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On the object of axiology

Axiological sentences fall into three types:

- a) In sentences of the first type, we judge some individual thing to be good, e.g. 'this individual deed is a good deed'. Only in sentences of this type is the adjective 'good' used in its usual sense.
- b) In sentences of the second type, we judge a certain type of thing or a general thing to be good, e.g. 'pleasure is good'.

This sentence is equivalent to the sentence 'everything that is pleasant is good'. In sentences of this type, the adjective 'good' is used incorrectly, because things that are pleasant are good in the proper sense, not pleasure as an abstract object.

The term 'good' in the incorrect sense is used instead of 'criterion of good'.

- c) In sentences of the third type, we judge a fact or state of affairs to be 'good'. Thus, in these sentences, the predicate is 'goodness', and the subject is the statement of fact, e.g. 'it is a good thing that S is P'. 'A good thing' here is not identical to the term 'goodness' as an *abstractum* from 'good', nor is it a name for the general category of 'goods', i.e. objects that are good in the proper sense.

We define the relationship between the terms 'goodness' and 'good' in both meanings in such a way that an individual object is good always and only if it has a feature that constitutes a criterion of goodness, and a certain feature constitutes a criterion of goodness always and only if – when an object has this feature – it is good [because] it has it.

By analogy with the modal sentence 'it is necessary that S is P', the sentence 'it is a good thing that S is P' means that the fact stated in the

sentence 'S is P' is 'good'. Goodness is therefore not the subject of representation, but of judgement: in this respect it is a concept analogous to existence, necessity, and possibility. Goodness cannot be represented, just as existence cannot be represented; like existence, goodness can only be stated. However, the criteria of goodness are representable. Goodness is therefore different from any criteria of goodness given by ethical systems. Goodness is neither pleasure nor moderation, although it may be good that some of my experiences are pleasant or that someone acts with moderation.

Axiology makes statements about goods and goodness, criteria of goodness, or finally, goodness itself. However, we may say that goodness is the only subject of axiological research into relationships through which the concept of goodness and the criteria of goodness boil down to the concept of goodness.

Discussion

W. Steinberg pointed out that in the considerations of Brentano, Moore, and the author, goodness encompasses both fundamental judgements (moral and legal) as well as utilitarian and aesthetic judgements. Is such a broad concept of goodness scientifically valuable?

S. Frydman. Given the equivalence of the three axiological statements highlighted by the author, statements I and III can be reduced to statement II. For instance, if something is pleasant, then it is good. Therefore, if someone proves that only what is pleasant is good, the term 'good' can be eliminated. The author's considerations aimed to prove that the analysis of axiological statements necessarily implies that goodness is something specific, that it is the subject of a statement rather than a judgement. However, from the above remark, it can be seen that the lecturer's thesis does not necessarily imply that good is something specific. Thus, the consequences of the paper are contradictory.

H. Heffتمانowa inquires whether evaluative statements fall within the bounds of two-valued logic. Answer: they do not, because they are neither true nor false. However, they also do not provide a basis for multi-valued logic.

M. Fritzhand. 1. It is incorrect to use the words 'valuable' and 'good' interchangeably. This leads, for example in Moore's case, to clearly false conclusions. 2. The referent's statement is not true if we understand 'pleasure' as a simple quality.

Z. Łubieński. If we use the word 'good' in a meaning different from the word 'pleasant', will it not ultimately be a word devoid of content? After all, we do have examples of the use of words devoid of content, as in scholasticism, which uses terms such as 'spirit', 'God' and 'person'.