Affective Goals in Teaching Philosophy in Higher Secondary Education: Reality, Criticism, Perspectives

Introduction

Under the influence of labor market pressures, formal education is seen mainly as a means of acquiring the kind of knowledge and skills that can be used in a graduate’s future work life. Philosophical education thus inevitably comes into contrast with, for example, education in the field of technology, information technology, or, at the level of higher secondary education, in contrast with subjects that create the assumption of practical – and especially economic – use of their knowledge. According to Halík, this situation in Central European conditions is a consequence of former ideological surveillance, due to which “in the field of primary and secondary education […] to this day the paradigms of communist ideology and propaganda continue to echo (and sometimes even rule and strengthen the scientific world view)”.

Apparently, however, it will not be only a legacy of the former ideology, because Zakaria, based on American realia, states: “In an age defined by technology and globalization, everyone is talking about skills-based learning. Politicians, businesspeople, and even many educators see it as the only way for the nation to stay competitive. They urge students to stop

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dreaming and start thinking practically about the skills they will need in the workplace”.³

Even in the context of the market mentality, the old truisms hold, according to which, philosophical education develops critical thinking, argumentative skills, and other necessary soft skills in an individual, which are valuable in the competitive environment of a developed market. However, this study focuses on how the subject “Philosophy” in the structure of higher secondary education participates in the formation of desirable attitudes of students, since this perspective is not particularly dominant in discussions about education. The teaching of philosophy undoubtedly serves to convey basic knowledge about the history of philosophy as such and its main representatives, who fundamentally shaped the character of our culture with their thinking. However, the potential affective, or educative, goals of teaching philosophy are equally unquestionable and deserve closer attention.

Due to limited publication space, the focus is put on one – but essential – example of an affective goal, which is formulated in the Slovak State Education Program,⁴ and on its connection to the cognitive goals of the teaching of philosophy. This link is subsequently problematized and different ways of achieving affective goals in teaching philosophy than those assumed by the State Education Program are introduced. As the basis for inspiration, with respect to the aforementioned notions, the ideas of contemporary pragmatists – Richard Rorty and Richard Shusterman – are used.

1. The Relationship between Cognitive and Affective Goals in Teaching Philosophy

While cognitive goals “include knowledge, intellectual skills, cognitive abilities (perception, memory, thinking, creativity)”,⁵ the affective goals of teaching in general “include the emotional area, the area of attitudes, value orientation and social-communication skills. Achieving them is the main purpose of education; therefore, they are also called educational goals”.⁶ Cognitive goals are mostly defined by the phrase “The student knows...”, for example: “The student knows the basic representatives of idealistic philosophy”. Affective goals are usually stated with, for example, the words: “The student appreciates the value of justice”. Both cognitive and affective goals, consisting in the formation of desirable attitudes and value preferences of pupils and students, are undoubtedly associated with the teaching of philosophy.

⁴ Although this is based on Slovak realia, the assumption is that in the European space, growing out of similar traditions of education, this analysis can be equally beneficial. Not to mention that its content also corresponds with the results of research in non-European (American) space (cf. Robert C. Solomon, The Joy of Philosophy. Thinking Thin versus the Passionate Life (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999)). It points to the fact that the ways of teaching philosophy are not fundamentally different in the Western world.
⁶ Ibidem.
The Slovak State Education Program characterizes a basic affective goal as “an important expected effect of teaching philosophy whose aim is the cultivation of respect for other opinions and an argumentative way of dealing with those of them that contradict their own beliefs”.

It is not a cognitive goal, because the acquisition of knowledge is not stated here, nor is the acquisition of thought processes, such as analysis, generalization, abstraction, and others, but the acquisition of such an attitude is assumed here, which is based on respect for the value of otherness and at the same time on the conviction that we should not deal with different opinions with physical force, but with the force of thought and argumentation. Respect for other opinions does not mean only their passive tolerance, but potentially also their active appreciation. Implicitly, the general affective goal of teaching philosophy in the environment of higher secondary education is the acquisition of a pluralistic attitude – as long as the term “pluralism” is defined in the basic outline as a term that can be used to “characterize the attitude of open-mindedness and the willingness to non-repressively tolerate (perhaps even positively appreciate) the diversity of worthwhile pursuits to which humans may devote themselves”.

The attitude of a person who respects different opinions is an attitude based on the recognition that others can also possess the truth – contrary to their own beliefs. According to Welsch, such a person should not only be convinced in principle that, from a different perspective, the situation may rightfully appear completely different, but this awareness will also translate into concrete decision-making and practice. One of the values that one should internalize in the process of teaching philosophy at secondary school (grammar school) is the value of plurality. An attitude respecting otherness is an attitude that should be characteristic of a citizen of a liberal democracy, “in which conflictual tensions among competing ways of life, identities and world views are tolerated and resolved without violence”.

However, by what means should we work towards this goal in the teaching of philosophy?

Appendix ISCED 3A of the State Education Program for the subject “Civic education” works with the assumption that the achievement of affective goals in the teaching of philosophy depends on the realization of cognitive goals. In other words, knowledge from philosophy will participate in the formation of students’ value attitudes. This is indicated by the following statement: “By teaching students to understand the historical justification of individual philosophical directions, currents, positions, or ideas, to comprehend their argumentative support and value background and to appreciate the relevant intellectual performance, even if it does not coincide with their

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11 The abbreviation ISCED denotes the international classification of education according to UNESCO, the so-called International Standard Classification of Education. Addendum 3A pertains to the standards given to higher secondary education, more precisely, grammar school education.
position, we are also teaching them tolerance”. This means that through intellectual acquaintance with the plurality of philosophical positions and their different assumptions, attitudes of respect in relation to otherness should be formed. Although the above quote also refers to the “value” background and the “appreciation” of intellectual performance, which are terms linked to the affective goals of teaching, this is about “understanding” (cognitive goal) of the value background, and “appreciation” is linked to “intellectual” performance; therefore, the cognitive, rather than the affective, component is dominant here, while the cognitive forms the starting point of the affective.

The assumption that knowledge should shape the value attitudes of pupils and students is not only inherent to philosophy, but also to other human sciences. In aesthetic theory, a similar assumption can be encountered in Welsch, who states that theoretical knowledge of modern art is a suitable prerequisite for developing a tolerant attitude. Knowledge and understanding (cognitive domain) of modern art as a pluralistic phenomenon – this is analogous to philosophical education – should help shape the attitudes and value orientation of the individual by assuming the possibility of transferring what is learned to what is felt, theory to practice, school to life. Welsch says that on this basis we become allergic, but also resistant to limited, mindless and petty ridiculous grasps, to comparing one type to the scale of another type, to this elementary error in the situation of plurality.

2. Problematizing the Supposed Cognitive-Affective Relationship

The success of such a transfer, when knowledge of plurality and otherness turns into an attitude based on respect for it, will probably depend on the pedagogical skills of the particular philosophy teacher. They should be expected to present the knowledge base they convey to their students as a basis for forming desirable attitudes and internalizing desired values. Such pedagogical action can be perceived as an ideal, but it is necessary to look into the real conditions and performance of pedagogical practice. Indeed, if one is to look at the basic didactic aids that a philosophy teacher has at their disposal in higher secondary education – for example, civics textbooks from which students prepare for the graduation exam in the given subject (including philosophy), we notice that the parts devoted to philosophy are mostly conceived as a concentrated overview of the history of philosophy. This overview in itself certainly demonstrates a colorful mosaic of a plurality of philosophical positions. However, it is already up to the specific teacher to lead students on this basis to form an attitude based on respect for particular positions. In order to make them aware that the historical-philosophical excursion aims to convey not only knowledge from philosophy, but also to form attitudes in which they would be able to positively appreciate the values of plurality and

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12 Lysý et al., Štátny vzdelávací program. Občianska náuka (Vzdelávacia oblasť: Človek a spoločnosť). Príloha ISCED 3A. The italics were used by the author of the present article.
14 Cf. e.g. Anna Bocková et al., Občianska náuka. Príprava na maturity a prijímacie skúšky na vysoké školy (Bratislava: Slovenské pedagogické nakladateľstvo, 2013).
otherness, not only in an intellectual sense, but also in real life. After all, it is indisputable that the values a person should internalize through the study of philosophy and other human sciences “need to be implemented in society. [...] If human sciences do not strive for this implementation, they lose their influence on society”.\(^{15}\) This also applies to pedagogy, although it is necessary to add in the same breath that it is not the easiest task in the structure of formal education.

This difficulty results from the didactic methods by which we try to shape desirable student attitudes in the teaching of philosophy. In reality, this is about conveying knowledge in a short period of time (one school year) of an impenetrable (and therefore inevitably superficial) plurality of opinions of various thinkers, living in the temporal horizon from approximately 500 BC up to our present day. Thinkers determined by their current historical, social, or political conditions. To achieve the declared affective goal of teaching philosophy, it is so excessive from the point of view of the knowledge base that it is pitifully little as a result of the formation of a desirable value attitude. The link between the cognitive and affective goals of teaching philosophy is problematic because of this way of teaching philosophy. It is not obvious why getting to know philosophical schools, currents, concepts, and disciplines should necessarily lead to the fulfillment of an affective goal in the teaching of philosophy, or at least not to the desired extent. The concentrated form of knowledge to which well-founded experts devote their entire professional life, moreover, if exams or tests are written from this knowledge (pedagogical diagnostics for the purpose of verifying acquired knowledge, not internalized attitudes), there is no reason to lead students to focus on the affective dimension of teaching philosophy, which they undoubtedly miss out on.

As teachers’ experiences have told us for a long time, “It would be an unforgivable mistake to see the mission of teaching philosophy in grammar schools, or in other secondary schools, exclusively in the mentioned cognitive and a kind of general cultivation dimension”.\(^{16}\) It could be argued that space for affective goals could be provided by a philosophy seminar in addition to a cognitively oriented interpretation, if the educational practice of the philosophy teachers themselves did not assume the following: “The aim of the seminar is to expand and deepen the overall knowledge that the students have acquired in the civics classroom in previous grades and in the basic philosophy course”.\(^{17}\) Thus, if the seminar form of teaching serves the deepening of knowledge, here again the focus on the essential affective goal of teaching philosophy is lost. That is not to say that seminar discussions do not cultivate pupils and students in any way. What is more important is that intellectual activity, stimulated by knowledge from philosophy, does not yet automatically lead to an increase in moral sensitivity, which we should not separate from a tolerant attitude and base it only on formal knowledge. As Welsch stated: “Sensitivity for differences is then a real condition for tolerance. Perhaps we live in a society which talks too much of tolerance


\(^{17}\) Ibidem, 132.
but has too little command of sensitivity”.\(^\text{18}\) The key question in this context is how to arrive at this sensitivity.

The knowledge base (however broad) in itself does not in any way guarantee sensitivity in relation to otherness in real, everyday life. In an extreme case, the opposite can even be assumed: resorting to intellectual contemplation, which is often characteristic of philosophy,\(^\text{18}\) can lead to a widening of the gap between the world of the intellect and the world that begins beyond the boundary of the individual’s cognitive processes. As an illustration – but not as a result of teaching philosophy – an example can be cited: “of the aesthetically refined Nazi officers who would weep at Beethoven to express their human emotions while inhumanly orchestrating the wholesale slaughter of innocent children”.\(^\text{19}\) Intellectualism or the acquisition of knowledge that demonstrates plurality does not necessarily lead to higher sensitivity, and knowledge – even philosophical – has no reason to be the basis of a real value attitude, manifested in everyday life.

If the link between cognitive and affective goals in teaching philosophy really works, then it should be true that professional philosophers or philosophy teachers (that is, persons who have a philosophical education background and a philosophical knowledge at a higher degree than the rest of the population), they should be tolerant people who respect otherness more fundamentally than others, as a result of this philosophical knowledge. However, Solomon held up a ruthless mirror to his profession (philosophy and pedagogy) when he stated that, in fact, philosophers are not always very open-minded, and that “today are too often killjoys, too quick with objections, too obstinate to understand (or to listen to) imperfectly stated alternatives, too anxious to belittle both insight and enthusiasm”.\(^\text{20}\)

With a similar pedagogic approach, in which learning by exemplification (which is also extremely important in the realization of affective goals, but still too unreflected) cannot even be talked about, and the transfer of the cognitive to the affective thus occurs only in a very difficult way, if at all. Apparently, as a result of similar personal experiences, Solomon was interested in how former school graduates viewed the teaching of philosophy. When he met many successful people on his travels, he often heard from them, in their own words, that although they attended lectures on philosophy, at best they did not remember anything from them, but at worst they hated them.\(^\text{21}\) The reason was often “a most unflattering portrait of an uncaring, pompous teacher who was obviously too clever by half and intent on displaying this”.\(^\text{22}\) He asked himself the question “Who is this bad apple? All too often the who turns out to be one of the more distinguished members of our profession. He (almost always a he) has a distinguished publication record, and his lifework is to inspire one or two students (out of hundreds or thousands) to go on in philosophy to inflict similar damage on the next


\(^{21}\) Ibidem.

\(^{22}\) Ibidem.
generation”. Solomon stated this in relation to university professors of philosophy, but that is beside the point. Solomon’s examples confirm that the connection between philosophical knowledge and wise life, cognition and affectivity, cannot be assumed a priori. Of course, it would be very unfair to generalize Solomon’s statement by saying that most philosophy teachers act like this, and that they act like this on purpose. This was not the goal. The goal was to demonstrate that knowledge from philosophy in no way guarantees an open and tolerant attitude towards otherness. For if tolerant attitudes may not be inherent in those who teach philosophy, there is no reason to assume that those who learn it will adopt them, at least not in the way they learn it. Perhaps it would be time to rethink the concept of teaching philosophy in the environment of higher secondary education with regard to the effort to realistically achieve its affective goals. The inspiration for this modification can be found in the pragmatism of Rorty and Shusterman.

3. Philosophy as an Education in Newer Pragmatism

It is no accident that we turn to pragmatism in search of inspiration. The balance of the cognitive and affective components in the educational process was already systematically pointed out by Dewey, according to whom it is necessary that we refuse “to isolate vocational training on any of its levels from a continuous education in the social, moral, and scientific contexts within which wisely administered callings and professions must function”. This complexity of education, in which affective goals should not be a secondary result of the primary realization of cognitive goals, is reminiscent of the ideas of the teacher of nations, J. A. Comenius, who wanted to perceive school exactly like this – as a complex workshop of humanity. Also due to the timelessness of his ideas, Dewey is considered, along with Comenius, one of the most famous philosophers of education, whose intellectual heritage (including his permanent emphasis on the importance of experience in human life) is referred to by both Rorty and Shusterman. However, Dewey’s intellectual and practical contribution to the philosophy of education is widely known; therefore, the focus is going to be put on the educational potential of the philosophies of Rorty and Shusterman. Although these authors deserve much more attention in the field of pedagogy and the didactics of philosophy, their approaches cannot be given detailed attention here. However, attention can be drawn to at least a few inspiring moments that indicate the possibility of a different implementation of philosophical teaching than the one assumed by the State Education Program.

Rorty ended his magnum opus, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, with the idea of the so-called educational philosophy as opposed to philosophy identified with epistemology. He linked it to the idea of Bildung, as education or self-formation, as he

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23 Ibidem.
25 This phrase comes from Great Didactics by J. A. Komenský. Cf. Jan A. Komenský, Didaktika velká (Brno: Komenium, 1948), 72, 76.
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found it interpreted by Gadamer, or to Dewey’s concept of education. However, he perceived both of these terms as insufficient, so he decided to use the term edification. In Rorty’s understanding, the key task of philosophy is precisely edification, i.e. educational activity, which is much more important than its cognitive goals. “One way to see edifying philosophy as the love of wisdom is to see it as the attempt to prevent conversation from degenerating into inquiry, into a research program. Edifying philosophers [...] can help prevent it from attaining the secure path of a science.”

However, this is precisely what formal education tends to do, especially if the cognitive component is the starting point or prerequisite of the affective component of the educational process. Of course, the fact that philosophy takes the safe path of science is not in itself a negative. Rather, it could be said that it is a great pity if philosophy is only reduced to science, or that it is a pity if ideas arise about philosophy only as a science, or a certain method of guidance or knowledge, because it has many other beneficial aspects that deserve the attention of students. It is enough to remember ancient philosophy, which often performed a consoling, curative, or therapeutic function. However, the dominant emphasis on knowledge from philosophy creates a suitable prerequisite for philosophical topics to become primary topics worthy of speculation and the development of thinking, but less so topics that shape real human experience and moral sensitivity. Rorty was well aware of this when he wrote: “Discussions of deontology versus consequentialism, or of whether our sense of moral obligation originates in reason or in sentiment, seem pedantic distractions from discussions of historical or literary personages.”

What does Rorty mean by this? It indicates a change in point of view. Historical or literary personalities as what we should discuss philosophically, what should form us philosophically against abstract themes and principles, are only exempla inherent to Rorty’s interests. For Rorty, the ancient stories and fates of ancient historical (and philosophical) personalities are much more interesting than any philosophical textbooks, because “ancient moral philosophy [...] concern alternative moral identities – and thus provide moral issues to get one’s teeth into – in a way that debates about the alternative merits of the categorical imperative and the utilitarian principle do not”. The modified point of view in relation to the educational process, which Rorty sets up here, consists of shifting the attention to different material than what is normally worked with in the teaching of philosophy. It is usually assumed that the teaching of philosophy must use philosophical material or philosophical means for its goals. The question is, however, why it should be so. While preserving philosophical methods such as Socratic dialogue, Cartesian skepticism, etc., it is possible to work with any material that serves edifying goals – with fiction, cinematography, historical material, and examples from everyday life. To put it quite directly: When reaching the affective goals of philosophical teaching, philosophical means in the form of knowledge from philosophy are not necessary.

27 Ibidem, 372.
29 Ibidem, 210–211.
If the State Education Program is serious about its intentions, and students should learn to appreciate plurality and adopt a tolerant attitude through philosophy, philosophical knowledge, theories or concepts alone are insufficient for this purpose. Rorty once put it quite accurately: “If you want your books to be read rather than respectfully shrouded in tooled leather, you should try to produce tingles rather than truth. What we call common sense – the body of widely accepted truths – is, [...] a collection of dead metaphors. Truths are the skeletons which remain after the capacity to arouse the senses – to cause tingles – has been rubbed off by familiarity and long usage”.

It is the same with philosophy, at least in its concentrated form in the environment of higher secondary education. It is an expression of the historical crystallization of amazing humanitarian knowledge, but without greater opportunities to impress the feelings and perceptions of current students in that concentrated time, at the end of which the acquired knowledge is verified by pedagogical diagnostics. Under the influence of constant exposure to stimuli from social networks and the Internet, they are used to fundamentally different stimuli than they were a few decades ago. With that, their reactions to the material that is supposed to shape them naturally change.

If the school is to use philosophy to cultivate today’s young people and fulfill its affective goals, it cannot do so in seemingly unproblematic isolation from the specifics of the Lebenswelt of today’s youth and from the material that appeals to them and to which they “naturally” respond. This material – at least in the environment of higher secondary education – cannot be reduced to historical-philosophical textual material and the teacher’s interpretation. As Rorty pointed out, “it is best to think of moral progress as a matter of increasing sensitivity, increasing responsiveness to the needs of a larger and larger variety of people and things”.

So it is progress in increasing sensitivity to the suffering of others, where “others” mean truly others, i.e. marginalized, excluded, culturally different. According to Rorty, a good means for this is fiction, depicting the suffering of literary characters, which, thanks to its artistic rendering of that suffering, can make its readers identify with the “other”, with this fictional character living on the pages of the novel. However, we must state that even Rorty’s ideas about the philosophical means of sensitization are limited. In addition to literature, we can similarly think about film and TV series production (art in general) and about real historical people and our contemporaries. The whole world is open to philosophical “education” as a material or means. However, the question is whether philosophical “education” is capable of opening up to the whole world.

However, it is possible to go even further when looking for material or means that help make the achievement of the affective goals of philosophical teaching more efficient. Within the framework of contemporary pragmatism, Shusterman’s somaesthetics offers many inspiring suggestions in this direction, which revives the understanding of philosophy as an embodied art of life. Philosophy understood in this way includes, for example, oriental practices known from Indian or Chinese philosophy, but also from modern approaches that emphasize working with one’s body in relation to self-cultivation. As Shusterman often shows in his works, meditation, various mindfulness techniques, breathing exercises, yoga, or tai chi can

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have many benefits for a more prudent, open, and tolerant way of thinking, although the implementation of such work with oneself and through oneself runs into rigid obstacles in the education system which pertain to assumptions about how philosophy should be taught by default: “philosophical thinking in the classroom is expected to be done by the students in sitting position with their eyes open; such instruction is to be essentially conceptual rather than experiential”.32

Experiential (and somatic) teaching of philosophy represents the cultivation of wisdom and morality through various techniques of working with one’s own body, and is an experiential form of education rather than a conceptual or theoretical one. However, Shusterman’s emphasis on bodily perception and self-knowledge (one of the goals of philosophy, which has its origins in the Socratic tradition of thought) is not accidental. It is based on the assumption that intolerant behavior towards other races, ethnicities, or sexualities cannot be solved simply “through logical means of verbal persuasion because it has a visceral basis of discomforting unfamiliarity, then as long as we do not consciously attend to these deep visceral feelings we can neither overcome them nor the enmity they generate and foster”.33

This is a very important aspect that, for example, the State Education Program, even if it is well-intentioned, does not take into account. In other words, the attitudes, declared values, feelings, etc., which we want to shape through philosophical teaching, depend precisely on affectivity and not on cognition. Shusterman writes about the numerous ways in which these originally unconscious feelings, resulting in specific value attitudes, can be thematized, reflected on, and thereby guided. Through physical practices, it is possible to participate in self-transformation towards a more tolerant and sensitive person. Although more space cannot be devoted to these practices here, it must at least be said that Shusterman’s philosophy also implies that the assumption of achieving affective goals through cognitive ones is considerably limited. Furthermore, without an equivalent emphasis on varied forms of truly affective action, it is, cognitively, at least myopic and will always be deficient in terms of forming desirable values and attitudes.

As Rorty and Shusterman’s briefly indicated positions show, inspirations for contemporary philosophical education in the environment of higher secondary education exist. Moreover, there are certainly many more than those mentioned. It is only a matter of those who are responsible for designing basic documents guiding education to reflect on the research that can help shape these documents in a way that would not correspond to the tradition of philosophical education, but to its expected results in the present and the near future.

Conclusion

It is thus appropriate to ask the question: What is actually the expected result of teaching philosophy in the environment of higher secondary education? If philosophy

is to participate in imparting skills that can be used in the work life of graduates, such as critical thinking, the ability to analyze and interpret, expressive skills, the ability to lead and participate in a discussion, its contribution in this direction cannot be overlooked. When it comes to imparting knowledge that the graduate will use in their future work, considerable doubts should be stated here – if consideration is not given to the few individuals who decide to study philosophy at university. For the majority, however, knowledge of philosophy will be irrelevant. On the basis of the analysis carried out, it is also shown that knowledge from philosophy in the environment of higher secondary education cannot even be assumed as a starting point for the formation of desirable “civic”, moral, or value attitudes of students, because such a method of imparting knowledge (in addition, dominantly historical-philosophical) does not participate in their sensitization, which is apparently an essential prerequisite for acquiring desirable values – for example, respect for otherness.

If philosophy is to fulfill a complex – using Rorty’s term – edifying task in the environment of higher secondary education, then the way it is taught must necessarily be modified. As Rorty suggests, abilities usable (not only) in work life can be developed using any material, which does not have to be historical-philosophical. However, it can easily be systematical-philosophical, it can take the form of solving acute problems and topics that trouble students or that are present in their perception. It can be about topics that we find in the fictional worlds of literature and movies, social networks and computer games, in the virtual world, not just the real world (although today virtuality is perceived more like an augmented reality than in contrast to it). That is, topics that are part of the Lebenswelt of current students.

Shusterman even reminds us that such material of self-transformation need not even be material that is different from ourselves. It can be our own body and the work we do with it. Of course, there are countless other ways to think differently about teaching philosophy. At least two possible ones have been indicated here, although it needs to be kept in mind that in a rigid system of formal education, it is likely that teachers of philosophy will be working with an assumption that Kant already perceived as flawed for a long time. That is, with the assumption that a young person should “learn philosophy. But that is impossible, for he ought now to learn to philosophise”.34 According to Kant, “it is not thoughts but thinking which the understanding ought to learn”.35 In addition it should be added that he should not only learn to think, but also to feel. Can this be achieved by the prevailing ways of teaching philosophy? Can this be achieved with concentrated knowledge from the history of philosophy?

# Bibliography


**Summary**

The study has the character of a critical reflection of the assumed combination of cognitive and affective goals of teaching philosophy in the environment of higher secondary education. Official state documents work with this connection as unproblematic, but the author tries to problematize this link between cognitive and affective and focuses on the current deficits in achieving affective goals in the teaching of philosophy. The article finds its inspiration for a different approach to achieving them in the pragmatism of Richard Rorty and Richard Shusterman.

**Keywords:** affective educational goals, cognitive educational goals, education, pragmatism