@article{Makaś_2016, title={A Certain Version of Preservationism}, volume={26}, url={https://apcz.umk.pl/LLP/article/view/LLP.2016.027}, DOI={10.12775/LLP.2016.027}, abstractNote={<p>A certain approach to paraconsistency was initiated by works of R. Jennings and P. Schotch. In their “Inference and necessity” [4] they proposed a notion of a level of inconsistency (incoherence) of a given set of premises. This level is a measure that assigns to a given set of premises X, the least number of elements of covers of X that consist of consistent subsets of X. The idea of the level of inconsistency allows to formulate a paraconsistent inference relation called by the authors forcing, while the obtained approach preservationism. Similarly as classical inference relation is truth-preserving, the obtained inference relation is preserving the level of inconsistency.</p><p>We will discuss some examples of inferences that are valid in the sense of Jennings-Schotch inference relation and rise some questions on them. Based on that we formulate an inference relation as an answer to the mentioned doubts.</p><p>As regards forcing inference relation, the set of premises needed to derive a given conclusion can vary when changing covers from one to another. Our proposal is to stipulate to have some common set of relevant premises.</p>}, number={1}, journal={Logic and Logical Philosophy}, author={Makaś, Michał}, year={2016}, month={Aug.}, pages={63–77} }