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From Feelings to Norms

T. Czeżowski's Conception of Norms in the Context of a Brentanist Classification of Mental Phenomena

In the Brentanist tradition, scholars divided mental phenomena into four types: presentations, beliefs, feelings, and strivings.¹ This division

¹ Naturally, there were times when one or the other element of the classification was questioned. The most famous attempt was made by Brentano himself. In his book, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, F. Brentano adopted a three-part division of mental phenomena into presentations, judgments, and emotional experiences (the experience of love). From today's perspective, the first two parts do not raise any doubts. However, the third type of mental phenomena, the experience of love, has sparked debate and discussion. For Brentano, the reason for this reduction is the essential congruence between feelings and strivings that is experienced in internal experience when relating to reality. Brentano emphasizes that in a series of phenomena between willing and striving, subsequent phenomena gradually transition into the next (342–343). He argues that acknowledging qualitative differences among these phenomena would require recognizing each one as a distinct class. However, he concludes that the differences between them “are not as profound as between a presentation and a judgment” (343), and, therefore, it is better to consider them as belonging to a single class of mental phenomena. The unity of this class is also supported by the similarity of the class of feelings to the acts of judgment: “just as a thing can become the content of a judgment in so far as it is acceptable as true or worthy of

represents, to some extent, a return to the two intersecting divisions of mental acts common in the scholastic tradition: sensory-intellectual and cognitive-appetitive. In that case, we would have the following list of types of acts: cognitive-sensory (involving external and internal senses), cognitive-intellectual (rational activities, among which we would distinguish using concepts, making judgments, and reasoning, and, later, also defining and making distinctions), appetitive-sensory (involving feelings), and appetitive-intellectual (involving acts of will and decisions).² As can be seen, this first distinction differs from the traditional distinction mentioned above, as it questions the existence of purely sensory-cognitive activities. Instead, it points out that every cognitive sensory act has an intellectual component. The presented division of phenomena into four groups dominated in the works of Twardowski and his students,

being rejected as false, so too can it become the content of a phenomenon of this third fundamental class only insofar as it is, for us (in the broadest sense of the word), pleasant or suitable as good, or unpleasant or unsuitable as bad" (346). Brentano's views were critically examined by Twardowski. In the most general terms, Twardowski expresses his critical stance on Brentano's views on the combination of all appetitive phenomena in one group in his philosophical self-portrait, *W sprawie klasyfikacji zjawisk psychicznych* [*On the Classification of Mental Phenomena*], as follows: "it does not seem [...] correct to classify desires, strivings, and longings as manifestations of the will. They are usually considered a lower, while the will is considered the highest stage of their tension transitioning into action. The source of the error lies precisely in the fact that desires, just like acts of will, ultimately lead to certain actions. However, despite this similarity in effects, there is a profound psychological difference between desires and decisions. Decisions, despite appearances to the contrary, do not differ in intensity (similarly as it is the case with judgments). Besides, all desire can be decomposed into simpler factors, belonging to the previous groups of mental phenomena, namely: (1) the presentation of the object; 2) the belief that the object has no reality; 3) unpleasant feelings resulting from it; 4) the conviction that the actualization of the object would be connected with the feeling of pleasure. Therefore, desires should be considered as a combination of feelings and beliefs: as feelings arising from certain beliefs"; Kazimierz Twardowski, "W sprawie klasyfikacji zjawisk psychicznych" [*On the Classification of Psychic Phenomena*] (1900) in: Kazimierz Twardowski, *Myśl, mowa i czyn* [*Thought, Speech, and Act*], 137–139. In Twardowski's lectures (from 1903–1904), published in his *Wybór pism psychologicznych i pedagogicznych* [*The Selection of Psychological and Pedagogical Writings*], we can find an elaborate criticism of Brentano's position, often referring to von Ehrenfels's arguments; cf. Kazimierz Twardowski, "Psychologia pożądań i woli" [*Psychology of Desires and Will*] (lectures from 1903–1904), in: *Wybór pism psychologicznych i pedagogicznych* [*Selected psychological and pedagogical writings*] (Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne), 203–242.

² Stępień 1999, 171.

Ajdukiewicz, Witwicki, and Czeżowski. Twardowski's students considered this division to be unquestionable to some extent, so it was included in propaedeutic books.³ Since the characteristics of cognitive mental acts influence the analysis of feelings and the conclusions drawn from this analysis for Czeżowski's conception of evaluations and norms, I will now briefly present Czeżowski's findings regarding presentations and beliefs.

II. Cognitive mental activities: beliefs and presentations*

1) Beliefs

Czeżowski describes beliefs as thoughts expressed in declarative sentences. He mentions the following properties (moments or aspects) that make up beliefs:

- a) Quality of the belief: the affirmation or negation that takes place in the belief;
- b) Value of the belief: logical value, i.e., the truth (positive value) or falsehood (negative value) of the sentence expressing the belief, and emotional value (which is how we evaluate the belief);
- c) The (intentional) object of the belief, i.e., the object affirmed (or denied) in the belief (for instance, the belief that "it is no longer raining" denies that it is raining). This means that in the belief, we can have:

* Czeżowski places the distinctions concerning beliefs and presentations in the section *Psychology of knowledge* (analogously, in Ajdukiewicz's work, this section is called the *Psychology of cognitive processes*). This is in accordance with a certain pattern adopted in philosophy propaedeutics written in this tradition, which consist of three sections: on the process of knowledge creation, on the structure of knowledge, and on conduct. Accordingly, by applying Twardowski's distinction between acts and products, the considerations concerning propositions and names, as products of acts, are placed in the section devoted to logic, which is the science of the structure of knowledge.

³ Cf. Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, *Propedeutyka filozofii* [Introduction to Philosophy] (1938); Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Główne zasady nauk filozoficznych* [The Main Principles of Philosophical Sciences], 3rd ed. (Wrocław 1959). It is worth mentioning that many of the distinctions noted in these propaedeutics are also found in the textbook by Alojzy Hoefler, *Zasady psychologii* [Principles of Psychology], trans. Z. Zawirski (Lwów: Księgarnia Naukowa 1922, 2nd ed. 1927). (A copy of this book from Czeżowski's library can be found in the collections of the Kujańsko-Pomorska Digital Library, with the translator's dedication: "To my beloved colleague Dr. Tadeusz Czeżowski, with warm regards, the translator", Lwów 3.07.1926)

- d) An assertion (or a denial) of the existence of the object of the belief. This assertion or denial is the basis for determining the truth (or falsehood) of the belief;⁴
- e) in each belief, the following can be distinguished:
 - the action moment (the act of belief), that is, the act of thinking (or “the act of arousing and experiencing a belief”) and
 - the moment of content or the content of the belief (what I think or a thought). Czeżowski calls the act of belief – the act of judgment, and its content – a judgment.
- f) The foundation, i.e., the presentation of the object of belief; “In order to determine that it is raining, you must first know what rain is [...] In presentations, we represent objects, i.e., we make them present to ourselves; in our beliefs, we affirm or deny them [...] By making present to ourselves an object which we affirm or deny in the belief, the presentation as the basis of the belief is its necessary condition” (Czeżowski 1959, 9).

2) Presentations

A presentation is a mental phenomenon “in which we make an object present, that is, we get to know what it is like, without yet affirming or denying its existence” (Czeżowski 1959, 9). We distinguish the following types of presentations, according to how they can be made present to us (“according to how they arise”):

- a) ideas, which are intuitive presentations (they are called intuitive from Lat. *intueor* – I look). Their intuitiveness consists of their immediacy or directness, meaning that “in an idea, I make the object itself present to myself, and not the speech sign or another symbol representing it (...), the object itself, as it were, in its own person, stands before us in thought” (Czeżowski 1959, 11). Their intuitiveness also consists of their wholeness or totality, “meaning that the object of the idea becomes present in it at once in its entirety, as if in a single glance” (ibid.) and
- b) concepts, which arise “when we make objects or events present to ourselves differently, not as seen or heard, remembered or dreamed in fantasy, but as described in a description or defined in a definition” (ibid., 10). Concepts are a type of symbolic representation (because they are formed with the use of signs from

⁴ “This belief is true in which one affirms what exists or denies what does not exist; the belief is false in the contrary cases” (Czeżowski 1958, 8).

ordinary or symbolic language), and, in this sense, they are indirect representations. Concepts are also discursive presentations, i.e. their objects are not given in their entirety but are composed of parts. As Czeżowski sums it up, the symbolic nature of concepts is contrasted with the directedness of ideas, and the discursiveness of concepts is contrasted with the wholeness of the apprehension of the object in an idea. Additionally, one can state that concepts are the result of abstraction and, as such, have an abstract, non-concrete character, and, in this, they are contrasted with the concreteness of ideas (Czeżowski 1959, 35).

Within each presentation, we can distinguish:

- a) the act of presentation, or the act of making an object present to oneself. Acts of presentation are considered of the same kind when the object is made present in the same way, e.g., when I see the same object in two successive perceptive images. They are considered to be of different kinds when the object is made present in different ways, for instance, I perceive it one time and recall it another time (*ibid.*, 10);
 - b) the content of the presentation, i.e., what fulfills the presentation; it can be a view of the object of the presentation (in this sense, the content is one-sided); presentations with different content may have the same subject;
 - c) the object of the presentation, i.e., what I make present to myself in the act of presentation. While the content of the presentation exists in every presentation, its object does not always exist (e.g., there are no objects of those presentations about which I make true negative judgments, *ibid.*, 10).
- 3) Relationships between presentations and beliefs:
- a) Every presentation is a necessary condition for a belief, as it serves as its foundation. On the other hand:
 - b) a presentation is most often the motive for the emergence of a belief in which the existence of its object is affirmed or denied. In this sense, the presentation is a sufficient condition for the belief. This motive can be an idea (the motive for a perceptual, recollective, or imaginative belief) or a concept. In the latter case, "the concept becomes the motive for a belief in which we affirm that the object of the concept, if it exists, possesses the properties explicitly mentioned in the description or definition of the concept, or those that result from them indirectly" (*ibid.*, 41).

III. Appetitive Mental Activities

The second type of mental phenomena, distinct from cognitive phenomena, are appetitive phenomena. For clarity, it should be noted that Czeżowski does not use this term; he simply speaks of phenomena different from presentations and beliefs. He treats these phenomena as indefinable, offering instead a descriptive characterization of them that refers to phenomena known to the reader from inner experience.⁵ He distinguishes two types of phenomena here, in accordance with the Brentanist tradition: feelings and desires.

1) Feelings

According to Czeżowski, the defining characteristic of feelings is the pleasure or displeasure experienced in a given mental experience.⁶

- a) Feelings are mental wholes. In addition to their specific feeling elements (pleasure, pain),⁷ they also include cognitive elements

⁵ The classification of desiderative phenomena can be found (in the spirit of the School) in the third section of *Główne zasady* [*The Main Principles*], namely, in the part *On Conduct*. Czeżowski introduces the characteristics of feelings in the following way: "It is pleasant to drink a cup of water on a scorching summer day, and it is unpleasant to experience a headache. It is pleasant to find oneself in a bright, warm room, and unpleasant to take a walk on a rainy autumn evening. [...] These are examples of mental phenomena different from presentations and beliefs [...] we call them feelings" (Czeżowski 1959, 189). And it is similar with respect to strivings. "All strivings share a characteristic factor, which we call precisely the conative/desiderative factor: we know it from our own inner experience, but we are unable to analyze or describe it as it presents itself to us as something elementary" (ibid., 202).

⁶ Witwicki points out that the term *feeling* can refer either to a simple mental fact, namely the sensation of pleasure or pain, or to designate complex states in which pleasure or displeasure can be distinguished. It can also designate affective dispositions, which are the lasting conditions for the emergence of emotional states of a certain kind (e.g. a person's love for someone that lasts for years. In many dispositions, we can identify their somatic basis; cf. Witwicki 1963, 7–8). It is also worth noting that Witwicki devoted almost 300 pages of the second volume of his *Psychology* to the analysis of feelings (though this topic, including, also, the numerous classifications of feelings contained in the *Psychology*, is worthy of separate analysis).

⁷ It is interesting that members of the School did not analyze those most specific emotional qualities, namely, pleasure and displeasure, even though the very concept of pleasure is as old as philosophy itself. Brentano, as Chisholm, for example, shows, reduced pleasure and pain (displeasure) to sensory acts. Chisholm (Chisholm 1987, 60) points out that "Brentano says that sensory plea-

like presentations or beliefs. These cognitive elements are the psychological basis for the emotional qualities that accompany them.⁸

- b) Pleasure and displeasure, as emotional qualities, can occur with varying degrees of intensity. Unlike the qualities of beliefs, emotional qualities can also occur simultaneously, creating ambivalent feelings that are both pleasant and unpleasant at the same time.
- c) Every feeling has its intentional object, which is provided by the psychological basis of the feeling. If the intentional object of a feeling is its own basis (e.g., the sensation of touching soft, warm fur), then we are dealing with an experiential feeling (examples include sensory feelings and introspective experiences).

sure and sensory pain are acts of love and hate that are directed upon 'the appearance [*Erscheinung*]' of certain sense qualities, but not upon the qualities themselves. Stumpf, who could not accept this view, said that, according to Brentano, 'the agreeableness of an odor is a love, not of the odor, but of the smelling of that odor'. According to Brentano, then, we must distinguish three features of sensory pleasure and sensory pain: (i) the intentional act of love or hate; (ii) the act of sensing upon which this love or hate is directed; and (iii) the sense quality which is the content ('primary object') of that act of sensing". Therefore, the very concepts of pleasure and displeasure are referred back to acts of love (a turning toward) and hatred (a turning away from). Furthermore, Chisholm points out: "The sensory pleasure, Brentano says, redounds upon the nonsensory pleasure. Brentano is thus telling us something about psychical causation: that when we come to have a belief in the existence of something that we love or approve, this fact causes us to take pleasure in the experience of certain sense-qualities. I take him to mean that the believing together with the nonsensory love or approval causes us to have sensations involving sensory pleasure. What Brentano calls the nonsensory pleasure is not the sensory pleasure itself, nor is it the love or approval that is directed upon the object of the belief. The nonsensory pleasure consists in the love or approval one then has for the combined experience – that of contemplating the intentional object of the belief and having the resultant sensory pleasure" (ibid., 62). Various philosophical theories of pleasure are presented in a synthetic overview, for example, by W. Alston in the entry "Pleasure" in Paul Edwards' *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (vol. 6, 341–347).

⁸ "The psychological basis for the feeling of joy that comes from a past successful skiing trip is the recollection of that trip, which is composed of a group of reproductive ideas and recollective beliefs" (ibid., 190).

- d) Feelings that are not experiential are called objective feelings.⁹ We distinguish between aesthetic feelings (likings)¹⁰ and feelings of value (sentiments or emotions)¹¹ depending on whether the basis of the feeling is a presentation or a belief, respectively.
- e) Pleasant aesthetic feelings arise when we see beautiful things, and unpleasant ones when we see unpleasant things. At the same time, for an aesthetic feeling to arise, the mere content of the presentation is sufficient. These feelings emerge against the background of presentations, primary or derivative ideas, or from concepts in which we represent the objects of aesthetic feelings to ourselves.
- f) If, in the perception of an object, we focus exclusively on nothing but the content of the presentation itself and divert our attention away from all other properties the object possesses, the relationships it has, or its functions, we adopt an aesthetic attitude. In this sense, the aesthetic feeling is called a presentational feeling "because of the very fact that, in an aesthetic attitude, the presentation of the object towards which the aesthetic feeling is directed is a sufficient psychological basis for the emergence of the feeling" (ibid., 193).

⁹ In contrast to subjective/experiential feelings, objective feelings are evaluative; that is, their characteristic component is an evaluation (Czeżowski 1959, 197). An evaluation does not occur in the case of subjective/experiential feelings. This raises a question about subjective feelings: if pleasure and pain in objective feelings are the result of an evaluation, then what is the reason for the pleasure and displeasure associated with subjective feelings? It is not a reference to (or a recognition of) values.

¹⁰ Insightful analyses of aesthetic feelings can be found in Witwicki's work *Psychologia [Psychology]* (Witwicki 1963, 113–156).

¹¹ In his work *Strach i lęk [Fear and Anxiety]* (Czeżowski 1958), Czeżowski presented a more elaborate classification of feelings to replace Brentano's. Brentano's classification is carried out on a psychological foundation and encompasses experiential (subjective) feelings (directed toward the experience) and objective feelings (directed toward the object). The latter category comprises value feelings and aesthetic feelings. Meanwhile, Czeżowski's expanded classification of feelings is a two-tiered system. At the first level, he categorizes feelings into active and inactive (or contemplative). At the second level, they are divided into experiential and objective feelings. Then, among active feelings, we find experiential feelings and feelings of value, and among inactive feelings, we also find experiential (subjective) feelings and aesthetic feelings.

Value feelings (emotions or sentiments) include such feelings as love, joy, hatred, sadness, anger, indignation, pity, and envy. These feelings have the following common characteristics:

- a) They are more intense than likings (in this, they are more like sensory feelings, e.g. moral pain can be as acute as physical pain). "This refers to the displeasure that accompanies worry, and likewise the pain of sadness, despair, and jealousy, which can be as acute as the displeasure of sensory pain, whereas the displeasure of seeing an ugly sight never takes on such a character" (ibid., 196).
- b) The difference between feelings of liking and value feelings is not a difference in intensity but a difference in quality (analogous to the difference between a reproductive and a perceptive idea).¹²
- c) Sentiments are accompanied by bodily changes that do not occur with likings (e.g. a change in breathing, muscle tension, or a change in heart rate).¹³
- d) Feelings of sentiment are belief feelings. This means that for their formation, a mere presentation of the object of a feeling is not sufficient. Instead, it is necessary to affirm that the object of the feeling actually exists. "Anger and indignation will not arise in me, even if I were to present outrageous things to myself as accurately as possible, until I form the conviction that such a thing exists (or at least could appear in the future)"¹⁴ (196).

¹² It seems that reproductive images are pretty "pale" in comparison with perceptive images, and it would be analogous to compare likings and sentiments. This is likely the result of the fact that we may have a liking based solely on a presentation, without an accompanying judgment regarding the existence/non-existence of the object.

¹³ Witwicki notes that it is rather difficult to imagine an aesthetic attitude in which we have aesthetic feelings but experience no emotion, which is to say, to find feelings of liking devoid of desire. He states: "If we wanted to talk about the experience of beauty only where no desires arise in a person toward the object that pleases them, the question is whether we would find such states at all. In any case, we would have to exclude from the realm of aesthetic experiences a great many such states that we consider and want to consider to be typical aesthetic experiences" (Witwicki 1963, 114).

¹⁴ In Czeżowski's words, we can talk about "objective feelings whose intentional object is constituted by an external object of a representation or judgment. The latter are, in turn, divided into aesthetic feelings and feelings of value. An objective feeling is a whole that comprises the representation of the object of the feeling and the judgment evaluating this object as beautiful or good: this judgment requires an appropriate attitude, either aesthetic or moral, as the necessary and sufficient condition of its formation. In the feelings of value, apart from an evaluating judgment, there is a realizing judgment which asserts the reality,

- e) According to Czeżowski, intellectual feelings, also called feelings of knowledge, belong to one type of feelings of value. Their object is knowledge – we value knowledge, and the ascertaining of our possession of knowledge is accompanied by satisfaction, and thus pleasure. Social feelings (e.g. attachment and respect for the products of collective life) have a similar character (*ibid.*, 199).¹⁵
- (2) Strivings are the fourth type of mental phenomena. As Czeżowski writes, they encompass various phenomena, including desires, longings, wants, and decisions.¹⁶ He states: “All strivings share a characteristic factor, which we call precisely the desiderative/conative factor: we know it from our own inner experience, but we are unable to analyze or describe it as it presents itself to us as something elementary” (Czeżowski 1959, 202). Strivings have an active character, as they push us to “realize or preserve valuable objects and remove what we evaluate negatively” (*ibid.*). They seem to be similar to those movements that Brentano called acts of love or hate.¹⁷

actual or potential, of the object of the feeling: the necessary and sufficient condition of the formation of this judgment is attention, i.e. the cognitive attitude that helps ascertain the existence or possibility. These cognitive elements, a representation and the two judgments, are complemented by an emotional tinge in the form of comfort or discomfort to form the whole of a feeling” (Czeżowski 2000, 191).

¹⁵ Hoefler introduces a division of feelings into those based on presentations and those based on judgments (belief feelings). He then divides the latter into feelings of knowledge and feelings of value (Hoefler 1927, 110). In contrast, Witwicki considers intellectual feelings not as a type of feelings of value, but as a separate class of feelings. He defines them as “pleasant and unpleasant states, connected with and related to the activity of cognition – that is, judging and reasoning – regardless of what the object of cognition might be, and regardless of whether the judgment is affirmative or negative” (Witwicki 1963, 156).

¹⁶ For Hoefler, phenomena of this type are called appetitive phenomena. Hoefler defines an appetitive phenomenon as “that mental element which is common to decision and wishing, striving and resisting, and to cravings and aversions, as well as whims and lusts, etc.” (Hoefler 1927, 139). The appetitive phenomena are characterized by quality (cravings and aversions), intensity, and temporal determination: “with the attainment of its ‘goal’, every appetitive state as such comes to an end” (*ibid.*, 140).

¹⁷ Since our goal is to show how to get from the theory of feelings to the theory of norms, we will omit a further characterization of the appetitive phenomena.

3) Evaluations and evaluative attitudes

Both in feelings of liking and feelings of value (emotions or sentiments), the basic component is an evaluation of the object of feeling. A positive aesthetic feeling is one whose object we evaluate positively as beautiful, just as a positive feeling of value is one whose object we evaluate positively as good. Czeżowski writes: "An evaluation is an affirmation or a negation, just like a belief; we also sometimes call evaluations evaluative or valuing beliefs. However, evaluations differ from beliefs [...] in that they do not concern the existence of objects. In a belief about a certain object, we affirm or deny its existence; in an aesthetic evaluation, we affirm or deny its beauty, that is, its aesthetic value" (ibid., 194). Similarly, an evaluation of value is a component of a feeling of value (emotion or sentiment), "but it is an evaluation of a different kind than in the other case. We consider the object of love, joy, or admiration valuable, precious, and good, and we ascribe a positive value to it; we call the object of anger, indignation, or sadness bad, and we ascribe a negative value to it. The object of an emotion is never indifferent, worthless, or neither good nor bad. All of the listed determinations, and others like them [...], we encompass by means of the general term 'value'"¹⁸ (ibid., 197). And thus, we categorize feelings of value into positive and negative ones. Positive feelings of value arise when we affirm the existence of an object with a positive value or the non-existence of an object with a negative value. Negative feelings arise in the opposite cases [when we affirm the existence of an object with a negative value or the non-existence of an object with a positive value].

As Czeżowski emphasizes in his analysis of perceptual beliefs, attention is a necessary condition for perception. As he explains, "this term denotes an attitude (an attitude of the mind) that is characteristic of the act of perceiving and fades with it, an attitude, as it were, of tension [...]. The action of attention can be compared to the action of a focusing lens; it narrows the scope of consciousness and focuses it in such a way that the object on which attention is directed comes, as it were, into full light, while all others remain, as it were, outside the field of vision" (ibid.,

¹⁸ Two points come to mind here: a) It might be consistent to speak of evaluative (valuing) beliefs in the sense that just as in "ordinary" beliefs we affirm the existence of *being*, so in evaluative beliefs we affirm the existence of the beauty or the good of an object; b) Czeżowski, contrary to common usage, understands the term "value" narrowly as "the good", which is why he classifies emotions as feelings of value. This is a somewhat too narrow an understanding, as we usually speak of "aesthetic values, ethical values", etc.

47–48). Attention enables the subject to transition from perceptual images to perceptions, or perceptual beliefs, in which we can affirm that what is given in them exists. As Czeżowski puts it: “to notice anything is the same as to perceive it, and to perceive is not only to make an object present to oneself, but also to affirm that this object exists” (45). Attention is also a sufficient condition for the formation of a belief in the sense that “a perceptual image that finds itself in the field of attention acquires a motivational force sufficient for a perceptual belief to appear” (Czeżowski 1989, 97). As Czeżowski points out, the manner in which axiological assessments are made is analogous. He states: “The motive for making an evaluation is a presentation of the evaluated object always and only when the evaluating person adopts a specific evaluative attitude – moral or aesthetic – toward the object” (Czeżowski 1989, 98), an attitude related to attention as a cognitive attitude. In evaluations, the presentation becomes a motive for the affirmation of value, just as attention is a motive for the affirmation of existence.

Based on the above analogy, we can draw the following consequences regarding the genesis of evaluations:¹⁹

- 1) aesthetic evaluations and value evaluations are singular, just like perceptual beliefs, because their object is an empirical individual;
- 2) evaluations – or, more precisely, evaluative sentences (evaluative judgments) – are (like beliefs) affirmative or negative, and true or false. An evaluation that affirms the value of an object is true when the object is in fact valuable;

¹⁹ In his lecture report, Czeżowski briefly summarized his view on the similarity between perceptual beliefs and evaluations: “Evaluations [...] show a striking similarity to perceptual beliefs, which, in accordance with the Brentanist tradition, we understand as existential statements”. Namely: a) the conditions for the formation of both are similar. In both cases, the motive of the formation becomes the perceptual image of an object against the background of an appropriate subjective attitude, either cognitive (attention) or evaluative; b) both are singular, affirmative or negative, accurate or erroneous. An analogous definition of truth can be created for both; c) both are intuitive in a specific way and unprovable; however, they can be verified by comparing them in different cases – one can also train one’s ability to evaluate, just like the ability to perceive; d) both analogously enter into emotional associations (perceptual beliefs into intellectual feelings, and evaluations into feelings of value); e) both can be generalized in an analogous way; f) both are similarly devoid of content; that is, both the existence that is affirmed in perceptual judgments and the good that is affirmed in evaluations do not possess representational content; instead, both of these concepts belong to what are called transcendentals in classical logic (Czeżowski 1950: 192–193), cited in (Konstańczak 2012, 554).

- 3) the comparison of values is usually made by ranking them as higher or lower. However, values can sometimes be incommensurable, meaning they cannot be directly compared (e.g. health and wealth – each of them can be singled out based on a different criterion);
- 4) the degree of a value is not directly related to the intensity of emotion or the degree of pleasure/pain. Czeżowski explains that “an emotion to whose object we attribute a high degree of value, is much weaker in intensity than the emotions whose objects are trivialities” (Czeżowski 1959, 200);²⁰
- 5) evaluations are justified in a direct manner, similarly to how perceptual beliefs are justified. “That is, in affirming the value of an object, we rely on a specific obviousness of the evaluation, which – again like a perceptual belief – cannot become the conclusion of a deductive proof” (ibid., 98).²¹ It is worth emphasizing at this point that the thesis regarding the empirical nature of ethics, which Czeżowski repeatedly stressed, is based precisely on the recognition of this analogy between the affirmation of existence in perceptual judgments (beliefs) and the affirmation of value in evaluative judgments. This analogy was challenged, for example, by Jacek Hołówka, who pointed out that postulating such an analogy constitutes a strong ontological commitment. According to Hołówka, “Czeżowski uses this parallelism to show that the world of value is as real as the world of natural objects. But he underestimates dissimilarities. Our sense data are vivid, irrepressible, overwhelming and testify in every respect to the existence of the external world”.

Our primary evaluations, on the other hand, are vague, non-representational, i.e. they are not replicas of the external objects, and although they are intersubjectively verifiable to some extent

²⁰ This remark suggests that emotions have the character of “detectors of values” and not of their “measuring mechanisms”, just as a perceptual judgment is a detector of the existence of an object.

²¹ Elsewhere, Czeżowski wrote: “Such evaluations are analogous to perceptual judgments. Just as perceptual beliefs arise based on the presentation of an object in perception when attention, as a perceptive attitude, is directed at it, so a primary evaluation also arises based on the presentation of the evaluated object when a specific evaluative attitude – analogous to attention and well known to moralists [...] – is directed at it [one could call this evaluative attitude, by analogy, an attentiveness to values – ML]. The ability to evaluate is developed through practice, just like the ability to observe” (Czeżowski 1976/1989, 163).

they are verifiable in a much lower degree than sense data. Moreover, sense data are transmitted by sense organs, while there are no sense organs for the primary evaluations. Finally, it is doubtful whether they appear before emotions. It is commonly believed that values ride 'piggyback' on emotions, not the other way round. Czeżowski gives no explicit argument for the opposite claim. All these reservations must make us suspicious of the Czeżowski's contention that values are as real as observable objects (Hołówka 1989, 199–200).

Łukasiewicz addresses Hołówka's criticism just mentioned (Łukasiewicz 2002, 288) and observes that a) the claim that primary evaluations are not as vivid or irresistible as sensory experience can be questioned (for instance, he says, "when I learn of the fact of child abuse by adults, my value judgment about this fact is no less vivid, clear, or irresistible than when, for example, I see grease stains on my sweater");²² b) although there is indeed no sensory organ that registers values, there is likewise no sensory organ "which would allow for the registration of complex numbers or strings or objects of a similar type. This fact, however, does not deprive physics of its character of an empirical science" (ibid., 288); c) Czeżowski discussed a certain equivalent of sensory organs in the field of axiology, which would be the disposition to make accurate evaluations; it would be a certain intellectual capacity (ibid., 289); d) and finally, Łukasiewicz notes the inaccuracy of the last of Hołówka's accusations, namely the claim that it is doubtful that evaluations precede emotions. (However, Łukasiewicz does not provide any substantive reasons to support his suggestion.)

- 6) Despite their obviousness, evaluations may be false (just like perceptual beliefs). False (erroneous) evaluations are eliminated through verification, that is, "by way of repeating the same kind of evaluations under different conditions and comparing them with one another" (ibid., 98).

²² It is, of course, debatable whether we are talking here about the vividness of the actually made evaluations (these may occur with different vividness in different people) or about a certain ideal of the evaluative attitude. As it turns out, no such problem arises when discussing the vividness of sensory perceptions. It seems that the difficulty pointed out by Hołówka is indeed a real one: values simply cannot be seen in the same way as objects given in sensory perception are seen.

- 7) Czeżowski emphasizes that we cannot adopt the subjectivist view according to which feelings are motives for evaluations. It is the other way around, that is, it is the presentation of the object that is the motive for evaluation against the backdrop of an evaluating attitude: “we will have neither aesthetic liking nor a feeling of value [...] without a more or less explicit evaluation. Therefore, evaluation should be considered a necessary condition for a pleasant or unpleasant liking or sentiment” (ibid., 99). In the case of likings, it would be the presentation of the object with along its aesthetic evaluation, while in the case of emotions – the belief affirming the existence of the object of emotion, independent of the issuance of an evaluation (an evaluation can also be made concerning a non-existent object). According to Czeżowski, what is important is that affective qualities such as pleasure or displeasure appear against the background of the evaluation that has been made.²³
- 8) Individual evaluations (just like beliefs) can be generalized. “Generalizations lead to the establishment of an evaluation criterion. If we observe in a series of cases that objects of evaluation possess a common feature, this becomes the basis for a generalization stating that each object having that common feature is subject to the same kind of evaluation, that is, that it is good, bad, beautiful, tragic, sublime, etc. The criterion of evaluation is always some empirical feature, while the value predicated in the evaluation is not an empirical feature of the object” (Czeżowski 1989, 99).²⁴
- 9) Values such as goodness and beauty that we identify in evaluations are analogous to existence that we affirm in judgments (beliefs). At the same time, as Czeżowski emphasizes, “these are not terms that would denote any objects or features of objects [...] Evaluations add nothing to the object’s description. [...] Existence, goodness, or beauty are not things that we identify in presentations as qualities of objects. Rather, we affirm them in beliefs or evaluations”. These are transcendentals, that is, modifications of being. Unlike categories, adding or removing them from among

²³ Cf. footnote 15.

²⁴ “We evaluate actions that bear the characteristics of theft, fraud, etc., as bad, and prudent, creative, or sacrificial actions as good. The marks of the first kind are criteria for badness, while the marks of the second kind are criteria for goodness. Analogously, beliefs are generalized to define criteria for existence. For example, the empirical criterion of existence is affirmed in the sentence, “whatever is an object of perception, exists”, while another sentence of this type is the metaphysical principle, “whatever acts, exists” (ibid.).

the determining traits of an object does not affect determination²⁵ (ibid., 100). It is worth noting here that the way we understand transcendentals influences the entire analysis of evaluative judgments. According to the traditional doctrine of transcendentals, for instance, its Thomistic version, we should make a distinction between the absolute transcendental properties of being, which are being, essence, non-contradiction, and unity, and the relative transcendental properties, which are truth, goodness, and beauty (Krapiec 1978). The latter are distinguished due to their subordination relation to the intellect and will, either separately or taken together. [Transcendental] Being considered in the subordination relation to the intellect is [transcendental] truth, expressed by the principle of sufficient reason. Being considered in the subordination relation to the will is the [transcendental] good, expressed by the principle of finality (teleology). On the other hand, following the tradition that goes back to Aquinas, beauty constitutes a joint subordination relation to both the intellect (cognition) and will (desire), and in this sense, it is a derivative of transcendental truth and the good.²⁶ In light of this conception, if we assume that ex-

²⁵ "According to the analogy with the modal statement, 'it is necessary that S is P', the statement 'it is good that S is P' means that the fact affirmed in the statement 'S is P' is 'good'. Therefore, the good is not the object of presentation, but of judgment; in this respect, the good is a concept analogous to existence, necessity, and possibility. The good cannot be represented, just as existence cannot be represented. Like existence, the good can only be affirmed. On the other hand, the criteria for what makes something good are representable" (Czeżowski 1989, 115). It is worth emphasizing here, as Łukasiewicz points out, that accepting a formal analogy between existence and the good is fundamental to proper understanding of the metaphysics of Czeżowski's moral realism. At the same time, for Czeżowski, existence is not a characteristic of an object because a) every judgment is reducible to an existential judgment; b) when we present an object to ourselves, we cannot determine whether the object of the representation exists or not; only a judgment can determine the existence of an object; and c) existence (and the good) is not a characteristic because, in natural language it is not symbolized by means of a predicate. As Łukasiewicz puts it, "The words 'good', 'beautiful', 'necessary', or 'true' are morphologically similar to predicates, but they are not predicates. Rather, they are logical operators: propositional (sentential) functors [with a sentential argument – ML's note] (Łukasiewicz 2009a, 159–161), cf. also Łukasiewicz 2009b, 666–667.

²⁶ If we were to call the complete human cognitive-appetitive reaction an aesthetic experience – or an experience of beauty – then such a primordial human experience would be something fundamental in the human psyche. And if such a primary human experience were the source of all further purely cog-

periences are subjective correlates of objects, the feeling of liking would be the culmination of human cognitive faculties, constituting, as it were, the fullness of human experience, containing both a cognitive and an appetitive (desiderative) component. Such an approach, however, is at odds with the established relationship between presentation and feeling of liking, and belief and feeling of emotion.

- 10) Czeżowski also points out another difference between aesthetic evaluations and evaluations of values. Value judgments, unlike aesthetic judgments, can be absolute or relative. This division is derived from the division of values into absolute, that is, those that are independent of other values (absolute evaluations are directly justified) and relative (i.e., those whose justification points to their relationship with some absolute value (for instance, the value of the ability to read is justified by its reference to the absolute value of knowledge) (Czeżowski 1959, 200).²⁷
- 11) From another perspective (the motive for the formation of evaluations), Czeżowski divides evaluations into primary and secondary. Primary evaluations are subjective reactions to the phenomena of the external world (just like beliefs). The motive for their formation is to make the object of evaluation present in the subject's evaluative attitude. As concerns secondary evaluations, they are the result of applying some previously established criterion to the evaluated case – the evaluated case is subordinated to an existing ethical law. This division of evaluations is fundamental due to the way ethical theories are built and function. Primary evaluations are formed spontaneously,²⁸ while secondary evaluations are

nitive or purely volitional experiences, then the experience of beauty would indeed be transcendental in relation to all further cognitive experiences" (Krapiec 1978, 209).

²⁷ It seems that we could distinguish both absolute and relative values also among aesthetic evaluations. An example would be the admiration for a painting's texture as related to the absolute value of the painting itself as a work of art. However, it seems that if we wanted to provide a sufficiently thorough analysis of the relationship between likings and emotions/sentiments, we would have to refer to the works of Witwicki (who also had extensive psychological, aesthetic, and art history knowledge, which can be seen in his works on art theory) rather than Czeżowski.

²⁸ Wiśniewski points out that for Czeżowski, "values that we perceive intuitively are absolute and objective contents. For Czeżowski, axiological absolutism and objectivism go hand in hand with intuitionism. We can only directly cognize those values which are absolute (non-relative). However, what is inter-

the result of reflection or are stereotypically applied automated results of previous deliberation. Both types of evaluations are something fundamentally different from an impulsive/instinctual reaction to events.²⁹ (Czeżowski 1949/1989, 100).

IV. Ethical laws and norms

The considerations presented so far can be classified as part of the broadly understood psychology of cognitive and appetitive acts (or states). However, what is most interesting in Czeżowski's project is the issue of the transition from the psychology of the acts of human mental life to the objective (objectified) theory of norms. The fundamental question here is: how do we derive an objective theory of norms from the psychology of (essentially) appetitive acts? Or: how can one transition from individual value statements resulting from evaluations to objective norms? Such a theory, rooted in psychology, would therefore have, to some extent, an empirical character, hence the titles of Czeżowski's works *Etyka jako nauka empiryczna* [*Ethics as an Empirical Science*] (Czeżowski 1949) or *Uwagi o etyce jako nauce empirycznej* [*Remarks on Ethics as an Empirical Science*] (Czeżowski 1960; both works in: Czeżowski 1989).³⁰

esting here is that this absolutism cannot be maintained in practice; instead, it is an absolutism of axiological assumptions that allows for limitations on the applicability of value judgments or principles in practical reality" (Wiśniewski 1999, 114).

²⁹ While primary and secondary evaluations are relatively easy to distinguish in theory, they are often difficult to separate in practice. This is because secondary evaluations modify our perception of the world. This is clearly visible, for instance, in Th. Kuhn's conception of scientific development. According to Kuhn's theory, a paradigm, which is shaped by a set of secondary evaluations, influences researchers' primary evaluations (regarding the truth or cognitive value of actions), even though this often occurs unconsciously. In fact, however, it is similar in the case of perceptions: the adopted paradigm determines what the researcher is even able to perceive (observe).

³⁰ It is worth quoting here what Konstańczak (Konstańczak 2012, 554) pointed out, namely, Ossowska's critique of such a conception of ethics as an empirical science: "This program of ethics, not supported by any example that could serve as a sample or a starting point for discussion, raises the most far-reaching doubts. And it does not seem to be a coincidence that no one in the course of many centuries of ethical inquiry has left behind such a construction, while there is no shortage of systems built *more geometrico*" (Ossowska 1983, 476); to which Czeżowski replied: "I am not presenting a program of ethics that is to be

The first step of such a transition is the generalization of an individual evaluation, as mentioned above. It occurs in a manner analogous to the generalization of an individual perception, where the result of the generalization is a perceptual belief. When we observe in a number of cases that the evaluated objects share a common feature, this provides the basis for a generalization stating that every object with that common feature is subject to evaluation of the same type. In this way, the generalization of individual evaluations is to constitute a criterion of evaluation in the form of a certain empirical feature, while the object of evaluation – the value that is stated in the evaluation – has an objective character. (Czeżowski 1989, 99).

General statements in which the criterion of evaluation is established are ethical laws. As empirical generalizations, those ethical laws are uncertain and changeable because a criterion established in one area of moral experience may prove uncertain in another (*ibid.*, 101). Another reason for the changeability of ethical laws can be a change in the meaning of the terms used to formulate them. Still another reason could be a change in social relations that requires adapting the criteria of evaluation to them.

The ethical laws thus characterized are hypothetical empirical laws that can be justified only by reductive reasoning whose premises are primary evaluations. In this sense, these primary empirical evaluations are the presuppositions of ethics (*ibid.*, 101).³¹ “In order to justify a proposition P formulated as a general statement, we refer to individual evaluations p which stand in a subalternation relation to it, and we assume as true not that p is the content of someone’s belief, but p directly, as in any case of justifying general propositions” (*ibid.*, 103).

Czeżowski points out various types of confusion as to the understanding of ethical laws. Generally speaking, the confusion was based on the failure to distinguish between the original individual evaluations and their generalizations that define the criteria of good, which manifested itself in the transfer (of the requirement) of intuitiveness from

supported by an example. Rather, I am analyzing ethical systems, and among them also those that are built *more geometrico*” (Czeżowski 1989, 108).

³¹ Czeżowski emphasizes that the situation turns out to be the reverse of what aprioristic views suggest: “According to this interpretation, moral laws engraved in human hearts, about which the apriorists speak, take on a dispositional character not for learning general ethical laws, but for making individual evaluations. The ‘moral sense’ is a disposition for making individual moral judgments, just as sight is for individual perceptions and shapes” (101).

individual evaluations (which are actually entitled to intuitiveness) to generalizations.

At other times, the confusion was caused by taking the opposite approach, in which the uncertainty characterizing general sentences was transferred to primary individual evaluations. In this context, as Czeżowski further observes, the question of the non-relative character of evaluations was raised: “Do all people evaluate in the same way, regardless of the differences in the conditions in which the evaluations are made?” (ibid., 102). The attempt to respond to these objections led Czeżowski to state that “the necessary condition for the construction of an ethical theory is therefore neither the assumption of objectivity nor the assumption of the absoluteness of norms, but something else. The point is that evaluations should be intersubjectively communicable and verifiable” (ibid., 102). These are the conditions usually accepted for the scientific nature of knowledge. The point is that researchers should be able to communicate with each other about how they evaluate and whether they evaluate in agreement!

The next step is the transition from ethical laws to norms.³² As Czeżowski suggests, the term “norm” is to be understood as “an expression of the obligation of a regulation or a binding rule” (Czeżowski 1970, in: Czeżowski 1989, 144). Depending on its structure, it can take two forms:

- a) obligation statements, or should-statements (‘one should act in such and such a way’); such an approach characterizes moral norms; or
- b) declarative sentences (‘one acts in such and such a way’); this is a formulation characteristic of legal norms.

Both types of sentences are propositions in the logical sense (i.e. they are either true or false); only true propositions can be recognized as a norm (ibid., 145). Czeżowski rejects the position that assumes that a norm is an imperative statement that recommends, commands, or prescribes, etc. Czeżowski remarks that “a norm itself is neither a recommendation nor a command; however, in order for a norm to be implemented, i.e., for someone to act in accordance with its content, it requires a decision as an additional factor of a volitional nature, motivated by a norm of either the moral or the legal kind. The decision is expressed in an imperative sentence [...] addressed to the one who is to implement this norm” (ibid., 144).

³² Works concerning different types of norms appeared later than works on ethical laws. D. Łukasiewicz (Łukasiewicz 2020, 290–291) analyzes changes in terminology regarding norms proposed by Czeżowski.

Czeżowski distinguishes two types of norms: those that refer to accepted rules and those that refer to evaluations. The latter, called axiological norms, derive their power from their connection to the good stated in an evaluative sentence. An individual evaluation "this or that thing is good", generalized through repetition into a generic evaluation, "things of such and such a kind are good", justifies the normative sentence "such and such should be done always and only if this or that thing is good" (*ibid.*, 147). However, some situations requiring normative intervention cannot be established based on a reference to the good; we deal with them, for example, when we deal with conventional objects or activities. In such situations, "the character of a norm is given to propositions of this kind by some external provision by which their truth is presumed. Hence, norms of this kind are called constitutive or thetical norms" (*ibid.*, 145). Established (or constitutive) norms can be compiled into an axiomatic deductive system, whereas norms that are binding by nature, that is, axiological norms, form an inductive empirical theory, as they are derived from axiological experience (*ibid.*, 147).

Czeżowski also analyzed the system of norms in his later publications, where he referred to the distinction between teleological and formal norms. This division is based on the distinction between the definitions of ethical conduct. As he explains: "According to the teleological norm, ethical conduct is that which aims to realize a moral good [...]; according to the formal norm, ethical conduct is that which acts in accordance with a moral norm. This distinction reveals yet another opposition: the teleological norm regulates conduct directed towards its goals, that is, towards states of affairs or objects that the conduct is meant to realize in accordance with the norm [...]. Formal norms include the categorical imperative in Kantian ethics [...] and the commandment to love one's neighbor in Christian ethics [...]. None of these formal norms mentioned here as examples indicates the purpose of conduct. Instead, they link moral conduct to their observance. They concern the relationship of the ethical subject with other people or even animals [...], so this feature should be considered characteristic of formal norms" (Czeżowski 1970/ Czeżowski 1989, 150).³³

³³ Czeżowski offers a different explanation of the distinction between teleological and formal norms when he further points out that teleological norms define an obligation through the good that the action is supposed to achieve, whereas formal norms, in contrast, recognize obligation as primary. When we consider formal norms, an act is good as long as the conduct is in accordance

Additional elements in the theory of ethics are the so-called principles of ethics. They have the character of a norm of a higher order, that is, a norm that is not teleological, but is “used to distinguish moral or immoral behavior in interpersonal relations according to whether it is consistent or inconsistent with it” (ibid., 111). These principles correspond to what Czeżowski later refers to as formal norms.³⁴

In other words, the principles of ethics determine the conditions that must be met by the norm prescribing moral conduct:

“A teleological norm, however, even when it directs the efforts to achieve the goal which has rightly been evaluated as good, may become antagonistic to another norm of the same kind or even to itself if, while being used by two persons, it leads them to a mutual collision [...]. Another norm is needed then, not a teleological one, which would regulate the use of teleological norms. Such a norm of the second degree, so to speak, does not itself dictate the conduct which would aim at a specific goal [...] but it only sets a condition to be fulfilled by the norm which dictates moral conduct” (Czeżowski 1963/Czeżowski 1991, 141). (Czeżowski 2000, 183–184)

Ethical principles do not have an empirical genesis; rather, they possess an *a priori* character, similar to the axioms of logic. Just as logical axioms alone “cannot provide statements about reality but serve as the principles of reasoning to distinguish truth from falsity – so those formal ethical principles themselves do not tell specifically how to act since such an instruction would have to specify the goal of conduct. Though they make it possible to distinguish a conduct which is morally right from one which is not” (ibid., 142). (Czeżowski 2000, 184)

Final summarizing thoughts

Czeżowski’s views on the division of mental phenomena do not significantly deviate from the model that, to a greater or lesser extent, is characteristic of Brentanist psychology. What was innovative, however, was the fact that Czeżowski used this conception of mental phenomena

with the norm. For this reason, Czeżowski calls teleological norms axiological and formal norms deontic (ibid., 151).

³⁴ It is worth noting that Czeżowski generally distinguishes between two types of ethical theories based on the criterion of “equal measure”: those that apply equal measure to all people (altruistic ethics) and those that single out one type of subject (egoistic theories).

to draw the basis of his ethical theories, relying on analogies between cognitive and appetitive phenomena.

The analogy between cognitive attention as the basis of valuable perceptual judgments and axiological attention as the basis of evaluative judgments is of fundamental nature here. These evaluative judgments, which state the existence of values, form, in turn, the basis for teleological norms, which are generalizations of the individual value judgments that have been repeated many times. Therefore, the system of teleological norms, supplemented by certain a priori ethical principles, is empirical in nature.

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Od uczuć do norm. Koncepcja norm Tadeusza Czeżowskiego w kontekście brentanowskiej klasyfikacji zjawisk psychicznych

Streszczenie

Artykuł rekonstruuje koncepcję norm Tadeusza Czeżowskiego na tle brentanowskiej klasyfikacji zjawisk psychicznych, rozwijanej w Szkole Lwowsko-Warszawskiej. Punktem wyjścia jest podział aktów psychicznych na przedstawienia, przekonania, uczucia i dążenia oraz analiza relacji między ich aktem, treścią, przedmiotem i podstawą psychologiczną. Szczególne znaczenie ma analogia między uwagą poznawczą, umożliwiającą stwierdzenie istnienia przedmiotu w spostrzeżeniu, a postawą oceniającą, dzięki której przedstawienie staje się motywem afirmacji wartości. Na tej podstawie Czeżowski ujmuje oceny jako prawdziwe lub fałszywe sądy wartościujące, podlegające intersubiektywnej kontroli i uogólnieniu. Uogólnienia ocen pierwotnych prowadzą do praw etycznych, a następnie do norm aksjologicznych, które nakazują urzeczywistnianie lub ochronę tego, co w ocenach zostało rozpoznane jako dobre. Autor omawia również normy tetyczne, teleologiczne i formalne oraz aprioryczne zasady etyczne, regulujące stosowanie norm teleologicznych. W tym połączeniu systemu norm teleologicznych z uzupełniającymi go apriorycznymi zasadami etycznymi ujawnia się swoistość projektu Czeżowskiego.

Słowa kluczowe: Tadeusz Czeżowski, Franz Brentano, Szkoła Lwowsko-Warszawska, klasyfikacja zjawisk psychicznych, psychologia uczuć, oceny aksjologiczne, teoria norm, etyka empiryczna

From Feelings to Norms. T. Czeżowski's Conception of Norms in the Context of a Brentanist Classification of Mental Phenomena

Abstract

The article reconstructs Tadeusz Czeżowski's conception of norms against the background of the Brentanist classification of mental phenomena as developed within the Lvov-Warsaw School. It begins with the division of mental acts into presentations, beliefs, feelings, and strivings, and examines the relations between their act, content, object, and psychological basis. Of particular importance is the analogy between cognitive attention, which makes it possible to affirm the existence of an object in perception, and the evaluative attitude, through which a presentation becomes the motive for affirming value. On this basis, Czeżowski conceives evaluations as true or false evaluative judgments that are subject to intersubjective scrutiny and generalization. Generalizations of primary evaluations give rise to ethical laws and, subsequently, to axiological norms, which prescribe the realization or protection of what has been recognized as good in evaluation. The article also discusses thetical, teleological, and formal norms, as well as a priori ethical principles governing the application of teleological norms. The distinctive character of Czeżowski's project emerges

from this combination of a system of teleological norms with the a priori ethical principles that supplement it.

Keywords: Tadeusz Czeżowski, Franz Brentano, Lvov–Warsaw School, classification of mental phenomena, psychology of feelings, axiological evaluations, theory of norms, empirical ethics