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ALAN FOREY (Kirtlington)

THE PARTICIPATION OF THE MILITARY ORDERS IN TRUCES WITH MUSLIMS IN THE HOLY LAND AND SPAIN DURING THE TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH CENTURIES

Although the military orders' primary function was to fight against the infidel, warfare in the Middle Ages was never continuous, as armies could not be kept in the field indefinitely, and when there was an imbalance of power between Christians and Muslims it was in the interests of the weaker side to seek truces, even at the expense of concessions.¹ When the neighbouring Islamic world was divided, it was also possible for Christians to play off rival Muslim powers by siding with one against another and sometimes gaining tribute. As the military orders grew in importance in the twelfth century, it was inevitable that they were among those consulted on cessations of hostilities, and this involvement was at times formalized in undertakings given by rulers to seek the orders' advice. In 1143 Raymond Berenguer IV, count of Barcelona, promised to the Templars that in future he would not make peace with the Muslims except with their advice.² At almost the same time, Raymond of Tripoli gave an undertaking to the Hospitallers that he would not enter into truces with the Muslims without their counsel, and a

¹ Y. Friedman, *Peacemaking: Perceptions and Practices in the Medieval Latin East*, in: *The Crusades and the Near East*, ed. C. Kostick, London 2011, pp. 233, 235, shows that in the second half of the thirteenth century negotiations in the eastern Mediterranean were usually initiated by the Franks.

² *Colección de documentos inéditos del Archivo General de la Corona de Aragón*, ed. P. de Bofarull y Mascaró et al., 41 vols, Barcelona 1847–1910, here vol. 4, doc. 43, pp. 93–99; Marquis d'Albon, *Cartulaire général de l'ordre du Temple, 1119?–1150*, Paris 1913, doc. 314, pp. 204–205; *Col·lecció diplomàtica de la casa del Temple de Barberà (945–1212)*, ed. J. M. Sans i Travé, Barcelona 1997, doc. 35, pp. 110–114.

similar promise was made by Bohemond III of Antioch to the Hospital in 1168.³ Such promises, some of them made at an early stage of the orders' involvement in warfare against the infidel, reflect the important contribution they were expected to make in the struggle against Islam. That advice was in fact sought and given, and that brothers of the orders were often among the negotiators employed by rulers, hardly needs demonstrating;⁴ but the purpose of this paper is to consider to what extent military orders acted independently in the making, observing and breaking of truces.

A distinction must be made between the Iberian peninsula and the Latin East, for in the latter the orders came to enjoy much greater freedom of action. This is hardly surprising. Rulers and nobles in the crusader states were normally dependent on limited local sources of revenue and manpower, while the international orders in the East were able to draw upon resources from the whole of western Christendom: they therefore constituted a major element in the armies of the crusader states, and gained authority over an increasing number of strongholds, in some areas controlling considerable marcher districts. In the Iberian peninsula military orders, by contrast, had to rely primarily on local resources. Santiago did have some property outside the peninsula, especially in France, but these holdings were not very significant;⁵ and Templars and Hospitallers in Spain did not receive support from colleagues in other parts of western Europe. The international orders in the peninsula were in fact obliged to send men and supplies out to the East. Spanish rulers themselves were able to draw on revenues and manpower – both nobles and townsmen – from an area which, despite setbacks, grew considerably during the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Central authority was also for most of the period more firmly established in Spanish kingdoms than in the crusader states, even if there were some periods of political instability in the peninsula. In the East, the lack of an effective ruler was most apparent in the kingdom of Jerusalem in the thirteenth century, but succession problems also occurred farther north.

In the Iberian peninsula, where Christian rulers sought to control relations with Muslim Spain, charters granting frontier strongholds to military orders – and to others – commonly contained the requirement that recipients were to make

³ J. Delaville Le Roulx, *Cartulaire général de l'ordre des Hospitaliers de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem* (henceforth: CGH), 4 vols, Paris 1894–1906, here vol. I, docs 144, 391, pp. 116–118, 266–268.

⁴ On brothers' involvement in negotiations, see, for example, J. Burgtorf, *Die Ritterorden als Instanzen zur Friedenssicherung?*, in: *Jerusalem im Hoch- und Spätmittelalter. Konflikte und Konfliktbewältigung – Vorstellungen und Vergegenwärtigungen*, ed. D. Bauer, K. Herbers, N. Jaspert, Frankfurt 2001, pp. 191–192.

⁵ E. Benito Ruano, *La orden de Santiago en Francia*, *Hispania* 37 (1977), pp. 5–56.

both war and peace at the king's command: when Alfonso IX of León gave Alcántara to the brothers of Calatrava in 1217, he decreed that 'you are always to make war and peace from there whenever and with whomsoever I command'.⁶ The phrasing used was not always the same. In the document recording the donation of Alcañiz by Alfonso II of Aragon to the same order in 1179, it was stated that war and peace were to be made *per me* (through me).⁷ In whatever way it was worded, the requirement continued to be made throughout the thirteenth century: it was mentioned when the Hospital received Serpa and Moura from Alfonso X of Castile in 1259 and the Murcian castle of Calasparra from Sancho IV in 1289, and also when Medina Sidonia and Alcalá de los Gazules were assigned to the minor order of Sta. María de España by Alfonso X in 1279.⁸ The orders were expected not only to fight at the ruler's command, but also to accept the peaces he made. These requirements relate only to operations from particular strongholds granted to orders, and are not found in all documents recording the gift of frontier castles to military orders, but they imply a general principle of subservience to royal wishes. It has, however, been claimed that during the period of truces between Alfonso VIII of Castile and the Muslims at the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the orders were able to make raids into Muslim territory, and that Calatrava seized the stronghold of Salvatierra, which became its headquarters.⁹ Yet, although the conquest of Salvatierra has usually been placed in the year 1198, the date is uncertain, and it has been suggested that it occurred before Alfonso made peace towards

⁶ J. González, *Alfonso IX*, 2 vols, Madrid 1944, here vol. 2, doc. 346, pp. 453–455; *Colección diplomática medieval de la orden de Alcántara (1157?–1494)*, ed. B. Palacios Martín, 2 vols, Madrid 2000–2003, here vol. 1, doc. 58, pp. 29–30; cf. H. Grassotti, 'Facere guerram et pacem.' *Un deber del que no estaban exentas las órdenes militares*, Anuario de estudios medievales 11 (1981), pp. 73–80; and, more generally, eadem, *El deber y el derecho de hacer guerra y paz en León y Castilla*, in: eadem, *Estudios medievales españoles*, Madrid 1981, pp. 43–132.

⁷ A. I. Sánchez Casabón, *Alfonso II Rey de Aragón, Conde de Barcelona y Marqués de Provenza. Documentos (1162–1196)*, Zaragoza 1995, doc. 279, pp. 375–376; for examples from the later twelfth and early thirteenth centuries relating to other military orders, see *ibid.*, doc. 453, pp. 599–601; González, *Alfonso IX* (as n. 6), vol. 2, docs 597, 620, pp. 693–695, 717–718.

⁸ *Libro de privilegios de la orden de San Juan de Jerusalén en Castilla y León (siglos XII–XV)*, ed. C. de Ayala Martínez et al., Madrid n.d., doc. 336, pp. 550–553; R. Serra Ruiz, *La orden de San Juan de Jerusalén en el reino de Murcia (siglo XIII)*, Anuario de historia del derecho español 38 (1968), doc. 5, pp. 574–577; J. Torres Fontes, *La orden de Santa María de España*, Miscelánea medieval murciana 3 (1977), doc. 10, pp. 110–113.

⁹ E. Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros en los reinos hispánicos. Las órdenes militares en la Península Ibérica durante la edad media*, Madrid 2008, pp. 149, 177–178. On Alfonso VIII's truces, see J. González, *El reino de Castilla en la época de Alfonso VIII*, 3 vols, Madrid 1960, here vol. 1, pp. 979–981.

the end of 1197.¹⁰ That in 1204/6 Santiago undertook an expedition in the *sierra* of Alcaraz and that Calatrava raided into Muslim territory via Muradal rests on a statement of the sixteenth-century historian Rades y Andrada,¹¹ and his comments are hardly consistent with contemporary evidence indicating that at that time the orders were unwilling to break royal truces. In 1205 Pedro II of Aragon sought Innocent III's approval to use Calatrava on the Aragonese frontier because Alfonso VIII of Castile had a truce with the Muslims which the brothers did not dare to contravene, and in the next year the Cistercian abbot of Morimond, to which Calatrava was affiliated, informed the pope that because of truces between Christian rulers in the peninsula with the Muslims, brothers of the order were unable to engage in fighting against the infidel: the abbot wanted them to be sent to the Holy Land.¹² It was also at about this time that a Calatravan statute ruled that a brother 'who in time of peace seeks to do harm to Christians or pagans is not to be received back [into the order] except with the consent of the visitor, the master and the king'.¹³ The wording of a letter from Innocent III to Alfonso VIII in 1210 also implies that the military orders were not then able to undertake expeditions on the Castilian frontier, and in 1220 the master of Calatrava further complained to Honorius III that Spanish kings were preventing them from responding to Muslim raids.¹⁴ An agreement between the orders of Santiago and Calatrava in the following year did, however, envisage some independent action by these orders. It was ruled that if Muslims attacked one order when the king had a truce with them, the other order was to give assistance, despite the truce: but it could, of course, be argued that in this situation the truce had already been breached and was no longer valid, even if this was not the king's view; and the reference is only to defensive action. Yet a further clause stated that if one order was at war with the infidel, it should not make a truce without the counsel of the other; and the further provision was included that if one order made a peace with Muslims, it was to

¹⁰ J. F. O'Callaghan, *Sobre los orígenes de Calatrava La Nueva*, *Hispania* 23 (1963), p. 7; G. Martínez Diez, *Alfonso VIII, rey de Castilla y Toledo*, Burgos 1995, p. 171.

¹¹ F. Rades y Andrada, *Crónica des las tres órdenes y cavallerías de Sanctiago, Calatrava y Alcántara*, Toledo 1572, Santiago, fol. 22v. Rades seems to imply doubts by stating that from writings in the archive of Calatrava a raid by that order appears (*parece*) to have occurred, and he qualifies gains by Santiago with the word *dizen*.

¹² D. Mansilla, *La documentación pontificia hasta Inocencio III (965–1216)*, Rome 1955, docs 321, 342, pp. 351, 366–367; *Die Register Innocenz' III*, vol. 8, ed. O. Hageneder, A. Sommerlechner, Wien 2001, doc. 97, pp. 175–176.

¹³ D. W. Lomax, *Algunos estatutos primitivos de la orden de Calatrava*, *Hispania* 21 (1961), p. 494.

¹⁴ Mansilla, *Documentación pontificia hasta Inocencio III* (as n. 12), doc. 416, p. 436; idem, *La documentación pontificia de Honorio III (1216–1227)*, Rome 1965, doc. 340, p. 251.

be observed by the other.¹⁵ This agreement was confirmed in 1243¹⁶ but, in view of the evidence already quoted, it would probably be unwise to attach a great deal of significance to these clauses. Although their inclusion implies some degree of independent action, they may be referring merely to very localized and brief cessations of hostilities which were likely to occur during any military operations and which were not intended to flout royal decrees. Certainly, a further agreement between the masters of four military orders in León and Castile in 1224 does not allude to truces,¹⁷ and the wording of a papal letter dispatched in 1225 still suggests a reluctance among the orders to ignore royal truces with Muslims.¹⁸ In 1300, however, the *concejo* of Ubeda in southern Spain did undertake to observe the peace which Gutierre Pérez, *comendador mayor* of Calatrava, had made with the Muslim ruler of Granada.¹⁹ Gutierre was at that time seeking to oust the master of Calatrava, García López de Padilla, who had been appointed in 1297, and had apparently sought Muslim assistance.²⁰ But this happened during the minority of Fernando IV of Castile, when there was considerable political unrest within the kingdom, and is not indicative of the orders' normal stance.²¹

By contrast, the military orders' freedom of action was recognized fairly early in some of the Christian states in the East. In 1168 Bohemond III conceded that the Hospitallers could make war or peace from the places which he was then giving them, and he promised that he and his vassals would observe truces made by

¹⁵ *Bullarium ordinis militiae de Calatrava*, ed. I. J. de Ortega y Cotes, J. F. Alvarez de Baquedano, P. de Ortega Zúñiga y Aranda, Madrid 1761, pp. 683–685; cf. J. F. O'Callaghan, *Hermandades between the Military Orders of Calatrava and Santiago during the Castilian Reconquest, 1158–1252*, *Speculum* 44 (1969), p. 612; S. Zeno Conedera, *Brothers in Arms: Hermandades among the Military Orders in Medieval Iberia*, in: *Crusades – Medieval Worlds in Conflict*, ed. T. F. Madden, J. L. Naus, V. Ryan, Farnham 2010, p. 36.

¹⁶ *Bullarium de Calatrava* (as n. 15), pp. 685–686.

¹⁷ O'Callaghan, *Hermandades between the Military Orders* (as n. 15), pp. 617–618.

¹⁸ Mansilla, *Documentación pontificia de Honorio III* (as n. 14), doc. 569, pp. 421–422.

¹⁹ *Colección documental del Archivo Municipal de Ubeda. I (siglo XIII)*, ed. J. Rodríguez Molina, Granada 1990, doc. 75, pp. 121–122; M. Nieto Cumplido, *Orígenes del regionalismo andaluz (1235–1325)*, Córdoba 1979, doc. 27, pp. 199–201. On this document, see also A. Riesco Terrero, *Consideraciones en torno a la tipología documental y validación notarial de una carta de hermandad suscrita por el concejo de Ubeda y la orden de Calatrava*, in: *Notariado público y documento privado: de los orígenes al siglo XIV. Actas del VII Congreso Internacional de Diplomática*, 2 vols, Valencia 1989, here vol. 1, pp. 561–575.

²⁰ Ph. Josserand, *Eglise et pouvoir dans la péninsule ibérique. Les ordres militaires dans le royaume de Castille (1252–1369)*, Madrid 2004, p. 532; L. V. Díaz Martín, *Los maestros de las órdenes militares en el reinado de Pedro I de Castilla*, *Hispania* 40 (1980), doc. 3, p. 341.

²¹ C. de Ayala Martínez, *Las órdenes militares hispánicas en la edad media (siglos XII–XV)*, Madrid 2003, p. 594, expresses the view that 'las acciones militares de los freires al margen de la voluntad real serían más bien excepcionales'.

the order; he also granted that if he or a vassal agreed to a truce without consulting the Hospitallers, the latter were to be free to ignore it.²² Freedom to make war and peace on Muslims bordering on Hospitaller possessions was also given by Leo of Armenia and Raymond Roupen, claimant to Antioch, in 1210.²³ The orders' early independence in more northerly regions is illustrated by the receipt of tribute from the Assassins by the Templars in the 1170s.²⁴ No similar concessions have survived for the kingdom of Jerusalem, but there are indications as early as the reign of Amaury that the orders could adopt an independent stance with regard to truces. William of Tyre reports that in 1168 the Templars refused to participate in an invasion of Egypt, with which a truce had been agreed in the preceding year.²⁵ Admittedly, a contemporary western source claims that they did contribute a contingent,²⁶ and it has been argued that William, although the closest source to the events, was hostile to the military orders and had an axe to grind.²⁷ He certainly stated first that the Templars refused to act either because a truce had earlier been agreed or because the master of the Hospital was the driving force behind the expedition, but he then went on to affirm that they thought that it would be unjust to break the truce: in William's account it is the master of the Hospital who is heavily censured, not the Templars. The latter therefore appear to have been able to act independently in the south with regard to truces. This assumption finds some support in a reference in 1179 to 'Templar Bedouins', who had been attacked by *turcoples* from the Hospitaller castle of Bethgibelin in the south of the kingdom: the Bedouins were presumably paying tribute to the Templars.²⁸ The ability

²² CGH I, doc. 391, pp. 266–268; see also *ibid.*, doc. 783, pp. 491–496.

²³ CGH II, docs 1349, 1355, pp. 118–119, 122–123.

²⁴ William of Tyre, *Chronicon*, XX, 29–30, ed. R. B. C. Huygens (Corpus Christianorum continuatio medievalis 63), Turnhout 1986, pp. 954–955.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, XX, 5, pp. 917–918.

²⁶ Lambert de Waterlos, *Annales Cameracenses*, ed. G. H. Pertz, in: *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptorum*, vol. 16, Hannover 1859, pp. 546–547; see also Abu-Shama, *Le livre des deux jardins*, in: *Recueil des historiens des croisades. Historiens orientaux*, 5 vols, Paris 1872–1906, here vol. 4, p. 135.

²⁷ H. Nicholson, *Before William of Tyre: European Reports on the Military Orders' Deeds in the East, 1150–1185*, in: *The Military Orders*, vol. 2: *Welfare and Warfare*, ed. H. Nicholson, Aldershot 1998, pp. 116–117.

²⁸ CGH I, doc. 558, pp. 378–379; R. Hiestand, *Papsturkunden für Templer und Johanniter*, Neue Folge, Göttingen 1984, doc. 27, pp. 237–239. According to the *Chronique d'Ernoul and de Bernard le Trésorier*, ed. L. de Mas Latrie, Paris 1871, p. 52, Baldwin IV at this time opposed the Templars' plan to build a castle at Jacob's Ford while a truce existed; but he later gave them his support. It has also been questioned whether Saladin then had a truce with the king of Jerusalem: B. Hamilton, *The Leper King and his Heirs: Baldwin IV and the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem*, Cambridge 2000, p. 142, note 61; and J. Prawer, *Histoire du royaume latin de Jérusalem*,

to act independently is also implied by the twelfth-century Templar statute which states that the master should consult his convent when making truces in districts under the order's control.²⁹

In the thirteenth century there are numerous references in both documentary and narrative sources to truces between Templars or Hospitallers and neighbouring Muslim powers in the East, and to the exaction of tribute by them, especially in more northern areas.³⁰ Willbrand of Oldenburg, who went on a pilgrimage in 1212, reported that the Hospitallers received tribute from Aleppo and the Assassins, and Bar Hebraeus noted that in 1221 they lost their tribute from Barin.³¹ A Muslim source alludes to payments by the Assassins in 1227, as do the annals of Dunstable in 1231.³² In the record of a dispute between Hospitallers and Templars in 1233 it was noted that the former had a truce with the Sultan of Aleppo, and *L'histoire de Eracles* mentions a campaign in the same year to enforce the payment of the tribute owed to the Hospitallers of Crac by the ruler of Haman.³³ Matthew Paris writes of the expiry of a truce between the Templars and Aleppo in 1237, and the tribute paid by the Assassins to the Templars and Hospitallers in the middle of the century was noted by Joinville.³⁴ Further examples could easily be given, although there is a lack of evidence relating to the Teutonic order in this context.

For the later thirteenth century there are also several surviving texts of truces: these relate to agreements made by the master of the Hospital with the Sultan Baybars in 1267 and 1271 and between the Templar master and Qalawun in

2 vols, Paris 1969–1970, here vol. 1, p. 555, note 20, questions whether at that time the building of a frontier castle would have been considered a breach of a truce. William of Tyre implies that the initiative for the construction of the castle came from the king: *Chronicon* (as n. 24), XXI, 25, 29, pp. 997, 1003.

²⁹ *La règle du Temple*, ed. H. de Curzon, Paris 1886, p. 79, art. 85.

³⁰ Some aspects of Hospitaller relationships with Muslim powers in the north are discussed by B. Major, *Al-Malik Al-Mujahid, Ruler of Homs and the Hospitallers (The Evidence in the Chronicle of Ibn Wasil)*, in: *The Crusades and the Military Orders. Expanding the Frontiers of Medieval Latin Christianity*, ed. Z. Hunyadi, J. Laszlovsy, Budapest 2001, pp. 61–75. M. S. Omran, *Truces between Moslems and Crusaders (1174–1217 A.D.)*, in: *Autour de la première croisade*, ed. M. Balard, Paris 1996, pp. 423–441, makes only passing reference to military orders.

³¹ Willbrand of Oldenburg, *Peregrinatio*, I, 11, in: *Peregrinatores medii aevi quatuor*, ed. J. C. M. Laurent, Leipzig 1873, p. 170; *The Chronography of Gregory Abû'l Faraj*, trans. E. A. W. Budge, Oxford 1932, p. 379.

³² *Annales de Dunstaplia*, in: *Annales monastici*, ed. H. R. Luard, 5 vols (Rolls Series 36), London 1864–1869, here vol. 3, p. 128.

³³ CGH II, doc. 2058, pp. 455–457; *L'estoire de Eracles empereur et la conquête de la terre d'outremer*, XXXIII, 38–39, in: *Recueil des historiens des croisades. Historiens occidentaux* (henceforth: RHC Hist. Occ.), 5 vols, Paris 1844–1895, here vol. 2, pp. 403–405.

³⁴ Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, ed. H. R. Luard, 7 vols (Rolls Series 57), London 1872–1883, here vol. 3, p. 404; Joinville, *Vie de Saint Louis*, ed. J. Monfrin, Paris 1995, cap. 453, p. 222.

1282.³⁵ These truces, like those made by other Franks in the Holy Land, went beyond a mere cessation of hostilities. They commonly included provisions about *condominia*, which were territories under joint Muslim and Christian lordship, the revenues of which were shared: in 1271, for example, territory in the district of Margat was established as a *condominium*.³⁶ They also contained clauses about the treatment of fugitives fleeing from the lands of one party to those of the other and about protection for merchants and travellers.

In the thirteenth century the orders did not, of course, always act independently in agreeing truces in the East: when in the early 1240s the Hospitallers were at times favouring peace with Egypt, while the Templars preferred a settlement with Damascus, they were not always acting in isolation;³⁷ nor were they in 1255, when a ten-year truce was agreed.³⁸ Yet when they acted with others, their independence was increasingly acknowledged, even by Muslim rulers. When a truce was agreed in 1272 the Sultan Baybars took an oath not only to the King Hugh but also, separately, to the masters of the military orders;³⁹ and when Qalawun made a further agreement with the Franks in 1283, it was stated that the *bailli* of the kingdom *and* the masters of the orders – including apparently the Teutonic order – should have jurisdiction over those who left Frankish territory with prohibited goods, and that the chattels of Christian merchants dying in Muslim lands should be delivered to both the *bailli* and the masters; the *bailli* and the masters were also to be responsible for guarding wrecked Muslim galleys and for informing the sultan if any other Christian ruler was planning action against him.⁴⁰ The wording of these agreements contrasts strongly with that of treaties made by Span-

³⁵ Translations of the texts are provided in P. M. Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy (1260–1290). Treaties of Baybars and Qalawun with Christian Rulers*, Leiden 1995, pp. 33–41, 49–57, 66–68; on the Hospitaller treaties, see also U. Vermeulen, *Le traité d'armistice entre le sultan Baybars et les Hospitaliers de Hisn al-Akrad et al-Marqab (4 Ramadan 665 A.H. / 29 mai 1267)*, *Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica* 19 (1988), pp. 189–195; idem, *Le traité d'armistice relatif à al-Marqab conclu entre Baybars et les Hospitaliers (1 Ramadan 669 / 13 avril 1271)*, *Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica* 22 (1991), pp. 185–193.

³⁶ On *condominia*, see J. Richard, *Un partage de seigneurie entre Francs et Mamelouks: les "Casaux de Sui"*, *Syria* 30 (1953), pp. 72–82; M. A. Köhler, *Allianzen und Verträge zwischen fränkischen und islamischen Herrschern im Vorderen Orient*, Berlin 1991, pp. 418–428.

³⁷ On the situation at this time, see P. Jackson, *The Crusades of 1239–41 and their Aftermath*, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 50 (1987), pp. 32–60.

³⁸ *La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, de 1228 à 1261, dite du manuscrit de Rothelin*, in: RHC Hist. Occ., vol. 2, p. 630.

³⁹ Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy* (as n. 35), p. 71; *Ayyubids, Mamlukes and Crusaders: Selections from the Tarikh al-Duwal wa'l-Muluk of Ibn al-Furat*, trans. U. and M. C. Lyons, 2 vols, Cambridge 1971, here vol. 2, p. 157.

⁴⁰ Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy* (as n. 35), pp. 73–91.

ish kings and Muslim rulers in the late thirteenth century: in these the military orders are usually not even mentioned.⁴¹

The orders in the East not only entered into agreements independently in the thirteenth century: they were also at times prepared to ignore the terms of truces agreed between crusader states and Muslim rulers. It is perhaps not surprising that Frederick II's peace with al-Kamil in 1229 was opposed.⁴² But breaches of truces by military orders were not altogether unusual. In the early 1260s, for example, the orders were said to have contravened agreements made with Baybars in several ways: the Hospitallers had built fortifications at Arsuf; the orders had not sworn the oaths which had been required of them; they had failed to release their Muslim slaves in an arranged exchange of prisoners; and in January 1264 they launched a raid, capturing some 300 prisoners, during a period of truce.⁴³

Little could be done in the crusader states to prevent the orders acting as they wished. In 1233 the patriarch of Antioch did rule that the Templars should observe the truce which the Hospitallers had with the Sultan of Aleppo with regard to Gibelet, and that the Hospitallers should observe any similar truce in that district made by the Templars; but this was part of an arbitration requested by the masters of the two orders.⁴⁴ When he was in Cyprus in 1248, Louis IX ordered the Templar master not to negotiate with the Muslims without the French king's permission.⁴⁵ Yet in 1252 the Templar marshal was sent by the master to treat with the Sultan of Damascus. In consequence Louis did banish the marshal from the kingdom of Jerusalem.⁴⁶ Yet clearly the French king's earlier decree had not been observed; and Louis did not remain long in the East.

⁴¹ *Los documentos árabes diplomáticos del Archivo de la Corona de Aragón*, ed. M. A. Alarcón, R. G. de Linares, Madrid 1940, docs 1, 116, 145, 155, pp. 1–3, 247–253, 335–344, 399–400.

⁴² According to the *Chronique d'Ernoul* (as n. 28), p. 462, Gregory IX had instructed the orders not to collaborate with the excommunicate emperor.

⁴³ *Ayyubids, Mamlukes and Crusaders* (as n. 39), vol. 2, pp. 54–55, 66; *Estoire de Eracles* (as n. 33), XXXIV, 4, in: RHC Hist. Occ., vol. 2, p. 447; *Les Gestes des Chiprois*, ed. G. Raynaud, Paris 1887, cap. 318, p. 167; Makrizi, *Histoire des sultans mamlouks*, trans. F. Quatremère, 2 vols, Paris 1837–1845, here vol. 1, part 1, p. 195; *Annales de Terre Sainte*, Archives de l'Orient latin 2 (1884), 2, p. 451; P. Thorau, *The Lion of Egypt. Sultan Baybars I and the Near East in the Thirteenth Century*, London 1987, p. 149; Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy* (as n. 35), p. 13.

⁴⁴ CGH II, doc. 2058, pp. 455–457. When the Temple, Hospital and Teutonic order drew up procedures for settling disputes in 1258, no reference was made to truces: *ibid.*, doc. 2902, pp. 859–863; *Tabulae ordinis Theutonici*, ed. E. Strelhke, Berlin 1869, doc. 116, pp. 98–103.

⁴⁵ Guillaume de Nangis, *Vita Sancti Ludovici*, in: *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*, ed. M. Bouquet, 24 vols, Paris 1869–1904, here vol. 20, pp. 366–369; *Chroniques de Saint-Denis*, in: *ibid.*, vol. 21, p. 114; John of Columna, *Mare historicum*, in: *ibid.*, vol. 23, p. 119.

⁴⁶ Joinville, *Vie de Saint Louis* (as n. 34), caps 511–514, pp. 252–254.

During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries varying opinions were expressed about the orders' actions with regard to truces with Muslims. As would be expected, rulers, such as Frederick II, whose wishes were ignored by the orders, at times complained: he appealed to the pope.⁴⁷ Yet during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the papacy itself did not adopt a consistent stance. In 1193, following a petition from Alfonso II of Aragon, who was then planning action against the Muslims in Spain, Celestine III ordered the military orders to fight against the infidel, notwithstanding any truces between Christian rulers and Muslims.⁴⁸ Similarly in 1220, Honorius III instructed Spanish rulers not to prevent Calatrava from responding to Muslim attacks, and five years later he acceded to a petition from the Castilian noble Alfonso Téllez by telling the orders to assist the noble in the defence of the castle of Albocácer, even if Spanish kings had truces with the Muslims.⁴⁹ On the other hand, when Innocent III had received requests that Spanish military orders should be allowed to transfer their activities to other fronts during truces, the pope had not condemned their observance of truces,⁵⁰ and 1231 Gregory IX, on the receipt of Frederick II's appeal, forbade the Templars in the Holy Land to break the truce which the Emperor had agreed,⁵¹ while in 1264, on hearing reports from the Holy Land, Urban IV told prelates, nobles and the military orders in the East not to enter into separate truces with Muslims, because these were harmful to the Christian cause; but he was not opposing truces altogether.⁵² These diverse papal rulings are to be explained in part by differing attitudes adopted by individual popes: Innocent III was in general more ready to tolerate – and even to encourage – truces with Muslims in the Iberian peninsula than his predecessor Celestine III had been. But it should also be remembered that in the matter of truces, as in many others, the papacy was not usually taking the initia-

⁴⁷ *Epistolae saeculi XIII e regestis pontificum romanorum selectae*, ed. C. Rodenburg, 3 vols, Berlin 1883–1894, here vol. 1, doc. 427, pp. 345–346.

⁴⁸ P. Kehr, *Papsturkunden in Spanien. II. Navarra und Aragon* (Abhandlungen der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Phil.-hist. Klasse, Neue Folge 22), Berlin 1928, docs 200–201, pp. 554–557.

⁴⁹ Mansilla, *Documentación pontificia de Honorio III* (as n. 14), docs 340, 569, pp. 251, 421–422.

⁵⁰ Mansilla, *Documentación pontificia hasta Inocencio III* (as n. 12), docs 321, 342, pp. 351, 366–367.

⁵¹ *Epistolae saeculi XIII* (as n. 47), vol. 1, doc. 427, pp. 345–346.

⁵² *Les registres d'Urban IV*, ed. J. Guiraud, 5 vols, Paris 1892–1958, here vol. 1, doc. 867, pp. 419–420. H. Nicholson, *Templars, Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights. Images of the Military Orders, 1128–1291*, Leicester 1993, p. 16, argues that Gregory IX in 1238 and Nicholas III forty years later urged the orders not to make truces; but the documents in question do not make any direct references to truces: *Les registres de Grégoire IX*, ed. L. Auvray, 4 vols, Paris 1896–1955, here vol. 2, doc. 4129, p. 912; *Les registres de Nicolas III*, ed. J. Gay, Paris 1898–1938, doc. 167, p. 51.

tive, but responding to petitions which had varying objectives and which had been prompted by varying circumstances: papal decisions were inevitably influenced by such requests, especially as popes were often not fully aware of the background to petitions: this situation could lead to a lack of consistency in papal responses.

The orders were criticized by others both for breaking peaces and for making them. Opposition to the breach of agreements is exemplified by comments made by the chronicler Matthew Paris. He was not consistently hostile to the military orders, but in the *Chronica majora* he put into the mouth of the Sultan of Egypt the claim that the Templars had shamelessly (*procaciter*) breached the agreement made between Richard of Cornwall and Egypt, while in the *Flores historiarum*, after repeating this assertion, he claimed that their action had led to the disaster at La Forbie in 1244.⁵³ In some instances, comments of this kind may have been prompted by personal animosities, but there was also concern that unity should be maintained among Christians in the East. Others, especially in the West, were opposed to making any peace with Muslims and looked askance at what was seen as undue familiarity with the infidel. At the end of the twelfth century Innocent III informed the patriarch of Jerusalem and the masters of the Temple and Hospital that the dispatch of aid to the East would have to be delayed because the enthusiasm of some westerners had been dampened by reports of truces with Muslims.⁵⁴ Those who expressed opposition to truces included brothers of the orders themselves when they first arrived in the East after being recruited in the West. The last Templar master, James of Molay, stated during the Templar trial that he and other young knights, 'eager for battle, as is the way with young knights wanting to experience deeds of arms', were critical of the master William of Beaujeu because the latter maintained good relations with Baybars during the truce arranged by the English prince Edward.⁵⁵ In time, however, they realized that the master could not act differently. As Templars in the East were often new recruits who served for only a limited time in the crusader states,⁵⁶ James of Molay's stance was probably

⁵³ Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora* (as n. 34), vol. 4, p. 525; *Flores historiarum*, ed. H. R. Luard, 3 vols (Rolls Series 95), London 1890, here vol. 2, pp. 264, 272. On Matthew Paris's attitude towards the Templars, see H. Nicholson, *Steamy Syrian Scandals. Matthew Paris on the Templars and Hospitallers*, *Medieval History* 2 (1992), 2, pp. 68–85; S. Menache, *Rewriting the History of the Templars according to Matthew Paris*, in: *Cross Cultural Convergences in the Crusader Period. Essays presented to Aryeh Grabois on his Sixty-Fifth Birthday*, ed. M. Goodich, S. Menache, S. Schein, New York 1995, pp. 183–213.

⁵⁴ *Patrologia Latina*, ed. J. P. Migne, 221 vols, Paris 1844–1864, here vol. 214, cols 737–738.

⁵⁵ J. Michelet, *Procès des Templiers*, 2 vols, Paris 1841–1851, here vol. 1, pp. 44–45.

⁵⁶ A. J. Forey, *Towards a Profile of the Templars in the Early Fourteenth Century*, in: *The Military Orders*, vol. 1: *Fighting for the Faith and Caring for the Sick*, ed. M. Barber, Aldershot 1994, pp. 200–201.

fairly common among brothers arriving from the West. But criticism of truces was sometimes voiced for other purposes, unconnected with the situation in the East. During the Templar trial the theme was taken up by Philip IV's spokesman William of Plaisians, who in May 1308 sought to condemn the Templars by saying that they had often made secret agreements with the sultan; but this was, of course, merely a subsidiary point in the French case against the Templars.⁵⁷

During the Templar trial the subject of truces was also raised in a different way, as it was suggested that the alleged abuses at Templar admission ceremonies resulted from frequent contacts with Muslims. The Templar Hugh of Narsac told papal commissioners in Paris that errors had been introduced in the East, 'where they [the Templars] had frequent dealings with the Saracens, and brother William of Beaujeu, at one time master of the order, and brother Matthew Sauvage, knight, were on very friendly terms with the sultan and the Saracens.'⁵⁸ William of Beaujeu had agreed the truce in 1282, and Matthew Sauvage had been involved in various negotiations with the Muslims in the second half of the thirteenth century.⁵⁹ There is, of course, no reason to accept Hugh's explanation or Templar guilt, but it was a comment which might understandably be made by a brother who had admitted abuses and who was seeking to account for them.

These comments, apart from some papal statements, not surprisingly relate to the situation in the East, where the orders enjoyed more independence. Letters sent to popes from Spain do indicate discontent, but that was with royal policy rather than the actions of the military orders.

⁵⁷ G. Lizerand, *Le dossier de l'affaire des Templiers*, Paris 1964, p. 122; H. Finke, *Papsttum und Untergang des Templerordens*, 2 vols, Münster 1907, here vol. 2, doc. 87, p. 139.

⁵⁸ Michelet, *Procès* (as n. 55), vol. 2, p. 209.

⁵⁹ J. Burgtorf, *The Central Convent of Hospitallers and Templars. History, Organization and Personnel (1099/1120–1310)*, Leiden 2008, pp. 593–594.