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# Education as a Personal Journey: An Excursion into Jung's Notion of Individuation

Edukacja jako osobista podróż.  
Wyprawa ku Jungowskiemu  
pojęciu indywiduacji

In his (The) *Significance of Unconscious in Individual Education*, Jung counterposes analysis to other forms of education which he places under the general rubric of “collective education”. The point that Jung makes is that whereas collective education aims to produce individuals moulded by the general rules, principles and methods necessary for society, the former aims to subordinate rules, principles and systems to the “one purpose of bringing out the specific individuality of the pupil”.<sup>1</sup> Implicit in this distinction is that collective education is aimed at imbuing individuals with a conscious collective mind that allows them to partake in the various affairs of the society to which they belong, whereas as individual education, i.e. analysis, aims at fostering the incorporation of unconscious contents into the mind of the individual. It is

<sup>1</sup> C.G. Jung, *The Significance of Unconscious in Individual Education*, *Collected Works* (CW 17), London 1954, par. 256.

#### KEY WORDS

Carl Gustav Jung, individuation, analytical training, person, apophaticism, Christian orthodox tradition

#### SŁOWA KLUCZOWE

Carl Gustav Jung, indywiduacja, szkolenie analityczne, osoba, apofatyzm, chrześcijańska tradycja prawosławna

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this dialectic between the conscious and the unconscious that the analyst aims to facilitate in her patient's life. As such, she is perhaps more of an educator than a doctor:

The unconscious progressiveness and the conscious regressiveness together form a pair of opposites which, as it were, keeps the scales balanced. The influence of the educator tilts the balance in favor of progression.<sup>2</sup>

It is in this vein that Jung asserts the instrumental role of dreams in analytical work. As products of the unconscious, dreams arise, according to Jung, in order to correct one's one-sided conscious attitude. As such, in their pictorial language dreams carry the potential of being conduits for new potentialities in the life of the patient/student. Yet, Jung strongly contests the idea of a general theory in the interpretation of dreams,

Indeed, I am persuaded that, in view of the tremendous irrationality and individuality of dreams, it may be altogether outside the bounds of possibility to construct a popular theory. Why should we believe that everything without exception is a fit subject for science? It might be better to look upon dreams as being more in the nature of works of art instead of mere observational data for the scientist [emphasis mine].<sup>3</sup>

In his essay on the *Development of Personality*, Jung describes the achievement of personality in terms of

“the development of the whole human being” and a bit further, Personality is the supreme realization of the innate idiosyncrasy of a living being. It is an act of high courage flung in the face of life, the absolute affirmation of all that constitutes the individual, the most successful adaptation to the universal conditions of existence coupled with the greatest possible freedom for self-determination.<sup>4</sup>

In the same essay Jung starkly contrasts individuation to individualism. The former, Jung explains, is driven by forceful necessity, the closest equivalent to the brute force of nature. It amounts to obeying,

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<sup>2</sup> Ibidem, par. 281.

<sup>3</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>4</sup> C.G. Jung, *The Development of Personality*, Collected Works (CW 17), London 1954, par. 289.

whatever the costs and despite the prohibitions imposed by persevering social conventions, the law of one's nature. Attending to one's law is to be in the service of one's vocation, to attend to the inner voice with an attitude and a conscious deliberation equivalent to that of a religious man towards God.<sup>5</sup>

I will never forget the first time I heard these words,

Only the man who can consciously assent to the power of the inner voice becomes a personality.<sup>6</sup>

They were recounted to me by Dr. Antony Stevens during a memorable long walk around the garden at his home in Corfu. I had reached out to him for advice as I was embarking on a journey that eventually led to my Zurich training. Looking back at that time, I see myself walking in the darkness with a heavy heart, a sense of failure in life and a premonition of impending disasters. In my CV, I could see one after another a series of failures, which all signified that I was at the end of my road. In my home country in Greece, every road seemed to end at a *cul-de-sac* as every attempt at existing was fraught with the experience of having my energies quelled...

Jung grew up at the end of a religious era. As Murray Stein has suggested, his work on Christianity was an attempt to rehabilitate an ailing tradition psychotherapeutically. Jung's father, a pastor who had fallen out of faith, provided an example of how false homage to tradition was a stifling, deadening affair. In his extensive work with Christian symbolism, Jung would eventually suggest that a trinitarian God would need to evolve into a quaternitarian expression as to properly incorporate those aspects of psychic wholeness, the feminine principle and evil, which Christianity had repressed in its official doctrines. Jung had arrived at these contentious conclusions by an approach to the religious which he described as both empirical and phenomenological. His underlying premise was that even though no scientific speculations could be made as to the actual existence of God, clinical practice could corroborate the existence of a god-principle operating as an archetypal image of man's fullest potential and unity of personality. In an elusive expression reminiscent of German idealism, Jung described this

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<sup>5</sup> Ibidem, par. 296.

<sup>6</sup> Ibidem, par. 308.



unifying principle as both the center and the circumference of psychic life embracing both the unconscious and conscious realms of psychic life. During his own creative illness, which had thrust Jung into a vertiginous journey into the deep recesses of his interiority, as well as in the dreams of his clients, Jung could point with scientific confidence to the existence and operation of a principle that strove towards psychic wholeness, integration and the mediation of opposites. In his wide study of symbolism in myths, tales, and religious traditions including gnosticism and alchemy, Jung could point to the phenomenology of the self. In that vein, Christianity's trinitarian god was a collective archetypal expression of the Self in Jung's eyes. To the extent that individuation consisted in expressing a union of opposites arising from the confrontation of the consciousness with the unconscious, a trinitarian god was for Jung the culmination of the symbolic expression of psychic wholeness at the collective level. As such, Christian symbolism was long anticipated and prefigured by other religions and traditions.

In fact, in his essay on the *Psychological Approach to the Trinity*, Jung begins with what he calls "pre-Christian parallels" to the doctrine of Trinity. By means of a historical survey he uncovers the use of "triads" in the history of religious ideas. Such examples of pre-figuration of the Christian Trinity are found in Egyptian theology where Jung observes,

(an) essential unity (*homousia*) of God as father and son, both represented by the king. The third person appears in the form of Ka-mutef ("the bull of his mother"), who is none other than the ka, the procreative power of the deity. In it and though it father and son are combined not in a triad but in a triunity.<sup>7</sup>

Similarly, Jung discovers a pre-figuration of Trinity in Greece in the Pythagorean theory of numbers as well as in Plato's *Timaeus*. In a characteristic moment where Jung discusses the significance of Pythagorean number theory via Plato on the natural philosophy of the Middle Ages he explains:

Unity, the absolute One, cannot be numbered, it is indefinable and unknowable; only when it appears as a unit, the number one, is it knowable, for the "Other" which is required for this act of knowing is lacking in

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<sup>7</sup> C.G. Jung, *Psychology and Religion*, Collected Works (CW 11), London 1958, par. 177.

the condition of the One. Three is an unfolding of the One to a condition where it can be known-unity become recognizable; had it not been resolved into the polarity of the One and the Other, it would have remained fixed in a condition devoid of every quality. Three therefore appears as a suitable synonym for a process of development of time, and thus forms a parallel to the self-revelation of the Deity as the absolute One unfolded in Three.<sup>8</sup>

Jung then moves into a rather cryptic passage from Plato's *Ti-maeus*.<sup>9</sup> From this passage Jung extracts the idea that one mean can only unite two opposites in a two dimensional plane. In three-dimensional reality a second mean would be necessary to unite opposite elements. Jung interprets quaternity as psychic wholeness and concludes that Plato had to

content himself with the harmony of airy thought-structures that lacked weight, and with a paper surface that lacked depth.<sup>10</sup>

What Jung is here suggesting is that Plato's pre-figuration of trinity/quaternity was still to a great extent unconscious.<sup>11</sup> It was much later in the Christian era that these pre-figurations of the archetype of wholeness in ancient theology and philosophy would find a clear-

<sup>8</sup> Ibidem, par. 180.

<sup>9</sup> "Hence the god, when he began to put together the body of the universe, set about making it of fire and earth. But two things alone cannot be satisfactorily united without a third; for there must be some bond between them drawing them together. And of all bonds the best is that which makes itself and then it connects a unity in the fullest sense; and it is of the nature of a continued geometrical proportion to effect this most perfectly. For whenever, of three numbers, the middle one between and two that are either solids or planes [i.e., cubes or squares] is such that, as the first is to it, so is to the last, and conversely as the last is to the middle, so is the middle to the first, then since the middle becomes first and last, and again the last and first become middle, in that way all will necessarily come to play the same part toward one another, and by so doing they will make a unity". Quoted in C.G. Jung, CW 11, par. 181.

<sup>10</sup> Ibidem, par. 185.

<sup>11</sup> "Thus the history of the Trinity presents itself as the gradual crystallization of an archetype that molds the anthropomorphic conceptions of father and son, of life, and of different persons into an archetypal and numinous figure, the «Most Holy Three-in-One». The contemporary witnesses of these events apprehended it as something that modern psychology would call a psychic presence outside consciousness. If there is a consensus of opinion in respect of an idea, as there is here and always has been, then we are entitled to speak of a collective presence". Ibidem, par. 224.



er expression. It is this line of thought, which implicitly suggests an archetypal progression towards wholeness operating not merely in the individual human psyche, but in the collective evolution of human history, which allowed Jung to also claim that the Christian expression of the archetype of wholeness was still lacking the fourth as the element of evil had not been openly acknowledged and given its proper place in Christian doctrine.<sup>12</sup>

In his *Answer to Job* Jung would engage in a confrontation with his own God image in order to interpret the Old Testament Book of Job. It is said that in a letter to A. Jaffe Jung, upon finishing the book, suggested that he had “landed a whale”.<sup>13</sup> I have been wondering what he might have meant by that expression. Is this in any way related to Jung’s contention that the traditional view of Christ’s redemption reflects a one-sided way of thinking and to counter pose, as a much more valid interpretation of atonement, one whereby Christ’s sacrifice is not a repayment of a human debt to God but the converse, a reparation of a wrong committed by God to man (Job)? Is the implication that allows this insight to emerge that God’s (Yaweh’s) confrontation with Job forces God (the Self) to become more conscious and to re-incarnate in a new archetypal configuration (Trinitarian) that represents a further step forward? If finite man (Job) confronted by the Old Testament God can make God change as to reappear in a New Testament form, the implication is that man’s confrontation with the God image may affect the noumenal realm where the archetypes reside, outside of time and space, and precipitate a new Self constellation at the collective unconscious. Confronting his own God image, Jung seems to have thus arrived at the notion of a God-image/Self in the form of quaternity. One only needs to read Jung’s correspondence with Viktor White, a Dominican priest who had taken an active interest in analytical psychology and became a friend to Jung before their relationship deteriorated following the publication of *Answer to Job*, to realize how strongly Jung felt about his assertions in that book, how certain he was about the whale that he had landed.

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<sup>12</sup> “But the Christian definition of God as the *summum bonum* excludes the Evil One right from the start, despite the fact that in the Old Testament he was still one of the «sons of God». Hence the devil remained outside the Trinity as the «ape of God» and in opposition to it”. Ibidem, par. 252.

<sup>13</sup> I attribute this to a lecture by Murray Stein at ISAP Zurich.

I admit to not being capable of partaking in that certainty at the end of my training in Zurich. This disconnect at the very core of my intimate Jungian process certainly requires some reckoning. For a long time I have been inclined to hold Jung accountable for my persevering unease. I searched with a passion to identify a weakness in his method, a flaw in his appropriation of Kantian philosophy, an aporia in his conception of the psyche. Yet, the more I would engage in these academic tasks, the more I would feel that I was failing to wholly take stock of what was truly at stake for me behind this feeling of discontentment. In his autobiographical book, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* (MDR), Jung describes how a part of his personality, attune to meaning and to historical continuity, was “in secret accord with the Middle Ages”.<sup>14</sup>

His father was a pastor of the reformed church, his country was Switzerland. His cultural and religious background was embedded within the heritage bequeathed by German Idealism, by Goethe, Schopenhauer and Schleiermacher. The philosophy of his times was that of Nietzsche, who had delivered the news that god had died. How different is this to the world I was born into! How different is this heritage to my own. I grew up in Athens in the 1970s and 80s at a time of general euphoria and materialism following the military Junta of 1967–1974. My parents and grandparents were secular, we never went to church nor was I ever introduced to the cultural heritage and way of life associated with the Eastern Church. The Eastern Greek Orthodox Church never went through a reformation, not did it ever properly adopt the vernacular, nor did it ever show a proclivity towards engaging into dialogue with other currents of thought. Its purpose, it seems, has been to remain a vestige of Byzantium and to act as a gatekeeper to the true “Greek faith” as it is inculcated in religious practice and ceremony through the ages. The world I was brought up in was a world primarily laying emphasis on material advancement, eager to partake in new possibilities presenting in Greece and abroad with no commensurate concern for tradition, psyche or culture. My world, as I can say now with the benefit of hindsight, was a decadent world. My academic training was conducted in the US in a language foreign to my immediate sensibilities; my subsequent

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<sup>14</sup> C.G. Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, London 1995, p. 107.



readings were very much influenced by the ideas ascendant at the time. It took me years to recover, if I have ever fully recovered, from the news delivered by way of Michel Foucault, that the “subject is dead”.<sup>15</sup> From the vantage point of my own decadent background, from the point of view of my estranged relationship to my own cultural heritage, from the perspective of my fragmented identity, Jung’s propositions about individuation, wholeness, interiority and the natural psyche were life-giving, yet, at the same time, also reminders of possibilities not readily available in a congruent relationship with my own culture of origin and conditioning.

Ultimately, I think it was through loss and dispossession that I experienced a certain awakening. How is it that what is, is? Despite all the possible intellectual confusion about identity, despite and beyond all possible discussion and argumentation about the social constructiveness of one’s (vacuous) subjectivity, there remains un-thematized, as Martin Heidegger first pointed out in his discussion of *Being and Time*, the fact of Being. I am not sure if Rudolph Otto’s term, so instrumental in Jung’s description of the relationship towards the God image, the numinous, captures the feeling and effect of the first awakening to Being as event that I would only want to go as far as only to hint at here before lapsing into silence.

Perhaps this is already a point of rupture. Where would a culturally dispossessed and estranged Greek secular subject turn today in order to place a certain life-altering experience which is not properly religious? Can the rich heritage of German idealism, the protestant tradition, analytical psychology or even psychoanalysis writ-large, offer a genuine recourse if one wishes to genuinely speak in terms that

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<sup>15</sup> “First of all, we can say that today’s writing has freed itself from the theme of expression. Referring only to itself, but without being restricted to the confines of its interiority, writing is identified with its own unfolded exteriority. This means that it is an interplay of signs arranged less according to its signified content than according to the very nature of the signifier. Writing unfolds like a game [*jeu*] that invariably goes beyond its own rules and transgresses its limits. In writing, the point is not to manifest or exalt the act of writing, nor is it to pin the subject within language; it is rather, a question of creating a space into which the writing subject constantly disappears” [emphasis mine]. M. Foucault, “What is an Author”, in: idem, *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, ed. J.D. Faubion, New York 1998, p. 206.



are not entirely borrowed? That is another terrifying moment, the moment where one realizes that one does not properly have access to a heritage that one can claim as one's own so that experiences can be spoken of authentically. Stripped of this, how can we even begin to talk intimately?

There is a wonderful book, a forgotten book, *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe* by Alexandre Koyre (1892–1964). It tells the story of how the world was transformed through philosophical and scientific revolution. It speaks of how the seventeenth century marked the beginning of a momentous change by means of the secularization of consciousness, which amounted to the substitution of the medieval and ancient objectivism with modern subjectivism. Nature and being were no longer to be subject to man's contemplation, they were rather to become objects for his domination and mastery. As one follows the tortuous thread of an argument regarding the size of the cosmos and the place of god in it, starting from Nicholas of Cusa in 1440 all the way to Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Newton, Berkeley and Leibniz in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, one gets a sense of the long process of sublations that were necessary in order for God to depart from our world. This is an opportunity to recall that conflicts regarding spirit and matter or between individuality and universality also existed in ancient consciousness. Yet, these types of strains, which in many ways Jungian psychology also addresses, were more easily resolved in antiquity due to a belief that world and self alike were structured to fulfill intelligible moral ends. Reason (nous) in that vein was not a mere faculty, but an actual quality of a hierarchically structured cosmos.<sup>16</sup> The closing paragraph of Koyre's magnificent book is worth citing:

The Infinite Universe of the New Cosmology, infinite in Duration as well as in Extension, in which eternal matter in accordance with eternal and necessary laws moves endlessly and aimlessly in eternal space, inherited all the ontological attributes of Divinity. Yet, only those—all the others the departed God took away with Him.<sup>17</sup>

Karl Barth in his monumental study of *Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century* speaks of the 18<sup>th</sup> century in terms of the rise of 'absolute man':

<sup>16</sup> J. Seigal, *The Idea of the Self*, New York 2005, p. 51.

<sup>17</sup> A. Koyre, *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe*, London 2008, p. 200.



Man, who discovers his own power and ability, the potentiality dormant in his humanity, that is, his human being as such, and looks upon it as the final, the real and absolute, I mean as something 'detached', self-justifying, with its own authority and power, which can therefore set in motion in all direction and without restraint—this man is absolute man.<sup>18</sup>

In his self-assured assertiveness the man of the 18<sup>th</sup> century believed that he could actually vouch for the existence of God by virtue of his own reality. The voice of reason existing within every man was a reliable agent for virtuous acts in the world. In the same vein, Barth describes how this attitude towards self and world manifested itself in the symphonic music of the Age of Absolutism. Mastery over the musical instrument found its corollary in the aim to humanize an amorphous mass of possible sounds,

forcing, imposing and stamping upon it not any individual style as such, but rather the law known to each individual human being, the order of sounds that he invents, i.e. finds already within himself as an objectively valid order [emphasis mine].<sup>19</sup>

The eighteenth century also marked the beginning of an attempt to make Christianity an individual and inward matter; man experiencing himself in the facticity of his life becomes the epicenter of the secret.<sup>20</sup> Barth associates this process of individualization with man finding in himself something eternal, almighty, wise, good, glorious in conjunction with turning man himself into an authority over all things outside of God.<sup>21</sup> The powerful Pietist reform movement of the time is a token of these emerging attitudes toward (individual) self and god. The main tenants of this movement in a schematic form are particularly telling in terms of receiving the echoes of a theological tradition subsisting, as a bedrock, in the background of a long cultural heritage in terms of which the genealogy of analytical psychology could much later be retraced. (a) The pietist is a man who fights for the reality, related to god, that he has discovered in himself; (b) he knows no object which is not in the first place really within him and which must therefore be brought in, be made in-

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<sup>18</sup> K. Barth, *Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century*, London 2001, p. 23.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 57.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 99.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibidem*.

ward, and be transposed to where it authentically belongs (the self); (c) he wants to believe, but his Christian belief is predicated in the primacy of the criterion of taking himself seriously; (d) he seeks to appropriate Christianity by means of also stripping it from all those elements, which he cannot assimilate; (e) he is, as a consequence of the above, oriented towards transforming the unassimilable fact of the Christian church and its creed in the incarnation of the word in Jesus Christ. Such external objects seem too far removed from the center of the existence of the individualized pietist.<sup>22</sup>

The vulgar individualism that Jung castigated in his essay on the *Development of Personality* and which he contrasted to his notion of individuation is certainly not the individualism that Karl Barth describes in his historical exposition. In fact, what is striking is how close Christian individualism comes to Jungian sensibilities when described by Karl Barth:

Individualism does not mean a denial of authority, but the suppression of all alien external authority in favor of the inner, personal authority of the man whose ultimate foundation as an individual is in himself, an authority close to and indeed related to the authority of God in a way that could sometimes be clarified in particular details. Christian individualism had, in this respect also, to mean the incorporation of the external authority of the Church, dogma, in the last resort even the Bible, into a unity with the authority which the Christian man has, in the last resort, as his own...the authority of the Bible and of ministry had their limited, clearly visible bounds. And both could be bypassed. Beyond them was at all events the authority of a voice that could no longer be distinguished clearly from the voice of the pious individual: the so-called 'inner voice' [emphasis mine].<sup>23</sup>

To amplify the relevance of the reference to 'foundation' in Barth's discussion of the individual, I turn to Marcel Gauchet, who in his significant book, *Disenchantment of the World*, makes a compelling case as to a counter-intuitive understanding of secularism, comprehended not in opposition to the religious, but as the result of the natural evolution of the history of religion. As such, the secular is constituted within the religious field. Gauchet defines the essence of

<sup>22</sup> Ibidem, p. 100.

<sup>23</sup> Ibidem, p. 104.



the religious act in terms of its antihistorical frame of mind. In the pure state of the religious, Gauchet posits, the present is placed in a relationship of absolute dependence to a mythical past; moreover, the religious,

guarantees the irrevocable allegiance of all human activities to their inaugural truth...The key to the inter-relationship between religion and society, as well as the secret of the nature of the religious, lies in its radical conservatism which structurally combines co-presence to the origin with disjunction from the originary moment, combining unstinting conformity to what has been definitively founded with a separated foundation [emphasis mine].<sup>24</sup>

As we think of 'foundation' it is worth recalling that in antiquity humans and deities lived in a cyclical world with no discernible moment of foundation/creation. As such, Gods and humans lived in a world which essentially remained outside their ability to truly affect. Creation is associated with the rise of monotheism in what Karl Jaspers calls the Axial Age. The appearance of a transcendent God-creator who lies outside of the immanent world of humans enables for the first time in human history the conjoining of two hitherto separate dimensions, that of the original and the actual.<sup>25</sup> From now on, One, a single subjectivized God, is the originator of the world while at the same time determining the order of things through his omnipotent will. Humans are thus ushered in a world of duality with a rift separating their world from that of the creator. Meaning is not pre-established; rather God's will has to be continuously discovered and construed through reason and interpretation,

Of course, no one can ever attain the height of divine wisdom; but wisdom's goals and acts, insofar as we can grasp them, are dependent on what we ourselves can inwardly reconstruct [emphasis mine].<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> M. Gauchet, *The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion*, Princeton, N.J. 1997, p. 25.

<sup>25</sup> Ibidem, p. 52.

<sup>26</sup> Ibidem, p. 55.

Along this process, God's greatness is linked and correlated to the rising autonomy of humans as cognitive subjects. Therein probably lies the grounds for a potential objection to Jung's affinity with Gnosticism with implications for both the notion of conjunction of opposites and the incorporation of Evil in the god-image. A wholesome god is not a transcendent god, he is a god re-inscribed in the pre-axial ontology of the one,

once the ancient legacy reached its peak in St. Thomas Summa, the ultimate monument to conciliation and the Christian hierarchizing of being, any future attempt to unite what had been irretrievably separated became superfluous. There could be no further integration of opposites. Original tensions were unleashed though the insuperable division of swords and realms, and this rending would generate a way of reasoning wholly different to that born of the Greek city [emphasis mine].<sup>27</sup>

It is in this sense that Gauchet discerns religion's demise in modernity. Not in terms of the decline of the church but in terms of the reversal of a conserving logic integrating us into being, nature, and culture defined in terms of the ontology of the one, namely, a hierarchical view of being, where humans and gods coexist in a preexisting cosmos and where the notion of a foundation is projected onto the past within a uni-some symbolic universe of meaning. At the same time, and here lies I think the impact-fullness of this exposition, it is by means of religion's —Judeo-Christianity's—rendering of God as absolute and transcendent that the true possibility for an autonomous and imminent sphere was constituted in human history. The demise of the cosmos, the insertion of an ontological split, were necessary preconditions for the later emergence of our modern world of individuality, democracy, history, technology and (even) capitalism.<sup>28</sup> But, if the emergence of a secular, immanent world (of individual autonomous subjects) has been predicated on the prior positing of

<sup>27</sup> Ibidem, p. 150.

<sup>28</sup> "The Christian god's transcendence was necessary for the conception of a purely physical and completely isomorphic world. This world was removed from any spiritual animating force and all meaningful correspondences between the parts and the whole, between the parts and the cardinal principle coordinating and justifying the world's basic elements". Ibidem, p. 145.



an omnipotent and transcendent god, we can also begin to appreciate how the death of religion would necessarily reintroduce the question of foundation at the level of the individual subject. In that vein, keeping the theme of individualism/individuation in mind, it is worth also pondering, with Gauchet, if the split between the conscious and the unconscious, introduced in the 1900s, had the effect of positing the question of foundation outside the (conscious) human subject in order to then retain the individual possibility of properly and ownedly acceding to one's full self, i.e., individuate.

But, where would I turn in my own tradition in order to begin to come to terms with the question of personality in equivalent terms to the ones that have been driving this exploration up to this point? Though admittedly there are rich philosophical, theological and mystical sources in the background, the transport to a modern psychological language, without grafts from western European streams of thought and experience, in the absence of anything equivalent to a Reformation, or an autochthonous Enlightenment, is poised to be a challenging matter plagued with gaps, lacunae and aporias. For the purposes of this essay and in order to set the ground for a further exposition of such foundations elsewhere, I would like to conclude by schematically introducing some key aspects on (a) the tradition of apophaticism; (b) the elaboration of Trinity by the Greek Fathers and (c) by the notion of the person as evidenced in Greek Orthodox tradition.

The gist of *apophaticism* as expressed by the Cappadocian Fathers amounts to the belief that it is the “unknowable depth of things”, that which constitutes their true, indefinable essence. In theology, this amounts to refusing to attribute to god any properties as in affirmative theology, god is neither One, nor Unity. Rather, trinitarian god transcends this antinomy, being in essence unknowable in what He is,

God is not stone, he is not fire [...]. God is not being, he is not the good. At each step of this ascent as one comes upon loftier images or ideas, it is necessary to guard against making of them a concept, ‘an idol of God’.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> V. Lossky, *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church*, Cambridge 2005, pp. 31, 40.

The doctrine of the Trinity defines god as a trinity of hypostases, three persons with absolute existential difference, but with a community of essence, will and activity.<sup>30</sup> According to Lossky, the theological notion of hypostasis was purged from its Aristotelian content by the eastern Fathers and, as such,

means not so much individual as person, in the modern sense of the word. Indeed, our ideas of human personality, of that personal quality which makes every human being unique, to be expressed only in terms of itself: this idea of person comes to us from Christian theology. The philosophy of antiquity knew only human individuals. The human person cannot be expressed in concepts.<sup>31</sup>

While human persons or hypostases are isolated, the mystery of the Trinity consists in how three such hypostases may dwell in one another. For apophatic sensibilities to make a numeric scheme out of this mystery as to then add a fourth, for completion or wholeness, is surely an abomination. There is no doubt that one can find in such a doctrine prefigurations; the very language of the doctrine that expresses it, is, as we have seen a borrowed language from Greek antiquity. Yet, such references had to be superseded in order for something else to be expressed elliptically, apophatically. What this mystery is and whence it comes is, I would posit by way of closing, unknown whether one wishes to approach such questions from a historical, theological or a psychological point of view. In our secular time, it has befallen us to ask similar questions about the human personality. What is a human person? Whence does she come? How does one become one? What is it to be one? All of these and a whole other host of such questions are profound mysteries to this student of analytical psychology, destined to forever worship and ultimately not to know.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>30</sup> C. Yannaras, *Elements of Faith*, Edinburgh 1991, p. 20.

<sup>31</sup> V. Lossky, *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church*, op. cit., p. 53.

<sup>32</sup> From an entirely different register, I turn to William J. Richardson's discussion of Heidegger's reading of Plato with regard to παιδεία, "Παιδεία is the conversion of the entire man in the depths of his Being. It is not simply an accumulation of mere knowledge but a complete transformation by reason of which man is transferred from the domain of beings that he first of all and the most part encounters (v.g. Shadows) into another realm where beings in their essence shine forth. To make an adaptation to this new realm and consequently to assume an orientation toward that which shines-forth as supremely un-concealed (the Ideas)—this is the essence of παιδεία". W.J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, New York 2003, p. 387.



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### Streszczenie Summary

Po sześciu miesiącach Jungowskich szkoleń w Zurychu zadanie mówienia o „indywiduacji” wciąż pozostaje dla mnie kłopotliwym wyzwaniem. W swym artykule, bardziej niż na usiłowaniu rekapitulacji Jungowskiej teorii indywiduacji, skupiam się na naszkicowaniu pobieżnych zarysów modelu badania indywiduacji w szerszych ramach, obejmujących moje doświadczenia i rozmaite lektury. Jako taki powyższy tekst oznacza raczej punkt wyjścia, ogólny przewodnik po badaniach, a nie próbę powiązania rozmaitych wątków lub wyczerpujące omówienie krytyczne. Po setkach godzin kursów, praktyk psychiatrycznych, analiz dokonywanych w ramach ćwiczeń,

After more than six years of Jungian training in Zurich, the task of talking about “individuation” is still a perplexing one. Rather than attempting to recapitulate Jung’s theory of individuation, this exposé aims to sketch the rough contours of a matrix for the exploration of individuation in a wider frame which includes my experiences and diverse readings. As such, this text marks a point of departure, a general itinerary for a continued exploration rather than an attempt to tie threads together or to offer an exhaustive critique. After hundreds of hours of training analysis, courses, psychiatric internships, control cases and seminars, aimed at training a candidate into an analyst, I find myself reflecting on that experience as a whole. Where am I as I reach the final stages of my training in comparison to where I started? What does this “education” actually consist of? What has



been learned? What can be put in words as to be properly recounted? Does the gist of psychoanalytic training consist in learning a theory and in mastering a certain analytical/clinical toolkit ensuing from it? Or is there something else, additional or extraneous, that provides the under-bed, the foundation, for one's actual conversion into an analyst that needs to occur as a consequence of the training process? In the same vein, what is it that analysis affects, as a therapeutic method, to its clients/patients/trainees? What does its cure consist of? Does it properly belong to the realm of medicine, where psychotherapy firmly resides in our days, or is rather education its more natural and authentic field of belonging? Such questions, although not directly addressed, nevertheless inform this ongoing inquiry from the background.

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przypadków kontrolnych i seminariów, które miały uczynić ze mnie analityka, zastanawiam się nad tym doświadczeniem jako całością. Gdzie znajduję się po osiągnięciu ostatnich etapów mojego szkolenia, a gdzie było moje miejsce, gdy owo szkolenie się rozpoczynało? Z czego w rzeczywistości składa się to „kształcenie”? Czego mnie nauczono? Jakich słów należałoby użyć, by to właściwie opisać? Czy istotę psychoanalitycznego szkolenia można sprowadzić do wyuczenia się teorii i opanowania pewnych analitycznych/klinicznych metod, które z niej wynikają? Czy też tkwi w tym jeszcze coś dodatkowego lub pobocznego, co stanowi bazę, fundament rzeczywistej przemiany w analityka, a co należy traktować jako konsekwencję procesu szkoleniowego? Podążając dalej w tym samym duchu: w jaki sposób analiza, jako metoda terapeutyczna, oddziałuje na klientów/pacjentów/praktykantów? Z czego składa się jej działanie terapeutyczne? Czy właściwie należy ona do medycyny, w obrębie której w dzisiejszych czasach sytuuje się psychoterapię, czy też raczej do edukacji, jako bardziej dla niej naturalnej i bardziej w stosunku do niej komplementarnej? Takie pytania, choć postawione niebezpośrednio, informują o kontekście tych ciągłych zapytywań, choć jest to informacja niejako z drugiego planu.