TY - JOUR
AU - Wójtowicz, Anna
AU - Wójtowicz, Krzysztof
PY - 2024/05/04
Y2 - 2024/08/12
TI - A Misleading Triviality Argument in The Theory of Conditionals
JF - Logic and Logical Philosophy
JA - LLP
VL -
IS -
SE - Articles
DO - 10.12775/LLP.2024.015
UR - https://apcz.umk.pl/LLP/article/view/43755
SP - 1-32
AB - <p>PCCP is the much discussed claim that the probability of a conditional A → B is conditional probability. Triviality results purport to show that PCCP – as a general claim – is false. A particularly interesting proof has been presented in (Hájek, 2011), who shows that – even if a probability distribution P initially satisfied PCCP – a rational update can produce a non-PCCP probability distribution.</p><p>We argue that the notion of rational update in this argumentation is construed in much too broad a way. In order to make the argumentation precise, we discuss the general rules for modeling conditionals in probability spaces and present formalized version(s) of PCCP and of minimal assumptions concerning the appropriate spaces. Using the introduced apparatus we give a detailed analysis of Hájek’s (2011) triviality proof and show that it is based on an application of revision rules which allow one to construct probability distributions violating not only PCCP, but also fundamental properties of conditionals.</p><p>This means that they do not really provide arguments against PCCP, properly formalized. We also discuss a Dutch Book argument which shows that the updated belief system is not coherent. This gives an additional, strong argument against accepting the update rules. We also discuss the Converse Dutch Book theorem and argue, that even if the produced probability measure seems to violate it, it cannot serve as the counterexample, as it is not an appropriate model for conditionals. Ultimately, we show that important arguments against PCCP fail.</p>
ER -