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Kazimierz Twardowski's Philosophy and Mykhailo Rudnytskyi's Literary Criticism

Introduction

The work of Mykhailo Rudnytskyi (1889–1975) – the Ukrainian literary critic, writer, interpreter, member of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, Doctor of Philosophy occupies a worthy place in Ukrainian culture. However, it is not fully understood and realized. This is indicated by the critical remarks of researchers of Rudnytskyi's work.

According to Oleh Bahan, a contemporary critic of Rudnytskyi, the literary critic's strength lies "in his ability to intrigue by literature, to open its unexpected and little-known faces, and to demonstrate proficiency in the professional analysis of a literary work and the figure of an artist."¹ And at the same time, he warns the readers of the author's usage of "hyperbole, distortion of facts, absolutely trendy valuation, and fictions."² Bahan adheres to this view since Rudnytskyi has not established his integral aesthetic conception: "an effective phrase, paradoxical judgement, subtle

¹ Oleh Bahan, "Koryfei liberalnoi literaturnoi krytyky", in: Mykhailo Rudnytskyi, *Vid Myrnoho do Khvyliovoho. Mizh ideieiu i formoiu. Shcho take "Moloda muza"?*, ed. Oleh Bahan (Drohobych: Vidrozhennia, 2009), 11.

² *Ibidem*, 25.

aphorism became Rudnytskyi's main weapon, rather than the deep conceptualism, supported by the philosophical foundations (no matter how many times he quoted world philosophers for their effectiveness)."³

Similarly, Lidia Stefanovska did not place Mykhailo Rudnytskyi amongst modern literary critics owing to the lack of conceptual apparatus and methodology in his works and his inability or unwillingness to accept the new artistic trends just because they did not meet his tastes and views. She defined Rudnytskyi's method as "psychological impressionism" whereas his main criterion was "a not very clearly outlined impression of a literary work."⁴

It seems that Rudnytsky was mostly blamed by some critics for the idea of worldviewlessness as a writer. The latter believed it was an absurd view⁵ and perceived it as a central hit on the "strength and endurance of the national culture."⁶ It is noticeable, that during the rise of Rudnytskyi's literary career in Lviv, similar thoughts in the same city were being spread by another person – the Polish philosopher Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938), the founder of the Lviv-Warsaw school. It was Twardowski who uttered the idea of the worldviewlessness of a philosopher.

If one considers that Rudnytsky studied philosophy during its establishing by Twardowski at the University of Lviv,⁷ it is advisable to exam-

3 Ibidem, 19.

4 Lidia Stefanovska, *Antonych. Antynomii* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2006), 109.

5 Mykola Hnatyshak, "Literatura i suspilne zhyttia", in: Stefanovska, *Antonych. Antynomii*, 286.

6 Bahan, "Koryfei liberalnoi literaturnoi krytyky", 25.

7 Here is the list of Twardowski's lectures, credited to Rudnytsky:

winter term 1900/1901 – Psychology, part 1;

summer term 1901 – Psychology, part 2;

summer term 1903 – About the method of scientific research;

summer term 1903 – Essay on History of Modern philosophy;

winter term 1903/1904 – Psychology of Feelings;

winter term 1903/1904 – Development of Philosophy in XIX century;

winter term 1907/1908 – Essay on Psychology, part 1;

winter term 1907/1908 – History of Philosophy from Aristotle to the End of Ancient Times;

winter term 1908/1909 – Medieval philosophy;

summer term 1910 – Ethical Scepticism;

summer term 1910 – Development of New Philosophy until Kant;

winter term 1912/1913 – History of Philosophy, part 1;

winter term 1912/1913 – Philosophical Exercises for Beginners;

summer term 1913 – History of Philosophy, part 2;

ine some of Twardowski's philosophical principles in order to identify their possible impact on Rudnytskyi's literary criticism and thereby contribute to its rethinking in Ukrainian culture.⁸

1. Twardowski's philosophy: methodological and theoretical background

Analysis of the concepts. Kazimierz Twardowski's style of philosophizing was mostly influenced by his teacher, the Austrian philosopher Franz Brentano (1838–1917). In this regard, in his *Autobiography* (1926), the Polish philosopher noted that "Brentano's strict conceptual distinction, which excludes fruitless intricate games, has become one of the most important programme points of my own works."⁹ That is why Twardowski's method provided *precision* and *clearness* of the analyzed concepts.¹⁰ The demand for clearness in philosophy Twardowski formulated in his programme article *On clear and unclear philosophical style* (1919/20).

In fact, Aristotle¹¹ distinguished clear and unclear style, but in poetry. According to Aristotle, dialectisms, metaphors, epithets, and other types

summer term 1913 – Reasoning Theory of Brentano;

summer term 1913 – Philosophical Exercises for Beginners. See: Stepan Ivanyk, *Filozofowie ukraińscy w Szkole Lwowsko-Warszawskiej* (Warszawa: Semper, 2014), 39.

⁸ On the influence of Kazimierz Twardowski and Franz Brentano on the Lviv-Warsaw School and its Ukrainian branch, see: Arianna Betti, "Brentano and the Lvov-Warsaw School", in: *The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School*, ed. Uriah Kriegel (New York: Routledge, 2017), 334–340, access 30.11.2020, <https://hdl.handle.net/11245.1/40898c34-6357-4d3a-af7c-ed9eb3c6aedc>; Anna Brożek, "Franz Brentano and the Lvov-Warsaw School", *Academia.edu*, access 30.11.2020, https://www.academia.edu/36043332/AB_Brentano_FINIS; Stepan Ivanyk, "Franz Brentano's Influence on Ukrainian Philosophy: A Methodological Introduction to Research", *East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 6 (2019): 125–146.

⁹ Kazimierz Twardowski, "Autobiografia [5]", in: Kazimierz Twardowski, *Myśl, mowa i czyn*, ed. Anna Brożek, Jacek Jadacki, cz. 2 (Kraków: Copernicus Center Press, 2014), 39.

¹⁰ Kazimierz Twardowski, *Zasadnicze pojęcia dydaktyki i logiki do użytku w seminariach nauczycielskich i w nauce prywatnej* (Lwów: Polskie Towarzystwo Pedagogiczne, 1901), 65.

¹¹ Twardowski formulated the demand for clearness in philosophy under the influence of Brentano, who in his turn under the influence of Aristotle interpreted the analysis of concepts as the main means of cognition in philosophy. See: Franz Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte*, Bd. 1 (Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1874), 55–81.

of words create an unusual and exalted style in poetry, whereas common words contribute to the clarity of a style.¹²

On the other hand, René Descartes appreciated eloquence and was in love with poetry. However, he believed that both were gifts of mind rather than a result of learning. For this reason, Descartes was looking for a true method for cognition. In his opinion, this was the analytical method.¹³

In accordance with Aristotle's division of a language into poetic and ordinary, and Descartes's analytic method, Twardowski was aiming at purifying the language of philosophy from polysemous and meaningless words. The philosopher argued for a close relation between thought and language, rejecting the idea that an unclear style directly reflects the depth of philosophical content and giving his approval to the statement that one who thinks clearly would also write clearly.¹⁴

Language clarity is a characteristic feature of all of Twardowski's philosophical works. For example, in his speech *What is philosophy and why do we study it?* (1904), he distinguished three meanings of the term *philosophy* in history in order to shift the central place of philosophy to the inner life of the human. According to the first meaning, philosophy is "a science about the deepest, the most common issues of the human mind,"¹⁵ according to the second – it is metaphysics, and, according to the third – it is a science about the proper way of life. Analysis of the contexts in which the three meanings of the term philosophy functioned in history prompted Twardowski to pay attention to its modern meaning. In his view, philosophy no longer "meant neither all sciences as before, nor only one science."¹⁶ All the philosophical sciences are united in a single whole by the subject of their study – internal experience: "Their subject is, directly or indirectly, wholly or at least partly, the human spirit."¹⁷

Introspectionism. Twardowski considered to be naive the definition of truth as the conformity of its subject image. He noted, that it is impossible

12 Aristotel, "Poetyka", in: *Antychni poetyky. Aristotel. Poetyka. Psevdo-Lonhin. Pro vysoke. Horatsii. Pro poetychne mystetstvo*, ed. M. Boretskyi, V. Zvarych (Kyiv: Hramota, 2007), 53.

13 Rene Dekart, "Mirkuvannia pro metod", *Psychologiia i suspilstvo* 2 (2015): 42.

14 Kazimierz Twardowski, "On a Clear and Unclear Philosophical Style", in: Kazimierz Twardowski, *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy* (Amsterdam–Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1999), 258.

15 Kazimierz Twardowski, "Co to jest filozofia i po co się jej uczymy?", in: Kazimierz Twardowski, *Myśl, mowa i czyn*, ed. Anna Brożek, Jacek Jadacki, cz. 1 (Kraków: Copernicus Center Press, 2013), 486–487.

16 Ibidem, 487.

17 Ibidem, 488.

to compare these notions, because "the subject is always given to me only as imagined."¹⁸ "Only a naive realist, – as he wrote, – who considers everything he perceives to be true, can assert so."¹⁹ Thus, he limited the cognition of a subject to the knowledge of a mental fact about it. The only sources of direct knowledge of it, in his opinion, were introspection, internal experience, and consciousness. According to Twardowski, all these statements mean a way of cognition, distinctive from the cognition of the sensual, physical, material world. The approach which Twardowski employed to cognition is called epistemological realism and goes back to the philosophy of Brentano who, on the basis of the unity between a representation and internal perception, proved the direct obviousness of internal experience.²⁰

Twardowski believed that there were two fundamental differences between external and internal experience. The first one lies in the insensibility of internal experience. Actually, we do not need any senses for direct cognition of mental facts, as it occurs without their help. With this property of internal experience, Twardowski associated its obviousness, which is lacking in external experience. The second difference lies in the limitation of introspection to the mental life of one person, the one who carries it out. For instance, two people can look at a picture at the same time, but the mental facts about it are available only to the consciousness of the person in whom they arise.²¹

Twardowski acknowledged that internal perception is not as clear as sensual perception. However, he believed that "training and exercise can develop the ability to have a very clear internal perception and can create very expressive images of own mental phenomena."²² He was convinced of this by a subtle analysis and detailed descriptions of a mental life, made by ingenious psychologists and poets: "The productive images with which Shakespeare portrayed the mental life of Hamlet, in terms of liveliness and clarity, are not inferior to the productive images of Raphael with which he portrayed his Madonnas."²³

¹⁸ Kazimierz Twardowski, "Teoria poznania", in: Twardowski, *Myśl, mowa i czyn* (cz. 1), 197.

¹⁹ Ibidem, 198.

²⁰ Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte*, Bd. 1, 184.

²¹ Kazimierz Twardowski, "O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i jej rozwoju", in: Kazimierz Twardowski, *Wybrane pisma filozoficzne* (Warszawa: PWN, 1965), 257–258.

²² Kazimierz Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia* (Lwów: Komisja Księgarni H. Altenberga, 1898), 33.

²³ Ibidem.

By the word *representation*, Twardowski covered *images* and *concepts*. The image he described as a synthesis of sensual impressions that regulate feelings close together. Therefore, the *image* is not a simple reproduction of sensations, but a whole, composed of them. The philosopher divided images into perceptual, reproductive, and productive: "Every reproductive and productive image has its source of perceptual images. Reproductive image is a simple recollection, and productive – is the transformation and combination of perceptual images."²⁴

Thus, according to Twardowski, introspection is a certain insight of a person into his or her psyche which allows him or her to perceive, through internal experience, direct knowledge of the facts of his or her own mental life, as well as to construct their chaotic impressions into a clear and distinct whole.

Intentionalism. Following Brentano, Twardowski believed that every mental act intentionally contained the object to which it was directed. This means that there are no phenomena of consciousness that do not relate to certain objects outside consciousness and which do not correspond to any content within consciousness. The theory of intentionality allowed Twardowski to formulate the original theory of *actions* and *products*. In his work *On Actions and Products. A Few Remarks on the Border of Psychology, Grammar and Logic* (1911), the philosopher called a psychophysical product the external *expression* of a mental product. For example, it is not the paint and the canvas that are the product of the painting, but a certain *shape* given to the paint or canvas. In other words, a psychophysical product is an external *expression* of a mental product. For example, music is an expression of the composer's intention. Within the short-lived psychophysical products, a mental product, according to the philosopher, ceases to be expressed when a psychophysical product ceases to exist. But within the long-term psychophysical product, a mental product that no longer exists continues to be expressed. For example, the composer's idea has already perished, but the musical composition, in which he expressed it, remains and it is being expressed as long as this musical composition exists. Therefore, there is a potential existence (and not actually real) of a mental product in a psychophysical product. Twardowski believed that the long-term psychophysical product causes alternately in the same individual, or alternately or simultaneously in different persons, obviously, not only one mental product, but as many as there are actions that create products. Because of this, the products will not be completely equal to each other,

²⁴ Ibidem, 27.

but will be more or less different. For example, the same picture evokes different mental products in different individuals. The philosopher did not consider the difference between mental products to be too significant, "as each particular mental product should include a number of common attributes."²⁵ These common attributes Twardowski defined as the *meaning* of a psychophysical product – the *content* established in it. Therefore, he spoke of only one meaning of the sign – bypassing cases of ambiguity – and not of as many meanings as the number of mental creations that this sign evokes or can evoke. The meaning understood in this way is no longer, according to Twardowski, a specific mental product, but something that is reached by abstraction carried out on specific products.²⁶ Owing to these circumstances, the psychophysical product, repeated as if in an identical way in different individuals, acquires the character of something independent of those actions.

The distinction between actions and products helped Twardowski consider psychophysical products, regardless of the mental actions that create them. The extrapolation of his outlined theory into the aesthetics area reveals that there is not only an artist who contributes to the creation of a work of art, but also a person who interprets its meaning. And this is also an act of creativity.

Classification of mental phenomena. Twardowski grouped the manifestations of mental life into: 1. Representations (images and concepts); 2. Judgements; 3. Senses; 4. Manifestations of will. He defined representations as a necessary condition and basis not only for judgements but also for senses and manifestations of will. He also explained the peculiarity of representations by the fact that judgements, senses, and manifestations of will appear in the ambivalent form, revealing the undoubted opposite, while images and concepts "supply the material to our brain, provide it with some content."²⁷

²⁵ Kazimierz Twardowski, "O czynnościach i wytworach. Kilka uwag z pogranicza psychologii, gramatyki i logiki", in: Kazimierz Twardowski, *Rozprawy i artykuły filozoficzne* (Lwów: Księgarnia S. A. "Książnica-Atlas" T. N. S. W., 1927), 122.

²⁶ Here Kazimierz Twardowski refers to Edmund Husserl, noting that it is he who examines this problem in detail in his *Logische Untersuchungen* (1901) (Logical Researches), speaking about *ideale Bedeutung* (*ideal meaning*).

²⁷ Kazimierz Twardowski, "On the Classification of Mental Phenomena", in: Twardowski, *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, 72.

2. Rudnytskyi's literary criticism: the attempt of reconstruction

Analysis of the concepts. Rudnytskyi argued against the position of contemporary literary critics that "criticism becomes objective when it is scientific, and that it is only creative when it is subjective."²⁸ His decision about the objective and subjective measure of the value of a literary work was based on the analysis of the concept *scientific*. Rudnytskyi explained the unacceptable consequences of the use of the term *scientific* to literary criticism by its misunderstanding by literary critics. The first misunderstanding followed from the ambiguity in the use of this term: in the sense of the science as a field of separate studies of nature and man, and in the sense of a subject that can be taught to someone. The second misunderstanding arose from some critics of literature who had given prestige "of some suprapersonal value" to the term *scientific*.²⁹ The position of the literary critic was strengthened by the exclusion of creative work from the scope of scientific studies in the field of Ukrainian literature, which turned them into archaeological research. Under such circumstances, the objective approach deprived Ukrainian literary studies of vitality, while the subjective approach made them the field of a personal worldview.

As an example of science for the study of literary works, Rudnytskyi chose an intermediate solution, between subjectivity and objectivity. Such an example was made by him on the basis of the analysis of the historical concept of philosophy. In the history of philosophy Rudnytskyi distinguished the points of reckless trust in metaphysics, which was independent of the exact methods of science, and the points of its complete bankruptcy, when the methods of exact sciences were considered the only basis for the development of philosophical ideas. However, he recognized as a model of the scientific critique of literature the modern European understanding of the term *science*, according to which the concept of objectivity as a superpersonal measure does not contradict the subjective work of the researcher.

Rudnytskyi proposed to deprive literary criticism of arbitrariness by the method, which was similar to the method of natural sciences. After all, even in such an accurate scientific work as physics, the facts are only a manifestation of the creative synthesis of a scientist. On the example of history studies, the literary critic argues that historians, even if they use the same research method, will never get the same picture of events,

²⁸ Mykhailo Rudnytskyi, "Mizh naukoiu y indyvidualnistiu", in: Rudnytskyi, *Vid Myrnoho do Khvyliovoho*, 391.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, 393.

because the idea of development as the measure of people, affairs, social change, and value, etc. determines for each of them a separate direction and content of work. Therefore, he did not equate the concepts of *objectivity* and *science*, since he considered them different, not only in different areas of study of nature and man, but even in the works of different scientists and artists. Rudnytskyi admitted individual creativity as the greatest and only value in the field of literary criticism.

Epistemological realism and literature. According to Rudnytskyi, the Ukrainian writers of the Romantic era perceived their literary mission as the coverage of truth, the depiction of reality as it is. But the "life picture" in an art work was considered by the literary critic to be a task only for the secondary realist, while in his understanding, realism in literature is characterized by a reaction "to the picture of life in which the writer could confuse real objects with all the whims of his imagination."³⁰ Naturalism – a detailed description of life, similar to a historical chronicle, was interpreted by Rudnytskyi as a negative manifestation of realism in literature: "The most brilliant historical document becomes a notice of a civil government, when a writer with the education of a public clerk begins to explain its content and value."³¹

The purpose of literature. Rudnytskyi saw the purpose of literature as in satisfying the spiritual needs of readers, which are diverse, thoroughly individual, and which cannot be covered by theories about the various social and moral responsibilities of a writer. Literature is a world of the writer's creative imagination which is not overshadowed by any of his own rational preferences. The purpose of a writer is to convey what he lives as a person: "Just as a philosopher must extract ideas from the imagination and cannot replace them with personal impressions, so a writer must extract the image of the imagination from ideas, and cannot replace them with *general thoughts*."³²

Rudnytskyi contrasted the creative individuality of a writer with the graphomaniac's need for originality, caused by his desire to escape from his own banality to hide his *self-emptiness* in front of a reader. Therefore, from the fact that every creative writer is original, the literary critic deduced the danger of concluding that every originality is creativity. Rudnytskyi argued, that the great writer does not bring into a literary work forms into which he pours his thoughts and impressions, as if into a jar;

³⁰ Mykhailo Rudnytskyi, "Napriamky ta napriamni", in: Rudnytskyi, *Vid Myrnoho do Khvyliovoho*, 102.

³¹ Mykhailo Rudnytskyi, "Meta y metoda", in: Rudnytskyi, *Vid Myrnoho do Khvyliovoho*, 42.

³² *Ibidem*, 34.

he brings to the work something deeper and more creative – vulnerability, temperament, a sense of relationships between a word and experience – *ideas* expressed in the *clearest* and *simplest* form. According to Rudnytskyi, the literary critic, Shakespeare gave the best example of how “from the same topic you can get completely new chords of impressions.”³³

The writer and the worldview. Rudnytskyi emphasized that a writer must not have a worldview, because since he expresses general philosophical, social, or educational ideas in his literary works, he gets into the area where the imagination has no basis – metaphysics. The writer, for whom the worldview is the main basis of his work, can seldom omit the tendencies of instructiveness, and didactics is the only non-literary genre of literature; the writer who has a true worldview, that is, is able to create the world from ideas, not from impressions and experiences, does not write poetry or stories, but sociological, philosophical, or religious studies. Instead, the writer who seeks interesting life phenomena and stops in front of them in amazement, reproduces only his own doubts, impulses, and searches. Life reveals to such a writer only one manifestation, too difficult to understand clearly, and therefore, as a sensitive artist, he tries to refrain from general conclusions about it.

The idea and the form. Rudnytskyi denied the possibility of comprehending a literary work in harmony with its idea and form: “All the power of a literary work is in the impressions it leaves on us during our mutual journey, and in the memories when we part with them.”³⁴ He imagined each literary work as a landscape, a city, a country, which awakens in the readers the need to restore memories of itself as long as he does not forget about it. He imagined each writer as a man whom the readers had just met.

Idea was interpreted by Rudnytskyi in a broad sense as a thoroughly intellectual work that cannot be transmitted in any sensory form. *Idea* is a generalized thought which “is being created by the imagination of a reader-critic under the influence of a number of specific images depicted by the artist in his work.”³⁵ The literary critic deliberately resorted to the concept of *idea* as, in his opinion, “it is extremely difficult to distinguish the *content* from its *form*, something quite the opposite.”³⁶ Such a view of Rudnytskyi goes back to the aesthetics of Theodor Lipps,³⁷ who associated the unity of content and form of the work with the absence of difference

33 Ibidem, 42.

34 Ibidem, 47.

35 Rudnytskyi, “Mizh ideieiu i formoiu”, 437.

36 Ibidem.

37 Theodor Lipps extrapolated the main ideas of Brentano’s analytic philosophy to aesthetics. See: Theodor Lipps, *Ästhetik Psychologie des Schönen und der Kunst*,

between them. That is why Rudnytskyi opposed the *idea to form*, considering them to belong to two different worlds – the inner world of the writer's representations and the outer world of means of speech. According to such an approach, all the means of speech by which the writer expresses his impressions belong to the *form*.

Relationships and combinations. Rudnytskyi believed that there was no idea in the literary work, because if it existed, there would not be so many opposing views on its manifestations: "the completed work begins to live an independent life regardless of the will of its author."³⁸ According to the literary critic, when reading a book, words awaken in the reader's imagination a long line of images that turn into impressions, emotions, and thoughts. Therefore, the reader has the same task as every writer: he tries to embody his idea in some form. Thus, the reader repeats the path of the writer: from purely abstract elements he goes on to concrete and from concrete – to abstract: "A number of impressions and images must be permeated with the idea, if it does not intend to remain a disorderly mass of elements; an idea must be transformed into a number of representations and images if it does not intend to remain a bare abstract that stands outside the artistic utterance – art."³⁹ Consequently, the reader is always between the search for the absolute idea of a literary work and the subjective form of its expression. Considering this, Rudnytskyi denied the eternity of ideas and the variability of forms. He believed that in art there are only forms of expression of ideas, which when trying to express them create new forms, the duration of which is unknown, because it depends on the culture.

The concept of beauty. Rudnytskyi objected to the possibility of the-oretically proving the value of a literary work, as he did not believe in the possibility of defining beauty. In his opinion, literary works depicted such divergent forces of human psychology that it was difficult to "bring them together to one form of some supreme ideal."⁴⁰ As the literary critic affirmed, "beauty is embodied in all possible forms in which each of us can find all possible ideas."⁴¹ And owing to the fact that the variety of means of poetic utterance determines the diversity of kinds of beauty, the beauty

zweiter Teil: *Die ästhetische Betrachtung und die bildende Kunst* (Leipzig: Verlag von Leopold Voss, 1920).

³⁸ Rudnytskyi, "Mizh ideieiu i formoiu", 437.

³⁹ Ibidem, 441.

⁴⁰ Mykhailo Rudnytskyi, "Vplyv suspilnych idei", in: Rudnytskyi, *Vid Myrnoho do Khvyliovoho*, 352.

⁴¹ Mykhailo Rudnytskyi, "Mizh slovom i dilom", in: Rudnytskyi, *Vid Myrnoho do Khvyliovoho*, 427.

of a literary work is a matter of taste, the only way to evaluate which is to compare as many of its kinds as possible.

According to this understanding of beauty, Rudnytskyi opposed the evaluation of a literary work on the basis of its general characteristics, which would evidence its belonging to well-known literary trends: a dozen *-isms*.

3. Rudnytskyi's literary criticism in the context of Twardowski's philosophical tradition

Analysis of the concepts. Signally, in his work Rudnytskyi used Twardowski's method of analyzing the concepts. He tried to define accurately such concepts as "scientific", "science", "idea", "form". It is noticeable that Rudnytskyi has probably extrapolated the historical analysis of the concept of *philosophy*, made by Twardowski, to the field of literary criticism in order to analyze the concept of *literary criticism*. Following his teacher of philosophy, in resolving the everlasting argument between objectivism and subjectivism, Rudnytskyi, like Twardowski, aimed to avoid minimalist restrictions in literary criticism by choosing subjective experience as the starting point for achieving objective results. At the same time, Rudnytskyi did not differentiate the language of science from the language of literature. For better understanding it is useful to refer to very similar views on the common and different between logical language, i.e. the language of science and literary language in the works of Tadeusz Czeżowski, a Polish student of Twardowski, who proved that "ignoring language in favor of empty art is condemned in both literary and scientific style."⁴²

Introspectionism. Rudnytskyi recognized the description of the writer's spiritual world as the purpose of a literary work. This is similar to the method of introspection postulated by Twardowski in philosophy, which, in his opinion, is the only one capable of giving knowledge about the mental life of a man. Rudnytskyi's opinion on the writer's construction of his ideas from a number of impressions and images into a certain literary form, as well as his critique of naturalism in literature, further substantiates his commitment to introspectionism.

Rudnytskyi's denial of naturalism in literature can be explained when referring to the speech *On the relationship between science and art* (1920) delivered by Władysław Witwicki, a Polish student of Twardowski, at the

⁴² Tadeusz Czeżowski, "O kulturze logicznej", in: Tadeusz Czeżowski, *Odczyty filozoficzne* (Toruń: Towarzystwo Naukowe w Toruniu, 1958), 277.

First Congress dedicated to the organization and development of Polish science. In his speech, Witwicki argued that a scientist works with the intelligence and creates for the intelligence, while an artist lives by experiences and talks primarily to experiences. Therefore, Witwicki stressed that in practice the state and society should take care of raising the level of intellectual culture of future artists in schools of fine arts, so as "not to educate people who would take out of school the ambitions of angels of artisan culture, but only intelligent artists, conscious of their work."⁴³ Obviously, following Witwicki's attitude to the aesthetic culture of the Polish artists, Rudnytskyi appealed to Ukrainian writers not to copy reality in their own works.

Intentionalism. Rudnytskyi's acknowledgment of the orientation of literature on aesthetic emotions reveals his understanding of literature as a purely intentional object. His comprehension of the completed work as independent of the author's will demonstrates a probable impact of Twardowski's work *On Actions and Products* on Rudnytskyi's views. In addition, Descartes influenced Rudnytskyi's literary criticism, because the philosopher believed that "reading good books is like conversing with their authors, the worthiest people of previous centuries," so conversing with writers of other centuries is the same as traveling.

Classification of mental phenomena. Rudnytskyi distinguished the philosopher's goal (the analysis of concepts) from the writer's goal (the analysis of images). This proves his awareness of Twardowski's classification of mental phenomena, which divides representations into images and concepts. Moreover, the literary critic acknowledged that the evaluation of a literary work is a consequence of the ability of a judgment.

Other common features. Rudnytskyi noted such tendencies in Ukrainian literature as excessive rigidity, provincial orientation, and educational narrowness, and in this regard sought to involve it in dialogue with Western European literature. Similar to this was Twardowski's evaluation of contemporary Polish philosophy, which national face shaping, in his opinion, depended on its meeting and interaction with Western European philosophy.⁴⁴ Such a view of Twardowski goes back to the beliefs of his Austrian teacher, who argued that there should be no "specifically national psychology – even German – as there is no specifically German truth."⁴⁵

⁴³ Władysław Witwicki, "O stosunku nauki do sztuki", *Nauka Polska* 3 (1920): 60.

⁴⁴ Kazimierz Twardowski, "Jeszcze słówko o filozofii narodowej polskiej", *Ruch Filozoficzny* 6 (1911): 1–3.

⁴⁵ Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte*, Bd. 1, VI.

Twardowski demanded that the philosophers leave their worldviews outside of methodological research. This does not mean that he neglected the importance of a philosophical attitude towards the world. He believed that the worldview is a guide in a human life, but “such a view is person’s own business.”⁴⁶ Noticeably, denying the worldview urgency for the writer became the central idea in Rudnytskyi’s work.

Twardowski completely abandoned philosophy as a purely speculative science, and decided to focus on gathering information that in the future could be useful for creating a single true system of philosophy. This confirmed the purpose of philosophy, not in its classification by various *-isms*, systems, directions, and schools, but in the search for truth and its scientific justification.⁴⁷ Markedly, Rudnytskyi’s leveling of literary trends, which narrows the knowledge of a literary work to its identification with a certain *-ism*, denying the perception of its uniqueness, is obvious.

Conclusions

A comparative analysis shows not only some aspects of Rudnytskyi’s work, which have not yet been fully realized, but also reveals his desire to create his own analytical conception of literary critics, formed under the probable influence of the philosophical tradition of his Polish teacher. The probable influence of Twardowski’s philosophy on Rudnytskyi’s literature criticism, disclosed in this paper, proves that the latter has the philosophical basis, conceptual apparatus, and methodology, and confirms only the productivity of a critique which is based on philosophy.

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⁴⁶ Kazimierz Twardowski, *Przemówienie, wygłoszone na obchodzie dwudziestopięciolecia Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego we Lwowie dnia 12 lutego 1929* (Lwów: Nakładem “Słowa Polskiego”, 1929), 10.

⁴⁷ Kazimierz Twardowski, “Opening Lecture at the Lvov University”, in: Kazimierz Twardowski, *Myśl, mowa i czyn. On Prejudices, Judgments, and other Topics in Philosophy*, ed. Anna Brożek, Jacek Jadacki (Amsterdam–New-York: Rodopi, 2014), 36.

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Summary

In this article Twardowski's philosophy and Rudnytskyi's literary criticism have been compared for the first time. The purpose of the comparative analysis was to identify Twardowski's tradition in the works of his student Rudnytskyi. This comparison seems to contribute to a rethinking of Rudnytskyi's literary criticism in Ukrainian culture, namely to clarify its philosophical background, conceptual apparatus, and methodology. In the introduction some critical remarks on Rudnytskyi's literary work, that were made by Ukrainian scholars, have been provided. Next, in the first part, the methodological and philosophical background of Twardowski's philosophy has been analyzed. The second part encompasses an attempt to reconstruct Rudnytskyi's literary criticism. In the third part the author argues the direct impact of Twardowski's philosophy on Rudnytskyi's literary criticism. Finally, in the conclusions, the author claims that Rudnytskyi's literary criticism had a philosophical background, conceptual apparatus, and methodology.

Keywords: philosophy, Kazimierz Twardowski, the Lviv-Warsaw School, literary criticism, Franz Brentano, Mykhailo Rudnytskyi

