TY - JOUR AU - Paśniczek, Jacek PY - 2003/01/01 Y2 - 2024/03/28 TI - Ways of reference to Meinongian objects. Ontological commitments of Meinongian theories JF - Logic and Logical Philosophy JA - LLP VL - 0 IS - 2 SE - Articles DO - 10.12775/LLP.1994.005 UR - https://apcz.umk.pl/LLP/article/view/LLP.1994.005 SP - 69-86 AB - <p>A. Meinong’s views are usually associated with an highly inflated ontology including various kinds of nonexistent objects, incomplete and impossible ones among others. Around the turn of the century B. Russell strongly criticised this ontology accusing it of inconsistency. And perhaps because of this criticism Meinong’s views have been forgotten for a long time. Only recently some philosophers have created theories of objects which are formalisations of Meinong’s ontology or which are directly inspired by the ontology 1 . However there still remains a need to discuss the problem of ways of reference to Meinongian objects regarding their specific structure of predication, and the interrelated problem of ontological commitment of those theories.</p>Meinong’s ontological theory seems to be not so bizzare if we interpret it as a theory of possible intentional objects, i.e. possible objects of consciousness. And this interpretation perfectly agrees with phenomenological tradition from Brentano to Husserl and with the contemporary philosophy of mind. Needless to say reference is a special form of intentional relation so semantical investigations into these objects are of great relevance for general theory of intentionality. ER -