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## A FLEXIBLE RESPONSE OF NATO TO POTENTIAL THREATS OCCURRING ON THE EASTERN BORDER

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### Abstract

From the beginning of The North Atlantic Pact has been based on the concept of collective defense. This assumption takes on meaning after 2014. The annexation of Crimea to Russia and the hybrid war in Ukraine are confirming the Increase of military threat to the NATO border states, Including Poland. None of the eastern flank countries it would be able to oppose Russian aggression themselves. The Decisions are Strengthen the eastern flank are going to Effectively deterring threats from military escalation. This action take place thanks to the presence of international contingents.

**Key words:** Defense; Security; NATO; eastern border.

### INTRODUCTION

Projects to ensure the safety are implemented at the level of individual countries and in the framework of direct cooperation of States and organizations for international

stability. One such organization is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), based on the concept of collective defense of the Member States. The Alliance was established in the so-called. the Cold War, the political confrontation between the Western countries and the countries of the communist bloc. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact have contributed to the emergence of the opinion that the formula is outdated and the NATO alliance should be terminated. But he quickly found the existence of many other threats to global security, including the revival of the imperialist and military aspirations of Russia. They are highlighted by the annexation of the Crimea and hybrid war in the eastern part of Ukraine. Thus far edge states belonging to NATO appeared real threat of confrontation. Therefore, the strategy of NATO has been modified, inter alia, by adopting the concept of defense of the eastern flank of NATO as an effective method of deterring potential aggression.

The aim of the study was to analyze the concept of the eastern flank of NATO defense adopted by the alliance in 2016 during the summit in Warsaw as a way to effectively deter potential enemy. Such analysis may be useful to political scientists, politicians and people interested in the military, in order to objectively justify the position for or against the full participation of the Polish projects carried out by the NATO alliance.

## **COOPERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF NATO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE**

The North Atlantic Treaty for the implementation of tasks recognizes the need to maintain an appropriate level of nuclear and conventional forces, ensuring the ability to conduct military operations, to maintain conventional forces capable of mobility and readiness to move, conducting exercises and exchange of information. Today, as a key capability is indicated to have effective rapid reaction forces - troops that can be prepared in a short time to move to the area of operation depending on where the contingent will be able to carry out the operation for 60 days (a time rated as optimal for possible mobilization of other forces or pre-stabilize the situation ). This attitude is a result of both changes in the perception of threats and the conclusion drawn after engagement in the Balkans. It also means adopting the concept of preparing a different type of troops - the international forces, capable of running away from the country, carry out complex operations with a capacity other than territorial defense. Created in 2002 Response Force (NRF NATO Response Force) is still subject to modification, but the premise is the composition of the force of the body (from 13 to 20 thousand soldiers), taking into account the units of all kinds of armed forces, are able to act in a way connected to the allies command, which can move into action after a few days of the announcement of the order [1,2].

## **EXTERNAL RISKS FOR SAFETY**

Specialists most significant security threats in the international environment, entailing the need for defense capabilities, include international terrorism, organized crime, illegal arms trafficking, failure to comply with obligations in the field of arms control and political risks, eg. The violation of international obligations, resolve disputes inside or outside of the use of military force [3,4]. Specific acts or events can cause a crisis in the wider area, including a dozen or so countries. Security threats and are sometimes also divided into different categories, relating to the areas of human activity. In addition to the risks of political, economic or environmental distinguished military threats occurring when the state is unprepared for defense, and the aggressor is breaking international law. Defining a military

threat boils down to indicate the possibility of use by the opposing party and the forces of nature to achieve military objectives - weaken the territorial integrity, sovereignty of the state received under attack [5].

## **NATO MILITARY SECURITY AND POLISH SITUATION**

The process of accession to the alliance needed to take action to transform the Polish Armed Forces, including the transition to a new system of communication and new ways of command, organizational change, ensure civilian control over the army and the subordination of the General Staff of the Minister of Defense, to establish parliamentary control over the army. Also associated with the allocation of commitments on defense alliance of the measures required standards [6].

All Polish strategic documents, as the White Paper on Security and National Security Strategy, exchanging three pillars of Polish military security: NATO membership, membership in the European Union and the alliance with the United States. The Defense Concept RP determined membership in NATO as a foundation for thinking about collective defense, pointing to the need for reaching agreements with allies in building a common catalog of threats and strengthening of allied solidarity. In terms of membership in NATO guarantee aid stems from Article 5 of the Washington Treaty: provision of collective defense of the affected Member State is both the promise of aid and obligation to other allied countries.

They are fundamental to consolidation efforts of the alliance, including contributing to projects and initiatives implemented by the pact. This is an important demonstration that as an ally of the country is not only a consumer but also a producer of security. Every time participation in the activities of the alliance, fulfillment strengthen the position of Polish as a reliable ally.

Poland as a country edge appreciates the original concept of the establishment of NATO as a collective defense organization. Pending confirmation of such a concept in the form of not only political, but as updating contingency plans and even distribution of alliance defense infrastructure in all Member States. It also means support in this, not to tolerate bullying smaller neighbors by Russia, which in essence is a tool to obtain submission [7].

## **PLANS FOR GAIN OF THE EASTERN FLANKS**

Multinational divisional headquarters established in Poland, based on the command stationed in Elblag 16th Mechanized Division, Location forces established as follows:

As stationed groups sent within ERI selected Zagan, Swietoszow, Skwierzyna, Boleslawiec and Powidz. Yes Armored Brigade was deployed Battle Group. Agreement also included conducting exercises in the field of common tasks, exchange of experiences, investments related to the modernization and construction of infrastructure, which will support the allied troops and equipment [8].

Similar measures were taken in other countries, eg. In Lithuania. At the end of January 2017, the German battalion battle group began the process of dislocation in Lithuania. Its composition is provided to the target of about 1 200 soldiers from six countries: Germany (the leading role, 400 - 600 soldiers), France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Croatia and Luxembourg. The choice of the Germans as a state framework resulted from long-term cooperation of the Bundeswehr and the Lithuanian Armed Forces (since 1994 in Munich and Hamburg are trained officers from Lithuania), both selected for the first shift troops from

troops stationed in Bavaria, many times before exercising with the Americans. Simultaneously Germany decided to continue April 28 2017 years lasting from 31 August 2016 years on duty in the mission of NATO Baltic Air Policing in the form of a 4 Eurofighter Typhoon fighter aircraft and 85 personnel from the Tactical Squadron 71 "Richthofen", stationed at the base in Estonia. Other countries have declared send contingents from 50 to 200 soldiers. BBG made up of 4 companies combat teams and logistical support and medical awarded as a base stationed in Rukla circuit Kaunas, which is located about 150km from the Kaliningrad region. Equipment battalion covered, among others, the Norwegian Leopard 2A4 tanks, infantry combat vehicles CV90, German Leopards 2A6, self-propelled haubicoarmaty PzH2000 and armored vehicles Boxer and Marder [9,10]. Tactical Squadron "Richthofen", stationed at the base in Estonia. Other countries have declared send contingents from 50 to 200 soldiers. BBG made up of 4 companies combat teams and logistical support and medical awarded as a base stationed in Rukla circuit Kaunas, which is located about 150km from the Kaliningrad region. Equipment battalion covered, among others, the Norwegian Leopard 2A4 tanks, infantry combat vehicles CV90, German Leopards 2A6, self-propelled haubicoarmaty PzH2000 and armored vehicles Boxer and Marder [9,10]. Tactical Squadron "Richthofen", stationed at the base in Estonia. Other countries have declared send contingents from 50 to 200 soldiers. BBG made up of 4 companies combat teams and logistical support and medical awarded as a base stationed in Rukla circuit Kaunas, which is located about 150km from the Kaliningrad region. Equipment battalion covered, among others, the Norwegian Leopard 2A4 tanks, infantry combat vehicles CV90, German Leopards 2A6, self-propelled haubicoarmaty PzH2000 and armored vehicles Boxer and Marder [9,10]. which is located about 150km from the Kaliningrad region. Equipment battalion covered, among others, the Norwegian Leopard 2A4 tanks, infantry combat vehicles CV90, German Leopards 2A6, self-propelled haubicoarmaty PzH2000 and armored vehicles Boxer and Marder [9,10]. which is located about 150km from the Kaliningrad region. Equipment battalion covered, among others, the Norwegian Leopard 2A4 tanks, infantry combat vehicles CV90, German Leopards 2A6, self-propelled haubicoarmaty PzH2000 and armored vehicles Boxer and Marder [9,10].

Russian reactions to the presence of NATO bases in Central - Eastern Europe are in line with the aforementioned, the security dilemma and are arranged in a series of official statements. Russia already, eg. In the national security strategy of 2009 and the military doctrine of 2014 indicates the North Atlantic Alliance as one of the external security threats. According to this position the movement of allied forces interpreted the Russian side as increasing the risk of conflict [11-15].

## CONCLUSIONS

Solutions suggested at the top of the Welsh, and clearly articulated during the NATO summit in Warsaw means that the alliance goes back to the roots - the original concept of the existence of a military pact declaring collective defense in order to deter potential enemy. The course of history made the opponent is the same as a few decades ago, but significantly changed international alliances, including Polish place in the global balance of power.

The concept of defense eastern flank as supporting Member boundary by rotating the presence of medium- and long-term new forces is a practical proof of the increasing willingness of NATO to respond quickly. Here you can add that kind of alliance is forced to generate signals about their readiness. The level of response to threats associated with the assessment of the credibility of NATO as a significant political force and military. No reaction would mean inability to act, and this unleash likely escalation in the activity of the

opposing party, which would not have to reckon with serious resistance. In 2017 years there has been a displacement of the first quota changes, declarations of maintaining their new location are still valid (not specified deadlines of the task) and the territories of the boundary organize joint activities undertaken by the multinational force with branches of the state - the host. The effectiveness of deterrence is suitable to low escalating threats, and in case of serious crisis, it is necessary to have more serious forces, including self-defense capabilities. Future prospects depend on the consistency and coherence of commitment of Member States.

Until now, the concept of strengthening the eastern flank is realized in practice for about a year and half. During this time the event was recorded in the form of such incidents. Violations of the airspace of the Baltic countries, Scandinavia sea space and large-scale maneuvers near the borders of the Russian trained allied countries. The effectiveness of deterrence strategy will determine the prospect of next year and the following events in them - hopefully not related to the so-called excess. the red line.

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