



NICHOLAS COUREAS (NICOSIA)

PARTICIPANTS OR MEDIATORS? THE HOSPITALLERS AND WARS INVOLVING 15TH CENTURY LUSIGNAN CYPRUS

Throughout the fifteenth century the Hospitallers were involved (as participants, mediators or both) in various conflicts that the Lusignan kingdom had with the Genoese, the Mamluks, the Turkish emirates of Alaya and Karaman and finally in the civil war between Queen Charlotte and her illegitimate half-brother James. As a Roman Catholic military order accountable to the Pope, they could not be indifferent to the threats faced by Lusignan Cyprus which, together with Rhodes itself (the Hospitaller headquarters), formed one of the easternmost bulwarks of Western Christendom. More material considerations, also underpinned Hospitaller interest in Cyprus, however – notably the considerable exports in sugar, grain, wine and other produce from Hospitaller estates and the Lusignan kingdom's increasing indebtedness to the Hospitaller Order. The above factors made Hospitaller interest in Lusignan Cyprus inevitable, although eventually the Hospitallers' involvement cost them dearly as regards their interests in the island.

Hospitaller mediation followed King Janus' unsuccessful attempt to capture Famagusta from the Genoese in 1402, an attempt thwarted by the Genoese Hospitaller Antonio Grimaldi. The Hospitaller Grand Master Philibert de Naillac averted an attack on Cyprus by Marshal Boucicaut, the French governor of Genoa who had sailed to Cyprus with a fleet in April 1403. The two men had fought the Turks at Nikopolis in 1396 and Philibert had subsequently assisted in raising a ransom for Boucicaut, captured during that battle. Philibert proposed negotiations instead, thereby enabling Boucicaut to leave Cyprus in order to attack the Turkish emirate of Alaya (Scandelore) on the southern Turkish coast, something he eventually accomplished on 29 June, burning and pillaging a section of the town. In June 1403, Philibert arrived in Cyprus together with l'Ermite de la Faye, one of Boucicaut's advisers. Boucicaut himself, who had previously consid-

ered making war on Cyprus after concluding a peace treaty with the emir of Alaya, with a view to using Alaya as his operational base, now arrived on the island sometime before July 1403. He was met at Pendency by Philibert, escorted by Brother Walter Grendon the prior of England, Brother Raymond de Lescurre the prior of Toulouse and Brother Peter de Bauffremont, in charge of the Order's hospital in Rhodes, as well as nobles of the Cypriot Haute Cour, whereupon he was conducted to Nicosia. There a new treaty between Cyprus and Genoa was concluded on 7 July 1403, with the Hospitallers accepting King Janus' crown jewels and plate, valued at 70,000 gold ducats, as security for the king's implementation of the treaty's terms, in particular the payment of an indemnity of 150,000 ducats. Once Marshal Boucicaut had fulfilled those provisions of the treaty pertaining to him the Hospitallers would hand over the jewels and plate and he in turn, on receipt from the king of part payments of the indemnity amounting to 15,000 ducats, would give the king a portion of the jewels and plate worth the equivalent of each part payment. Should he fail to do so, he would pay double this amount, to be deducted from the indemnity. Were the king to default on any payment, Marshal Boucicaut would be entitled to either keep or sell jewels and plate equal in value to the missed payment. One may note that the terms of this treaty did not prevent Janus from attacking Famagusta, albeit half-heartedly, in 1404, while in 1407 he sent his adviser Raymond de Lescurre to redeem the jewels and plate delivered in 1403 to the Hospitallers. Lescurre, himself a Hospitaller, had been the Grand Prior of Toulouse in 1403. Since the Hospitallers were negotiating a new treaty with the Mamluks over commerce and pilgrim traffic in mid-1403, they had every motive to dissuade Boucicaut, who wished to attack both the Mamluks and the Turks and in fact raided both Tripoli and Beirut in August 1403.¹

The Hospitallers were active participants during the Mamluk invasion of 1426, in which King Janus was defeated, captured and his kingdom reduced to tributary status. From 1416 onwards Rhodes constituted an ideal Catalan trading centre for trade with Cyprus and the Mamluks domains, and the Catalan presence on Rhodes was strengthened from 1421 onwards due to the election of the Catalan An-

¹ L. de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan*, 3 vols., Paris 1852–1861, here vol. 2, pp. 466–471; G. Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, 4 vols., Cambridge 1940–1952, here vol. 3, pp. 451–455, 458, 466; A. Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages*, Princeton 1983, pp. 217–219; A. Luttrell, *Ta stratiotika tagmata*, in: *Historia tes Kyprou*, vol. 4: *Mesaionikon Basileion, Henetokratia*, ed. Th. Papadopoulos, Nicosia 1995, pp. 749–750; idem, *The Hospitallers in Cyprus after 1378*, in: idem, *The Hospitaller State on Rhodes and its Western Provinces 1306–1462*, Aldershot, 1999, p. 8; *Sources for Turkish History in the Hospitallers' Rhodian Archive 1389–1422*, ed. A. Luttrell, E. Zachariadou, Athens 2008, pp. 56–60; *Documents concerning Cyprus from the Hospitallers Rhodian Archives: 1409–1459*, ed. K. Borchardt, A. Luttrell, E. Schöffler, Nicosia 2011, p. 45.

thoni de Fluvià as Hospitaller grand master. With the encouragement of King Janus of Cyprus the Catalans used Cyprus as a base for piratical raids against the coastlines of Egypt and Syria, angering the Mamluks, who prepared a fleet and mounted a full scale invasion of Cyprus in 1426 following preliminary raids in 1424 and 1425. In a naval battle off Larnaca the Mamluks successfully defeated the Cypriot fleet, despite the shortcomings of their own fleet, which apparently lacked sufficient rudders and included Nile barges as troop transports. Three out of the 17 galleys of this fleet were Hospitaller, including a smaller one belonging to Brother Juan Encantón, while Brother Jake Pelestri was killed in this engagement. According to the French chronicler Monstrelet, Hospitallers and other Westerners were involved in a subsequent skirmish against the Mamluks immediately preceding the battle of Khirokitia on 7 July 1426, in which the Mamluks decisively routed the royal army.²

More significant, however, was the role they played following the defeat in raising ransoms for both the king and the numerous Cypriots captured by the Mamluk invaders. The Hospitaller Grand Master Anthoni Fluvian advanced 15,000 ducats towards King Janus's ransom of 200,000 ducats, which Arabic sources give as 200,000 dinars, and the king returned to Cyprus accompanied by a Hospitaller ship. The Order also borrowed another 15,000 ducats from Venice for the same purpose. In addition, the Hospitallers contributed 50,000 florins for the ransom of other captives from Cyprus. The sums contributed were not repaid soon. As late as 1446 the crown pledged the incomes of certain casalia in the Paphos district towards repaying this debt and in 1451 King Jean II granted one of these casalia, that of Tarsis, to the Hospitallers with all its incomes. The Mamluk invasion, moreover, considerably damaged the Hospitaller estates in Cyprus. In 1428 the Grand Master and Chapter General of the Order allowed the Cypriot Grand Commandery, which Hermann von Ow then held, to be leased to the Hospitaller brothers Pedro Carnes and Angelino Muscetulla at the rent of four ducats per annum for the next

² *Chronique d'Amadi*, in: *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi*, ed. R. de Mas Latrie, 2 vols., Paris 1891–1893, here vol. 1, p. 509; L. Makhairas, *Recital concerning the Sweet Land of Cyprus, entitled 'Chronicle'*, ed. R. M. Dawkins, 2 vols., Oxford 1932, here vol. 1, § 686; Hill (as n. 1), here vol. 2, p. 479, n. 2; R. Irwin, *Hoi eisboles ton Mameloukon sten Kypro*, in: *Historia tes Kyprou* (as n. 1), pp. 165–173; *Monstrelet on the Capture of King Janus of Cyprus*, in: *Pero Tafur and Cyprus*, trans. C. I. Nepaulsingh, Albany–New York 1997, Appendices 2, 3, pp. 43–44, 48–49; Khalil ibn Shahin al-Zahiri, *Zubdat Kasf al-Mamalik* and Salih B. Yahya, *Tarikh Beyrouth*, both in: *Chypre dans les sources arabes médiévales*, trans. M. Tahar Mansouri, Nicosia 2001, pp. 95–99 and 102–109 respectively; A. Fuess, *Rotting Ships and Razed Harbours: The Naval Policy of the Mamluks*, *Mamluk Studies Review* 5 (2001), pp. 53–55; D. Coulon, *Barcelone et le Grand Commerce d'Orient au Moyen Age: Une siècle des relations avec l'Égypte et la Syrie-Palestine (ca. 1330 – ca. 1430)*, Madrid–Barcelona 2004, pp. 54–55; *Documents concerning Cyprus from the Hospitallers Rhodian Archives* (as n. 1), p. 49.

seven years so that they could help it recover, even though the standard response was 12,000 ducats per annum. The Mamluk devastation of Hospitaller estates during the course of their invasion of Cyprus clearly indicates that they too saw the Order as an enemy rather than as a neutral party.³

The Order's estates in Cyprus escaped a similar fate in the wars of 1440–1444 between the Mamluks and the Hospitallers. With the exception of one Mamluk raid against the Cypriot Grand Commandery on their way back from an expedition against Rhodes sometime before 8 March 1443, the Hospitallers' estates on the island were otherwise unharmed. Late in 1442 the Mamluk sultan Jaqmaq had proposed that Cyprus should not be involved in the hostilities between both parties. Jacques de Milly, the head of the Cypriot Grand Commandery, sent his lieutenant Jean de Marsenac to Alexandria for negotiations. He was specifically instructed in October 1442 to negotiate peace between the Mamluk sultan *and us and our said religious Order in the kingdom of Cyprus through the intervention and means of [...] the lord king of Cyprus*. This passage indicates that the peace was to encompass explicitly the Hospitaller estates in Cyprus. Furthermore, the allusion to the involvement of King Jean II of Cyprus constitutes an interesting reversal of roles, inasmuch as the Cypriot king was to mediate on behalf of the Hospitaller Order, not vice-versa. These instructions were essentially reiterated in subsequent instructions sent to him on 8 November 1442, although in this letter Jacques de Milly was authorised to appear and request the mediation of either the king or his noble counsellors. In a third letter of 14 January 1443 the master and convent gave virtually identical instructions as those given to Jacques de Milly to Jean Dalphin, the master scutifer of the Order, who was to go to Egypt and negotiate peace with the sultan on the terms expounded above. Upon the latter's arrival in Rhodes, the sultan's conditions were ratified by the Hospitaller Grand Master Jean de Lastic and then brought back to Egypt by Jean Dalphin.⁴

The importance for the Hospitallers of concluding a localized peace settlement with the Mamluk sultan covering their estates in Cyprus, regardless of hostilities between the Order and the sultan in other areas, is expressed nowhere more clearly than in the letter of March 8 1443 sent by the master and convent to Jacques

³ *Chronique d'Amadi* (as n. 2), p. 514; Makhairas (as n. 2), here vol. 1, § 701; Mas Latrie, *Histoire* (as n. 1), here vol. 3, pp. 30–34, 60; Hill (as n. 1), here vol. 3, pp. 479, n. 2; 487–489, 488, n. 7; R. Irwin, *Hoi eisboles ton Mameloukon sten Kypro*, in: *Historia tes Kyprou* (as n. 1), p. 173; Yahya (as n. 2), pp. 109–110; Fuess (as n. 2), p. 54; *Documents concerning Cyprus from the Hospitallers Rhodian Archives* (as n. 1), p. 1 and nos. 80, 83, 89–90, 288.

⁴ Hill (as n. 1), here vol. 3, pp. 516–517; Luttrell, *Stratitotika tagmata* (as n. 1), p. 750; Fuess (as n. 2), pp. 55–56; *Documents concerning Cyprus from the Hospitallers Rhodian Archives* (as n. 1), pp. 52–53 and nos. 178, 180–182, 184, 187.

de Milly. Referring to how a recent Mamluk raid on Hospitaller estates had damaged property and diminished revenues to a degree that would require years to restore to their former condition, the letter then authorises Jacques de Milly to make peace with the sultan with the following justification:

And again, because this our great bailiwick is located and situated in the above mentioned kingdom, under that serene king of the same kingdom who fortune permitting lives at peace with the said sultan and with other infidels, therefore, notwithstanding whatever disputes and wars that we and our Religion might have at present or in future with the sultan himself or with whomsoever other unbeliever, we wish that the said venerable preceptor be allowed to have peace and to live in concord and peace with the same sultan and other infidels, in whatever manner the serene king of Cyprus concludes or might wish to conclude in the future.

This neutral status for Hospitaller estates in Cyprus, notwithstanding the general state of warfare between them and the Mamluks, formed a precedent for a similar arrangement during the civil war that broke out on the island between the legitimate heir Queen Charlotte and her illegitimate half-brother Jacques following the death of King Jean II, to be discussed below. That the Hospitallers undertook efforts to secure the neutrality of their Cypriot estates in itself attests to their considerable commercial value, a supplementary reason for the importance Cyprus had for them, besides being an imperilled outpost of Western Christendom.⁵

This strategic and commercial importance of Cyprus impelled the Hospitallers to offer the enfeebled Lusignan kingdom of Cyprus their assistance as mediators in 1448 when the Turkish emir of Karaman decided to attack Cyprus, despite the friendly relations Cyprus and Karaman had enjoyed since the late 1420s. Venice at that time had encouraged these relations and Cypriot assistance towards Karaman within the context of the coalition involving Hungary, Wallachia, Karaman, Venice and a Venetian backed pretender to the Ottoman sultanate named Mustafa, which fought the Ottoman sultan Murat II (1421–1451) until the peace of Lapseki in 1430. King Jean II of Cyprus had sought to continue this friendship with Karaman by sending an embassy to Karaman at the start of his reign in 1432. But the emir of Karaman Ibrahim attacked the Ottomans in 1443 and, despite being

⁵ J. Sarnowsky, *Macht und Herrschaft im Johanniterorden des 15. Jahrhunderts. Verfassung und Verwaltung der Johanniter auf Rhodos (1421–1522)*, Münster–Hamburg–London 2001, p. 424, n. 109; *Documents concerning Cyprus from the Hospitallers Rhodian Archives* (as n. 1), pp. 52–53, n. 187.

defeated, secured peace from them since they needed to concentrate their forces in Europe to confront the Crusade against them led by the Hungarian John Hunyadi. The Ottomans managed to defeat these Crusading forces at Varna in 1444 as well as those of a new crusade organized under Hunyadi's command, which invaded Serbia but was defeated at Kosovo in October 1448. Nonetheless, with the Ottomans distracted in Europe, the emir of Karaman had freedom to act in Anatolia. Hospitaller mediation backed by the threat of force against Karaman occurred in 1448, when the Order attempted to deter Ibrahim from taking Korykos, a port in Cilicia that the Armenians had conceded to King Peter I of Cyprus in 1359, from the king of Cyprus. Sometime before August 1448, King Jean II of Cyprus sent his ambassador Philip Mistachiel to Rhodes and so informed the Hospitaller grandmaster Jean de Lastic of the impending expedition being readied against Korykos. Jean de Lastic responded to this news by sending his envoy Motin Vaseline, the Hospitaller preceptor of Troyes, to the emir of Karaman, with instructions to urge him to maintain good relations with the king of Cyprus. In a letter dated 28 August 1448 that Jean de Lastic wrote to King Jean he informed him that an envoy of the emir had declared his willingness to conclude a peace settlement. Nevertheless, the Grand Master promised to send King Jean an armed galley if Korykos were attacked, with more help to follow if the need arose.⁶

The Hospitallers also employed commercial incentives to discourage the emir of Karaman from attacking Cyprus. In August 1448 Jean de Lastic also instructed Motin Vaseline, his envoy to the emir of Karaman, to offer the emir's subjects commercial facilities at Rhodian ports and to state that Jean de Lastic would willingly act as mediator to prevent the outbreak of war between Karaman and Cyprus. If the emir of Karaman was determined on war, however, he was to be told that the Hospitallers would assist Cyprus and respond as though they themselves had been attacked. The emir's assertions that the king of Cyprus paid an annual tribute of 5,000 ducats to the emir of Alaya and so he should reciprocate were to be dismissed as untrue, for any such payment to the emir of Alaya, if made, had been given just once rather than regularly. On leaving Karaman Motin Vaseline was to make for Cyprus and assure King Jean that an armed galley would arrive from Rhodes to assist him in the event of war.

⁶ L. de Mas Latrie, *Des relations politiques et commerciales de l'Asie Mineure avec l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de Lusignan*, in: *Correspondances et écrits de Louis de Mas Latrie sur Chypre*, publ. by the A. G. Leventis Foundation, Nîmes 1997, pp. 276–277; idem, *Histoire* (as n. 1), here vol. 3, pp. 3–7, 48–49; Hill (as n. 1), here vol. 3, p. 518; S. J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, 2 vols., Cambridge 1976 (repr.: 1991), here vol. 1, pp. 47–54; K. M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571)*, 4 vols., Philadelphia 1976–1984, here vol. 2, p. 29; C. Imber, *The Ottoman Empire*, Basingstoke 2002, pp. 17–27; *Documents concerning Cyprus from the Hospitallers Rhodian Archives* (as n. 1), nos. 236–237.

In addition, he was to raise the matter of the annual payments claimed by the Latin archbishop of Rhodes from the ecclesiastical revenues of the Latin archbishopric of Nicosia, in accordance with an agreement reached in Rome between the Latin archbishops of Nicosia and Rhodes in the presence of King Jean II's ambassadors.⁷ Such an agreement, if made, indicates that incomes from Cyprus were received or at any rate claimed not only by the Hospitallers, but also by the Latin secular church.

In the event, Hospitaller mediation with the emir of Karaman underpinned by the threat to despatch aid to Cyprus was of no avail. While the emir kept Motin Vase- lin in his dominions so as to spin out the negotiations and thereby delay the despatch of the Hospitaller galley, he simultaneously bribed the starving Cypriot and Arme- nian garrison on Korykos with gold into surrendering the port on 26 October 1448 before Motin Vase- lin's departure.⁸ On leaving, Vase- lin could only go first to Cyprus and thence to Rhodes with the news of the capture of Korykos, now a *fait accompli*, together with King Jean's request to the Grand Master for advice. Grand Master Jean de Lastic offered some to King Jean of Cyprus in his letter of 20 November, advising him either to make peace with the emir of Karaman or else to seek assistance from his suzerain, the Sultan of Egypt. Jean de Lastic also wrote to the sultan of Egypt, de- ploring the loss of Korykos, which the emir of Karaman had apparently seized with the sultan's acquiescence, and urging him to help King Jean retake it.⁹ The Hospi- tallers were clearly unable or unwilling to assist King Jean on their own, and in solicit- ing the Mamluk sultan's aid they could only point out that if Cyprus were abandoned to its fate it might be annexed by a more powerful and aggressive Christian state. In- deed this possibility had been broached just two years earlier, in 1446, by the Vene- tian Emmanuel Piloti. Arguing that the manifest weakness of the Lusignan kingdom could lead to its permanent loss for Christendom, of which it was a forward bulwark, he suggested in the overall context of advocating a crusade that King Jean be deposed and that dominion over Cyprus be assumed by another Christian power such as Ven- ice, a possibility that indeed materialised in 1473.¹⁰

⁷ Mas Latrie, *Histoire* (as n. 1), here vol. 3, pp. 50–53; Hill (as n. 1), here vol. 3, pp. 518–519; *Docu- ments concerning Cyprus from the Hospitallers Rhodian Archives* (as n. 1), nos. 238–240.

⁸ Mas Latrie, *Relations politiques* (as n. 6), p. 277; idem, *Histoire* (as n. 1), here vol. 3, p. 59; Hill (as n. 1), here vol. 3, p. 519; G. Grivaud, *Une petite chronique chypriote du XV^e siècle*, in: *Dei gesta per Francos: Crusade Studies in Honour of Jean Richard*, ed. M. Balard, B. Z. Kedar, J. Riley-Smith, Aldershot 2001, p. 331; *Documents concerning Cyprus from the Hospitallers Rhodian Archives* (as n. 1), no. 250.

⁹ Mas Latrie, *Relations politiques* (as n. 6), p. 277; idem, *Histoire* (as n. 1), here vol. 3, pp. 53–56; Hill (as n. 1), here vol. 3, p. 520; *Documents concerning Cyprus from the Hospitallers Rhodian Archives* (as n. 1), nos 244–245.

¹⁰ Hill (as n. 1), here vol. 3, p. 520; J. Richard, *Chypre du protectorat à la domination Vénitienne*, in: idem, *Les Relations entre l'Orient et l'Occident au Moyen Age*, London 1979, p. 667.

Hospitaller intervention was more successful in the case of Alaya. In 1444 Luftou, the emir of Alaya, gathered a strong force with which to attack and conquer Cyprus, but ceased these preparations on learning that the Hospitallers had sent assistance to King Jean II. This, in conjunction with the prospect of facing the full force of Hospitaller arms following their successful rout of an Egyptian fleet that besieged Rhodes in August for forty days, impelled the emir to take steps to secure a peace treaty with the grand Master of the Order. In this instance, the Hospitallers' successful mediation and prevention of open war between Cyprus and Alaya was underpinned by the threat of force following their successful defence of Rhodes against the Mamluks. But the fall of Korykos to the emir of Karaman in October 1448 emboldened the emir of Alaya with regard to the island. In 1450 Emir Luftou planned to attack Cyprus together with other Turkish rulers, and the ensuing consternation this news caused in Cyprus was brought to the Hospitaller Grand Master's notice. In response, he sent two galleys to Cyprus and warned Bernard of Villamarina, the admiral of King Alfonso V of Aragon whose fleet was in eastern Mediterranean waters, of the dangerous developments. Villamarina sent a squadron of ten ships to Cyprus and this, in conjunction with the Hospitaller galleys and a fleet allegedly sent by the Mamluk sultan, caused Emir Luftou to abandon his enterprise. Instead a peace treaty between King John II of Cyprus and the emir of Alaya was concluded on 7 September 1450, guaranteeing to traders of both parties free access to the ports of the opposing party, the payment of damages to either party by the perpetrators and an undertaking that each party should warn the other of an impending enemy attack. The Hospitaller Grand Master was entrusted with the maintenance of the treaty, written in contemporary Cypriot Greek, and was to arbitrate in any dispute occasioned by a violation of its provisions.¹¹

The final occasion in which the Hospitallers intervened in a war concerning Lusignan Cyprus was in the civil war that broke out after the death of King Jean II in 1458. On this occasion, the Hospitallers were both participants and mediators at various points in time. It was following the death of King Jean II of Cyprus on 26 July 1458 and the designs of Jacques to acquire the kingdom from his half-sister Charlotte, crowned on 15 October that the Hospitallers adopted a policy of actively supporting Queen Charlotte, at least on the international scene. Following Jacques' departure for Cairo in late 1458 and the arrival of Louis of Savoy in

¹¹ Mas Latrie, *Des relations politiques* (as n. 6), pp. 275 and 278–279; Hill (as n. 1), here vol. 3, pp. 517–518, 520–521; *Anekdoita engrapha gia te Rhodo kai tis Noties Sporades apo to arkheio ton Ioanniton Hippoton 1421–1453*, ed. Z. Tsirpanlis, Rhodes 1995, pp. 557–560, no. 222; *Documents concerning Cyprus from the Hospitallers Rhodian Archives* (as n. 1), no. 271.

October 1459 in Cyprus to marry Queen Charlotte, both the Hospitallers and Jacques solicited the support of the Mamluk sultan as regards the throne of Cyprus, with Jacques eventually prevailing and returning to Cyprus on 18 September 1460 with a Mamluk army.¹² The Hospitaller envoy Jean Dalphin, the Hospitaller commander of Nisyros sent in late 1459 to Cairo in an attempt to win over the sultan, was still being detained there in June 1461, when the Hospitaller grand master sent the Catalan merchant Bartholomew de Parete to Alexandria to deliver some letters to him, and then to proceed to Cairo, to protest over Dalphin's detention and, if the occasion was opportune, to ask the sultan to have Queen Charlotte restored to the throne.¹³

Besides these diplomatic overtures, the Hospitallers also intervened militarily, sending forces to garrison Kyrenia, held by Queen Charlotte's supporters. Yet the Hospitaller desire for an accommodation with James is illustrated by a letter Jacques de Milly sent on 11 October 1460 to Niccolò de Corogna, the commander of Treviso, and to Jean de Chailly, commander of Auxerre, instructing them to go to Cyprus and have Louis of Savoy escorted away from Cyprus should he wish, but also to secure his assent for a temporary accommodation with Jacques so that their goods and incomes from Kolossi, under the care of Brother William de Combort, would be secure. This occurred despite protestations that the arrangement, as the two commanders were instructed to assure Louis of Savoy, would not prejudice the resistance against James conducted by Kerynia. They would also assure Louis that just as by custom the Hospitallers did not render homage to the kings of Cyprus for the Commandery of Kolossi, so now they would refuse to render homage to Jacques. Furthermore, they would continue to guard it well as always so that Jacques would not be able to take possession of it.¹⁴ Jacques de Milly, anxious to emphasize his declared support of Charlotte at a time when he was also making overtures to her half-brother Jacques, also wrote in November 1460 to the Hospitaller houses in Western Europe, accusing Jacques of apostasy to Islam and warning them of the dangers ensuing from a Muslim annexation of Cyprus, including the severance of various supplies, including grain, from Cyprus to Rhodes.¹⁵ Indeed Queen Charlotte, who had left Cyprus for Rhodes in late 1460 or

¹² *Tzortzes (M)poustrous (Georgios Bo(s)tr(y)nos e Boustronios, Diegesis Kronikas Kyprou*, ed. G. Kehayoglou, Nicosia 1997, pp. 72–77; George Boustronios, *A Narrative of the Chronicle of Cyprus*, trans. N. Coureas, Nicosia 2005, §§ 41–43; Mas Latrie, *Histoire* (as n. 1), here vol. 3, pp. 96–99; Hill (as n. 1), here vol. 3, pp. 555–556; Fuess (as n. 2), p. 56.

¹³ Mas Latrie, *Histoire* (as n. 1), here vol. 3, p. 86.

¹⁴ *Tzortzes (M)poustrous (Georgios Bo(s)tr(y)nos e Boustronios* (as n. 12), pp. 84–89; Boustronios (as n. 12), §§ 50–51; Mas Latrie, *Histoire* (as n. 1), here vol. 3, pp. 104–106.

¹⁵ Mas Latrie, *Histoire* (as n. 1), here vol. 3, pp. 108–113.

early 1461, was to stay there until 1474. Following the death in July 1473 of her half-brother Jacques, who had become master of Cyprus in 1464, certain Hospitaller brothers, as will be seen below, covertly but ineffectively supported Charlotte's failed attempts to regain her throne, and she seems in time to have realized the futility of their efforts. On 4 July 1474 she left Rhodes for Italy, never to return.¹⁶

Therefore, the Hospitallers offered support to Queen Charlotte on the international scene, while in Cyprus itself their policy was more nuanced. On 18 October 1460 the Grand Master Jacques de Milly instructed Brother William de Combort, the lieutenant in command of the Grand Commandery of Kolossi in Cyprus, not to put it in the hands of either Jacques or the Mamluk sultan but to assure Jacques that he would obtain the same obedience from the Order as had been given by custom to his predecessors. Jacques understood manifestly that the Hospitallers wished to have peaceful if not cordial relations with him and on 3 March 1462 Jacques gave William and his household of up to 20 men leave to either stay in Cyprus or travel to Rhodes at their will.¹⁷ Following Jacques' victory, he desisted from making reprisals against the Hospitallers in Cyprus. Indeed, documents from the *Livre des Remembrances* for the years 1468–1469 indicate that he had good relations with individual Hospitallers resident in Cyprus, his desire to secure papal recognition of his right to the throne of Cyprus forming a powerful incentive to the cultivation of such relations. One instance deserves particular mention. On 5 October 1468 King Jacques II issued orders for the dispatch to Brother Peter Anthony, a mandatory of the Hospitaller grand master, of a consignment of white sugar of the first cooking, that is to say crystallized but as yet unrefined, originating from the royal estates of Kouklia and Akhelia and priced at 36.5 ducats per quintal so as to repay his debt to the order's grand master degli Orsini, amounting to 693 Venetian ducats or 1,040 Rhodian ducats. The debt in question had been contracted as a ransom for seven former Muslim slaves, whom the previous grand master Raymond Zacosta had purchased on King Jacques' behalf in Rhodes and had then sent back to the Mamluk sultan in Egypt in former years. One observes that in 1466 with the support of King Ferrante of Naples Jacques had secured recognition of his rule from the Venetian pope Paul II. This explains how by 1468 the Hospitallers were acting as mediators in the dealings of King Jacques with his Mamluk suzerains.¹⁸

¹⁶ *Tzortzes (M)poustrous (Georgios Bo(s)tr(y)nos e Boustronios* (as n. 12), pp. 162–171; *Boustronios* (as n. 12), §§ 113, 116–119, 123–124, 127; Hill (as n. 1), here vol. 3, pp. 599–601; Luttrell, *Stratitotika tagmata* (as n. 1), p. 752.

¹⁷ Mas Latrie, *Histoire* (as n. 1), here vol. 3, pp. 107–108, 164.

¹⁸ *Le Livre des remembrances de la secrète du royaume de Chypre (1468–1469)*, ed. J. Richard with

Following King Jacques' death in July 1473 and the Venetian annexation of the island, the Hospitallers lost once and for all their ability to intervene in the affairs of Cyprus. Unlike the enfeebled fifteenth century Lusignan kings, Venice had no need of their assistance. The Venetians warned the Hospitallers of Rhodes not to support Queen Charlotte after King Jacques' death, and the Hospitallers, mindful of Venice's naval power, did indeed remain officially neutral. Despite this, Hospitallers as individuals appear to have continued working against Venice, for as late as 1475 the Venetians received news that the Hospitaller brother Jean de Canosa was arming four large ships in the kingdom of Naples with a view to invading Cyprus, something that impelled the Venetian government to lodge a strong protest before King Ferrante of Naples, who was greatly perturbed that the Venetians had got wind of this plan, allegedly fomented by Rizzo di Marino. Furthermore, on a local level the Venetians were angered by the involvement of Brother Nicholas Zaplana, who had acquired the Grand Commandery of Kolossi in February 1471, in a plot hatched by some former mercenaries of King Jacques II against his widow, Queen Catherine. One of the plot's leaders had been Nicholas' relation James Zaplana, whose valuables Nicholas had concealed in Kolossi after James Zaplana had been forced to flee from Cyprus in January 1474 with his fellow conspirators. Once the Venetians ascertained Nicholas' complicity he was deprived of office, and under the Venetians appointed to succeed him, such as Marco Crispo, a Venetian Hospitaller who was the commander of the priory of Verona as well as the uncle of Queen Catherine, the Grand Commandery became gradually but firmly attached to the Venetian Corner family.¹⁹ In this way the era of Hospitaller intervention in the wars involving Cyprus, as active participants, as mediators, or both, came to an end.

the collaboration of Th. Papadopoulos, Nicosia 1983, nos. 4, 50, 63, 66, 139, 164, 196; Hill (as n. 1), here vol. 3, p. 631, and Addenda, p. 1159.

¹⁹ *Tzortzes (M)poustrous (Georgios Bo(s)tr(y)nos e Boustronios* (as n. 12), pp. 218–231, 286–287; Boustronios (as n. 12), §§ 176–177, 180, 182, 184–186, 192, 256; Mas Latrie, *Histoire* (as n. 1), here vol. 3, pp. 93, 437; Hill (as n. 1), here vol. 3, p. 698 note 3; P. W. Edbury, *Hoi teleutaioi Louzignanoi*, in: *Historia tes Kýprou* (as n. 1), pp. 250–251; Luttrell, *Stratiotika tagmata* (as n. 1), p. 753.

