TY - JOUR AU - Botting, David PY - 2017/05/01 Y2 - 2024/03/29 TI - The Cumulative Force of Analogies JF - Logic and Logical Philosophy JA - LLP VL - 27 IS - 1 SE - Articles DO - 10.12775/LLP.2017.011 UR - https://apcz.umk.pl/LLP/article/view/LLP.2017.011 SP - 105-141 AB - <p>In this paper I will argue that most objections to deductive analyses of a priori analogies are incorrect, often involve basic misinterpretations of what the deductive reconstruction of those arguments are saying, and sometimes also betray a confusion about what part of the reasoning corresponds to the analogical inference. In particular, I will be focusing on a raft of objections made by Juthe in [2015] and subject his alternative views to criticism.</p><p>I will then argue that Juthe does implicitly have a good argument against deductivism: adding further analogues seems to have a cumulative force that they would not have on a deductivist analysis. This is so not only in ordinary analogical arguments but, perhaps surprisingly, with a priori analogical arguments. I will then argue that this does not favor a sui generis view of the analogical argument over inductivist views, and attempt to show that a confirmation-theoretic approach to analogical inference makes the best sense of our intuitions about the strength of analogical arguments.</p> ER -