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## The Metaphysical Problems of Tadeusz Hipolit Czeżowski's Meta-Axiology

### The Toruń School of Axiologics

The subject of this article is not – as the syntax of the wording used in the title might suggest – a theoretical exposition of Tadeusz Czeżowski's theory of value, nor a meta-theoretical reflection on the system of values advocated by this philosopher. Rather, it is an examination of his original conception of axiology, which distinguishes him in several important respects, not only among Polish scholars but also among international researchers concerned with the equally elusive and fundamental problem of value. Czeżowski was a philosopher through and through rooted in the Polish philosophical tradition. In *Szkic do postaci Tadeusza Czeżowskiego* (*A Sketch of Tadeusz Czeżowski*), his former student and collaborator, Professor Bogusław Wolniewicz (1927–2017), recalled him in the following words:

Professor Czeżowski was my teacher at the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń. For two years, as Head of the Department of Logic, he was also my superior. I hold his memory in the highest esteem, and as the years pass, that esteem continues to deepen and become ever more firmly established. [...]

Let us attempt to discern the figure who remains, as it were, in the shadows, yet forms an integral part of the history of Polish philosophy. It is a figure marked by quiet dignity and profound gravity.<sup>1</sup>

Likewise, when the young Wolniewicz, preparing for his final secondary-school examinations in the spring of 1947, was contemplating whether to study philosophy or mathematics<sup>2</sup> and asked his philosophy teacher, Aurelia Rozenthalowa, for advice about studying philosophy at the University in Toruń, she replied: "Certainly, you may. Above all, Professor Elzenberg is here – he is a European intellect. Professor Czeżowski is here as well; he is also an excellent scholar, though rather a distinctly Polish one".<sup>3</sup>

To the newly established Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń in 1945, Professor Czeżowski brought the finest traditions of Polish philosophy that had flourished before the Second World War at the Universities of Lvov and Vilnius. Together with the aforementioned Professor Henryk Elzenberg (1887–1967), he transplanted those traditions into the philosophical milieu that he was creating in Toruń, to which he himself had been resettled.<sup>4</sup> The two professors became the first – and initially the only – holders of chairs in philosophy at the new university. Czeżowski assumed office by virtue of his letter of appointment issued on 1 June 1946.<sup>5</sup> Five years later, by ministerial decree of 14 June 1951, the Chair of Philosophy I, which he headed, was reorganized into the Chair of Logic,<sup>6</sup> whereas the chair directed by Professor Elzenberg was abolished and its incumbent was sent on what Czeżowski ironically described as a compulsory "research leave".<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bogusław Wolniewicz, "Szkic do postaci Tadeusza Czeszowskiego" ("A Sketch of Tadeusz Czeżowski") (26.7.1889–28.3.1981), in: Bogusław Wolniewicz, *Filozofia i wartości. Rozprawy i wypowiedzi* (*Philosophy and Values: Essays and Statements*) (Warsaw: Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology, University of Warsaw, 1993), 125.

<sup>2</sup> Tomasz Sommer, *Wolniewicz. Zdanie własne* (*Wolniewicz: His Own View*) (Warsaw: 3S Media Sp. z o.o., 2010), 33.

<sup>3</sup> Wolniewicz, "Szkic do postaci Tadeusza Czeszowskiego", 125; Sommer, *Wolniewicz. Zdanie własne*, 37.

<sup>4</sup> Czeżowski, *Wspomnienia (Zpiski do autobiografii)* (*Memoirs [Notes for an Autobiography]*). Manuscript (Toruń, December 1976), 22.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibidem*, 24.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>7</sup> Tadeusz Czeżowski, "O początkach UMK i organizowaniu katedr filozoficznych w Toruniu" ("On the Beginnings of Nicolaus Copernicus University and the Organization of Philosophy Chairs in Toruń"), in: *Uniwersytet Mikołaja*

In a letter recommending Associate Professor Tadeusz Czeżowski for the vacant Chair of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities at the Stefan Batory University in Vilnius, addressed to the Dean of that Faculty, Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938) – Czeżowski's teacher and philosophical mentor – wrote:

A characteristic feature of his scholarly work is its reliability and precision. [...] The author expresses himself with exactness, concision, and objectivity, always striving to justify his claims as thoroughly as possible. The candidate for the chair is by no means a narrow specialist. Although most of his research concerns logistics, logic, methodology, and above all the mathematical sciences, one of his studies belongs to the field of axiology (e.g. *O formalnym pojęciu wartości* (*On the Formal Concept of Value*), 1920). That work deals precisely with certain ethical problems.<sup>8</sup>

Both this assessment and Wolniewicz's remark that at the University of Toruń Czeżowski lectured only on "logic and philosophy in general"<sup>9</sup> clearly indicate that axiology never became his principal field of research, as it eventually did in the case of Elzenberg. Nor did Czeżowski seek – again unlike Elzenberg – to construct a comprehensive axiological system.<sup>10</sup> Yet the relatively limited scope of his engagement with axiology should by no means be mistaken for its marginal significance within his philosophical oeuvre. On the contrary, Czeżowski had a great deal of profound and original insight to contribute in this domain. The present article offers a synthetic reconstruction of his meta-axiological position.<sup>11</sup> In characterizing it, I employ the terminology developed by

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*Kopernika. Wspomnienia pracowników* (Nicolaus Copernicus University: *Memoirs of Its Staff*), ed. Andrzej Tomczak (Toruń: Nicolaus Copernicus University Press, 1995), 40; Józef Pawlak, "Henryk Elzenberg", *Acta Universitatis Nicolai Copernici. Filozofia* 12(228) (1991): 4.

<sup>8</sup> Eugeniusz Wasilewski, "Działalność Tadeusza Czeżowskiego w Wilnie" ("Tadeusz Czeżowski's Scholarly Activity in Vilnius"), in: *Tadeusz Czeżowski (1889–1981). Dziedzictwo idei: logika – filozofia – etyka* (Tadeusz Czeżowski (1889–1981): *The Legacy of Ideas – Logic, Philosophy, Ethics*), eds. Włodzimierz Tyburski, Ryszard Wiśniewski (Toruń: Nicolaus Copernicus University Press, 2002), 41.

<sup>9</sup> Czeżowski, "O początkach UMK", 35; Sommer, *Wolniewicz. Zdanie własne*, 37.

<sup>10</sup> Pawlak, "Henryk Elzenberg", 5; Ryszard Wiśniewski, "Henryk Elzenberg o złu" ("Henryk Elzenberg on Evil"), *Ruch Filozoficzny* 46(1) (1989): 81.

<sup>11</sup> On the term "meta-axiology", see Agnieszka Smolicka, "Świat wartości w ujęciu Tadeusza Czeżowskiego i Henryka Elzenberga: studium porównawcze" ("The World of Values in the Thought of Tadeusz Czeżowski and Henryk Elzenberg: A Comparative Study"), doctoral dissertation supervised by Prof.

Henryk Elzenberg.<sup>12</sup> Let me briefly recall that Elzenberg understood general axiology as a branch of philosophy<sup>13</sup> integrating two fundamental divisions: formal axiology and substantive axiology.<sup>14</sup>

Formal axiology constitutes the foundational level of axiological inquiry. It serves as the point of departure and the logical basis for the normative aspirations of substantive axiology and, accordingly, ought to precede it logically.<sup>15</sup> Its task is to formulate "propositions about value that it regards as true independently of which objects are taken to be valuable".<sup>16</sup> These propositions encompass three mutually complementary domains:

1. the analysis of the concept of value, which seeks to answer the question of what values are as such and thus assumes the form of a logic of value;

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Adam Jonkisz (University of Silesia, Katowice, 2010), 23; Jan Zubelewicz, "Ewolucja aksjologii Elzenberga w świetle jego tekstów. Analiza filologiczno-filozoficzna" ("The Evolution of Elzenberg's Axiology in the Light of His Texts: A Philological and Philosophical Analysis"), *Przegląd Filozoficzny – Nowa Seria* 26(4) [104] (2017): 373.

<sup>12</sup> Elzenberg, "Inedita deposited in the Archives of the Polish Academy of Sciences", file 77: University Lectures III, "Toruń Lectures 1946/47," "Podstawowe pojęcia aksjologii I" ("Basic Concepts of Axiology I"), Lecture I, 17 October 1946.

<sup>13</sup> Henryk Elzenberg, *Kłopot z istnieniem. Aforyzmy w porządku czasu (The Trouble with Existence: Aphorisms in Chronological Order)* (Toruń: Nicolaus Copernicus University Press, 2002), 157, 160; Bogusław Wolniewicz, "Myśl Elzenberga" ("Elzenberg's Thought"), *Studia Filozoficzne* 12 (1986): 60; Michał Woroniecki, "Elzenbergowska próba systemu" ("Elzenberg's Attempt at a System"), *Acta Universitatis Nicolai Copernici. Filozofia* 12(228) (1991): 9–28.

<sup>14</sup> Elzenberg, "Inedita"; Wolniewicz, "Z aksjologii Elzenberga" ("Studies in Elzenberg's Axiology"), *Etyka (Ethics)* 25 (1990): 8; Lesław Hostyński, *O wartościach: aksjologia formalna, estetyka i etyka Henryka Elzenberga (On Values: Henryk Elzenberg's Formal Axiology, Aesthetics, and Ethics)* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 1991); Hostyński, "Filozofia wartości Henryka Elzenberga na tle filozofii polskiej XX-lecia międzywojennego" ("Henryk Elzenberg's Philosophy of Value Against the Background of Polish Philosophy of the Interwar Period"), *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, Sectio I*, 29(4) (2004): 62.

<sup>15</sup> Włodzimierz Tyburski, *Elzenberg* (Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 2006), 32; Henryk Elzenberg, "Podstawowe pojęcia aksjologii I. Wykłady toruńskie 1946–1949" ("Basic Concepts of Axiology I. Toruń Lectures 1946–1949"), ed. Andrzej Lorczyk, in: Henryk Elzenberg, *Pisma aksjologiczne (Axiological Writings)*, eds. Lesław Hostyński, Andrzej Lorczyk, Agnieszka Nogal (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2002), 197–257.

<sup>16</sup> Elzenberg, "Inedita".

2. the theory of the cognition of value (the epistemology of value), which investigates the principles governing the apprehension of something as valuable;
3. the analysis of the relation between value and human consciousness, which examines the influence exerted by already recognized values upon actual human conduct. This dimension of inquiry is commonly referred to as the anthropology of value.<sup>17</sup>

Substantive axiology, in turn, is concerned with identifying classes of valuable objects on the basis of the properties they have in common, as well as according to the degree of their value.<sup>18</sup> It advances propositions concerning the value of objects and, on that basis, determines the obligations for action entailed by those values.<sup>19</sup> It is therefore a creative axiology,<sup>20</sup> distinctly normative in orientation. Accordingly, its judgments are categorical in character: "this has value," "that has no value", and so forth. It is not sufficient that the subject merely understand such judgments – they must also motivate him or her to act<sup>21</sup> – whereas the judgments of formal axiology are hypothetical in form: "If such-and-such possesses value, then such-and-such follows from it". They neither assert the value of objects nor specify the criteria according to which values are to be preferred.

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<sup>17</sup> Elzenberg, "Podstawowe pojęcia aksjologii I", 198; Henryk Elzenberg, „Zależność aksjologicznych spraw formalnych od merytorycznych?" ("The Dependence of Formal Axiological Issues on Substantive Ones?"), ed. Lesław Hostyński, in: Elzenberg, *Pisma aksjologiczne*, 193–195; Ulrich Schrade, "Aksjologia formalna Henryka Elzenberga" ("Henryk Elzenberg's Formal Axiology"), *Studia Filozoficzne* 12 (1986): 83–104; Wolniewicz, „Z aksjologii Elzenberga", 8; Jan Zubelewicz, "Pojęcie wartości perfekcyjnej w aksjologii formalnej Henryka Elzenberga" ("The Concept of Perfect Value in Henryk Elzenberg's Formal Axiology"), *Etyka* 25 (1990): 87; Zubelewicz, "Ewolucja aksjologii Elzenberga", 373–374; Tyburski, *Elzenberg*, 32–33.

<sup>18</sup> Elzenberg, "Inedita"; Henryk Elzenberg, "Nauka i barbarzyństwo" ("Science and Barbarism"), in: Henryk Elzenberg, *Wartość i człowiek. Rozprawy z humanistyki i filozofii* (*Value and Man. Essays in the Humanities and Philosophy*) (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2005), 235.

<sup>19</sup> Henryk Elzenberg, "Konstrukcja pojęcia wartości" ("The Construction of the Concept of Value"), ed. Lesław Hostyński, in: Henryk Elzenberg, *Pisma aksjologiczne* (*Axiological Writings*), eds. Lesław Hostyński, Andrzej Lorczyk, Agnieszka Nogal (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2002), 72, 81–84, 88, 90, 92.

<sup>20</sup> Jan Zubelewicz, "Pojęcie wartości perfekcyjnej w aksjologii formalnej Henryka Elzenberga" ("The Concept of Perfect Value in Henryk Elzenberg's Formal Axiology"), 87; Tyburski, *Elzenberg*, 32.

<sup>21</sup> Wolniewicz, "Z aksjologii Elzenberga", 8.

It should be borne in mind that the axiology postulated by Elzenberg is monocategorical. He assigns all values to the same ontological category – that of possible states of affairs – although he at times hesitated as to whether a substantialist interpretation should instead be adopted.<sup>22</sup> The anti-substantialist monocategoriality of Elzenberg's axiology is associated with an anti-naturalistic approach. This is an inevitable consequence of his distinction between two meanings of the term *value*: the naturalistic – more precisely, the utilitarian-subjective-relativistic (psychological) – according to which value is understood as whatever in a given object corresponds to and satisfies someone's desires, needs, aspirations, capacities, or strivings;<sup>23</sup> and the non-naturalistic – more specifically, the perfectionist – conception, which presupposes the immateriality, non-electiveness in Laird's sense,<sup>24</sup> non-utilitarian character, non-relativity (*scilicet*, absoluteness), objectivity, and deontic (normative) character of values.<sup>25</sup> According to Elzenberg, only values understood in this latter sense deserve to be called values in the strict sense.<sup>26</sup> Czeżowski demonstrates that Elzenberg derives two distinct types of normative ethics from these two respective conceptions of value. On utilitarian values rests hedonistic ethics, whereas perfection values provide the foundation for perfectionist ethics, conceived by Elzenberg as pure ethics.<sup>27</sup> Its embodiment and paradigmatic form is Stoic ethics.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Ibidem, 11–12.

<sup>23</sup> Henryk Elzenberg, "Pojęcie wartości perfekcyjnej" ("The Concept of Perfect Value"), in: Henryk Elzenberg, *Wartość i człowiek. Rozprawy z humanistyki i filozofii* (*Value and Man: Essays in the Humanities and Philosophy*) (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2005), 15; Émile Bréhier, *Problemy filozoficzne XX wieku* (*Philosophical Problems of the Twentieth Century*), trans. Mieczysław Tazbir (Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy „Pax”, 1958), 65.

<sup>24</sup> John Laird, *The Idea of Value* (Cambridge, UK: The University Press, 1929), Chap. 3, § 1, 92–93; Chap. 9, § 2, 302–304; § 2, 304–305. Cf. Elzenberg, "Pojęcie wartości perfekcyjnej", 16.

<sup>25</sup> Elzenberg, "Pojęcie wartości perfekcyjnej", 16–19.

<sup>26</sup> Ibidem, 18–19.

<sup>27</sup> Tadeusz Czeżowski, "Henryk Elzenberg jako teoretyk etyki" ("Henryk Elzenberg as a Theorist of Ethics"), *Etyka* 4 (1969): 99–101. Cf. Henryk Elzenberg, "Ideal zbawienia na gruncie etyki czystej" ("The Ideal of Salvation on the Basis of Pure Ethics"), in: Henryk Elzenberg, *Wartość i człowiek. Rozprawy z humanistyki i filozofii* (*Value and Man. Essays in the Humanities and Philosophy*) (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2005), 211–231.

<sup>28</sup> Henryk Elzenberg, *Marek Aureljusz: z historii i psychologii etyki* (*Marcus Aurelius: Studies in the History and Psychology of Ethics*) (Lwów–Warszawa: nakł. Księgarni Polskiej B. Połonieckiego, 1922), 95 ff.

Czeżowski carefully studied Elzenberg's axiological writings. He presented the views developed therein with precision and due appreciation in his lecture entitled *Henryk Elzenberg as a Theorist of Ethics*.<sup>29</sup> Despite the fundamental differences in their methodological approaches to philosophy,<sup>30</sup> which, at least theoretically, should have placed the two scholars in opposition to one another – although there were indeed tensions between them,<sup>31</sup> though never so serious as to estrange them completely – they maintained due respect for one another and for their respective work.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, in matters concerning axiology and ethics (aesthetics did not occupy his attention to the same degree),<sup>33</sup> Czeżowski appears to have regarded Elzenberg's works with genuine admiration, being clearly impressed by them and, quite possibly, also influenced by them.<sup>34</sup> This is evidenced, for example, by the concluding remarks of the aforementioned lecture, in which Czeżowski states that "what has appeared in print impresses by its breadth of learning, depth of analysis, precision of expression, rigor of reasoning, and breadth of intellectual horizons, and will remain a lasting achievement of philosophical inquiry".<sup>35</sup>

In one of his autobiographical recollections, Czeżowski recalls that during his university studies, which he began in 1907 and completed in

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<sup>29</sup> Czeżowski, "Henryk Elzenberg jako teoretyk etyki". See also: Tadeusz Czeżowski, "Henryk Elzenberg (1887–1967)," *Studia Filozoficzne* 3 (1967): 283–285

<sup>30</sup> Waldemar Voisé, "Aksjologika: toruńska logika i aksjologika lat 1946–1950 po pół wieku" ("Axiologics: Toruń Logic and Axiologics 1946–1950 Half a Century Later"), *Analecta: studia i materiały z dziejów nauki* 5/1(9) (1996): 108, 119, 120.

<sup>31</sup> Mieczysław Wallis, *Materiały Archiwalne Mieczysława Wallisa* (*Archival Materials of Mieczysław Wallis*), Archiwum Połączonych Bibliotek WFiS UW (IFiS PAN i PTF w Warszawie) (Archives of the Combined Libraries of the Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology, University of Warsaw [Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the Polish Philosophical Society in Warsaw]),teczka Rps nr 15 (file Rps no. 15), t. I (vol. I), k. 41 (fol. 41); Joanna Dorota Zegzuła-Nowak, "Henryk Elzenberg w świetle nieznanych źródeł archiwalnych Mieczysława Wallisa" ("Henryk Elzenberg in the Light of Unknown Archival Sources of Mieczysław Wallis"), *Studia z Historii Filozofii* 2(7) (2016): 146.

<sup>32</sup> Voisé, "Aksjologika: toruńska logika", 110, 112.

<sup>33</sup> Smolicka, "Świat wartości", 84; Tomasz Siwiec, "Rekonstrukcja problematyki estetycznej w filozofii Tadeusza Czeszowskiego" ("Reconstruction of Aesthetic Issues in Tadeusz Czeżowski's Philosophy"), *Ruch Filozoficzny* 66(4) (2009): 811–818.

<sup>34</sup> Stefan Konstańczak, "Tadeusza Czeżowskiego koncepcja etyki naukowej" ("Tadeusz Czeżowski's Conception of Scientific Ethics"), *Przegląd Filozoficzny – Nowa Seria* 21, 3(83) (2012): 551–552.

<sup>35</sup> Czeżowski, "Henryk Elzenberg jako teoretyk etyki", 102.

1912 at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Lvov,<sup>36</sup> which at that time – while Poland remained partitioned – officially bore the name *Universitas Franciscana* until the end of the First World War (it was also known as the Imperial-Royal Emperor Francis I University in Lvov),<sup>37</sup> he was more deeply absorbed in mathematics and physics than in philosophy. At the same time, he studied philosophy under, among others, Kazimierz Twardowski and Jan Łukasiewicz, mathematics under Józef Puzyna and Waław Sierpiński, and physics under Ignacy Zakrzewski and Marian Smoluchowski.<sup>38</sup> In 1914, Czeżowski obtained his doctorate in philosophy, a discipline that – as he himself recalls – had already attracted his interest when he was a seventh-grade gymnasium student,<sup>39</sup> on the basis of his dissertation *Theory of Classes*,<sup>40</sup> written under the supervision of Kazimierz Twardowski, the founder of the renowned Polish philosophical Lvov–Warsaw School (whose conventional founding date is taken to be 15 November 1895, when Twardowski moved from Vienna to Lvov to assume the Chair of Philosophy at the then Francis

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<sup>36</sup> Wojciech Słomski, “Tadeusz Czeżowski – obszary filozofowania” (“Tadeusz Czeżowski: Areas of Philosophical Inquiry”), *Galicja – Studia i Materiały* 8 (2022): 225.

<sup>37</sup> Anna Brożek, “Filozofia na Uniwersytecie Lwowskim do 1939 r.” (“Philosophy at the University of Lvov until 1939”), in: *Alma Mater Leopoliensis. Dzieje humanistyki lwowskiej 1661–1946 (z dwoma interaktywnymi inwentarzami)* (*Alma Mater Leopoliensis. A History of the Humanities in Lvov, 1661–1946 [with Two Interactive Inventories]*), vol. 3: “Filozofia, teologia, muzykologia, historia sztuki” (“Philosophy, Theology, Musicology, History of Art.”), eds. Anna Dąbrowska, Helena Sojka-Masztalerz (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2025), 26; Małgorzata Przeniosło, Marek Przeniosło, “Profesorowie Uniwersytetu Jana Kazimierza we Lwowie urodzeni w rodzinach chłopskich (okres II Rzeczypospolitej) – portret zbiorowy” (“Professors of the Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov Born into Peasant Families [The Second Polish Republic]: A Collective Portrait”), *Dzieje Najnowsze* 52(3) (2020) (*Recent History*): 130, note 1; Anna Jedy-nak, “Początki szkoły lwowsko-warszawskiej” (“The Beginnings of the Lvov–Warsaw School”), *Galicja – Studia i Materiały* 2 (2016) (*Galicja – Studies and Materials*): 168–169.

<sup>38</sup> Ryszard Jadczyk, “Uwagi o działalności dydaktycznej Tadeusza Czeżowskiego” (“Remarks on the Teaching Activity of Tadeusz Czeżowski”), *Edukacja Filozoficzna* 26 (1998) (*Philosophical Education*): 329.

<sup>39</sup> Czeżowski, *Wspomnienia*, 5.

<sup>40</sup> Czeżowski, “Teoria klas” (“Theory of Classes”), *Archiwum Naukowe*, Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa dla Popierania Nauki Polskiej (Scientific Archive, Publications of the Society for the Advancement of Polish Learning), Division 1, vol. 9, no. 2 (1918). See also Czeżowski’s earlier article on this subject: “Niektóre zasadnicze twierdzenia logiki klas” (“Some Fundamental Theorems of the Logic of Classes”), *Ruch Filozoficzny* (*The Philosophical Movement*) 4 (10) (1914).

I University)<sup>41</sup> and the founder of the scholarly journal *Ruch Filozoficzny* (*The Philosophical Movement*), established in Lvov on 15 January 1911.

Significantly, despite his predilection for the exact sciences, Czeżowski associated philosophy with reflection on the meaning of the term *good* and on the question of “how one ought to act in order to be good”,<sup>42</sup> that is, with (meta-)ethical rather than strictly logical, epistemological, ontological, or methodological issues. Although this sensitivity to axiological problems – which, incidentally, was characteristic of the period, especially the first half of the twentieth century, when axiology was taking shape and when the impulse for its emergence (a point of particular importance in the context of Czeżowski's interests and methodological perspective) came from the circle of Austrian Brentanists, specifically from Christian Freiherr von Ehrenfels (1859–1932) and his two-volume *System der Werttheorie* (1897–1898)<sup>43</sup> – did not become the leitmotif of Czeżowski's philosophy as it did in the case of Elzenberg, his scholarly output in this field nevertheless comprises no fewer than forty academic articles, collected in the volume *Writings on Ethics and the Theory of Value*.<sup>44</sup> Among the most important of these are *On the Formal Concept of Value* (1919), *On the Subject Matter of Axiology* (1936), *Ethics as an Empirical Science* (1949), *How Should the Logic of Goods Be Constructed?* (1) (1959), *How Should the Logic of Goods Be Constructed?* (2) (1959/1960), *What Are Values?* (1965), *Two Kinds of Norms* (1966), and *Axiological and Deontic Moral Norms* (1970). In this context, mention should also be made of Czeżowski's as yet unpublished typescript entitled *Metaethical Reflec-*

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<sup>41</sup> Anna Jedynak, “Początki szkoły lwowsko-warszawskiej” (“The Beginnings of the Lvov–Warsaw School”), *Galicja – Studia i Materiały* (*Galicia – Studies and Materials*) 2 (2016): 168.

<sup>42</sup> Czeżowski, “O początkach UMK i organizowaniu katedr filozoficznych w Toruniu” (“On the Beginnings of Nicolaus Copernicus University and the Organization of the Chairs of Philosophy in Toruń”), in: *Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika. Wspomnienia pracowników* (*Nicolaus Copernicus University. Memoirs of Its Staff*), ed. Andrzej Tomczak (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 1995), 35.

<sup>43</sup> Christian von Ehrenfels, *System der Werttheorie* (*System of the Theory of Value*), vol. 1: *Allgemeine Werttheorie, Psychologie des Begehrens* (*General Theory of Value. Psychology of Desire*) (Leipzig: O. R. Reisland, 1897); Christian von Ehrenfels, *System der Werttheorie* (*System of the Theory of Value*), vol. 2: *Grundzüge der Ethik* (*Fundamentals of Ethics*) (Leipzig: O. R. Reisland, 1898).

<sup>44</sup> Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Pisma z etyki i teorii wartości* (*Writings on Ethics and the Theory of Value*), ed. Paweł J. Smoczyński (Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk–Łódź: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich – Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1989).

tions.<sup>45</sup> This work is particularly noteworthy because, drawing upon the writings listed above, it constitutes an *ex post* attempt to synthesize and recapitulate them.

Czeżowski's achievements in the fields of axiology and ethics have been classified in various ways. The philosopher himself employed such designations as *the logic of goods*, *the theory of value* (axiology), or *metaethics*. Tadeusz Styczeń, by contrast, spoke of Czeżowski's remarkable "personal union of logic and ethics".<sup>46</sup> Waldemar Kmiecikowski emphasized the metaethical status of Czeżowski's analyses,<sup>47</sup> whereas Agnieszka Smolicka pointed to their meta-axiological character.<sup>48</sup> Abroad, Manuel Rebuschi,<sup>49</sup> and in Poland Marcin Drofiszyn,<sup>50</sup> proposed the designation *ethical logic*. The latter even argued that Czeżowski laid the "proper philosophical foundation" for ethical logic.<sup>51</sup> Perhaps the most interesting terminological proposal, however, was advanced by Czeżowski's student Waldemar Voisé, who referred to his teacher's logic-based axiology as *axiologics* (*aksjologika*), a term which, incidentally, he also applied to Elzenberg's work.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Stefan Konstańczak, "Tadeusza Czeżowskiego koncepcja etyki naukowej" ("Tadeusz Czeżowski's Conception of Scientific Ethics"), *Przegląd Filozoficzny – Nowa Seria* 21(3) (83) (2012): 555–557.

<sup>46</sup> Tadeusz Styczeń, "Refleksja metaetyczna na Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim" ("Metaethical Reflection at the Catholic University of Lublin"), in: Tadeusz Styczeń, *W drodze do etyki. Wybór esejów z etyki i o etyce* (*On the Way to Ethics. Selected Essays in Ethics and on Ethics*) (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1984), 161.

<sup>47</sup> Waldemar Kmiecikowski, "Wartości moralne między doświadczeniem a ontologią. Kilka uwag wokół etyki Ingardena, Czeżowskiego i Krąpca" ("Moral Values between Experience and Ontology. Several Remarks on the Ethics of Ingarden, Czeżowski, and Krąpiec"), *Studia z Filozofii Polskiej* 11, ed. Marek Rembierz, K. Śleziński (Cieszyn-Kraków: Uniwersytet Śląski w Katowicach – Wydawnictwo «scriptum»), 160.

<sup>48</sup> Agnieszka Smolicka, "Świat wartości", 23.

<sup>49</sup> Manuel Rebuschi, "Czeżowski's Axiological Concepts as Full-fledged Modalities", *Forum Philosophicum* 13, no. 1 (2008): 1–3.

<sup>50</sup> Marcin Drofiszyn, "Ontologiczne założenia logiki etycznej" ("Ontological Assumptions of Ethical Logic"), *Studia Philosophica Vratislaviensia* 6(1) (2011): 51–60.

<sup>51</sup> Ibidem, 58.

<sup>52</sup> Voisé, "Aksjologika: toruńska logika", 107–121.

## Dimensions and Problems of Czeżowski's Meta-Axiology

Czeżowski's meta-axiology constitutes an intellectually compelling synthesis of several distinct philosophical traditions: metaphysical transcendentalism, Brentanism, anti-naturalism, and realism. Drawing upon the last of these, Czeżowski adopts the position of axiological realism. Dariusz Łukasiewicz, for interpretative purposes, employs the more restrictive designation moral realism,<sup>53</sup> maintaining, in agreement with Czeżowski, that "moral propositions possess a logical value (they are either true or false), and what confers logical value upon them are moral values existing in the world; at the same time, however, the deduction of moral propositions from propositions about facts is impossible (one cannot derive value from being)".<sup>54</sup>

Axiological realism may assume either a naturalistic or an anti-naturalistic form. The naturalistic approach postulates the reducibility of all evaluative propositions to empirical propositions. Propositions concerning what ought to be are reduced to propositions concerning what in fact is. Anti-naturalism, by contrast, rejects such a possibility, pointing out that naturalism runs the risk of reducing axiological problems to truisms. If axiological phenomena are reducible to natural phenomena – for example, to pleasure or displeasure – then the question whether a given pleasure is morally acceptable might prove to be a trivial one, since pleasure is, indisputably, pleasure.

By adopting anti-naturalistic realism, we are confronted with the question of the nature and kind of such properties as *good*, *bad*, *beautiful*, *ugly*, and the like. Drawing upon the conception of Franz Brentano,<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Dariusz Łukasiewicz, "Ontologiczne podstawy aksjologii w filozofii Tadeusza Czeżowskiego" ("Ontological Foundations of Axiology in Tadeusz Czeżowski's Philosophy"), *Filo-Sofija* 1(8) (2009): 156, 158, 159–166; Dariusz Łukasiewicz, "Źródła, zasady i perspektywy realizmu moralnego Tadeusza Czeżowskiego" ("Sources, Principles, and Perspectives of Tadeusz Czeżowski's Moral Realism"), *Ruch Filozoficzny* 66(4) (2009): 663–673.

<sup>54</sup> Łukasiewicz, "Ontologiczne podstawy aksjologii", 156.

<sup>55</sup> Franz Brentano, *O źródle poznania moralnego* (*The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*), trans. Czesław Porębski (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1989), 19–21, 66–67, 98–113; Brentano, *Psychologia z empirycznego punktu widzenia* (*Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*), trans. Włodzimierz Galewicz (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1999), 346–348; William David Ross, "Brentano and the Foundations of Ethics", in: William David Ross, *Foundations of Ethics. The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of Aberdeen, 1935–6* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), 279–283; Everett W. Hall, "Is Value the Being an Object or a Right Love?", in: Everett W. Hall, *What is Value? An Essay*

Czeżowski maintains that these are not real properties and therefore rejects the predicative theory of value. The question thus arises as to what values are and what syntactic category should be assigned to such expressions as *good*, *bad*, *beautiful*, *ugly*, and the like. Values are not properties; consequently, the expressions mentioned above cannot be predicates.<sup>56</sup> What category, then, do they belong to?

Czeżowski finds the answer in the vocabulary of medieval metaphysics. He argues that such expressions are sentence-forming functors determining different *modi entis*. Dariusz Łukasiewicz maintains that these are sentence-forming functors with one propositional argument, more specifically, modal operators.<sup>57</sup> However, on the basis of Czeżowski's works devoted to the formal concept of value,<sup>58</sup> this interpretation re-

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in *Philosophical Analysis* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952), 94–112; Uriah Kriegel, "Foreword to the Routledge Classics Edition: Brentano's Moral Philosophy", in: Franz Brentano, *The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong* (London–New York: Routledge Classics, 2026), XVI–XXVII; Roderick M. Chisholm, "Defining Intrinsic Value," *Analysis* 41(2) (1981): 99–100; Roderick M. Chisholm, *Brentano and Intrinsic Value* (Cambridge, MA – New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 3–5, 9–11, 33–45; Arkadiusz Chrudzimski, "Brentanowska filozofia moralności" ("Brentano's Moral Philosophy"), *Etyka* 31 (1998): 110–112, 115–118; Dariusz Łukasiewicz, "The Brentanian Inspirations in Tadeusz Czeżowski's Philosophy", in: *The Significance of the Lvov-Warsaw School in the European Culture*, ed. Anna Brożek, Friedrich Stadler, Jan Woleński. *Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook* 21 (Wien: Springer, 2017), 79–92; Dariusz Łukasiewicz, "Brentanian Philosophy and Czeżowski's Conception of Existence", in: *Actions, Products, and Things. Brentano and Polish Philosophy*, eds. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski, Dariusz Łukasiewicz (Heusenstamm nr. Frankfurt: ontos verlag, 2006), 183–215; Kamil Moroz, "Zagadka podmiotowości w psychologii opisowej Franza Brentany" ("The Puzzle of Subjectivity in Franz Brentano's Descriptive Psychology"), *Principia* 63 (2016): 144–148; Artur Rojszczak, "Od sądów do zdań. Nośnik prawdy a obiektywizacja wiedzy" ("From Judgments to Propositions. The Truth-Bearer and the Objectification of Knowledge"), *Filozofia Nauki* 2(18) (1997): 94; Mark Textor, "That's correct! Brentano on intuitive judgement", *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 31(4) (2023): 806–810.

<sup>56</sup> Łukasiewicz, "Źródła, zasady i perspektywy", 665.

<sup>57</sup> Ibidem, 66–67.

<sup>58</sup> Czeżowski, "Jak budować logikę dóbr? (1)" ("How Should the Logic of Goods Be Constructed? (1)"), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Pisma z etyki i teorii wartości (Writings on Ethics and the Theory of Value)*, ed. Paweł J. Smoczyński (Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk–Łódź: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich – Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1989), 130–135; Czeżowski, "Jak budować logikę dóbr? (2)" ("How Should the Logic of Goods Be Constructed? (2)"), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Pisma z etyki i teorii wartości (Writings on Ethics and the Theory of Value)*, 136–138; Tadeusz Czeżowski, "O formalnym pojęciu wartości" ("On the

quires a slight correction through the introduction of a two-place functor. The modal operator would then constitute merely a special case of such a functor.

The legitimacy of introducing a two-place functor follows from Czeżowski's conception of the basic relation (*stosunek podstawowy*), formulated in 1919,<sup>59</sup> which in his later works, published in 1960, he referred to as the value-constituting relation (*stosunek wartościotwórczy*).<sup>60</sup> In its most concise formulation, this is "the relation connecting the object evaluated as a good with the value parameter and the valuing subject".<sup>61</sup> By value parameter, Czeżowski understands "the good in virtue of which some-

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Formal Concept of Value"), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Pisma z etyki i teorii wartości* (*Writings on Ethics and the Theory of Value*), 121–129. Cf. Włodzimierz Wasiukow, "Reinterpretacja formalnej teorii wartości Tadeusza Czeżowskiego" ("A Reinterpretation of Tadeusz Czeżowski's Formal Theory of Value"), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski (1889–1981). *Dziedzictwo idei: logika – filozofia – etyka* (Tadeusz Czeżowski (1889–1981). *The Legacy of Ideas: Logic – Philosophy – Ethics*), eds. Włodzimierz Tyburski, Ryszard Wiśniewski (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2002), 123–143.

<sup>59</sup> Tadeusz Czeżowski, "O formalnym pojęciu wartości" ("On the Formal Concept of Value"), *Przegląd Filozoficzny* 22(1–2) (1919): 13–24; I use the edition: Czeżowski, "O formalnym pojęciu wartości" ("On the Formal Concept of Value"), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Pisma z etyki i teorii wartości* (*Writings on Ethics and the Theory of Value*), 122–129. Cf. Adam Jonkisz, "Formalna teoria wartości" ("The Formal Theory of Value"), *Filozofia Nauki* 6(3–4) (23–24) (1998): 121–123, 128–129; Adam Jonkisz, "Tadeusza Czeżowskiego formalne pojęcie wartości" ("Tadeusz Czeżowski's Formal Concept of Value"), in: *Polska filozofia analityczna. W kręgu Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej* (*Polish Analytical Philosophy. In the Circle of the Lvov–Warsaw School*), eds. Włodzimierz Tyburski, Ryszard Wiśniewski (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 1999), 197–206; Wasiukow, "Reinterpretacja", 123–134; Katarzyna Ossowska, "Logiczne podstawy etyki – metaetyka Tadeusza Czeżowskiego" ("Logical Foundations of Ethics: Tadeusz Czeżowski's Metaethics"), *Humanistyka i Przyrodoznawstwo* 20 (2014): 417–419.

<sup>60</sup> Tadeusz Czeżowski, "Jak budować logikę dóbr? (1)" ("How Should the Logic of Goods Be Constructed? (1)"), in: *Charisteria: rozprawy filozoficzne złożone w darze Władysławowi Tatarkiewiczowi w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin* (*Charisteria: Philosophical Essays Presented to Władysław Tatarkiewicz on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday*), ed. Tadeusz Czeżowski (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1960), 130–134; Czeżowski, "Jak budować logikę dóbr (2)" ("How Should the Logic of Goods Be Constructed? (2)"), *Ruch Filozoficzny* 1–2 (1959/1960): 186–188.

<sup>61</sup> Czeżowski, "O formalnym pojęciu wartości", 122; Tadeusz Czeżowski, "Jak budować logikę dóbr? (1)" ("How Should the Logic of Goods Be Constructed? (1)"), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Pisma z etyki i teorii wartości* (*Writings on Ethics and the Theory of Value*), 130.

thing is valuable".<sup>62</sup> Such a parameter may be a real or an ideal object, an individual or collective object, as well as something existing in the present, the past, or the future.<sup>63</sup> The value parameter is therefore the value-constituting point of reference in the light of which, and with respect to which, the evaluated object *a* acquires value (becomes valuable). The valuing subject is "the subject for whom something is valuable".<sup>64</sup> According to Czeżowski, the valuing subject *s* is the particular "factor for whom the value exists".<sup>65</sup>

[...] in its primary sense, it may be an individual human being; in a broader sense, however, it may also be a group of people, a nation, a society, and, finally, metaphorically, even non-sentient objects, of which we may say that objects constituting the condition of their existence or development possess value for them; for example, coal mines possess value for large-scale industry.<sup>66</sup>

The evaluated object *a* is any individual object to which the valuing subject *s* ascribes value. Observing that the moment of the valuing subject *s* is already contained in the very concept of the parameter, that is, the object *p*, since the parameter is something valuable for the subject *s*, Czeżowski proposes a simplification of the definition of value. Formally speaking, the value of the object *a* ( $W\bar{a}$ ) is its relation *R* to the object *p*, that is, to the parameter. Symbolically, this definition may be expressed by the following formula:  $W\bar{a} = a R p$ . The relation *R* between the object *a* (the evaluated object) and the value parameter *p* is referred to by Czeżowski as the basic relation or the value-constituting relation.<sup>67</sup> It is this relation that determines whether the object *a* is assigned a positive or a negative value.<sup>68</sup>

In ethical evaluations, the relation *R* consists in the conformity or non-conformity of an action with moral norms. In aesthetic evaluations, by contrast, the value-constituting relation that determines the positive or negative value of a work of art consists in its conformity or

<sup>62</sup> Tadeusz Czeżowski, "Jak budować logikę dóbr? (1)" ("How Should the Logic of Goods Be Constructed? (1)"), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Pisma z etyki i teorii wartości* (*Writings on Ethics and the Theory of Value*), 130.

<sup>63</sup> Jonkisz, "Formalna teoria wartości", 122.

<sup>64</sup> Czeżowski, "Jak budować logikę dóbr? (1)", 130.

<sup>65</sup> Czeżowski, "O formalnym pojęciu wartości", 122.

<sup>66</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>67</sup> Ibidem, 123–124. Cf. Jonkisz, "Formalna teoria wartości", 122; Ossowska, "Logiczne podstawy etyki", 418.

<sup>68</sup> Czeżowski, "O formalnym pojęciu wartości", 123.

non-conformity with the principles governing the field of fine arts.<sup>69</sup> The value of the object  $a$  is represented by the subset of the set of all value-constituting relations  $R$  that the evaluated object  $a$  satisfies with respect to the parameter  $p$ . Symbolically, this may be expressed by the following formula:  $W(a) = \{R \in \mathbf{R} : a R p\}$ .<sup>70</sup> The greater the number of such relations, and consequently the broader their scope, the greater the objective value of the object  $a$  (that is, the more valuable the object  $a$  is). Conversely, the fewer such relations, and thus the narrower their scope, the smaller the objective value of the object  $a$  (that is, the less valuable the object  $a$  is).

The foregoing analyses lead to the conclusion that an axiological evaluation, in its logical explication, cannot be reduced to a simple one-place assertion affirming merely the truth or falsity of the proposition  $p$ . Rather, it expresses a relation between the evaluated object (or state of affairs) and the criterion on the basis of which the evaluation is made. Consequently, the formalization of axiological evaluations requires an extension of the classical modal framework by introducing a relational structure. Instead of a one-place modal operator, it seems justified to introduce a two-place functor  $W(p, q)$ , where the first argument ( $p$ ) denotes the evaluated object, while the second ( $q$ ) denotes the value parameter in Czeżowski's sense, that is, the good constituting the value-creating point of reference for a given evaluation.

Such an approach remains fully consistent with the aforementioned conception of the value-constituting relation  $R$ , according to which value is not an isolated, immanent property of an object but rather the result of a specific relation obtaining between the object under evaluation and the parameter of its value. Consequently, an axiological judgment assumes a relational form. A given object  $a$  is evaluated as valuable by virtue of the previously presupposed value, adopted by the evaluating subject, of another object  $p$ . Within this framework, the basic schema of valuation takes the form of a two-place propositional function:  $a R p$ , that is, a two-place predicate  $R(a, p)$ .

The introduction of a two-place functor makes it possible to construe autotelic values (absolute values) as a specific form of modality. In situations where an object is valuable in and of itself, both arguments of the functor become identical ( $p = q$ ). This is illustrated by the following example: "It is valuable that we help others because we help others." In such a case, the two-place axiological functor is functionally reduced

<sup>69</sup> Ibidem. Cf. Jonkisz, "Formalna teoria wartości", 122; Ossowska, "Logiczne podstawy etyki", 418.

<sup>70</sup> Jonkisz, "Formalna teoria wartości", 122.

to a one-place modal operator. The claim that, in the case of autotelic values, the identity of arguments ( $p = q$ ) obtains is corroborated by the analyses of Adam Jonkisz. He points out that the so-called elementary parameters (that is, primary or basic parameters), which Czeżowski refers to as “absolute goods”,<sup>71</sup> are characterized precisely by the fact that “they are identical with their own parameters”.<sup>72</sup> In this interpretation, the functor expressing “valuing something in virtue of the value of something else” assumes a reflexive form, thereby ontically closing the structure of value within the object itself.

The logical structure of the formal mechanism of the autotelicity of value differs from that of a utilitarian relation (e.g., *we help others (a) in order to attain peace of conscience (p)*), in which the value of the action is derivative with respect to the value of its end. Autotelic values, or – to employ Czeżowski’s terminology – absolute goods, “are valuable in the primary sense of the term, that is, not by virtue of something else, but solely by virtue of themselves”. Accordingly, autotelic values are self-referential and self-justifying. Logically, this corresponds to a situation in which a valuable state of affairs grounds itself as the criterion of value. Thus, in the case of absolute goods, the two-place functor expressing “valuing something in virtue of the value of something else” ( $W\bar{a} = a R p$ ) is reduced to the one-place modal operator: “it is good that  $p$ ”.

From this perspective, it becomes evident that the modal operator does not constitute an alternative to the relational value-constituting functor but rather its limiting special case. A system of values consists of both relative and absolute values. Relative (instrumental) values possess a two-place relational structure, whereas autotelic values exhibit a one-place relational structure. They may therefore be regarded as a reduced case of the former. Relative values require an external frame of reference (expressed by the logical structure  $a R p$ ), whereas autotelic values ground themselves, thereby identifying the object  $a$  with the parameter  $p$  and allowing them to be construed as one-place modal operators. The interpretation of values as one-place modal operators constitutes, in Czeżowski’s later philosophy, the logical expression of their ontological status as modes of being (*modi entis* or *modi essendi*), that is, as transcendentals.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>71</sup> Czeżowski, “Jak budować logikę dóbr? (I)”, 131–132.

<sup>72</sup> Jonkisz, “Formalna teoria wartości”, 129.

<sup>73</sup> Tadeusz Czeżowski, “Transcendentalia – przyczynek do ontologii” (“Transcendentals – A Contribution to Ontology”), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *O metafizyce, jej kierunkach i zagadnieniach* (*On Metaphysics, Its Directions and Pro-*

## Metaphysical Foundations of Czeżowski's Axiology

The metaphysical foundations of Tadeusz Czeżowski's axiology constitute a rare attempt within the twentieth-century tradition of analytic philosophy to synthesize Brentanism, anti-naturalism, and the medieval doctrine of transcendentals. This position, referred to – as has already been noted – as axiological realism,<sup>74</sup> is based on the conviction that value judgments (evaluations) possess a logical value. However, in order to preserve the coherence of this conception with the ontological minimalism of the Lvov–Warsaw School, it is necessary to resolve a number of ontological and semantic problems concerning the nature of values as *modi entis*. Their resolution determines the coherence of Czeżowski's consistently adopted anti-naturalistic realism. In particular, the following issues require examination: the problem of justifying anti-naturalistic realism; the problem of truth-makers for evaluative judgments; the problem of the reducibility of evaluative judgments to existential judgments; the problem of the admissibility of the iteration of the axiological functor; and the problem of *modi entis* (transcendental properties).

### Justification of Anti-naturalistic Realism

Czeżowski's axiological realism does not postulate the existence of specific non-natural properties, as does George E. Moore.<sup>75</sup> Instead, it

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blems) (Kęty: Wydawnictwo Antyk, 2004), 188–192; Jan Woleński, "Two Theories of Transcendentals", *Axiomathes* 1–3 (1997): 367–380; Woleński, "Malum, Transcendentalia and Logic", in: *Phenomenology and Analysis: Essays on Central European Philosophy*, eds. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski, Wolfgang Huemer (Frankfurt–Lancaster: Ontos Verlag, 2004), 364–369; Jan Woleński, "On Analogical Concepts (Transcendentalia)", *Studia Metodologiczne* 37 (2016): 9–28; Jan Woleński, "Modalności zdaniowe" ("Sentential Modalities"), *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 52(2) (2004): 435–437; Wacław Janikowski, "Transcendentalia w teorii wartości Tadeusza Czeszowskiego" ("Transcendentals in Tadeusz Czeżowski's Theory of Value"), in: *Tadeusz Czeżowski (1889–1981). Dziedzictwo idei: logika – filozofia – etyka (Tadeusz Czeżowski (1889–1981). The Legacy of Ideas: Logic – Philosophy – Ethics)*, eds. Włodzimierz Tyburski, Ryszard Wiśniewski (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2002), 161–169; Marcin Drofiszyn, "Ontologiczne założenia logiki etycznej", 58.

<sup>74</sup> Dariusz Łukasiewicz, "Metaphysics of Axiological Realism," *Philosophia Scientiae* 12(1) (2008): 57–74.

<sup>75</sup> George E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, revised edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Chap. 2, point 26, 93.

employs a functional analysis of language based on two argumentative pillars: (1) the thesis that axiological judgments possess logical value, and (2) the rejection of naturalistic reductionism.

The first of these is semantic-logical in character. Czeżowski maintains that evaluative judgments – just like descriptive judgments – are bearers of truth and falsity.<sup>76</sup> We may meaningfully say: “It is true that *X* is good”, which indicates that axiological judgments enter into inferential relations and are subject to assessment with respect to their logical value. This argument is transcendental in character. Since, in the practice of moral and aesthetic discourse, we employ reasoning, we thereby (*eo ipso*) presuppose its truth-apt character.<sup>77</sup>

The second constitutive element of Czeżowski’s position is connected with the rejection of naturalistic reductionism. Czeżowski shares the view that the reduction of axiological properties (*scilicet*, values) to natural properties leads to the naturalistic fallacy in Moore’s sense.<sup>78</sup> If “good” meant the same as “pleasant” or “desired”, then the question whether a given pleasure is morally good would become tautological. Yet moral practice, mediated through axiological experience, clearly demonstrates the irreducibility of the normative level to the descriptive one. Therefore, according to Czeżowski, the reduction of values to empirical facts (e.g., to pleasure) leads to the trivialization of ethics.

As already mentioned, Czeżowski’s realism differs fundamentally from Moorean non-naturalism. Czeżowski does not accept the existence of specific “non-natural properties” but, in the Brentanian spirit, rejects the predicative interpretation of value.<sup>79</sup> In his view, value is not a property of a thing in the ontological sense but rather its mode of being (*modus entis*). Consequently, Czeżowski’s anti-naturalism is unequivocally ontological-categorial rather than ontologically inflationary.<sup>80</sup>

<sup>76</sup> Czeżowski, “Etyka jako nauka empiryczna”, 98; Czeżowski, “Dwojaki normy”, 145–146.

<sup>77</sup> Łukasiewicz, “Źródła, zasady i perspektywy”, 663.

<sup>78</sup> Tadeusz Czeżowski, “Aksjologiczne i deontyczne normy moralne” (“Axiological and Deontic Moral Norms”), *Etyka* 7 (1970): 136. Cf. Łukasiewicz, “Metaphysics of Axiological Realism”, 58–59; Łukasiewicz, “Źródła, zasady i perspektywy”, 664–665; Stanisław Jedynek, “Błąd naturalistyczny” (“The Naturalistic Fallacy”), *Etyka* 2 (1967): 290–292; Piotr Makowski, “Moore i semantyczna autonomia etyki” (“Moore and the Semantic Autonomy of Ethics”), *Principia* 59–60 (2014): 69–72.

<sup>79</sup> Łukasiewicz, “Metaphysics of Axiological Realism”, 62–63; Łukasiewicz, “Źródła, zasady i perspektywy”, 665–666.

<sup>80</sup> Stephen Mumford, “A New Solution to the Problem of Negative Truths”, in: *Metaphysics and Truthmakers*, ed. Jean-Maurice Monnoyer (Frankfurt–Paris–

## The Problem of Truth-Makers for Evaluative Judgments

Accepting the thesis that axiological judgments possess logical value, and therefore may be true or false, entails the necessity of resolving the question of their ontological grounding, that is, of identifying their objective correlates (truth-makers), which constitute their truth. In classical ontology, the truth of a proposition is taken to consist in its correspondence with a fact or state of affairs, understood as a definite configuration of objects and properties existing in reality and cognitively accessible through experience. With regard to evaluative judgments, this raises the question whether their truth has an analogous ontological foundation. Czeżowski, however, rejects the identification of values with facts. He does not treat values as real properties inhering in empirical objects.<sup>81</sup> Consequently, his position requires a different account of the relation between an evaluative judgment and reality than that assumed by the classical correspondence theory of truth based on the notion of a fact as a truth-maker. The solution to this issue must be sought in his conception of transcendentals. Value, as a transcendental, is not one of the structural properties of an object but refers instead to its mode of existence (*modus essendi*). This means that value does not belong to an object as one of its empirical characteristics or constituent properties. This means that value does not belong to an object as one of its empirical characteristics or as a property belonging to the object's ontological structure and co-constituting its ontic identity, but rather qualifies its being within the axiological order.<sup>82</sup> The proposition "*a* is good" has no counterpart in the form of a fact understood as a state of affairs comprising the object *a* together with the property of goodness as its immanent determination; rather, it constitutes an axiological qualification of the state of affairs consisting in the existence of *a*. Such an interpretation

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Ebikon–Lancaster–New Brunswick: Ontos Verlag, 2007), 320; Scott A. Shalkowski, "Essence and Nominalism", in: *Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine*, ed. Mircea Dumitru (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 303, 305–306, 309, 311–312, 314.

<sup>81</sup> Czeżowski, "Transcendentalia", 190; Tadeusz Czeżowski, "O przedmiocie aksjologii" ("On the Subject Matter of Axiology"), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Pisma z etyki i teorii wartości (Writings on Ethics and the Theory of Value)*, ed. Paweł J. Smoczyński (Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk–Łódź: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich – Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1989), 115; Czeżowski, "O formalnym pojęciu wartości" ("On the Formal Concept of Value"), 122–123; Cf. Łukasiewicz, "Ontologiczne podstawy aksjologii", 158, 175.

<sup>82</sup> Łukasiewicz, "Ontologiczne podstawy aksjologii", 162–170.

makes it possible to preserve the realist thesis concerning the truth of axiological propositions while at the same time avoiding ontological inflation consisting in the postulation of *sui generis* normative properties objectively inscribed into the structure of objects.

It may therefore be assumed that the truth-maker of axiological propositions is a particular state of affairs (e.g., the fact of the existence of object *a*), considered under the aspect of its axiological qualification. This means that the ground of the truth of the judgment "*a* is good" remains reality understood as a particular configuration of features, relations, and conditions constituting a given state of affairs that satisfies the adopted criterion of evaluation. In other words, value does not constitute a distinct component of the object's ontological structure but expresses the normative qualification of the total existential situation (the manner in which an object situated under particular circumstances presently exists), viewed from the perspective of specific axiological standards.<sup>83</sup> In this sense, axiological truth does not require ontological "inflation" but presupposes that normativity refers to real states of affairs without at the same time constituting an additional property of those states in the ontological sense. Value does not constitute a separate ontological layer of the object but determines the manner in which it is evaluated.<sup>84</sup> According to Renata Muszyńska, values, as "transcendental properties, add nothing to being [...]; they merely make explicit the content of the concept of being".<sup>85</sup> In this way, values such as goodness, which Stanisław Kowalczyk – on account of their transcendental character – calls "transcendental values", distinguishing them from the class of "categorical values," are merely "new aspects of being distinguished in relation to the subject's cognitive or conative-emotional faculties".<sup>86</sup> As Czeżowski cautions, however, the intuition of value thus constituted does not mean that one may "regard them as merely subjective ways of

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<sup>83</sup> Łukasiewicz, "Metaphysics of Axiological Realism", 68, 72; Jonkisz, "Formalna teoria wartości", 121–122; Kmiecikowski, "Wartości moralne", 161–162.

<sup>84</sup> Cf. Cezary Gorzka, "Teoria wartości Tadeusza Czeszowskiego" ("Tadeusz Czeżowski's Theory of Value"), *Ruch Filozoficzny* 48(1) (1991): 21.

<sup>85</sup> Renata Muszyńska, "Własności transcendentalne i pierwsze zdanie metafizyki w ujęciu historycznym" ("Transcendental Properties and the First Proposition of Metaphysics in Historical Perspective"), *Studia Teologiczne* 22 (2004) (*Theological Studies*): 428.

<sup>86</sup> Stanisław Kowalczyk, "Filozoficzne koncepcje wartości" ("Philosophical Conceptions of Value"), *Collectanea Theologica* 56(1) (1986): 45.

relating to the object".<sup>87</sup> The point is that values as *modi entis* "belong to their object according to a certain *modus*, in a certain manner... such that it is beautiful or good, etc."<sup>88</sup>

## The Problem of the Reducibility of Value Judgments to Existential Judgments

Franz Brentano, in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, formulates the so-called idiogenetic theory of judgment,<sup>89</sup> according to which a judgment does not consist in the combination of representations (as in the Aristotelian-scholastic tradition), but in specific acts of affirmation (*Anerkennung*) or negation (*Verwerfung*) of the existence of the object of representation.<sup>90</sup> Every judgment – regardless of its grammatical form – can be reduced to an existential form: "A exists" or "A does not exist".<sup>91</sup> Brentano explicitly emphasizes that even seemingly predicative judgments ("S is P") in fact assume the structure of affirmation or negation of the existence of a certain state of affairs.<sup>92</sup> Thus, the constitutive element of judgment is not the attribution of a property to the object of representation (*Gegenstand der Vorstellung*), but the act of acknowledging (or rejecting) its existence.

Czeżowski – remaining under the strong influence of the Brentanian school<sup>93</sup> – accepts this concept at least in relation to descriptive judgments. As Dariusz Łukasiewicz shows, in Czeżowski's interpretation, descriptive judgments can be reduced to existential forms, and

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<sup>87</sup> Tadeusz Czeżowski, "Czym są wartości?" ("What Are Values?"), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Filozofia na rozdrożu (Philosophy at the Crossroads)* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2009), 109.

<sup>88</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>89</sup> Franz Hillebrand, *Die neuen Theorien der kategorischen Schlüsse. Eine logische Untersuchung* (Wien: Alfred Hölder Kaiserlich und Königlich Hoflieferant und Universitäts-Buchhändler, 1891), Chap. 2: *Von der Natur des Urtheils*, § 16, 26.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. Franz Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, transl. Antos C. Rancurello, Dailey Burnham Terrell, Linda L. McAlister (London–New York: Routledge, 1995), Book 2, Chapt 7, § 5, 161–162.

<sup>91</sup> Ibidem, § 7–8, 163–172.

<sup>92</sup> Ibidem, § 7, 163–171.

<sup>93</sup> Cf. Tadeusz Czeżowski, "O naukach humanistycznych" ("On the Humanities"), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Odczyty filozoficzne (Philosophical Lectures)*, 2nd rev. and expanded ed. (Toruń: Towarzystwo Naukowe w Toruniu, *Prace Wydziału Filologiczno-Filozoficznego*, 1969), vol. 20, no. 3, 32.

thus to acts of affirmation or negation of the existence of a specific object or state of affairs.<sup>94</sup> This means that the logical analysis of descriptive sentences should take into account their existential core, even if their surface structure<sup>95</sup> suggests a classical subject-predicate form, i.e., a predicative sentence.

However, the question arises whether an analogous reduction also occurs in the case of value judgments. If we assume that a value judgment is also a judgment in the Brentanian sense, it would consistently follow that, similarly to descriptive judgments, it should be reducible to the form of a judgment affirming or negating the existence of the object of representation. Can the sentence “*a* is valuable”, then, be understood as a logical paraphrase of the sentence “it is valuable that *a* exists?” Czeżowski explicitly rejects in his works the possibility of reducing sentences of the type “*a* is valuable (good)” to the existential form: “there exists a valuable (good) *a*,” because “axiological sentences by definition state value, and not existence”.<sup>96</sup> This kind of analysis allows for maintaining consistency with the idiogenetic theory of judgment: the act of evaluation would then be an affirmation of the existence of the value of a given object, that is – as Czeżowski says – that it is such and such (e.g., truthful),<sup>97</sup> such as it should be, “if this and that is good (better, best)”.<sup>98</sup> At the same time, it does not imply treating value as a property belonging to an object in a predicative sense, but as its modality.

The problem becomes complicated, however, in a situation when we relate it to fictional beings<sup>99</sup> (*entia imaginaria*) or ideal objects (conceptual contents that are products of mental activities preserved, for example, in language).<sup>100</sup> If a value judgment is to concern a specific manifesta-

<sup>94</sup> Cf. Łukasiewicz, “Ontologiczne podstawy aksjologii”, 160–161; Łukasiewicz, “Źródła, zasady i perspektywy”, 666–669; Łukasiewicz, “Metaphysics of Axiological Realism”, 63.

<sup>95</sup> Cf. Noam Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* (Cambridge–London: The MIT Press, 2015), Chap. 1, 15–16.

<sup>96</sup> Łukasiewicz, “Ontologiczne podstawy aksjologii”, note 8, 160.

<sup>97</sup> Tadeusz Czeżowski, “Etyka jako nauka empiryczna” (“Ethics as an Empirical Science”), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Pisma z etyki i teorii wartości* (*Writings on Ethics and the Theory of Value*), 100.

<sup>98</sup> Tadeusz Czeżowski, “Dwojakie normy” (“Two Kinds of Norms”), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Pisma z etyki i teorii wartości* (*Writings on Ethics and the Theory of Value*), 147.

<sup>99</sup> Tadeusz Czeżowski, *O metafizyce, jej kierunkach i zagadnieniach* (*On Metaphysics, Its Directions and Problems*) (Kęty: Wydawnictwo Antyk, 2004), 84–85.

<sup>100</sup> Tadeusz Czeżowski, “O naukach humanistycznych”, sec. IV, 33.

tion of the mode of existence of an object stated in the evaluation, how does this relate to the evaluation of a literary work or a fictional character? According to the theory of the intentional relation adopted by Czeżowski – following Brentano and Kazimierz Twardowski – every mental act – that is, both representation and judgment – is invariably directed toward a specific object, which becomes its immanent correlate.<sup>101</sup> An object understood in this way is not a Lockean idea merely representing a real object in the mind, but is the real and direct target of the cognitive act. The anti-representationalist position formulated in this way allows Czeżowski to include a wide spectrum of beings in his analysis, including literary characters and ideal objects.<sup>102</sup> Consequently, a sentence such as “Hamlet is a valuable literary character” can be transposed into the sentence: “It is valuable that Hamlet exists as an intentional object” (in the mental process of his creator). Existential reduction does not require here the assumption of the real existence of the object, but only the acknowledgment of its existence in the intentional (mental) order “as a hypothetical-deductive construction”.<sup>103</sup> Extending the scope of the concept of existence is not equivalent to the ontological hypostatization of value, but is a consequence of applying the Brentanian concept of objecthood. It is also made possible by the ambiguity of the term “existence” itself. Ultimately, as Czeżowski states, all “mental worlds arise and exist in this one real world in the basic, narrow sense of this word”.<sup>104</sup>

The presented analysis enables a coherent integration of three key components of Czeżowski's concept: (1) the idiogenetic theory of judgment, derived from Brentano's philosophy; (2) the realistic nature of value judgments, based on moderate semantic-ontological realism; and (3) the possibility of evaluating fictional beings without ontologically hypostatizing their real existence.

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<sup>101</sup> Cf. Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, Book 2, Chap. 1, § 5, 68.

<sup>102</sup> Czeżowski, “Pojęcie prawdziwości w odniesieniu do utworów literackich” (“The Concept of Truth with Reference to Literary Works”), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Odczyty filozoficzne (Philosophical Lectures)*, 225–226.

<sup>103</sup> Ibidem, 226.

<sup>104</sup> Ibidem, 227.

## Problem of the Admissibility of Iteration of the Axiological Functor

If we consider an axiological expression as a propositional operator  $V(p)$  (where  $V$  denotes "it is valuable that..."), the question of the admissibility of constructions such as  $V(V(p))$  naturally arises. This problem concerns the meaningfulness of statements of the type "it is valuable that it is valuable that  $p$ ". In the literature analyzing Czeżowski's position, such as in the works of Dariusz Łukasiewicz<sup>105</sup> and Manuel Rebuschi,<sup>106</sup> three fundamental strategies for resolving this issue are indicated:

1. Reduction of iteration to a single level: subsequent occurrences of the functor are reduced to one level, serving only the function of emphatic underlining of the strength of the evaluation.
2. Hierarchization of levels: iteration is permissible provided there is a distinction between different levels of reflection – from first-order values to the value of the act of acknowledging value.
3. Prohibition of iteration in the strict sense: the axiological operator applies exclusively to states of affairs expressing existence, which excludes its reflexivity.

From the perspective of Czeżowski's ontological minimalism, the third position, postulating a prohibition of iteration in the strict sense, appears most justified. Value as a *modus entis* (a modification of being) is not a property of judgments, but a qualification of the mode of existence of being. Since the category of transcendentals identified by Czeżowski as a separate class – modal transcendentals,<sup>107</sup> such as "necessity", "possibility", "good", or "beauty" – characterize the structure of an individual object (that is, the ontological arrangement of a specific, singular thing (substance), treated as a primary, independent, organized whole), while not being part of the description of its properties, they cannot become arguments for subsequent axiological operations of the same order. Iteration would lead to an unjustified shift of emphasis from ontology to metalanguage. Predicating value of object  $a$  consists only in qualifying the mode of its existence. The sentence " $A$  is good" essentially means:

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<sup>105</sup> Łukasiewicz, "Ontologiczne podstawy aksjologii", 162; Łukasiewicz, "Metaphysics of Axiological Realism", 66.

<sup>106</sup> Rebuschi, "Czeżowski's Axiological Concepts", 103–108.

<sup>107</sup> Czeżowski, "Transcendentalia", 54–56. Cf. Jan Woleński, "Wstęp" ("Introduction"), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *O metafizyce, jej kierunkach i zagadnieniach* (*On Metaphysics, Its Directions and Problems*), 14.

"It is valuable that *a* exists". This is the level of ontology, because the evaluating functor refers directly to the object *A*'s mode of being.

While reflection on the evaluation of the mode of existence of a specific being itself is possible, it no longer constitutes a direct axiological act (an intuition of value), but is a second-order act of a cognitive or metatheoretical nature. Consequently, value judgments are reduced to existential judgments of the type "It is valuable that *a* exists", where the evaluating functor operates directly on the fact of existence.

## Transcendentals as *Modi Entis*

The reinterpretation of the doctrine of the transcendentals constitutes one of Tadeusz Czeżowski's most original contributions – within the framework of analytical philosophy and analytical axiology<sup>108</sup> – to contemporary ontology and meta-axiology. As Jan Woleński observes, Czeżowski is the only analytical philosopher known to him "who considered this issue";<sup>109</sup> doing so in a manner entirely characteristic of his own philosophical approach. By synthesizing Brentanism, the Scholastic tradition, and the methodological rigor of the Lvov–Warsaw School, Czeżowski proposed an account in which the transcendentals cease to be understood merely as coextensive (convertible) attributes of being<sup>110</sup> and instead become instruments for the categorization and classification of its modes of existence.

The foundation of Czeżowski's conception lies in abandoning the understanding of the transcendentals characteristic of classical Scholasticism in favor of dividing them into two principal varieties:

- supracategorical transcendentals, which comprise the concept of being (*ens*) together with terms equivalent to it, such as "something" or "object". These are the most general concepts, which neither determine other concepts<sup>111</sup> nor admit of negation (non-being is "an empty term signifying nothing in any of the worlds");<sup>112</sup>

<sup>108</sup> Łukasiewicz, "Ontologiczne podstawy aksjologii", 167.

<sup>109</sup> Jan Woleński, "Modalności zdaniowe", 435. Cf. Stanisław Majdański, "Ethicae loci naturales. Wybrane uwagi i refleksje metaetyczne" ("Ethicae loci naturales. Selected Remarks and Metaethical Reflections"), *Ethos. Kwartalnik Instytutu Jana Pawła II KUL* 37, no. 4(148) (2024): 322, 325.

<sup>110</sup> William A. Frank, Allan B. Wolter, *Duns Scotus. Metaphysician* (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1995), 37.

<sup>111</sup> Czeżowski, "Transcendentalia", 190.

<sup>112</sup> Ibidem, 189.

- modal transcendentals, which include “the modal terms necessity and possibility, as well as existence and value, which are conceived analogously to those modal concepts”.<sup>113</sup>

As both Jan Woleński and Dariusz Łukasiewicz emphasize, this should not be understood as Czeżowski’s complete abandonment of the Scholastic heuristic of the transcendentals, but rather of their conceptualization as developed by Thomas Aquinas. The matter is, however, neither sufficiently unambiguous nor entirely clear, especially since Czeżowski himself never explicitly addresses it, nor does he refer by name, in this context, either to Aquinas or to John Duns Scotus. He merely employs the general designation “medieval logicians”.<sup>114</sup> Woleński maintains that Czeżowski’s “modern conception of the transcendentals” constitutes, in essence, “a certain synthesis of the position of Thomas Aquinas and that of Duns Scotus”.<sup>115</sup> Łukasiewicz, in turn, states that “Czeżowski nevertheless does not accept Thomas Aquinas’s theory of the transcendentals, because he holds that there is a difference between the transcendental *being* and the *modi essendi*.” The justification for this claim is “that being is not subject to negation, whereas the *modi essendi* can be negated”.<sup>116</sup> The negation of being is non-being, that is, something non-existent, whereas the negation of goodness is evil, and the negation of beauty is ugliness, that is, something that exists.

The possibility of negating the transcendentals brings to Łukasiewicz’s mind an association with Duns Scotus’s notion of the *passiones disiunctivae*, that is, disjunctive transcendentals (disjoined from being), contrasted by Scotus with the convertible transcendentals (*passiones convertibiles cum ente*).<sup>117</sup> I shall set aside the discussion that Łukasiewicz’s association is

<sup>113</sup> Ibidem, 190.

<sup>114</sup> Ibidem, 188–189.

<sup>115</sup> Woleński, “Wstęp”, 14.

<sup>116</sup> Łukasiewicz, “Ontologiczne podstawy aksjologii”, 166.

<sup>117</sup> Ibidem, 166–167. Cf. Allan B. Wolter OFM, *The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus* (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1946), 136; Andrzej Maryniarczyk SDB, “Transcendentalia w perspektywie historycznej (od arche do antytranscendentaliów)” (“The Transcendentals in Historical Perspective (From Arche to Anti-Transcendentals)”), *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 43(1) (1995): 150–151; Sebastian Tomasz Kołodziejczyk, *Granice pojęciowe metafizyki (The Conceptual Boundaries of Metaphysics)* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2017), 163. The *locus classicus* of Scotus’s conception of the disjunctive transcendentals is the passage in Book I of his *Ordinatio*, Distinction 8, Part 1, Question 3. See Johannes Duns Scotus, “Ordinatio,” Liber I, in: *Iohannes Duns Scotus, Opera omnia*, vol. 4, ed. Carl Balić, Martin Bodewig, Stanislav Bušelić, Pietro Čapkun-Delić, Barnaba

justified only partially and only in a formal sense, of which Łukasiewicz himself is, moreover, aware.<sup>118</sup> For Duns Scotus unequivocally classifies goodness as a convertible transcendental, whereas Czeżowski regards it as a modal transcendental, interpreted by Łukasiewicz, just as by Woleński, as disjunctive in the Scotistic sense.<sup>119</sup>

Czeżowski transferred the disjunctive structure of the transcendentals<sup>120</sup> into the domain of axiology, which enabled him to regard good and evil as transcendental modes of being rather than as descriptive properties of being. The comparison of Czeżowski's modal reinterpretation of the transcendentals with Duns Scotus's conception of the transcendentals is justified by the fact that Scotus – following a line of thought already present in the works of Bonaventure<sup>121</sup>

Hechich, Ivan Jurić, Bruno Korošak, Luca Modrić, Sebastiano Nanni, Iulio Reinhold, and Odulf Schäfer (Civita Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1956), 169–229. Cf. Wolter, *The Transcendentals and Their Function*, 4–12; Allan B. Aertsen, “Scotus's Conception of Transcendentality: Tradition and Innovation”, *Archa Verbi. Subsidia* 5 (2008): 112.

<sup>118</sup> Łukasiewicz, “Ontologiczne podstawy aksjologii”, 167.

<sup>119</sup> Woleński, “Malum, Transcendentalia and Logic”, 364.

<sup>120</sup> Jacek Surzyn, “Jana Dunsza Szkota pytanie o metafizykę” (“John Duns Scotus's Question Concerning Metaphysics”), *IDEA – Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych* 23 (2011) (*IDEA – Studies on Structure and Development of Philosophical Concepts*): 20–21; Jacek Surzyn, “Szkotowy projekt nauki transcendentalnej” (“Scotus's Project of Transcendental Science”), *Folia Philosophica* 30 (2012): 66.

<sup>121</sup> Allan B. Wolter, Jan A. Aertsen, Jean-François Courtine, and Jared Isaac Goff unanimously argue – to cite here Aertsen's representative formulation – that: “[...] the source of this conception may have been Bonaventure, who in *De mysterio Trinitatis* bases one of his proofs for the existence of God on ten ‘differences of being’ (*differentiae entis* – addition by P. D.), such as ‘possible being and necessary being’ or ‘being in potency and being in act.’ What is new in Scotus's thought, however, is his understanding of the disjunctive properties of being as transcendental”. See Aertsen, “Scotus's Conception of Transcendentality”, 118; Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought. From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez* (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2012), Chap. 9: “Duns Scotus: a Turn in the Doctrine of the Transcendentals,” 388–389; Wolter, *The Transcendentals and Their Function*, 132–137; Jean-François Courtine, *Suarez et le système de la métaphysique* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990), 384–385; Jared Isaac Goff, *Caritas in Primo. A Study of Bonaventure's Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity* (New Bedford, MA: Academy of the Immaculate, 2015), XXX–XXXI; 9, note 22. Cf. St. Bonaventure, “Quaestiones Disputatae de Mysterio Trinitatis”, in: *St. Bonaventure, Opera omnia*, vol. 5: “Opuscula varia theologica” (Claras Aquas (Quaracchi), near Florence: Printing House of St. Bonaventure's College, 1891), Question 1, Article 1, points 10–20, 46b–47a. In contrast to the above-mentioned authors, other scholars, such as Frederick Charles Copleston SJ and Jacek Surzyn,

and generalizing it:<sup>122</sup>

[...] extends the range of transcendental concepts – which traditionally include ‘unity,’ ‘truth,’ and ‘goodness’ (these concepts being logically co-extensive with ‘being’) – by adding three further kinds of concepts: ‘being’ itself; disjunctive pairs such as ‘actual and potential,’ ‘finite and infinite,’ and ‘contingent and necessary’; and pure perfections such as ‘life,’ ‘wisdom,’ and ‘will.’<sup>123</sup>

Czeżowski categorically rejects the predicative nature of values, maintaining that goodness, truth, and beauty are not properties of objects (their attributes), but rather their modes of being (*modi entis* or *modi essendi*).<sup>124</sup> According to Czeżowski, expressions such as “round”, “coloured”, or “loud” belong to categorial predicates, that is, proper predicates, namely those that “correspond to the constituents of the content of presentations, images, or concepts”.<sup>125</sup> By contrast, expressions such as “existing”, “beautiful”, or “good”, that is, the transcendentals, lie “outside the domain of the categories”. As such, they are not representable,<sup>126</sup> a fact which, as Czeżowski points out, has long been well known in phi-

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maintain that Duns Scotus adopted the general scheme of the division of the transcendental attributes of being either from Avicenna (Copleston) or from Albert the Great (Surzyn), rather than from Bonaventure. See Frederick C. Copleston, *A History of Medieval Philosophy* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), 218; Surzyn, “Jana Dunsza Szkota pytanie o metafizykę”, 20.

<sup>122</sup> Courtine, *Suarez et le système de la métaphysique*, 384; Wolter, *The Transcendentals and Their Function*, 132, 137; Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus* (New York–Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 148; Kołodziejczyk, *Granice pojęciowe metafizyki* (*The Conceptual Boundaries of Metaphysics*), 163. Cf. Duns Scotus, “Ordinatio”, Book I, Distinction 8, Part 1, Question 3, nos. 113–115, 205–207.

<sup>123</sup> Frank, Wolter, *Duns Scotus. Metaphysician*, 38, note 8. Cf. Surzyn, “Jana Dunsza Szkota pytanie o metafizykę”, 20.

<sup>124</sup> Tadeusz Czeżowski, “Definicje deiktyczne” (“Deictic Definitions”), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Filozofia na rozdrożu (Analizy metodologiczne)* (*Philosophy at the Crossroads (Methodological Analyses)*) (Toruń: Nicolaus Copernicus University Press, 2009), 37–38; Czeżowski, “Czym są wartości?”, 109.

<sup>125</sup> Czeżowski, “Czym są wartości?”, 108.

<sup>126</sup> Czeżowski, “Transcendentalia”, 190; Czeżowski, “Czym są wartości?”, 109; Czeżowski, “Klasyfikacja rozumowań i jej konsekwencje w teorii nauki” (“The Classification of Reasonings and Its Consequences for the Theory of Science”), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Filozofia na rozdrożu (Philosophy at the Crossroads)* (*Analizy metodologiczne (Methodological Analyses)*) (Toruń: Nicolaus Copernicus University Press, 2009), 155.

losophy. "Hume and Kant maintained this".<sup>127</sup> The transcendentals do not add any new sensible quality to the description of an object. "They are asserted in various kinds of modal propositions".<sup>128</sup>

According to Czeżowski, the transcendentals characterize the structure of an individual object without constituting parts of that structure. They designate the manner in which properties are interconnected within a given individual and qualify its mode of being. The transcendentals, including values, as *modi*, are not representable in presentations,<sup>129</sup> but are apprehended in judgments, more precisely, in propositions having a modal structure,<sup>130</sup> where modal operators (including axiological modalities) – that is, expressions of the form "it is necessary that...", "it is true that...", "it is good that...", "it is beautiful that..." – function as propositional-forming functors.<sup>131</sup> Propositions with a modal structure consist "of a propositional-forming functor and its argument in the form of an affirmative or negative proposition," namely "*p*" or "*not-p*".<sup>132</sup> "In the case of existence, the functor takes the form: 'it is true that.' For value, by contrast, the functor is the expression: 'it is valuable that' (or: 'it is good that,' 'it is beautiful that')".<sup>133</sup>

Czeżowski distinguishes three kinds of judgments in which *modi entis* are predicated: (1) assertoric judgments, (2) apodictic judgments, and (3) axiological judgments (evaluations).<sup>134</sup> He analyses them primarily in his works on ontology, epistemology, and meta-axiology, such as *Filozofia na rozdrożu* (*Philosophy at the Crossroads*) (1965), *Transcendentalia – przy-*

<sup>127</sup> Czeżowski, "Definicje dejktyczne", 37.

<sup>128</sup> Czeżowski, "Czym są wartości?", 108.

<sup>129</sup> Tadeusz Czeżowski, "Etyka a psychologia i logika" ("Ethics and Psychology and Logic"), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Odczyty filozoficzne* (*Philosophical Lectures*), 2nd rev. and expanded ed. (Toruń: Towarzystwo Naukowe w Toruniu (*Toruń Scientific Society*), *Prace Wydziału Filologiczno-Filozoficznego* (*Papers of the Faculty of Philology and Philosophy*), 1969), vol. 20, no. 3, 241.

<sup>130</sup> In order to avoid the error of psychologism, the overcoming of which, according to Czeżowski, constitutes the task of logic, he draws a subtle but highly significant distinction between a judgment and a proposition. A judgment is a psychic act (an activity of the mind, a cognitive experience such as acceptance, evaluation, or assertion), whereas a proposition is a linguistic entity, the logical structure of a given language expressing the content of a judgment. Thus, a proposition is the linguistic expression, the carrier of the content of a judgment. On this matter see, e.g., Czeżowski, "Etyka a psychologia i logika", 241.

<sup>131</sup> Czeżowski, "Definicje dejktyczne", 37.

<sup>132</sup> Czeżowski, "Transcendentalia", 190.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>134</sup> Czeżowski, "Klasyfikacja rozumowań i jej konsekwencje w teorii nauki", 155.

*czyniek do ontologii* (*Transcendentals: A Contribution to Ontology*) (1977), and the textbook *Główne zasady nauk filozoficznych* (*The Main Principles of the Philosophical Sciences*). The claims he advances in this respect constitute the core of his conception of transcendental modes of being (*modi entis*). Assertoric judgments merely state a factual state of affairs, that is, the existence of an object or one of its properties, “without asserting necessity or possibility”<sup>135</sup> or the values attributable to it. Apodictic judgments predicate necessity. Axiological judgments (evaluations) predicate value, that is, beauty or goodness. Besides these, Czeżowski also distinguishes problematic judgments. These are “propositions in which possibility is asserted”.<sup>136</sup>

## The Empirical Character of Axiology

According to Czeżowski, the aforementioned kinds of judgments by means of which *modi entis* are predicated possess the characteristic that they do not result from a purely intellectual analysis of concepts,<sup>137</sup> hence, they are not *a priori* judgments in the classical rationalist sense.<sup>138</sup> Czeżowski regards judgments concerning transcendentals *en bloc* as synthetic judgments because they express “empirical convictions”.<sup>139</sup> “In them, we ascribe to their objects properties that cannot be inferred by reasoning from the definitions of those objects”.<sup>140</sup> Such an operation requires recourse to experience. Unlike the special (alias empirical) sciences, however:

[...] philosophy extends the scope of experience beyond natural experience. The natural sciences recognize only one kind of experience – sense experience – but philosophers have long drawn attention to its other kinds, designated by various names. They all share the common feature that the cognitive act apprehends its object, whatever its type may be, directly – that

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<sup>135</sup> Czeżowski, *Główne zasady nauk filozoficznych* (*Fundamental Principles of the Philosophical Sciences*) (Toruń: Nakładem Księgarni Naukowej T. Szczęsnego i S-ka (Published by T. Szczęśny & Co. Scientific Bookshop), 1949), Chap. 2: “Logika i metodologia” (“Logic and Methodology”), 92, sec. 4.

<sup>136</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>137</sup> Tadeusz Czeżowski, “O poznaniu” (“On Cognition”), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Główne zasady nauk filozoficznych* (*Fundamental Principles of the Philosophical Sciences*), 8.

<sup>138</sup> Ibidem, 9.

<sup>139</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>140</sup> Ibidem. Cf. Czeżowski, “Transcendentalia”, 191.

is, in its own proper form, and not through the mediation of any signs – and as a whole, precisely in the way an object is apprehended, for example, in visual perception. For this reason, such cognition is called intuitive, the original meaning of this term (*intuitive* = *visual*) being extended to every kind of cognition that is direct and holistic.<sup>141</sup>

Although intuitive cognition is extrasensory cognition, it possesses “features common to sensory cognition”,<sup>142</sup> which is empirical cognition in the narrow sense:

[...] being direct, it is self-evident, although there are different kinds of self-evidence corresponding to different kinds of intuition. It is not demonstrable, because it is factual rather than apodictic – one cannot prove to anyone that things are as I see them except by showing that very same thing to that person. It is, however, verifiable in the sense that it may be repeated by different persons, under different circumstances, and compared.<sup>143</sup>

Thus understood, intuitive cognition, according to Czeżowski, is not situated – as is usually assumed in philosophy, for example in the circle of neo-positivist philosophy<sup>144</sup> – outside the context of empirical cognition, but rather forms part of “experience in the broad sense of the word,” providing “empirical knowledge,” that is, “individual knowledge, although concerning objects of various logical types, such as numbers or geometrical figures...”<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> Tadeusz Czeżowski, “Filozofia na rozdrożu” (“Philosophy at the Crossroads”), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Filozofia na rozdrożu (Analizy metodologiczne)* (*Philosophy at the Crossroads [Methodological Analyses]*) (Toruń: Nicolaus Copernicus University Scientific Publishing House, 2009), 17.

<sup>142</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>143</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>144</sup> Cf., for example, Anna Jedynak, “Intuicyjne podstawy empirystycznych koncepcji sensu” (“The Intuitive Foundations of Empiricist Conceptions of Meaning”), *Filozofia Nauki (Philosophy of Science)* 1(21) (1998): 5.

<sup>145</sup> Czeżowski, “Filozofia na rozdrożu”, 18. Cf. Francesco Coniglione, “Logica, scienza, e filosofia in Tadeusz Czeżowski” (“Logic, Science, and Philosophy in Tadeusz Czeżowski”), *Global Philosophy* 8(1–3) (1997): 230. Coniglione points out that “Czeżowski therefore advocates an extension and transformation of the concept of experience, in accordance with the indications of Bergson, Husserl, and existentialism, although he acknowledges that these new paths of cognition have not yet been sufficiently investigated and developed, unlike the methods of the natural sciences (cf. [1951], 41). Precisely by referring to Bergson’s philosophy, Czeżowski emphasizes that this new ‘irrationalist or intuitionist metaphysics’ is nevertheless not anti-rationalist, since it does not oppose the classical methods of scientific inquiry, which it rather seeks to complement; moreover, it

Czeżowski sees the legitimation of his position in the view according to which, first, “the scope of human knowledge is always limited, and in two ways: only a finite segment of unlimited spacetime is accessible to experience, and it is moreover limited qualitatively by the range of human cognitive means”.<sup>146</sup> Second, “the totality of what exists” partly lies within the range of the exploratory possibilities of human experience, while partly it “extends further than human experience”.<sup>147</sup> The empirical world in the strict sense is the domain of research in the natural sciences, whereas the extra-empirical part of existence remains within the interest of metaphysics. It is obvious that “[t]his extra-empirical part of existence is not knowable”,<sup>148</sup> and therefore metaphysics is condemned, to a considerable extent, to making conjectures, carrying out extrapolations, and engaging in quasi-scientific speculations. Accordingly, it is indeed true that metaphysical constructions are not “hypotheses in the sense accepted in science”, since they are not decidable and, moreover, “they are not susceptible to being made probable”.<sup>149</sup> In the strict sense, however, “no natural-scientific proposition is decidable” either, although – in contrast to metaphysical constructions – natural-scientific propositions “through successive empirical tests receive an increasingly higher degree of probability”.<sup>150</sup> The epistemologically problematic status of metaphysical constructions does not, however, render them entirely devoid of value. Czeżowski expresses the conviction that:

Their value must be sought elsewhere. Every such construction represents a certain possible answer to questions arising against the background of knowledge of the empirical world, yet extending beyond the limits within which scientific methods are capable of providing answers. Such constructions therefore indicate possible directions for the expansion of knowledge

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aims to distinguish itself both from anti-rationalist metaphysics and from mystical positions, and is characterized by the verifiability of its methods and by the hypothetical rather than apodictic character of its results, thereby approximating the requirements of scientific criticism typical of the natural sciences (cf. [1948d], 23–24)”. See Coniglione, “Logica, scienza, e filosofia in Tadeusz Czeżowski”, 231. Cf. Ryszard Wiśniewski, “Intuitionism in Contemporary Polish Ethics. Part I. From Modernism to the Lviv-Warsaw School”, *Ruch Filozoficzny* (*The Philosophical Movement*) 75(4) (2019): 150–151.

<sup>146</sup> Czeżowski, “Filozofia na rozdrożu”, 14. Cf. Czeżowski, “O poznaniu”, 42.

<sup>147</sup> Czeżowski, “Filozofia na rozdrożu”, 14. Cf. Czeżowski, “O poznaniu”, 42.

<sup>148</sup> Czeżowski, “Filozofia na rozdrożu”, 14.

<sup>149</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>150</sup> Ibidem.

beyond its currently attained boundaries. In this lies their heuristic significance.<sup>151</sup>

Were even this argument still to prove debatable for opponents of incorporating metaphysics into the system of the sciences, it would undoubtedly be difficult for them – according to Czeżowski – to dispute the view that the value of metaphysical constructions is ultimately determined by their function and cognitive usefulness. The significance of metaphysics is justified above all by its role in organizing, ordering, and integrating scientific cognition. Czeżowski justifies the need to incorporate metaphysics into the system of the sciences by the function it performs with respect to science, binding into a “unity of generalization” the diverse laws formulated within the particular sciences. In this way, it becomes a “complement to the theories of the special sciences,” constituting the “unity of a scientific worldview”.<sup>152</sup> Czeżowski does not claim here that metaphysics is true because it is useful. Rather, he maintains that metaphysics is necessary because it responds to the natural need for a synthesis of knowledge. It is precisely this unifying function that justifies its presence within scientific culture.

As can thus be seen, Czeżowski advocates a twofold line of justification for incorporating metaphysics into the system of the sciences. First, metaphysics provides the “unity of generalization” of the results of strictly empirical scientific cognition.<sup>153</sup> Second, given the limited character of natural-scientific empiricism, which confines the natural sciences to acquaintance with “only one kind of experience – sense experience”, metaphysics makes it possible to transcend this limitation by attempting to reach directly and comprehensively those regions of expanded experience that possess a non-sensory character.<sup>154</sup> Czeżowski formulates here an important methodological reservation, according to which any cognition based on experience other than sensory experience cannot be rejected as unscientific if it satisfies the “basic condition of scientific correctness, namely the criterion of intersubjective verifiability, which makes it possible to distinguish what is objective from subjective illusions”.<sup>155</sup> According to Czeżowski, this criterion is un-

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<sup>151</sup> Ibidem, 15.

<sup>152</sup> Ibidem, 16. Cf. Woleński, “Wstęp”, 12.

<sup>153</sup> Czeżowski, *O metafizyce, jej kierunkach i zagadnieniach* (*On Metaphysics, Its Directions and Problems*), 129.

<sup>154</sup> Ibidem, 128.

<sup>155</sup> Czeżowski, “Filozofia na rozdrożu”, 18.

doubtedly fulfilled by the “various forms of intuitive cognition”.<sup>156</sup> For, as he maintains, one can “learn to make correct judgments in various domains of intuitive, extrasensory cognition, just as one can learn to use a microscope or to detect diminished breath sounds in the lungs and heart murmurs”.<sup>157</sup>

Czeżowski includes the following kinds of experience within extra-sensory empiricism:

- Internal experience (identified by Czeżowski with introspection or reflection): it comprises the direct perception of one’s own mental phenomena (such as “physical pain”, “one’s own beliefs, moods, desires”,<sup>158</sup> seeing, hearing, believing, or rejoicing) through living through and experiencing them within oneself, as well as the indirect cognition of one’s own and other people’s mental phenomena (past, present, and future) by means of their representations in “reproductive imagination”,<sup>159</sup> these representations are expressed by means of observational propositions concerning “mental phenomena experienced by the observer”.<sup>160</sup> The observational propositions of internal experience “have a certain initial degree of probability, which increases as observations are repeated under given conditions, by the same or by other observers.”<sup>161</sup>
- Axiological experience:<sup>162</sup> it is one of the varieties of broadly understood intuition, which Czeżowski identifies with the expanded concept of empiricism, referring to it as “axiological empiricism”.<sup>163</sup> It encompasses the sphere of moral values (represented by goodness) and aesthetic values (represented by beauty), which are ap-

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<sup>156</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>157</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>158</sup> Czeżowski, “O poznaniu” (“On Cognition”), 42.

<sup>159</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>160</sup> Czeżowski, “O tak zwanym uzasadnieniu bezpośrednim i oczywistości” (“On So-Called Direct Justification and Self-Evidence”), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Filozofia na rozdrożu (Analizy metodologiczne)* (*Philosophy at the Crossroads [Methodological Analyses]*), 71.

<sup>161</sup> Ibidem, 71.

<sup>162</sup> For more on axiological experience in Czeżowski’s understanding, see Ryszard Wiśniewski, “Doświadczenie aksjologiczne a teorie etyczne w koncepcji Tadeusza Czeszowskiego” (“Axiological Experience and Ethical Theories in Tadeusz Czeżowski’s Conception”), in: *Człowiek i wartości moralne. Studia z dziejów niezależnej myśli etycznej* (*Human Beings and Moral Values: Studies in the History of Independent Ethical Thought*), eds. Zdzisław J. Czarnecki, Stanisław Soldenhoff (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie, 1989), 259–287.

<sup>163</sup> Czeżowski, “Dwojakie normy”, 148.

prehended and recognized within it in their objectivity. According to Czeżowski, the objectivity of values stems from the fact that goodness and beauty exist independently of acts of valuation<sup>164</sup> and independently of the emotional states of the valuing subject.<sup>165</sup> Czeżowski categorically rejects axiological subjectivism,<sup>166</sup> according to which we evaluate something as good only because what we so evaluate gives us pleasure. In his view, the relation is precisely the reverse. The evaluation of value given in axiological intuition is primary and cognitive in character, whereas the feeling accompanying it (satisfaction, liking) is merely its secondary consequence.<sup>167</sup> For one does not "regard something as beautiful because one likes it, or as good because it gives one satisfaction; on the contrary, liking or satisfaction arises only as a consequence of the evaluation in which one states that something is beautiful or good".<sup>168</sup> For Czeżowski, value is an objective object of cognition and not merely a "content of experience", that is, a subjective experience.<sup>169</sup> This is so, in his view, because when one predicates of values "that this or that is beautiful, good, valuable", one is not merely predicating one's attitude toward a thing (that one likes it, that it gives one satisfaction, that it arouses positive feelings and desires), but is predicating "something that belongs to the thing itself".<sup>170</sup> Although values are "contentless" in the descriptive sense ("they contribute no new content to the description of an object"),<sup>171</sup> they nevertheless inform us about a distinctive, objective aspect of reality insofar as a given "property belongs to its object according to a certain *modus*, in a certain manner".<sup>172</sup> In the case of axiological modalities (values), a given property belongs to an object in such a way "that it is beautiful or good".<sup>173</sup> The af-

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<sup>164</sup> Woleński, "Wstęp" ("Introduction"), 12.

<sup>165</sup> Dariusz Łukasiewicz, "Analiza i egzystencja w ujęciu Tadeusza Czeżowskiego i Mariana Przełęckiego" ("Analysis and Existence in the Thought of Tadeusz Czeżowski and Marian Przełęcki"), *Analiza i Egzystencja (Analysis and Existence)* 15 (2011): 18.

<sup>166</sup> Czeżowski, "Czym są wartości?", 106–108. Cf. Agnieszka Smolicka, "Świat wartości", 48–50.

<sup>167</sup> Czeżowski, "Czym są wartości?", 106.

<sup>168</sup> Ibidem, 108.

<sup>169</sup> Ibidem, 106.

<sup>170</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>171</sup> Ibidem, 108.

<sup>172</sup> Ibidem, 109.

<sup>173</sup> Ibidem.

- firmation of value is the recognition of the objective belonging of an object to the "world of values", rather than an arbitrary act of will or an emotional impulse on the part of the evaluating subject.
- Intellectual intuition, which Czeżowski compares to Plato's *noesis*, Aristotle's cognition of essence, and phenomenological eidetic cognition (*Wesensschau*).<sup>174</sup> He defines it as an act of grasping an essence in a particular instance or of extracting from an observed individual case its generic component (species element). It is by no means a form of theoretical conjecture; rather, it enables the cognition of the necessity that characterizes the structure of an individual object, that is, the manner in which the properties belonging to a particular individual are interconnected.<sup>175</sup> This means that, analogously to sensory perception, by carrying out an intuitive insight into a particular object, the investigator is able to discern in it not only its accidental properties but, above all, that which constitutes its essence (*essentia*). Through the intuitive apprehension of necessary relations (for example, in mathematics or logic), the investigator may accept axioms that are "entangled definitions"<sup>176</sup> of reality and constitute the basis of deductive systems.
  - Mathematical intuition: the issue of mathematical intuition in Czeżowski's philosophy constitutes an integral element of his conception of expanded empiricism and of his programme of rendering philosophy scientific through logic.<sup>177</sup> Mathematical intuition is a variety of direct cognition directed toward "objects of various logical types",<sup>178</sup> such as numbers or geometrical figures. Czeżowski maintains that numbers and geometrical figures may be objects of extrasensory experience when they are apprehended directly as facts (e.g., the fact that two non-parallel straight lines intersect on a plane), rather than merely being deduced from definitions alone. A key feature of Czeżowski's position on this matter is his recognition of primary mathematical insights as synthetic

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<sup>174</sup> Czeżowski, "Transcendentalia", 191.

<sup>175</sup> Tadeusz Czeżowski, "Dyskusja" ("Discussion"), in: Mieczysław A. Krąpiec OP, "Filozofia bytu a zagadnienie wartości" ("The Philosophy of Being and the Problem of Value"), *Znak* 130 (1965): 438.

<sup>176</sup> Tadeusz Czeżowski, "O tak zwanym uzasadnieniu bezpośrednim i oczywistości" ("On So-Called Direct Justification and Self-Evidence"), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Filozofia na rozdrożu (Analizy metodologiczne) (Philosophy at the Crossroads (Methodological Analyses))*, 74.

<sup>177</sup> Coniglione, "Logica, scienza, e filosofia in Tadeusz Czeżowski", 228–229.

<sup>178</sup> Czeżowski, "Filozofia na rozdrożu", 18.

cognition. Although mathematics is commonly associated with apriority, the axioms that constitute its point of departure are, for him, synthetic in character,<sup>179</sup> since they do not result directly from the mere analysis of concepts but from a direct "encounter" with an ideal object (e.g., a number or a geometrical figure). According to Czeżowski, such an object appears to the investigator "intuitively", in its own form, and not through one description or another, nor through symbols. "Usually, intuition lies at the basis of accepted axioms".<sup>180</sup>

- Existential intuition: Czeżowski analyses this issue in two dimensions: (1) the logical-ontological dimension and (2) the metaphysical dimension. Existential experience, considered in the logical-ontological dimension, consists in grasping the very fact of existence in existential experiences, "that is, acts of judging understood as acknowledging the existence of an object given in an appropriate presentation. [...] The linguistic expression of this experience is the (affirmative) existential proposition".<sup>181</sup> Such a proposition may be subjected to rigorous logical analysis (for example, by paraphrasing it into the language of first-order predicate calculus with identity),<sup>182</sup> which constitutes the scientific foundation for its investigation. Existential experience, considered in the metaphysical dimension, goes beyond a purely logical approach, referring to the experience of "existence apprehended in an evaluative manner".<sup>183</sup> It is characterized by a "striving to grasp one's own self in its existence".<sup>184</sup> According to Czeżowski, it approximates "certain experiences of religious asceticism",<sup>185</sup> reaching the "innermost" core of individual human existence in such a way that "everything that can in any way be qualitatively apprehended [within it – supplement by P.D.] will be rejected as external to it".<sup>186</sup> This experience manifests itself particularly in situations such as dejection, boredom, anxiety, despair, suffering, loneliness, or

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<sup>179</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>180</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>181</sup> Łukasiewicz, "Analiza i egzystencja", 16. Cf. Czeżowski, *O metafizyce, jej kierunkach i zagadnieniach*, 84.

<sup>182</sup> Łukasiewicz, "Analiza i egzystencja", 16.

<sup>183</sup> Łukasiewicz, "Analiza i egzystencja", 16.

<sup>184</sup> Czeżowski, *O metafizyce, jej kierunkach i zagadnieniach*, 124.

<sup>185</sup> Ibidem, 123.

<sup>186</sup> Ibidem, 124.

death,<sup>187</sup> which shake the human being and enable him or her to grasp the meaning of his or her own existence. "Experiences of this type should not be rejected as unscientific, provided only that they are intersubjectively verifiable".<sup>188</sup>

All the aforementioned kinds of extrasensory experience are regarded by Czeżowski as synthetic rather than analytic cognition, because they provide knowledge of facts that cannot be derived from the mere analysis of concepts.

## Axiological – Deontological Complementarism

For a fuller understanding of Czeżowski's conception of expanded empiricism, it is essential to take into account the relation, emphasized throughout his writings, between extrasensory (intuitive) experience and the adoption by the cognizing subject of an appropriate attitude toward the object of cognition. According to Czeżowski, an act of intuitive cognition depends upon the subject's assuming a specific "state of psychological readiness" to engage in a particular "way of comporting oneself toward the world": cognition, action, or contemplation,<sup>189</sup> which Czeżowski refers to as an "attitude".<sup>190</sup> He distinguishes three such attitudes: (1) the cognitive attitude – defined as a "readiness to cognize empirical objects through their perception";<sup>191</sup> (2) the evaluative (practical) attitude – defined as a readiness to assess the value of a given object;<sup>192</sup> and (3) the aesthetic attitude, which is a "readiness for aesthetic evaluations in which the beauty of an object is affirmed,"<sup>193</sup> just as in a perceptual conviction one affirms the existence of an object, whereas in an "evaluative judgment one affirms its goodness".<sup>194</sup> The attitude proper to sensory and introspective cognition, as well as to the "cognition of what is general" (essential cognition), is attention. By contrast, the attitude

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<sup>187</sup> Ibidem, 126.

<sup>188</sup> Łukasiewicz, "Analiza i egzystencja", 16.

<sup>189</sup> Tadeusz Czeżowski, "Trzy postawy wobec świata" ("Three Attitudes toward the World"), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Odczyty filozoficzne (Philosophical Lectures)*, 162–163.

<sup>190</sup> Ibidem, 163.

<sup>191</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>192</sup> Ibidem, 163–164.

<sup>193</sup> Ibidem, 164.

<sup>194</sup> Ibidem.

proper to evaluations of the value of a given object is the "evaluative, moral, or aesthetic attitude".<sup>195</sup> The adoption of an appropriate cognitive attitude is a "sufficient condition for the emergence of an intuitive cognitive act".<sup>196</sup>

The issue of the human subject's adopting an appropriate attitude toward the world constitutes, in Czeżowski's philosophy, an indispensable psychological and epistemological condition for the emergence of empirical ethics. Without adopting a specific attitude (in this case, a moral attitude), it would not be possible to obtain empirical data (primary individual moral evaluations possessing a "structure analogous to that of observational statements in the natural sciences"<sup>197</sup> and functioning as protocol statements), upon which the entire edifice of ethical theory is inductively built up (from the bottom up).<sup>198</sup> A complete ethical system, in Czeżowski's understanding, is a system of deontic propositions<sup>199</sup> encompassing two kinds of moral norms: teleological and formal. Teleological norms indicate a "set of goods constituting the ends of ethically positive conduct".<sup>200</sup> Deontic norms, by contrast, do not designate particular goods as the ends of moral conduct, as teleological norms do; rather, "all of them bind moral conduct to their observance".<sup>201</sup> Both kinds of norms standardize human moral conduct in such a way that teleological norms derive rules of conduct from moral good (and, more broadly, from moral values), prescribing its (their) maximization. Formal norms, in turn, take the concept of moral obligation, rather than value, as primary. Such obligation consists in acting "in accordance with a norm". Only such action ensures the realization of the moral good indicated by the norm in question.<sup>202</sup> Since teleological norms are grounded in moral values, Czeżowski refers to them as axiological norms.<sup>203</sup> The fact that formal norms are directed toward acting "out of duty in accordance with a norm"<sup>204</sup> reveals their deontic character. Consequently, following

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<sup>195</sup> Czeżowski, "Transcendentalia", 191.

<sup>196</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>197</sup> Czeżowski, "Aksjologiczne i deontyczne normy moralne", 136.

<sup>198</sup> Wiśniewski, "Intuitionism in Contemporary Polish Ethics", 152.

<sup>199</sup> Czeżowski, "Dwojakie normy", 145, 149.

<sup>200</sup> Czeżowski, "Aksjologiczne i deontyczne normy moralne", 135.

<sup>201</sup> Ibidem, 133.

<sup>202</sup> Ibidem, 134.

<sup>203</sup> Ibidem, 134.

<sup>204</sup> Ibidem, 134.

Harold Arthur Prichard and William David Ross,<sup>205</sup> Czeżowski decides to refer to them as “deontic norms”.<sup>206</sup>

Axiological norms indicate which moral values ought to be realized (e.g., “helping those in need is a good thing; therefore, one ought to do so”)<sup>207</sup>. They arise through the generalization of “elementary evaluations”,<sup>208</sup> that is, primary individual evaluations, “made in individual cases”,<sup>209</sup> such as, for example, “this is good”, which are reports of direct axiological experience. Deontic norms, by contrast, determine a mode of conduct without reference to any specific end that such conduct is intended to realize. They are adopted as the primary assumptions of an ethical system, that is, as its axioms.<sup>210</sup> Their introduction is *a priori* in character and proceeds by means of the method of analytic description. The method of analytical description is a research procedure that makes it possible to transform a direct insight into the nature of a phenomenon

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<sup>205</sup> Czeżowski does indeed refer in the article “Aksjologiczne i deontyczne normy moralne” to Prichard and Ross, but he gives no specific references to their works. Ross mentions the complementarity of axiological (teleological) and deontic norms (principles) in: William David Ross, *Foundations of Ethics. The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of Aberdeen, 1935–6* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), 46–48. As for Prichard, he discusses this issue, among other places, in: Harold Arthur Prichard, “Moral Obligation,” in: Harold Arthur Prichard, *Moral Writings* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 186–189. The point is that although Czeżowski refers to Ross and Prichard in the matter under discussion, they were not the first to draw attention to it. For Ross refers here to the analyses of Charlie Dunbar Broad, who in turn refers in this matter to Henry Sidgwick. See Ross, *Foundations of Ethics*, 46. Cf. Charlie Dunbar Broad, *Five Types of Ethical Theory* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1930, 7th impression 1956), 162. Prichard, in turn, refers in his analyses, in this respect, to John Henry Muirhead. See Harold Arthur Prichard, “Moral Obligation,” 187. Cf. John Henry Muirhead, *Rule and End in Morals* (London: Humphrey Milford, 1932), 6–8; Muirhead, “The New Deontology,” *Ethics* 50(4) (1940): 448. The truth is that it was Broad who first introduced the division of ethical theories into teleological and deontological ones, whereas Muirhead developed and popularized it. Cf. Peter Vallentyne, “The Teleological/Deontological Distinction,” *The Journal of Value Inquiry* 21 (1987): 21–32; and Selim Berker, “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions,” *Philosophical Review* 122 (2013): 337–393.

<sup>206</sup> Czeżowski, “Aksjologiczne i deontyczne normy moralne”, 134.

<sup>207</sup> Ibidem, 138.

<sup>208</sup> Ibidem, 134, note 1.

<sup>209</sup> Ibidem, 136.

<sup>210</sup> Ibidem, 137; Tadeusz Czeżowski, “O jedności nauki” (“On the Unity of Science”), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Odczyty filozoficzne (Philosophical Lectures)*, 217.

into a real analytical definition.<sup>211</sup> Axioms possess formal truth, which means that they are always true within a given system, regardless of whether they are reflected in its semantic model, namely an “empirical community”, and thus regardless of whether they are in fact respected by that community in concrete action.<sup>212</sup> Following the French logician Joseph Diaz Gergonne, Czeżowski accepts that “the axioms of *a priori* theories” are “entangled definitions of the undefined (primitive) terms occurring within them”.<sup>213</sup> Originally, in his 1818 article entitled “Variétés. Essai sur la théorie des définitions” (“Miscellanies. Essay on the Theory of Definitions”), Gergonne employed the term *définitions incomplètes*<sup>214</sup> – *incomplete definitions*. These are definitions which, “although sufficient to distinguish a given object from all others, are nevertheless insufficient for its complete cognition”.<sup>215</sup> Mario H. Otero interprets Gergonne’s notion of “incomplete definitions” in terms of “implicit definitions” (*définition implicite*)<sup>216</sup> – that is, definitions that are understood rather than explicitly stated. As Czeżowski writes:

[...] analytical description, proceeding from the object being described, apprehends it as a representative of a certain general class and leads to general propositions possessing apodictic self-evidence. [...] Such a description provides an analytical definition of the object described through its generic or typical features (even if it does not take the form of a proposition exhibiting the structure characteristic of a definition); it is therefore at the same time a semantic analysis of the name of the object being described. This definitional character of analytical description explains its generality, which

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<sup>211</sup> Tadeusz Czeżowski, “O metodzie opisu analitycznego” (“On the Method of Analytical Description”), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Odczyty filozoficzne* (*Philosophical Lectures*), 138, 141.

<sup>212</sup> Czeżowski, “O tak zwanym uzasadnieniu bezpośrednim i oczywistości”, 72; Czeżowski, “Dwojakie normy”, 146–147; Czeżowski, “Aksjologiczne i deontyczne normy moralne”, 138. Cf. Maciej Zinkiewicz, “Metoda opisu analitycznego Tadeusza Czeżowskiego” (“Tadeusz Czeżowski’s Method of Analytical Description”), *Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce* 61 (2016): 53–103.

<sup>213</sup> Tadeusz Czeżowski, “Kilka uwag o racjonalizmie i empiryzmie” (“A Few Remarks on Rationalism and Empiricism”), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Odczyty filozoficzne* (*Philosophical Lectures*), 20.

<sup>214</sup> Joseph Diaz Gergonne, “Variétés. Essai sur la théorie des définitions” (“Miscellanies. Essay on the Theory of Definitions”), *Annales de Mathématiques pures et appliquées* 9 (1818–1819): 18.

<sup>215</sup> Gergonne, “Variétés. Essai sur la théorie des définitions”, 18.

<sup>216</sup> Mario H. Otero, “Les définitions implicites chez Gergonne” (“Implicit Definitions in Gergonne”), *Revue d’histoire des sciences* 23(3) (1970): 251–255.

brings it close to *a priori* mathematical propositions, since it is valid *ex definitione* for all cases falling under it.<sup>217</sup>

The model of ethical theory built upon a system of axiological norms is based on the inductive method deriving from Francis Bacon,<sup>218</sup> because by way of induction it proceeds from concrete, particular moral evaluations to the formulation of general ethical laws determining the general criteria of moral goodness.<sup>219</sup> By contrast, the model of ethical theory built upon a system of deontic norms is based on the deductive method deriving from Galileo and is constructed "from above," following the model of axiomatic hypothetico-deductive sciences.<sup>220</sup>

As examples of ethical theories based on a system of axiological norms, Czeżowski cites eudaimonism, perfectionism, virtue ethics, and utilitarianism.<sup>221</sup> Examples of ethical theories based on a system of deontic norms are provided for Czeżowski by the ethics of Immanuel Kant, Christian ethics, Schopenhauer's ethics of compassion, and Czesław Znamierowski's ethics of universal benevolence.<sup>222</sup>

Logical analyses of the structural and conceptual specificity of the two fundamental types of ethical theories – axiological and deontic – lead Czeżowski to formulate the conclusion concerning the complementary, that is, the axiological-deontological, nature of a complete system of ethics. In his 1970 article "*Aksjologiczne i deontyczne normy moralne*" ("Axiological and Deontic Moral Norms"), he states unambiguously in this regard that: "a complete system of norms must determine both the set of goods that constitute the goals of ethically positive conduct and conduct toward other people as ethical subjects as well; it should therefore contain both axiological and deontic norms".<sup>223</sup>

On the basis of the reconstructed line of reasoning, according to which "empirical theories may be [...] constructed in two ways, from above or from below, deductively or inductively",<sup>224</sup> Czeżowski advances the conclusion central to his analyses: "I regard ethics as an empirical science, for empirical propositions include primary evaluations as

<sup>217</sup> Czeżowski, "O metodzie opisu analitycznego", 138.

<sup>218</sup> Czeżowski, "Dwojakie normy", 149–150.

<sup>219</sup> Czeżowski, "Aksjologiczne i deontyczne normy moralne", 137, 139–140.

<sup>220</sup> Ibidem, 138–140; Czeżowski, "Dwojakie normy", 149–150; Czeżowski, "O metodzie opisu analitycznego", 138.

<sup>221</sup> Czeżowski, "Aksjologiczne i deontyczne normy moralne", 133.

<sup>222</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>223</sup> Ibidem, 135.

<sup>224</sup> Czeżowski, "Dwojakie normy", 149.

its premises, together with the generalizations and teleological norms derived from them".<sup>225</sup>

## Conclusion and Final Remarks

Within the framework of his original, logic-based approach to the philosophical theory of value, Tadeusz Czeżowski accomplished a unique synthesis of Brentanian motifs, axiological realism, and the medieval doctrine of transcendentals as revised by himself. This enabled him to develop a coherent anti-naturalistic position while at the same time preserving the ontological minimalism characteristic of the programme of the Lvov–Warsaw School. The principal findings of the present article may be summarized as follows:

- (1) Czeżowski demonstrated that values are not real properties of objects (predicates), but rather their modes of being (*modi entis*). At the formal level, this is expressed through a two-layered structure of predication: from the relational value-generating functor ( $a R p$ ) in the case of relative goods, to the one-argument modal operator ( $V(p)$ ) in the case of autotelic goods, that is, goods in which the object remains identical with the value-parameter.
- (2) By interpreting values as modal transcendentals, Czeżowski succeeded in identifying truth-makers for axiological propositions while avoiding ontological inflation. Moreover, by applying Brentano's idiogenetic theory of judgment, he justified the reducibility of evaluations to existential judgments (including intentional judgments), which enabled him to extend his analysis to fictional and ideal entities as well.
- (3) Czeżowski's fundamental achievement consists in his programme of rendering axiology scientific through an appeal to the concept of extrasensory (intuitive) experience. The legitimization of axiological intuition as a source of synthetic knowledge allows

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<sup>225</sup> Tadeusz Czeżowski, "Konflikty w etyce" ("Conflicts in Ethics"), in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Filozofia na rozdrożu (Analizy metodologiczne)* (*Philosophy at the Crossroads (Methodological Analyses)*), 116. Czeżowski's project of empirical ethics is subjected to a detailed analysis by his former student, and my mentor, Prof. Ryszard Wiśniewski, among others in the article "O możliwościach recepcji etyki empirycznej Tadeusza Czeżowskiego" ("On the Possibilities of the Reception of Tadeusz Czeżowski's Empirical Ethics"), *Acta Universitatis Nicolai Copernici* 234 (1991), *Filozofia XIII – Nauki Humanistyczno-Społeczne* (*Philosophy XIII – Humanities and Social Sciences*), 7–21.

- Czeżowski to regard ethics as an empirical science, constructed inductively and proceeding from primary particular evaluations.
- (4) The ethical system founded upon this conception of axiology integrates axiological (teleological) norms and deontic (formal) norms. Such an approach makes possible a comprehensive account of the phenomenon of morality, combining the pursuit of objective moral goods with the *a priori* obligation to observe the moral norms that presuppose those goods and lead to their realization.

In conclusion, Czeżowski's meta-axiology – referred to as axiologics (*aksjologika*) – constitutes a methodologically rigorous alternative both to axiological irrationalism and to reductionist metaethical naturalism. His proposal to conceive of values as transcendental modifications of being remains one of the most significant – and still insufficiently explored – projects in the history of Polish analytic thought.

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## Summary

The article reconstructs and analyses the meta-axiology of Tadeusz H. Czeżowski as an original philosophical project situated at the intersection of logic, ontology, epistemology, and ethics. It argues that by combining Brentanian inspirations, axiological realism, and a reinterpreted doctrine of transcenden-

tals, Czeżowski developed a coherent theory of value consistent with the methodological assumptions of the Lvov–Warsaw School. The paper discusses Czeżowski’s formal theory of value, grounded in the concept of the value-generating relation, and examines its connection with the metaphysical status of values as *modi entis* and with the problem of the truth of axiological propositions. It also presents the epistemological foundations of Czeżowski’s axiology, associated with the concept of axiological experience and the notion of value intuition, as well as the programme of ethics as an empirical science founded upon them. The analyses lead to the conclusion that Czeżowski’s meta-axiology constitutes a consistent form of anti-naturalistic realism, avoiding both ontological inflation and the reduction of values to empirical facts. His conception of values as transcendental modifications of being remains one of the most original achievements of twentieth-century Polish analytic philosophy.

**Keywords:** Tadeusz Czeżowski, Henryk Elzenberg, meta-axiology, axiologics, theory of value, transcendentals, *modi entis*, axiological realism, anti-naturalism, axiological experience, empirical ethics, Lvov–Warsaw School