason suggested by Haga: some six thousand janissaries and imperial cavalry (kapikulu sipahi) were prepared for the eastern campaign after a consultative meeting was held at the Porte.

The orders of cancellation from the Porte were either too late to arrive at Abaza Mehmed Pasha’s camp or disregarded by the pasha: Hetman Koniecpolski’s and Abaza Mehmed’s forces clashed near Kamieniec on 22 October 1633, where Abaza Pasha’s superior troops (some 24,000 men) failed to break the stalemate since Koniecpolski’s men, numbering around 11,000, commanded better firepower and pushed back the attacking Ottoman units. Even though the pasha could not achieve the victory he had hoped for, he still had enough troops at his disposal to besiege and loot the nearby wooden fort of Studzienica, enslaving a good number of its inhabitants before withdrawing to safety at Jassy. As Romanian chronicler Miron Costin informs us, the pasha sent the enslaved notables to

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20 Ibid., 317r (23 Sept. 1633).
22 OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Türcica 112 (1633), 153r–v (18 Sept. 1633).
24 BSB, Hs Clm 10369, 319r’ (10 Dec. 1633).
Istanbul, projecting his indecisive operation against the Polish hetman as a glorious victory.\textsuperscript{25}  

In the aftermath of Abaza Mehmed Pasha’s October campaign, the situation at the Porte can best be described as ambivalent. On the one hand, the decision to engage in a campaign against the Safavids had already been made, the grand vizier (Tabanıyassı Mehmed Pasha) and the janissary commander-in-chief having already crossed to Anatolia.\textsuperscript{26} On the other hand, Sultan Murad IV was now reputed to have developed a relentless hatred against the Poles, which inevitably spread the rumours of an impending campaign against Poland that would be led by the Sultan himself.\textsuperscript{27}  

The fate of the prisoners sent by Abaza Mehmed to Istanbul underlined this latter point. On 10 December 1633, around a month and a half after they were captured, eighty-eight Polish prisoners were brought to the Divan (imperial council) by a steward of Abaza Mehmed Pasha. Upon arrival, Sultan Murad IV purportedly had all of them publicly executed.\textsuperscript{28} The Habsburg agent Schmid described the scene even more vividly: three executioners slaughtered the Polish prisoners as if they were killing sheep – by cutting their throats one after the other, while the Sultan was watching through a window to quench his bloodthirstiness.\textsuperscript{29} The Ottoman fiscal documentation does not include such gory details but points out that Abaza Mehmed’s \textit{kapıkethüda} (agent) of Istanbul and three more of the pasha’s men were presented robes of honour on the specified date for bringing the prisoners to the Divan.\textsuperscript{30}


\textsuperscript{26} OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica 112 (1633), 173r (5 Nov. 1633).

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Ibid.}, 195r (26 Dec. 1633).

\textsuperscript{28} Riksarkivet/Oxenstiernska samlingen Axel Oxenstierna av Södermöre//E 657 (Ref. no 4133), From Carl Marinus to Axel Oxenstierna (1 Feb. 1634). Marinus’ letters are available online: https://sok.riksarkivet.se/oxenstierna?infosida=carl-marinus [Accessed: 9 Nov. 2020]; BSB, Hss Clm 10369, 319r’ (10 Dec. 1633).

\textsuperscript{29} OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica 112 (1633), 195r (26 Dec. 1633).

\textsuperscript{30} Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Ottoman Central Archives in Istanbul; hereinafter: BOA), Kamil Kepeci (hereinafter: KK.d) 667M, 170. I will refer to this register
Sultan Murad’s grudge against the Commonwealth also manifested itself through his refusal to admit the incoming Polish internuntius: the European corps diplomatique in Istanbul unanimously reported in mid-December that a Polish envoy sent by Hetman Koniecpolski to acquire a safe-conduct for the Polish ambassador who was to arrive later at Istanbul (as was the custom for the Poles) had managed to reach Küçükçekmece (Ponte Piccolo), the last station for European representatives before entering Istanbul. However, the envoy was not allowed to enter the Ottoman capital and was directly sent back to the Polish frontier in the company of a çavuş (marshal of the court) sent by the Porte. The Venetian bailo curiously remarked that this was the very same attitude assumed by Sultan Osman II before he declared war on Poland a dozen years earlier.

The summary expedition of the unnamed Polish envoy (an internuntius) back to the frontier caused concern among the Catholic members of the diplomatic circle in Istanbul. In a private speech between the French ambassador Count Marcheville and the Habsburg representative Rudolf Schmid, the diplomats tried to come up with ways to bring the Ottoman authorities to their senses. However, since the French ambassador felt himself out of favour among the Ottoman ministers at the time, the duty fell on Schmid to discuss the issue with the deputy grand vizier.

Rudolf Schmid canvassed the issue in mid-December, both with the deputy grand vizier (kaymakam) Bayram Pasha (who stood in

frequently, which is a protocol book recording the grants of robes of honour (to Ottoman officials and foreign emissaries) and the purchases made for the preparation of imperial letters between October 1632 and December 1634.

31 OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica 112 (1633), 195r, 198v (26 Dec. 1633); BSB, Hss Clm 10369, 320r (10 Dec. 1633).

32 A later document refers to this unknown Polish agent as a certain Boruchi, OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica 113 (Annexe), 230r: “...deinde D[omi]no Boruchi Internuntio suae Ma[ies]t[a]tis meo precursore ad Portam Ottomannicam non admissio...”. The letter is penned by Aleksander Trzebiński, the ambassador to the Porte. As for Boruchi, he must be the same Borucki (from Łęczyca province) found in Grand Hetman Koniecpolski’s letters, Agnieszka Biedrzycka (ed.), Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego hetmana wielkiego koronnego 1632–1646 (Kraków, 2005), as was the case in the letter dated 28 August 1633 from Stanisław Koniecpolski to Mikołaj Sieniawski. I must thank Professor Kołodziejczyk for providing me with the related reference.

33 Hurmuzaki, Documente, 473 (11 Dec. 1633).
for the grand vizier since 23 October)\(^{34}\) and with the grand mufti Hüseyin Efendi, the highest-ranking authorities he could have access to. Schmid’s conversation with the deputy grand vizier, unfortunately, did not yield the desired result. When he suggested that an *internuntius* was needed to precede an ambassador since the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth did not have a resident embassy in Istanbul, Bayram Pasha responded that Abaza Mehmed Pasha had the authority to discuss the related business and that the Polish representatives did not have to come all the way down to Istanbul.\(^{35}\) Moreover, both Bayram Pasha and the grand mufti were convinced that the Commonwealth purposefully failed to hold the Cossacks in check,\(^{36}\) which was against the accords between the Poles and the Ottomans. In short, there was not much hope for intermediating the conflict.

It looks like the Porte had already undertaken serious measures towards settling the Polish issue on its own terms: early in 1634, Abaza Mehmed Pasha showed up in Istanbul and had an audience with Sultan Murad IV.\(^{37}\) On 21 January, as Schmid wrote home, the governors in the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire were sent orders to mobilise their forces for a campaign that would be led by Abaza Mehmed Pasha as the commander-in-chief (*serdar*). The rumour had it that Sultan Murad would join the army, which was expected to set out after the Ramadhan feast (early April 1634). Moreover, the Crimean Tatar Khan Djanibek Giray was also sent a robe of honour and a sword, with the order to gather all his forces for a campaign to assist Abaza Mehmed Pasha, for whom firearms (*Waffen und Buchsn*) were sent from the capital.\(^{38}\) The fiscal records dated 21 January point to robes of honour to be sent to the Wallachian, Moldavian and Crimean rulers on the day Abaza Mehmed Pasha received one such at the hand-kissing ceremony with the Sultan before his departure for

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\(^{34}\) OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica 112 (1633), 173r (5 Nov. 1633).

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 198v (26 Dec. 1633).

\(^{36}\) Ibid. Cornelius Haga similarly informed his friend in Swiss lands (Carl Marinus) around the same time that the Cossacks had murdered some three to four hundred Ottoman subjects: Riksarkivet/Oxenstiernska samlingen Axel Oxenstierna av Södermöre//E 657 (ref. no. 4145), From Carl Marinus to Axel Oxenstierna (10 July 1634).

\(^{37}\) OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica 113 (1634), 1v (5 Jan. 1634); BOA, KK.d 667M, 178.

\(^{38}\) OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica 113 (1634), 7r (10 Feb. 1634).
the province of Özü, suggesting that Wallachia and Moldavia were to bring in their troops, too.\textsuperscript{39}

The military preparations for the campaign were thus given a start. On the other hand, however, political moves were also underway. Schmid drew attention to another rumour – that Abaza Pasha was commanded to stall the incoming Polish ambassador and to express the Sultan’s conditions: the ambassador could proceed on his way to Istanbul only if he would accept Sultan Murad’s terms on behalf of King Ladislaus IV (reigned from 1632 to 1648). Otherwise, the ambassador was to be directly sent back to Poland, and Abaza Pasha was to threaten him with war.\textsuperscript{40} The French embassy in Istanbul was similarly in doubt whether the Polish ambassador would be allowed to the Porte, considering that his avant-courrier had been denied entry to Istanbul in December and some 60,000 troops were now being gathered in Europe for a campaign.\textsuperscript{41}

In mid-February, the Habsburg resident agent Schmid wrote home that Abaza Mehmed Pasha’s steward had indeed stalled the Polish ambassador below the Danube, at Provadia (Prowadija), intending to keep him waiting until the arrival of the pasha from Istanbul. The ambassador Aleksander Trzebiński, however, had pro-actively sent a letter to Schmid in order to prompt him to intervene with the Porte and to speak with the deputy grand vizier Bayram Pasha: the Polish ambassador demanded either to be allowed to move on to Istanbul or to return to Poland. The deputy grand vizier responded that Trzebiński could continue his way to the Ottoman capital and informed Schmid that the lodging of the ambassador was already prepared. The deputy grand vizier did not stop short of expressing his uneasiness with the full authority Sultan Murad had given to Abaza Mehmed in this affair.\textsuperscript{42}

The agenda of Ottoman international politics at the time was busy as usual. While Aleksander Trzebiński tried to reach the Porte, the news was brought to the capital that the Habsburg ambassador (Count Puchheim) was already on his way to corroborate the latest peace (Szöny 1627) between the Austrian and the Ottoman courts.

\textsuperscript{39} BOA, KK.d 667M, 187–8 (21 Jan. 1634).
\textsuperscript{40} OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica 113 (1634), 7r (10 Feb. 1634).
\textsuperscript{41} Bibliothèque nationale de France (hereinafter: BnF), MS Français 7093, 201v–2r (Copie de la lettre de Constantinople du cinquième février 1634). The figures suggested by foreign representatives need to always be considered with caution.
\textsuperscript{42} OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica 113 (1634), 19r–v (14 Feb. 1634).
Along with this, Muscovite representatives Yakov Dashkov and Matvey Somov, who had been at the Porte for the last eight months, were sent back to Russia on 11 February. Schmid suggested that the Porte had admonished the Muscovite agents to keep their ruler at war against the Poles.

That the orders sent by the Porte to the provinces showed effects was manifested in the fact that the mobilisation of the provincial Ottoman troops was indeed afoot at the time. The aforementioned Habsburg ambassador, Count Puchheim, personally witnessed, on his way to Istanbul in early March, that Canpoladzade Mustafa Pasha (Governor-General of Rumeli) was mustering his forces before moving to Adrianople, where the rest of the Ottoman army was supposed to meet. Some twenty to twenty-five hundred infantry and cavalry soldiers had even accompanied Puchheim and his retinue to their lodgings in Sofia.

Similarly, Transylvanian Prince György Rakoczi I noted that bridges over the Danube were built at the exact spots they had been erected during Sultan Osman's Polish campaign in 1621. The Tatars (probably the Budjak Tatars) and the Ottomans mobilised for the campaign at Abaza Mehmed Pasha’s command were calculated at around sixty thousand. Furthermore, a kapıçabaşı had reached the Transylvanian prince’s court, bringing him the Sultan’s command to put together as many Transylvanian forces as possible and to join the main Ottoman army.

It is likely that Aleksander Trzebiński himself encountered some of these campaign preparations on his journey to Istanbul, which eventually came to an end early in March. The Ottoman protocol register suggests that Trzebiński, seven members of his retinue, Abaza Mehmed Pasha’s representative in Istanbul (Süleyman Efendi) and three of the pasha’s men (who had probably escorted Trzebiński from Provadia to Istanbul) were presented robes of honour on 4 March. Trzebiński took lodgings at the Tekfur Sarayı, that is within the walled

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43 BOA, KK.d 667M, 198 (11 February 1634); Novoselyskiy, XVII. Yüzyılın, 188.
44 OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica 113 (1634), 19v (14 Feb. 1634).
45 Ibid. (Annexe of Puchheim Embassy), 212r (3–5 March 1634).
46 Ibid., Polen I, Polonica 56 (1634), 13r–v: Cardinal Pazmany to Emperor Ferdinand II, Pozsony, 22 March 1634. Again, the figures sound exaggerated.
47 BOA, KK.d 667M, 206.
48 Jan Reychman, ‘İstanbul’da Eski Lehistan Elçiliğinin Yerine Dair’, Sanat Tarihi Araştırmaları, I (1964), 39–59, 43. The Ottoman treasury register points out
city, as was usual with extraordinary missions. Trzebiński and his retinue received three thousand *akçes* (the equivalent of 13 Venetian ducats\(^49\)) daily from the central treasury, the money being delivered by Ismail Aga, who was recorded as a “client of Abaza Pasha”.\(^50\)

### III

**NEGOTIATIONS AT THE PORTE**

Aleksander Trzebiński was accepted into Sultan Murad’s audience in a relatively short time. On 7 March 1634, the Polish ambassador’s eventful imperial audience took place, which provided the posterity of Polish historiography with a controversially audacious Trzebiński retorting fearlessly to Sultan Murad’s threats, until Dariusz Kołodziejczyk pointed out the discrepancy of the story with the more probable facts in 2003.\(^51\) Ironically, both Habsburg representatives Rudolf Schmid (*Finalrelazione*, 1643) and Count Puchheim (*Relazione*, 1634) had already referred to these events in their accounts with slightly more reasonable accuracy, the first being published in 1973, the second one as early as the 1640s.\(^52\)

To begin with the Ottoman documentation, the protocol register of the era records that on 7 Ramadhan 1043 (7 March 1634), the Polish

to an expenditure of 25.500 *akçes* spent on the furniture of the Polish embassy on 24 March 1634, BOA, KK.d 1826, 69 (the KK.d 1826 is a daily register of the central treasury, for March 1634 to March 1635).


\(^50\) BOA, KK.d 1826, 23.


\(^52\) Peter Meienberger, *Johan Rudolf Schmid zum Schwarzenhorn als kaiserlicher Resident in Konstantinopel in den Jahren 1629–1643* (Bern, 1973), 252; Count Puchheim’s *relazione* is copied by Khevenhüller: I was unable to detect the first edition of Khevenhüller (1640–6), hence I refer to the second edition that was published some eight decades later: Franz Christoph Khevenhüller, *Annalium Ferdinandeorum Tom XII* (Leipzig, 1726), 1420. One cannot help wonder why Hammer did not exploit the original Habsburg embassy accounts in the Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv (Vienna) for Trzebiński’s audience, as he mostly did for the rest of his work (*Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*), instead of excerpting from Kajetan Kwiatkowski (Kołodziejczyk, ‘Semiotics’, 246).
ambassador, nine of his men, his dragoman and four marshals (çavuş) in his retinue were awarded robes of honour during the “hand-kissing ceremony with the Sultan”.53 Schmid, whose unpublished dispatch dated 15 March 1634 is the most detailed account of the audience, suggested that the deputy Grand Vizier Bayram Pasha, Abaza Mehmed Pasha and Kenan Pasha were also present at the audience.54 It is probable that after hand-kissing, most of Trzebiński’s retinue was carried out of the audience chamber of the palace, which was now peopled by the Polish ambassador, his dragoman, a few lower-ranking palace officials (kapıbaşı), three viziers and the Sultan, all of whom, save for Trzebiński and his dragoman, were probably hungry and short-tempered on this seventh fasting day of Ramadhan.

The English ambassador Peter Wyche (who seems to be less informed than Schmid) suggested that Aleksander Trzebiński started his address by asking for a “confirmation of the peace as it was settled” in King Sigismund’s (d. 1632) time between the Ottomans and the Commonwealth. At that point, as Wyche remarked, an unusual event took place, and the Sultan started to speak himself,55 which was indeed against the accustomed diplomatic manner of the Ottoman court. Rudolf Schmid suggested that Sultan Murad IV’s outburst contained a series of tripartite demands, namely “tribute, sword, and faith”,56 which was openly a threat of war. Sultan Murad accused the Poles of building fortresses on Ottoman soil in breach of the peace and of deliberately letting the Cossacks have free rein in the Black Sea, pillaging Ottoman territory.

Trzebiński’s answer to this threat was that he had no authority to speak about any tribute, wherefore the Ottomans had to send back with him a messenger to King Ladislaus’s court to negotiate the issue. As for the forts (Palankcha), continued Trzebiński, the Sultan was misinformed, and a commissioner could again go back with Trzebiński to observe if any Polish fortress was built on Ottoman territory – if so, Trzebiński would surely take measures to have them razed to the ground. Lastly, regarding the Cossack issue, Trzebiński

53 BOA, KK.d 667M, 207.
54 OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica 113 (1634), 21r (15 March 1634).
55 The National Archives, Kew (hereinafter: TNA), State Papers (hereinafter: SP), 97/15, 244r (5[15] March 1634). I should hereby thank Ömer Gezer (Hacettepe University) for sharing with me his copies of State Papers documents in 2019.
56 OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica 113 (1634), 21r (15 March 1634).
put forth his excuses but complained about the Tatars, who were committing similar crimes against the Poles.

It is hard to judge if all of Trzebiński’s responses could be translated. For, as the ambassador was speaking, Sultan Murad’s fury took a more animate turn: with a sour face, he grabbed the handle of his sword and started to repeatedly draw out and put in his sword halfway out of the sheath, the blade shining at every draw. At this inimical sight, not only Trzebiński but also his dragoman froze stone cold. When the Sultan realised how nervous the ambassador had become, he assured Trzebiński that he needed not to fear and could continue saying what he had come to say.\textsuperscript{57} According to Wyche, this was the end of the conversation before they were escorted back to their lodgings. For Schmid, the audience indeed ended here, but Trzebiński and his retinue received their robes of honour before being shown out.\textsuperscript{58}

The dismay caused by the imperial audience continued for Trzebiński on the following days as well. He was not allowed to speak with any other minister than Abaza Mehmed Pasha, nor was he permitted to visit, or be visited by, the European diplomats in Istanbul. In any case, both Schmid and Wyche sent their secretaries to Trzebiński and offered their services for any possible mediation. Trzebiński made clear to the secretaries that he had understood the inevitability of the war, but exclaimed that the Commonwealth “would not be unprovided” for.

On their parts, the English and Austrian representatives begged to differ about the Polish war: Schmid referred to a rumour that Sultan Murad perhaps intended to mobilise the army in Europe but would make a \textit{volte-face} at the Dardanelles and join the eastern army to fight against the Safavids. Wyche, in the same vein, gave voice to the public protestation of the janissaries: the latter were quite discontent both with Abaza Pasha (for he had been the janissary-massacring rebel of Erzurum ten years before) and with the turmoil he dragged the Ottomans into in Poland. They believed, Wyche suggested, it was the ancestral custom for the janissaries to fight solely on one front at a time.\textsuperscript{59} Both representatives suggested that the janissary corps in the eastern campaign started to show signs of mutiny, demanding to

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Ibid.}, 21v (15 March 1634).
\textsuperscript{58} TNA, SP, 97/15, 244r–v (5[15] March 1634).
\textsuperscript{59} OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica 113 (1634), 22r (15 March 1634); TNA, SP, 97/15, 244v–5r (5 [15] March 1634).
return to the Porte if the Sultan really intended to wage war against the Commonwealth.

Schmid’s dispatch dated 15 March contained further important details: through the agency of the secretaries, Trzebiński sent word to Schmid to ask for a favour. The Polish ambassador wished to establish a secret correspondence with Murteza (Murtaza) Pasha through his mediation, to which Schmid replied positively. The only obstacle was Murteza Pasha’s sickness, which made it impossible to get into contact with the pasha for Schmid, too. Another issue of importance was that Abaza Mehmed Pasha was lately sent back to the frontier from Istanbul, despite his insistence on staying in the capital and on managing the whole Polish affair himself. Luckily for Trzebiński, even though he was still forbidden to meet with the Christian ambassadors in Istanbul, the departure of Abaza Mehmed Pasha enabled him to negotiate with the remaining Ottoman ministers, starting with Murteza Pasha on 15 March.60

Murteza Pasha had quite recently been called from his eastern post (Governor-General of Diyarbekir) back to the Porte because he had accumulated enough of experience at European frontiers of the Ottoman Empire by that time (Bosnia 1625–6; Buda 1626–30; Silistra 1630–2).61 Especially his experience in Silistra manifested itself in the pasha’s role as the conductor of the last peace negotiations with the Commonwealth, carried out in 1630.62 Now, since Trzebiński was in Istanbul and the Habsburg ambassador Count Puchheim was en route, the Ottoman viziers might have wished to keep Abaza Mehmed Pasha out of sight and hence sent him from the capital, given that Murteza Pasha had formerly negotiated both with the Habsburgs (including Schmid himself at Buda in the late 1620s) and with the Commonwealth’s Grand Hetman Koniecpolski (at Silistra in 1630).63

60 OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Türcica 113 (1634), 23v (15 March 1634).
62 Milewski points out that since Murteza Pasha had proven himself a skilful diplomat during the 1627 Szöny negotiations on the Hungarian frontier, he was appointed to Silistra in 1630 to conclude an agreement with the Poles that year, see Dariusz Milewski, ‘Negotiations instead of War’, 243–7.
63 Years later, Koniecpolski was probably one of the first Polish officials to learn about Murteza Pasha’s sorrowful end of devoted services, since Grand Hetman’s semi-official representative to the Safavid court (Giovannia di Lucca) would participate
Murteza Pasha’s summoning to the capital was thus an important indicator that the Porte was also inclined to employ diplomacy instead of (or in parallel to) war.

It is hard to pinpoint when Murteza Pasha arrived at Istanbul, but it must have been sometime between 10 and 15 March 1634. The first meeting Trzebiński had with Murteza Pasha on 15 March coincided with that of Schmid’s, who came face-to-face with the departing Trzebiński as he entered Murteza Pasha’s quarter. Schmid later frantically pointed out in a post-scriptum that the pasha’s attitude was quite positive: due to the news of the janissaries’ unrest in the eastern army, Murteza Pasha seemed to be eager for peace with Poland. This, hoped Schmid, would perhaps induce Sultan Murad to reconsider the Polish campaign.

Trzebiński, furthermore, had another promising prospect around this time frame: Habsburg ambassador (büyük elçi) Count Puchheim was now expected in Istanbul any moment, and Trzebiński turned to him even before his arrival. Concerning Trzebiński’s letter of self-recommendation dated 19 March, Count Puchheim sent a reply two days later from Silivri. He promised to form solidarity to remove the obstacles on Trzebiński’s way as soon as he made it to Istanbul. Trzebiński, in return, showed his goodwill towards Puchheim by offering his own carriage and finely dressed horses for the Habsburg ambassador’s ceremonial entrance into the Ottoman capital on 26 March: since the deputy grand vizier had forbidden Trzebiński to attend Puchheim’s entrance in person, this was the least he could do. For the moment, it looked like the Catholic block in Istanbul was getting stronger.

in the Safavid campaign and successful siege of Revan (Yerevan) in 1636, where the pasha passed away due to his wounds while defending the city, see Stanisław Jaśkowski, Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, and Piruz Minatsakanyan (eds), The Relations of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth with Safavid Iran and the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin in the Light of Archival Documents (Warszawa, 2017), 82.

64 The earliest record related to Murteza Pasha’s presence in Istanbul is dated 11 March 1634, when one of his clients received a robe of honour in his name, probably due to the pasha’s illness; BOA. KKd. 667M, 209.

65 OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Türkica 113 (1634), 23v (15 March 1634).

66 Ibid. (Annexe of Puchheim Embassy), 214v–16r.

67 Ibid., 216v–17v: Schmid to Puchheim, 24 March 1634. The offer of a carriage would eventually be turned down since Puchheim did not have time to ask for Emperor Ferdinand’s approval.
The Porte’s preparations for the campaign, however, continued with a crescendo, despite Murteza Pasha’s and the Polish ambassador’s push for peace. The Ottoman central treasury register of the time entered daily increasing sums as campaign expenditures starting from 15 March onwards. Around 1.2 million akçe were spent on providing and transporting fodder for pack animals, cloth for field tents, and on various purchases for the campaign kitchen in just about a week between 18 and 26 March. On 27 March, Habsburg ambassador Count Puchheim could observe the çavuşbaşı (head chiaus) and his suit of some six to seven hundred people and a thousand pack animals going outside Istanbul in order to erect the imperial tent and the tuğ (army standard in the shape of a horse-tail) for the preparation of the imperial camp at the field of Davud Paşa, which was the traditional rallying station for Ottoman campaigns in Europe.

On 4 April, i.e. after the Ramadhan feast was over, the campaign preparations assumed a new face: Kenan Pasha was now declared the İstanbul kaymakamı (deputy grand vizier in Istanbul), since Bayram Pasha was designated to accompany Sultan Murad to campaign as the deputy grand vizier. On the same day, Puchheim was received into an imperial audience, and on his way back to his lodgings, he was invited to a meeting with Murteza Pasha. At their meeting, the pasha opened up the issue of the mediation, suggesting that “Abaza Pasha directed the Sultan to wage the Polish war against the wills of almost every other vizier”. Under these circumstances, the Pasha hoped, Puchheim’s mediation would prevent all parties from unnecessary

68 BOA, KK.d 1826, 12–13 (15–26 March 1634). One interesting category was the repair of certain former registers of daily campaign records, ibid., 39.
69 Khevenhüller, *Annalium Ferdinandeorum*, xii (1411).
70 BOA, KK.d 667M, 220 (27 N 1043/27 March 1634); ibid., 218.
72 The tripartite functioning of the government (a grand vizier and two deputy grand viziers) was more common during Sultan Mehmed IV’s rule (1648–87), as he spent most of his time in Adrianople, while his grand viziers (the Köprülüş) campaigned in Europe, see Özgün Deniz Yoldaşlar, ‘The Realization of Mehmed IV’s Ghazi Title at the Campaign of Kamaniche’, unpublished MA thesis, Sabancı University (İstanbul, 2013), 49. In those circumstances, when the actual grand vizier departed to lead a campaign in person, the İstanbul kaymakamı would be left behind in the Ottoman capital, while a rikab-ı hümâyun kaymakamı (deputy grand vizier of the sultan’s stirrup) would follow the immediate presence of the ruler.
bloodshed. Murteza, for one, stood for peace with Christian states and wanted to concentrate all Ottoman forces on the Safavid front. As Puchheim was departing from Murteza Pasha’s presence, he came face-to-face with Aleksander Trzebiński, who was waiting for his turn with the pasha: the ambassadors exchanged greetings, and Trzebiński visited Puchheim at the latter’s lodging directly after his visit to Murteza Pasha was over.73

In his conversation with Puchheim, the Polish ambassador pointed to Abaza Mehmed Pasha’s self-willed attitudes as the origin of the problem and added that it was again Abaza Mehmed who tallied him on his way to Istanbul. Moreover, he believed that his eventful treatment during the audience with Sultan Murad IV had to be attributed again to Abaza Mehmed Pasha. In putting forth his grievances, Aleksander Trzebiński did not stop short of emphasising the intimacy between the Austrian and Polish dynasties, which shared the common Catholic faith. Ultimately, he requested of Puchheim to mediate between the Polish and Ottoman sides by presenting his case to Murteza Pasha with a written declaration. Puchheim answered the Polish ambassador positively, despite his unwillingness due to the fact that he had no official orders from the Habsburg Emperor.74

The documentation left behind by the Puchheim embassy points to a particular exchange of letters in this respect. In an undated copy of a memoriale (penned on either 4 or 5 April 1634) to Murteza Pasha, Trzebiński made it clear that he had been sent to the Porte nine months earlier, but detained at the Danubian banks, then at Provadia, and lastly at Kirkkilise (mod. Kirklareli). Moreover, Hetman Koniecpolski’s envoy Suliszewski had been detained by Abaza Mehmed Pasha, and the Porte rejected King Ladislaus’s internuntius (a certain Borucki) in 1633. At his audience with the Sultan, Trzebiński was also stunned to hear about new conditions, such as the destruction of fortresses allegedly built on Ottoman territory and the conversion of the Poles to Islam. And for the sake of peace, Trzebiński demanded to be immediately sent back to Poland in the company of Murteza Pasha’s trusted men in order to continue negotiations there. Any delay of his return would mean the further progress of Abaza towards the Danube, meaning that the Commonwealth, too, would be induced to move its army to the

73 Khevenhüller, Annalium Ferdinandeorum, xii, 1418–19.
74 Ibid., 1420.
frontier. On 5 April, Puchheim wrote to Murteza Pasha in the same tenor and demanded Trzebiński’s departure for Poland.\textsuperscript{75}

Early in the morning on 6 April, Trzebiński wrote to Count Puchheim, informing the Habsburg ambassador that Murteza Pasha expected them at his presence before noon. Trzebiński wished Puchheim to address Murteza Pasha in the following manner: the peace established between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans (some seven years ago) by the agency of the pasha was still standing, and hence Murteza Pasha could intervene to establish a similar peace also with the Poles. Moreover, if Emperor Ferdinand II (1619–37) had known about the Polish-Ottoman conflict at the time of Puchheim’s departure, he would have definitely intervened to broker a deal as the supreme authority of the Christian world. Interestingly, in another letter dated 6 April, Puchheim wrote to Murteza Pasha in precisely the same terms.\textsuperscript{76}

A few hours later, Trzebiński came with his carriage to pick Puchheim and Schmid up on his way to Murteza Pasha. The pasha started the conversation by expressing that even though certain viziers were against opening a new front against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Sultan had ordered his vassals to mobilise their forces while he was gathering his own imperial troops. The pasha suggested that if Trzebiński could assure the Ottomans that the Poles could put restraints on the Cossacks and destroy the fortresses, the Sultan could perhaps be brought to his senses. Otherwise, he had a firm resolution to demolish them himself and to “leave no stone upon the other”. Trzebiński began his response with a politically correct statement, suggesting that the Ottoman might was universally well-known and he himself desired “neighbourly peace and friendliness”. However, he had no further instructions than the Polish promise to keep the Cossacks in check; and he had received no command regarding the fortresses since this was a new demand made by the Ottomans.\textsuperscript{77}

At that point, Count Puchheim interfered with his suggested solution: while the Ottoman demands could not be responded to

\textsuperscript{75} OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Türcica 113 (Annexe of Puchheim Embassy), 230r–1r (Memoriale Vezirio Ill. Mess. Murtaza Bassae).

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 231v–2v.

\textsuperscript{77} Khevenhüller, \textit{Annalium Ferdinandeorum}, xii, 1421.
by Trzebiński, it would be in the best interest of both parties to send back the Polish ambassador along with an Ottoman official to bring back the Commonwealth’s response. In the meantime, the season would advance and daunt the Sultan from the campaign; or at least the Commonwealth would have more time to settle their conflict with the Muscovites and then focus on their southern frontier. Murteza Pasha seemed to have agreed to the proposition and offered assurances that if the Poles were to demolish the fortresses, he would keep the Budjak Tartars in check. \(^78\)

The trilateral meeting of Murteza-Trzebiński-Puchheim indeed started a peace process, but it was parallel to that of the on-going military preparations: on the same day the meeting took place, the English ambassador Peter Wyche wrote home that Sultan Murad was preparing to leave Istanbul within two days. The report continued that Abaza Pasha had already been sent to Rumelia to enlist soldiers “which go under the name of segmens” and the Commonwealth was also well-provided for a battle because news had recently reached him with regard to the utter defeat of the Muscovites at the hand of the Polish. \(^79\) The English representative also called attention to the rumour in Istanbul that the Ottomans would at a certain point abort the Polish campaign “espetiallie yf the Polander will give so much honour to the Turke as to demolish certaine Castles, that have bin latelie erected against the Tartars”. Moreover, news kept coming to the capital that the janissaries in the eastern campaign continued their protest that the Polish campaign should not be undertaken without them. Nevertheless, Peter Wyche believed that Sultan Murad was personally “so farr ingaged in the warre” that it would be difficult to call off the campaign. In any case, the final resolution would be made at Adrianople, where the Sultan was expected to stay for some time. \(^80\)

\(^78\) Ibid., 1422.
\(^79\) The Dutch paper of the time (probably in accordance with other papers spread over Europe) announced that the Muscovite army had capitulated to the Commonwealth on 24 February 1634, Courante uyt Italien, Duytslandt, &c. no. 15 (15 April 1634).
\(^80\) TNA, SP, 97/15, 249v–50r (27 March [6 April] 1634). In this dispatch, Wyche also informs us that both King Ladislaus (Vilnia, 21 July 1633) and Hetman Koniecpolski (Bar, 16 Dec. 1633) had sent him letters of recommendation for Trzebiński, which are to be found under TNA, SP, 97/15, 281r–3r.
On 8 April, Sultan Murad indeed left Istanbul with a grand ceremony to take his place at the imperial camp at the Davud Pasha plain. Peter Wyche estimated that there were around ten thousand men who left the city with the Sultan. This figure (as Puchheim informed us) included all the viziers present at the capital and several thousand janissaries and central cavalry troops (altı bölük sipahi). French ambassador Count Marcheville noted that the Sultan would sleep in his tent at Davud Pasha for eight days before departing for Adrianople, his enthusiasm deriving perhaps from experiencing the command of his army in person for the first time.

After the departure of the army, on 9 April, Count Puchheim met Trzebiński, who joyfully shared with him the success of their meeting with Murteza Pasha three days earlier. Now Trzebiński was allowed to leave for Poland right away in order to refer the resolution of the issue to King Ladislaus IV in the company of an Ottoman official named Şahin Aga. Indeed, Ottoman fiscal records registered Trzebiński’s departure costs on the same day (9 April), along with that of müteferrika Şahin Aga who was defined as “a principal man of Mortesa Bassas house”. Furthermore, Şahin Aga received three robes of honour through the agency of another client of Murteza Pasha’s, probably for being chosen as the Ottoman envoy to Poland. This should not come as a surprise, considering that Şahin Aga had run diplomatic errands at the behest of Murteza Pasha both in the 1620s (at Buda) and in 1630 (at Silistra).

While Şahin Aga was getting set up for his diplomatic mission, Trzebiński was paying his courtesy visits to the corps diplomatique in Pera. The English ambassador enlightens us that early on 9 April, Trzebiński crossed the Golden Horn and arrived at, so to speak, the

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81 BOA, KK.d 667M, 225 (9 Şevval 1043/8 April 1634); BSB, Hss Clm 10369, 321r (31 May 1634).
82 TNA, SP, 97/15, 252r (24 April [4 May] 1634); OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica 113 (Annexe of Puchheim Embassy), 254r (s.d., probably 18 April). The most detailed account of the Sultan’s procession is Khevenhüller, Annalium Ferdinandeorum, xii, 1555–60.
83 BnF, MS Français 7093, 216r (Lettre de Monsieur le Comte de Marcheville Ambassadeur en Levant Au Roy, De Constantinople 2 May 1634).
84 BOA, KK.d 1826, 29; TNA, SP, 97/15, 252r (4 May 1634).
85 BOA, KK.d 667M, 225 (10 Şevval 1043/9 April 1634).
diplomatic quarter, deliberately neglecting a visit to the churches at Galata, perhaps to reserve more time for diplomatic sociability. Wyche, however, refused to speak to Trzebiński, for the latter had chosen as his first visit Count Marcheville, the French ambassador. One might consider Wyche rightful in his resentment only if we put aside the fact that Trzebiński had a more important dealing at the French embassy before departing from Istanbul: the Polish ambassador left behind his nephew (whom Puchheim identified as “P. Sigismundus Miaskorosky, ordinis St. Dominici”) at the French embassy as some sort of a temporary unofficial resident agent to keep contact with the Ottoman capital during his absence.

On 10 April 1634, after months of journey, detainment and waiting, Aleksander Trzebiński’s diplomatic mission eventually came to its end, though without any concrete result. The Polish ambassador and Şahin Aga set out from Istanbul on that day with letters prepared by the Ottoman administration. For Schmid and Marcheville, the Ottoman letters demanded the demolition of the fortresses from the Polish King. Along with this, the actual documents dated 8 and 9 April suggested that the Poles had to pay their tribute to the Crimean Khan and the Cossacks would be prohibited from venturing into the Black Sea. Şahin Aga was expected to return within two months to Adrianople, where Sultan Murad IV would be waiting for the Polish response.

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87 TNA, SP, 97/15, 252v–3r (24 April [4 May] 1634).
88 BnF, MS Français, 7093, 217r (Lettre de Monsieur le Comte de Marcheville Ambassadeur en Levant Au Roy, De Constantinople 2e May 1634); Khevenhüller, *Annalium Ferdinandeorum*, xii, 1425; however, the original manuscript records the name as “P. Sigismundus Miaskowskÿ Ordinis St: Dominici”, OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica 113-2 (Puchheim’s embassy report), 92v. Years later, in 1679, Polish ambassador Gninski would similarly leave behind his sororal nephew Samuel Proski as a resident at the Porte; see Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *Podole pod panowaniem tureckim: Ejalet Kamieniecki 1672–1699* (Warszawa, 1994), 96.
89 OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica 113 (Annexe of Puchheim Embassy), 256v; BnF, MS Français, 7093, 217r; for Haga’s slightly misguided opinion on the terms, see BSB, Hss Clm 10369, 321v (31 May 1634).
THE POLITICAL SCENE AT ADRIANOPLE (EDİRNE)

The imperial camp at Davud Pasha witnessed further military preparations every passing day, as the Ottoman administration began waiting for a response from Poland. The fiscal records suggest that the imperial navy was sent to the Black Sea in mid-April. Thousands of sheep were purchased for the provisioning of the army and funds were transferred to pay either for the salaries of the troops or to cover the transportation of the army’s baggage. Moreover, new Muscovite representatives were also accepted into Sultan Murad’s audience at the army camp. 91

On 16 April, the imperial army started the westward voyage to Adrianople. Six days later, the camp was set up at Lüleburgaz and eventually, on 26 April 1634, Sultan Murad IV seems to have reached the former imperial capital Adrianople, setting up his camp along the River Tunca. However, a curious event had taken place at the Lüleburgaz station: on 22 April, Abaza Mehmed Pasha was relieved of his post at Silistra and a former governor of Egypt, Halil Pasha, was instated as the Governor-General of Silistra instead. 92

This unexpected development undoubtedly provoked certain doubts about the future of the Polish campaign: the French ambassador informs us that he had followed the army on 22 April and caught up with it au second logement (referring surely to Lüleburgaz) to bid farewell to Bayram Pasha, who shared with him his premonitions that the Sultan would not go further than Adrianople and come back to Istanbul within three months. The French ambassador seems unaware of the fact that Abaza Pasha was deposed around the time the meeting took place; but once he learned it, he duly confirmed that Bayram Pasha’s expectation was well-founded. The reason for Abaza Pasha’s removal from office was demonstrated to be complaints directed against the pasha from certain subjects suffering from his self-willed attitudes during his governorship. 93

91 BOA, KK.d 1826, 35, 56: At least 851 cebecis and 903 janissaries were sent to serve in the Black Sea on 16 April; for robes of honour presented to various dignitaries and Muscovite emissaries BOA, KK.d 667M, 227, 229; for provisioning BOA, KK.d 1826, 34–5 et passim.
92 BOA, KK.d 667M, 231 (22 April 1634); BOA, KK.d 266, 44.
93 BnF, MS Français, 7093, 216r–v, 217v (Lettre de Monsieur le Comte de Marcheville Ambassadeur en Levant Au Roy, De Constantinople, 2 May 1634).
The English ambassador, upon receiving the news of Abaza Pasha’s fall from grace, remarked that the pasha had fled away and was nowhere to be found. And, he continued, “so few would receive him; great inquisition is made after him & everie waie, heee is a loste man”.94 This was now an awkward situation: the main instigator of the war against Poland was missing, even though tangible preparations were still being made. And, when Count Puchheim joined the camp at Adrianople on 9 May, he found still an enthusiastic Sultan who was keen to take lodgings in the army camp along the Tunca River instead of the palace in the city.95

Puchheim and Schmid were the only significant representatives of the European diplomacy at Adrianople while the Ottoman court was there, and then only for a short while. Schmid pointed out on 11 May the court’s anticipation of Şahin Aga with a peremptory resolution from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. However, he also gave voice to the current belief that some sort of a deal would be cut in the end and no war would be declared despite the preparations.96

Approximately a month after he was removed from office, Abaza Mehmed Pasha showed up again in the Sultan’s presence in Adrianople. Although he had undertaken such a bold move “not without the risk of losing his head”,97 the pasha was forgiven, and he received a robe of honour on 17 May. Whether it was his audacity (of selfless obedience) or perspicacity (of Ottoman politics) that played in his favour is hard to judge, since the pasha had brought more than his head to Adrianople: he presented the Sultan a meaningful pişkeş of forty purses of silver after his arrival, suggesting a gift of two million akçes as a contribution to the treasury.98

Schmid gives us, at this point, quite a rare first-hand experience of the meeting with Abaza Mehmed Pasha at Adrianople on 26 May. After having completed his valedictory audience with the Sultan and deputy grand vizier Bayram Pasha, Puchheim visited Abaza Mehmed

94 TNA, SP, 97/15, 252v (4 May 1634).
95 Khevenhüller, *Annalium Ferdinandeorum*, xii, 1432.
96 OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica 113 (1634), 33r (Adrianople, 11 May 1634). It must nevertheless be pointed out that Transylvanian representatives were also present at the camp, whose Hungarian reports are inaccessible to the present author due to the language barrier.
98 BOA, KK.d 667M, 243; BOA, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi – Defter (hereinafter: TSMA D) 2008, 8v (22 May 1634).
Pasha in his pavilion outside Adrianople in the company of Schmid, who reported this interview on 28 May to Vienna. At the pasha’s quarters (which was a complex of multiple tents with a courtyard in between), the emissaries were kept waiting for a while, during which the pasha washed himself in the opposite pavilion since “he wished to be pure in his friends’ presence”. After joining the Habsburg emissaries, Abaza Pasha exchanged the usual words of courtesy, though he spoke in a quite haughty manner. While the pasha started his conversation discussing peace with the Habsburgs, he soon shifted to questions of frontiers and hence to the Polish issue. Schmid noted that Abaza Pasha greatly admired and highly commended his master Sultan Murad’s army, speaking presumptuously throughout the whole meeting. After the conversation came to its end, Puchheim was awarded a robe of honour, and the Habsburg emissaries left the pasha’s quarters, observing a few hundred arquebusiers and musketeers waiting in order outside of the pavilion.99

Schmid’s observations following the meeting with the pasha were of high importance. The Habsburg resident suggested that Abaza Mehmed, in line with the eagerness mentioned above, had been galvanising the Sultan into starting the campaign towards the Danube after the Kurban Feast (7–11 June) since his arrival at the Ottoman camp. He would have definitely convinced the Sultan if it not had been for the opposing faction, which insisted on delaying the departure of the army until the arrival of Şahin Aga with the Polish king’s response. It is not clear whom this ‘opposing faction’ consisted of, but Schmid’s closing remark that “either Murteza or Abaza Pasha will surely cause the other lose his life in no time” gives some idea.100

In the then circumstances, Schmid believed that the summer would pass without any major campaign.101 Nonetheless, as if to undercut the Habsburg resident’s assessment, commands were sent to the subjects of the Sultan throughout the Empire to prepare for war and to move to Adrianople once more on 30 May.102 And the

99 OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica 113 (1634), 39r (Adrianople, 28 May 1634): The report is a rendition by Michael D’Asquier (the Habsburg Court Interpreter) of Schmid’s report.
100 OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica 113 (1634), 39v (Adrianople, 28 May 1634); ibid. (Annexe of Puchheim Embassy), 283v (Copy of Schmid’s report, 31 May 1634).
101 Ibid. (1634), 39v (Adrianople, 28 May 1634).
102 BSB, Hss Clm 10369, 321v (31 May 1634).
presence of Abaza Pasha in the imperial camp, who had been deposed of Silistra but was nonetheless standing with his head held high over his shoulders and his personal army (kapı halkı) around his quarters, suggested that he was still held in favour by Sultan Murad IV. As long as Abaza Pasha preserved his status, it was hard to be sure of any peace with Poland.

The above statement was reinforced in its veracity when the first news from Poland arrived at Adrianople in early June. As Dutch ambassador Haga described it, while the Sultan was preparing himself to move from Adrianople after the feast, messengers from Şahin Aga and Hetman Koniecpolski arrived in the city. The letters they brought included excuses and apologies by Koniecpolski for the Cossack incursions into the Black Sea and the hetman’s assurance that King Ladislaus desired to preserve the peace. However, even these were not enough to satiate the Sultan’s rage, who resolved to wait only until the end of June for the return of Şahin Aga himself.103

The Ottoman protocol register records expenditures of paper and precious clothes for the preparation of response letters (and their purses) to the ‘Polish King’ and the ‘Polish side’ on 31 May, 4–11–12 June 1634;104 however, only the last of these letters, dated 12 June, to Polish Hetman Koniecpolski seems to have survived.105 As the diplomatic correspondence was thus taking effect, the preparations continued: Count Puchheim, who had left Adrianople at the end of May, observed at Belgrade on 19 June that Murad Pasha (probably the Governor-General of Timisoara) loaded twenty boats on the Danube to transport provisions, ammunition and material to build pontoon bridges down the river. Moreover, the Bosnian governor was also spotted moving towards the Danube, altogether constituting an unspecified large number of people.106

On 29 June, the Ottoman dignitary Arslan Paşazade Ali Pasha joined the Ottoman camp at Adrianople with his two brothers and retinue.107 Ten days later, on 9 July, Ali Pasha staged a public procession of his

103 Ibid., 322r (11 August 1634); The accommodation and travel costs of these messengers are in BOA, KK.d 1826, 84 (25 May & 11 June 1634).
104 BOA, KK.d 667M, 247–8, 251–2.
105 Abrahamowicz, Katalog dokumentów, 292.
106 OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica 113 (Annexe of Puchheim Embassy), 197r–v (Buda, 30 June 1634).
107 BOA, KK.d 667M, 264.
troops. On 15 July, Canpoladzade Mustafa Pasha (Governor-General of Rumelia) similarly arrived at the camp with a procession to display his forces, bringing along all the Rumelian soldiers: the protocol register identifies one by one all of the eleven county governors (sancakbeyleri) and eighteen troop commanders (alaybeyleri) who received robes of honour on that day. Moreover, a Transylvanian embassy was accepted into the deputy grand vizier’s audience.

This Transylvanian representative was most probably István Szentpáli, who had recently been in Poland and witnessed Şahin Aga’s negotiations himself. The Transylvanian agent’s mission at Adrianople focused on trying to convince the Ottomans that the Poles were, while ready for war, desirous of peace with the Ottomans. The Szentpáli embassy had brought along to Adrianople Turkish translations of letters from Polish Hetman Koniecpolski to the Transylvanian Prince to the same effect. Even though Transylvanian Prince György Rakoczi I had responded affirmatively to the Porte’s orders to support the Ottoman army, he thus employed his own diplomacy to try to settle the issue less expensively for himself.

The next day following the arrival of the Rumelian troops (16 July), Murteza Pasha was appointed ser-asker (commander-in-chief) of the Ottoman forces in Europe and received his robes of honour after kissing the Sultan’s hand. Two days later, the county governor of Azov, the Governor-General of Silistra (Halil Pasha), and seven officers of various army corps similarly received robes before departing for Silistra. New treasurers were appointed out of the central treasury staff to serve

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108 Ibid., 268.
109 Ibid., 270.
111 BOA, İbnülemin Hariciye 81, a transcription and Romanian translation can be found in Tasin Gemil, Relatiile Tarilor Romane cu Poarta Otomana in Documente Turceşti: 1601–1712 (Bucharest, 1984), 223. The rest of the series, İbnülemin Hariciye 82 through 85, are also related to the Polish-Ottoman conflict of 1634, but the documents are unfortunately in an unintelligibly poor condition, almost half of the pages being torn apart. The originals of these Ottoman translations appear to be in Romania (Cluj), see Władysław Baran et al. (eds), Sprawozdanie z poszukiwań na Węgrzech dokonanych z ramienia Akademii Umiejętności (Kraków, 1919) 144–5.
112 BOA, KK.d 667M, 271.
113 Ibid., 272.
with Murteza Pasha and over three hundred robes of honour were distributed. Lastly, the Governor-General of Bosnia (Süleyman Pasha), his county governors, alaybeys and other subordinate officials united with the Ottoman army with a similar flamboyant procession. With the arrival of Süleyman Pasha on 23 July, both the Bosnian-Rumelian and the central army troops were now united under the command of Murteza Pasha.

The very next day, carriage rentals were paid for moving the court from Adrianople back to Istanbul: Sultan Murad and the deputy grand vizier were heading back to the capital (along with Abaza Mehmed Pasha), while Murteza Pasha was entrusted the rest of the military undertaking. The Sultan made his ceremonial entrance into Istanbul on 5 August, a relatively detailed account of which is provided by the French representative in the city. Apart from the bureaucratic and administrative cadres of the empire, around six thousand irregular cavalry troops and some four thousand janissaries appointed for the Polish campaign were brought back to the capital from Adrianople.

Around the time the Sultan made it to Istanbul, the Polish authorities already had learnt through their spies that Murad IV would not be leading his army. The Polish reinforcements were gathering towards mid-August in Lwów to join the main Polish army camp. As the Habsburg informant in Cracow enlightens us, the Polish authorities responded to the Ottoman messengers sent from Adrianople that they were ready both for peace and for war.

V

SEALING THE FATE OF THE CAMPAIGN

The aftermath of the Sultan’s return to the capital is indeed difficult to examine insofar as the Polish-Ottoman tension is concerned. Both the Ottoman fiscal accounts and the European emissaries were being

114 Ibid., 273–4.
115 Ibid., KK.d 1826, 125. The itinerary is given as Edirne – Hafsa – Babaeski – Burgaz – Çorlu – Silivri – Istanbul, the payments of foodstuff being made between 27 July and 5 August; BSB, Hss Clm 10369, 322v (11 Aug. 1634).
116 BnF, MS Français, 7093 (Galata, 10 Aug. 1634), 387v–90r.
117 OeStA, HHStA, Polen I, Polonica 56 (1634), 39v–r (Kraków, 4 Aug. 1634). There is a series of letters written with a varying frequency from a certain Dvorjansky (definitely a nickname) to Mathias Arnoldinus von Clarstein, former Habsburg extraordinary envoy to the Commonwealth. It is manifest that the information collected was not always accurate.
kept in the capital with the Sultan, making it impossible to know what happened with Murteza Pasha. Nonetheless, even an Istanbul-centred vantage point sketches a rough picture.

Murteza Pasha had moved the army north from Adrianople on 2 August with a considerable crowd of followers, although it is hard to judge the exact number. The Venetian bailo suggested that there were two thousand janissaries and eighty thousand cavalries in the pasha’s army.\textsuperscript{118} Cornelius Haga offers a minimum of 45,000 provincial troops (thirty thousand Rumelian and fifteen thousand Bosnian soldiers) plus central army forces and the auxiliary units of the vassal states.\textsuperscript{119} In the absence of any first-hand witnesses from the army camp, it is hard to pinpoint an exact figure.

The only number we can be sure of is that of the janissaries: approximately 5,500 janissaries were originally mobilised to accompany Sultan Murad,\textsuperscript{120} but 4,000 of those were brought back from Adrianople to the capital, as suggested by the French embassy report above. In that case, the figure of two thousand janissaries expressed by the Venetian bailo must be a close estimate. As for the remaining central troops, even though the daily treasury register keeps a detailed account of the millions of akçe paid as salaries of the artillery personnel and the bölük sipahis who joined the army, their number is unfortunately not specified.\textsuperscript{121}

As regards the provincial troops, there is no reason to suspect that they would exceed the figures registered in the 1621 roll-call of Sultan Osman II’s Chocim campaign, which pointed out to some five thousand timar (fief) holders from the Rumelian and Bosnian regions,\textsuperscript{122} or less than some fifteen thousand provincial troops when their retainers are included.\textsuperscript{123} The two other groups impossible to

\textsuperscript{118} Hurmuzaki, Documente, 479 (12 Aug. 1634).
\textsuperscript{119} BSB, Hss Clm 10369, 322v (11 Aug. 1634).
\textsuperscript{120} BOA, KK.d 1826, 92: The entry dated 27 June 1634 suggests that 4,145 janissaries from Istanbul were prepared for the march, whereas some 1,400 more were transferred subsequent to their return from the Safavid campaign.
\textsuperscript{121} BOA, KK.d 1826, 43, 234, 238, 255.
\textsuperscript{122} Ömer Lütfü Barkan, ‘Timar’, İslâm Ansiklopedisi (M.E.B.), xii, 1 cilt (1997), 286–333, 328: 4, 157 kilç of Rumelia and 880 kilç of Bosnia out of a total of some 14,000 kilç.
\textsuperscript{123} Rhoads Murphey, Ottoman Warfare 1500–1700 (London, 1999), 41: with regards to retainers, Murphey uses the multiplier of 2.5 for the timar and 4 for the zeamet holders.
determine are the household troops of the governors and governors-general (which should be placed between five to ten thousand, given that even a well-established grand vizier like Fazıl Ahmed Pasha’s household troops varied between 100 and 400 in peacetime during the 1660s), and the Ottoman vassal tributary states (Wallachian, Moldavian, Transylvanian and the Tatar troops of both Crimea and Budjak). In any case, it would be safe to assume that if all these tributaries sent their troops to meet with Murteza Pasha, the total number of Ottoman forces in the 1634 campaign must have surpassed 60,000.

Coming back now to the further unfolding of events, while Murteza Pasha was leading his army slowly toward the Danube, messengers from Poland arrived with Şahin Aga’s letters at the pasha’s camp. As Haga claimed,Şahin Aga would soon be leaving with a Polish embassy, and the news he dispatched pleased the pro-peace viziers at the Porte. Here, Haga must be referring to the letters from the Polish court dated 24 July 1634 addressed to Sultan Murad and Murteza Pasha, which blamed Abaza Pasha for the conflict between the otherwise peaceful neighbours, though the tone of the letter to Murteza Pasha was slightly harsher. Nonetheless, this was not the most important development Haga reported in late August.

“It is the lesson I learned” wrote Haga on 24 August, “that it takes a golden nutcracker to open a tough nut. The more so when Abaza Pasha, the instigator and the promoter of the [Polish] war, was last night killed by strangulation at the Sultan’s behest; and is today nevertheless

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125 At the 1663 campaign against the Habsburgs (Siege of Ujvár), the total number of Crimean-Wallachian-Moldavian reinforcements were calculated at around 20, 000, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, Berol. Ms. Ital. Fol. 53 (Relazione di viaggio a Buda, Costantinopolis, Sofia, Ossek, Vivar e narrazione della campagna dell’anno 1663 in Ungheria), 91r (available online: https://jbc.bj.uj.edu.pl/dlibra/docmetadata?id=360171&from =publication&showContent=true) [Accessed: 9 Nov. 2020]).

126 BSB, Hss Clm 10369, 323r’ (24 Aug. 1634).

127 Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (hereinafter: AGAD), Libri Legationum (hereinafter: LL), 32, 477r–8v (Turcarum Imperatoris, Warsaw, 24 July 1634). This letter also has an Ottoman translation dated 28 July, BOA, TSMA E 813-40.

buried with great pomp, similar to the funeral of a grand vizier who would meet death during the office, enjoying the grace of the Sultan”. The English ambassador believed that even though Sultan Murad was much inclined to spare Abaza Pasha’s life, the outrage of the janissaries against the pasha and the obstacle he posed for any peace with Poland left the Sultan without a choice. In his subsequent letter, Haga specified that Abaza Pasha had been strangled in the garden of the Sultan and was buried in the shrine of (Kuyucu) Murad Pasha (d. 1611).

It is hard to say if Murteza Pasha was behind Abaza Pasha’s murder since the former was hundreds of kilometres away from the capital. Nevertheless, Sultan Murad had brought along the larger part of the janissaries (who were loath to Abaza Mehmed) from Adrianople before the army’s march for the Polish campaign: they were to be employed during the Sultan’s personally led Safavid campaign, the preparations for which would start within a few months following Abaza Pasha’s strangulation. The animosity of both the janissary corps (who hated Abaza Mehmed Pasha from the time he began massacring janissaries in Anatolia to avenge Sultan Osman II’s murder in 1622) and of the other incumbent viziers (such as Bayram and Murteza Pashas) against Abaza Pasha must have necessitated his sacrifice on the eve of the Sultan’s eastern campaign. The idea that Abaza Pasha’s rivals may have dangled his execution before the Sultan as a means to satisfy the Polish authorities and hence the intended audience of the murder was the Polish authorities is a possibility. However, satisfying the domestic elite before starting anew the campaign against the Safavids seems to be more of a necessity.

In any case, Murteza Pasha now seemed to be the only authority in the Polish issue, and he resolved to wait until the arrival of his steward Şahin Aga from the Commonwealth, who had cut a deal with Hetman Koniecpolski on 19 August. According to the understanding

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129 BSB, Hss Clm 10369, 323r’ (24 Aug. 1634).
130 TNA, SP, 97/15, 269r–v (20 Sept. 1634).
131 BSB, Hss Clm 10369, 324r (20 Sept. 1634).
132 BOA, KK.d 1826, 213 (10 Recep 1044/30 Dec. 1634).
133 Nevertheless, it seems to have also served that purpose, too, as the Habsburg correspondent in Kraków suggested: OeStA, HHStA, Polen I, Polonica 56 (1634), 60r (13 Oct. 1634).
134 BSB, Hss Clm 10369, 324r (20 Sept. 1634).
reached, no demolition was necessary since (as Trzebiński had suggested back in March) Şahin Aga confirmed that no fortresses were built on Ottoman soil; moreover, the Polish ‘tribute’ to the Crimean Khanate was now re-termed as the customary ‘gift’, while it was promised that the Cossacks would be kept in check by the Commonwealth. On the Ottoman side, a promise was given that the Tatars were to be removed from Budjak. On 8 September, the six-article-accord which confirmed the former treaties was also approved by Murteza Pasha.\footnote{Dariusz Kołodziejczyk (ed.), Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th–18th Century): An Annotated Edition of ‘Ahdnames and Other Documents (Leiden–Boston–Köln, 1999), 138. Kołodziejczyk also provides the transcriptions and English translations of these two Ottoman temessük{s}, \textit{ibid.}, 437–47.}

It appears that Murteza Pasha had directly forwarded the news of Şahin Aga’s progress, for which the latter’s messenger was awarded a robe of honour on 5 September.\footnote{BOA, KK.d 667M, 295.} Perhaps the forty pieces of robes of honour sent to the pasha on 22 September\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 300.} was meant to be distributed to the Ottoman officers at the army camp for celebrating the end of the campaign. The only step before officially putting the peace into effect was now the issuance of the Polish and the Ottoman ratifications (‘ahdname) of the conditions accepted by both sides.

While the Ottoman army at Murteza Pasha’s command was still at the Danube, the pasha’s confidant Şahin Aga finally made it to Istanbul and was accepted into Bayram Pasha’s audience on 10 October.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 308 (10 Oct. 1634).} The Polish ambassador was expected to arrive in the capital in a few days,\footnote{BSB, Hss Clm 10369, 326v (13 Oct. 1634).} suggesting that Şahin Aga had not travelled the whole way with him. Indeed, nine days after Şahin Aga was received by Bayram Pasha, the Polish ambassador Jakub Zielinski (Cupbearer of Braclaw) arrived at the Ottoman capital. He was similarly received by Bayram Pasha on 21 October, and, on the next day by Sultan Murad himself.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 325r (25 Nov. 1634).} During the audience with the Sultan, as the English ambassador noted, Sultan Murad spoke himself again to the Polish ambassador, saying that for the alimentation (33,000 akçe{s} for the period between 21 October and 5 November) and accommodation (22,500 akçe{s} for furniture; 5,140 akçe{s} for the repair of the kitchen of the lodging they took) costs of Zielinski, see BOA, KK.d 1826, 171, 177, 183, 198, 200, 201. A certain İbrahim Çavuş was appointed as the usher (mubahşir) of the Zielinski embassy.
“he had recalled his forces and forgettinge all injuries past, was willinge
to establish a firme peace, with the Kinge his Master who observinge it
dulie, should finde both clemencie and justice at his hands”. Moreover,
the Sultan (it was alleged) assured him that the Ottoman confirmation
document, i.e. the ‘ahdname, would be issued within a week.141

For Zieliński, who expected a hasty conclusion of the peace and
wished to return by the first week of November,142 two weeks indeed
proved to be enough to close the deal. On 29 and 30 October, cloth
purses (kise-ha) and capsules (kozak) were purchased for the preparation
of the ratification document (‘ahdname),143 which confirmed the former
agreements and corroborated the treaty texts (temessük) signed by
Şahin Aga and Murteza Pasha during the previous months.144 Some
additional letters were written for Polish officials and Koniecpolski on
5 November,145 that is, before Zielinski received his departing robe
of honour from Bayram Pasha, in addition to 52,000 akçe of voyage
payment for his retinue and the çavuşes accompanying them back
home on the next day.146

While Zieliński was busy fulfilling his diplomatic duties in Istanbul,
Murteza Pasha had already started moving the Ottoman army down
over the Danube, starting in late October to withdraw from Giurgiu
to Provadia.147 The Polish King, in the meantime, informed Vienna
that Murteza Pasha had kept his promise and started to send the
Tatars away from Budjak.148 In late September, the Budjak Tatar leader
Kantemir Pasha had indeed been appointed to the Morea, whereas
a certain Süleyman Mirza was given a position below the Danube two
months later.149 By November, the bearer of news from Murteza Pasha

141 TNA, SP, 97/15, 275r (27 Oct. 1634); OeStA, HHStA, Polen I, Polonica 56
(1634), 71r (Dvorjansky to Matthias Arnoldino Clarstain, Kraków, 23 Nov. 1634).
142 TNA, SP, 97/15, 275v (27 Oct. 1634).
143 BOA, KK.d 667M, 315.
144 This ratification (dated 23 Oct./1 Nov. 1634, though 30 October seems to
be the more accurate date) is also transcribed and translated; see Kołodziejczyk,
Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, 448–57.
145 Ibid. For travel reimbursement, BOA, KK.d 1826, 192 (Fi 14 Ca 1044/6 Nov.
1634); BSB, Hss Clm 10369, 325r (25 Nov. 1634).
146 Abrahamowicz, Katalog dokumentów, 302–3.
147 OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica 113 (1634), 58r (Estratto d’una lettera di
148 BOA, KK.d 266, 11 (24 Sept. 1634) and 45 (29 Nov. 1634).
that Kantemir had already crossed the Danube was awarded a robe of honour,150 and Cracow confirmed that the Tatars were crossing either the Danube for the Ottoman territories, or the Dniestr for the Crimea.151 Towards the end of the month, both Hetman Koniecpolski and Murteza Pasha were reported to have dismissed and sent away their troops to winter quarters.152

As a reward for his meritorious services and useful efforts in the peace negotiations, both with Austrians in the 1620s and with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as an emissary in the most recent episode, Müteferrika Şahin Aga was promoted to the office of kethiýa-ýı bevvaban-ýı dergah-ý ‘ali (commander of the imperial gatekeepers) on 18 November,153 receiving his robe of honour for the appointment from the deputy grand vizier on the next day.154 His long-time patron, Murteza Pasha, finally reached Istanbul and kissed the Sultan’s hand on 6 December 1634,155 amidst hectic preparations for the Sultan’s eastern campaign for the next spring.

VI
CONCLUSIONS

Polish-Ottoman diplomacy thus managed to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. The diplomatic traffic, i.e. the frequent back-and-forth voyages of the diplomats between the Ottoman and Polish-Lithuanian courts on an almost yearly basis continued after the Zieliński embassy. But thanks to them, the peace established in 1634 would be preserved for around four decades, even though causes of dissension (Tatar and Cossack raids) periodically kept resurfacing.

The Polish campaign of Sultan Murad IV, which obviously ended with nothing more than the conquest of the beautiful landscape of

150 Ibid., KK.d 667M, 317.
151 ÖeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica 113 (1634), 60r (Kraków, 2 Nov. 1634); ÖeStA, HHStA, Polen I, Polonica 56 (1634), 71r (Dvorjansky to Arnoldino Clarstain, Kraków, 23 Nov. 1634).
152 BSB, Hss Clm 10369, 325r (25 Nov. 1634); ÖeStA, HHStA, Polen I, Polonica 56 (1634), 71r (Dvorjansky to Arnoldino Clarstain, Kraków, 23 Nov. 1634).
153 BOA, Bâb-i Âsafi Ruús Kalemi Defterleri (A. RSK.d) 1506, 22; BOA, MAD.d 5589, 7.
154 BOA, KK.d 667M, 324.
155 Ibid., 329.
Adrianople by the Ottoman court and soldiers in 1634, underscored various details of the bilateral relations. To start with, Aleksander Trzebiński’s consistent employment of help from the Habsburg or French embassies portrayed how the Polish diplomacy functioned in the absence of a resident diplomatic agent in the Ottoman capital. The Habsburg ambassador Count Puchheim’s mediation in the conflict was similarly quite an exceptional co-operation of two extraordinary Catholic envoys in the Ottoman capital. Moreover, within the framework of the conflict the Polish embassies underwent rare moments of a diplomatic scandal, such as being denied entrance to the imperial capital (Borucki) or receiving outright threats from the Sultan himself (Trzebiński).

The resolution of the conflict also says something about the practice of Ottoman diplomacy at the time. In a period when career diplomacy was not an option, the Ottomans relied on ad hoc messengers chosen from among the servants of the palace, such as müteferrika Şahin Aga. Of course, early modern Ottoman factionalism also found its reflection in diplomacy too, since the latter assumed his diplomatic duty thanks mostly to his patron Murteza Pasha. Capitalising on his service during the Ottoman-Polish conflict in 1630 as a member of the Murteza Pasha clan, the aga now got his embassy to Warsaw in 1634 crowned with a promotion within the court. This might suggest that even though the use of diplomats per se was perhaps regarded as unnecessary, the efforts of diplomatic mediators were at least appreciated by the early modern Ottomans.

The crisis of 1633–4 further revealed the dynamics of Ottoman daily politics. If the diplomatic reports of the era are to be credited, Sultan Murad was in a way prompted by Abaza Mehmed Pasha to undertake the Polish campaign. However, the opposition at the Porte somehow seems to have brought the Sultan’s ambitions to a halt and led him, in the end, to turn his attention to the eastern campaign. Thus the present study argues that it was the insistence of the opposition represented by Murteza Pasha (who wished to give priority to a military settling of scores with Persia) that helped abort the Polish campaign, rather than a change of the Sultan’s mind, who allegedly, as suggested by Hering, renounced the Polish conflict upon hearing of the end of the Smolensk War.156

156 Gunnar Hering, Ökumenisches Patriarchat, 244.
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Lastly, the enmity between Murteza and Abaza Mehmed Pashas, the former as the promoter and the latter as the inhibitor of peace with the Commonwealth, was clearly reflected in the European embassy reports. Moreover, Sultan Murad’s ultimate decision to sacrifice Abaza Mehmed Pasha in favour of the janissaries might point to the limits and checks on a seventeenth century sultan’s domestic authority.\(^{157}\) However, more case studies and analyses are required in order to comprehensively evaluate the actual functioning of the bilateral diplomacy of the time, and with reference thereto to domestic politics in early modern Eastern Europe.

proofreading James Hartzell

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\(^{157}\) It is tempting to read this event as a ‘constitutionalist’ check on the imperial power, as recently suggested by the ‘Second Ottoman Empire’ framework, see Baki Tezcan, ‘The Second Empire: The Transformation of the Ottoman Polity in the Early Modern Era’, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, xxix, 3 (2009), 556–72, 567.
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