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Elephant in the Room: How to Assess the Vote Weighting System in the Council of the EU*

Pomijany problem: jak dokonać oceny systemu ważenia głosów w Radzie Unii Europejskiej

• Abstract •

The article emphasises the complementarity of research based on voting power theory with the analysis of the structure of blocking. Combining both methods enables a more comprehensive assessment of the vote weighting system in the Council of the EU, in particular the impact of changes in the voting system on the position of individual Member States and the power balance in this institution. I make two contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, the study develops a non-random voting model, dedicated to QMV in the Council, which abandons the assumption that each coalition of players is equally likely and takes into account the role of the European Commission as an agenda-setter. This not only allows us to exclude many coalitions that are only theoretically possible, but also to analyse the blocking structure from the perspective of different states or coalitions in the Council. Secondly, it

• Abstrakt •

W artykule podkreślono komplementarność badań opartych na teorii siły głosu i przeprowadzonych z wykorzystaniem analizy struktury blokowania, co umożliwia pełniejszą ocenę systemu ważenia głosów w Radzie Unii Europejskiej, a w szczególności wpływu zmian w systemie głosowania na pozycję poszczególnych państw członkowskich w tej instytucji. Prezentowane badania wnoszą do istniejącej literatury dwa istotne wkłady. Po pierwsze, opracowany został nielosowy model głosowania, dedykowany głosowaniu w Radzie większością kwalifikowaną, w którym porzucono założenie, że każda koalicja graczy jest równie prawdopodobna, oraz uwzględniono rolę Komisji Europejskiej jako podmiotu ustalającego agendę. Pozwala to nie tylko wykluczyć z analizy wiele jedynie teoretycznie możliwych koalicji, ale także analizować strukturę blokowania w Radzie z perspektywy różnych państw lub koalicji. Po drugie,

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shows that the application of blocking structure analysis provides novel insights into the Council's voting system. Unlike the *a priori* voting power approach, such analysis does not focus on distribution of winning power in the Council, but on the Member States' ability to build minimal blocking coalitions. Hence, it complements the application of mathematical indices of voting power in the assessment of the voting system in this institution.

Keywords: voting power; Council of the European Union; EU institutional reform; QMV; weighted voting; power indices; blocking coalition

pokazuje, że zastosowanie analizy struktury blokowania zapewnia nowy wgląd w system ważenia głosów w tej instytucji. W przeciwieństwie do podejścia opartego na sile głosu *a priori* analiza struktury blokowania nie skupia się na jej dystrybucji pomiędzy członków Rady, ale na zdolności państw UE do budowania koalicji minimalnie blokujących. Tym samym jest komplementarna do podejścia opartego na wykorzystaniu matematycznych indeksów siły głosu w ocenie systemu głosowania w tej instytucji.

Słowa kluczowe: siła głosu; Rada Unii Europejskiej; reforma instytucjonalna UE; większość kwalifikowana; waga głosu; indeksy siły; koalicja blokująca

Introduction

Enlargement of the European Union (EU) to include the Western Balkan countries or Ukraine will pose a political and institutional challenge, and therefore seems impossible without another institutional reform. However, changes regarding this issue have always been the subject of difficult negotiations between Member States during the intergovernmental conference convened to reach treaty reform (e.g., Laursen, 2008; Phinnemore, 2013; Trzaskowski, 2005). Finding agreement on the Council's formal decision rules turned out to be a particularly difficult task (see, e.g., Cameron, 2004; Moberg, 2014). In the past, the conflict over qualified majority voting (QMV) could have caused a significant delay in the work on the Treaty of Nice and almost derailed negotiations leading up to the Lisbon Treaty. Moreover, the growing politicization of European integration in the post-Lisbon era is likely to further expand the role of bargaining in the decision-making process in the Council (Bressanelli, Koop, & Reh, 2020; Hobolt & Rodon, 2020; Pircher & Farjam, 2021; Roos, 2019). As a consequence, it will probably increase the importance of the ability of Member States to form winning and blocking coalitions in order to influence negotiations in this institution.

In the fall of 2023, the debate on EU reform and its further enlargement intensified. The changes to the Council's voting system will almost certainly form part of this debate (e.g., Report of the Franco-German Working Group..., 2023). A question thus arises: how to assess the impact of changes in the voting system on the position of individual Member States and the power balance in this institution?

The analytical tool used for evaluating different votes distributions in the Council are mathematical indices of *a priori* voting power (Felsenthal & Machover, 1998), constituting part of the theory of cooperative games, specifically n-person weighted voting games (Owen, 2013). They are primarily used to indicate an actor's chance of being a pivotal player in the decision-making process in a given voting body, understood as having the ability to change the outcome of a vote. Most classic indices of *a priori* voting power focus on the distribution of winning power, defined as the probability that a player will become a critical member of a winning coalition, thus ignoring the problem of blocking power. However, as Sozański (2014) notes, the distribution of blocking coalitions is key to understanding the history of designing voting systems for the Council of the EU.

The legitimacy of the use of power indices in research on decision-making in the Council is questioned by some scholars (e.g., Albert, 2003, 2004; Garrett & Tsebelis, 1999a, b; Moberg, 2002). In their opinion, serious weakness is the basic assumption of the theory according to which all possible coalitions in the Council are equally likely. Lack of consideration of factors such as, i.a., agenda-setting rights, preferences of negotiating parties and other additional power resources is also criticised. However, no one has proposed a better solution that could be used for the evaluation and comparison of alternative vote weighting systems for the Council. The concept of *a posteriori* power is sometimes seen as an enhancement of *a priori* voting theory. The *a posteriori* power indices (see, e.g., Álvarez-Mozos, Hellman, & Winter, 2013; Barr & Passarelli, 2009; Grech, 2021; Mercik & Ramsey, 2017; Passarelli & Barr, 2007) take into account players' "ideological positions" and therefore the object of the analysis is "actual power", not the voting rule. Thus these two types of voting power indices simply serve different purposes.

The aim of this paper is to present methodological innovations that facilitate a more accurate assessment of the impact of changes in the voting system in the Council on the Member States' positions and the power balance in this institution. The study makes two important key contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, it develops a non-random voting model, dedicated to QMV in the Council, which abandons the assumption that each coalition of players is equally likely. It allows us to take into account the role of the European Commission (EC) as an agenda-setter and thus exclude some coalitions of players from the analysis. The research found that replacing the classic model with a non-random voting model only slightly affects the value of the voting power of states in the Council, measured using the Normalized Banzhaf Index (NBI) (Banzhaf, 1965) or Preventive Power Index (PPI) (Coleman, 1971), because the model has a small impact on the set of winning coalitions. However, its use results in profound changes in the distribution of voting

power as measured by Coleman's (1971) Power to Initiate Index (PII). Secondly, the study shows that the application of blocking structure analysis provides novel insights into the Council's voting system. Unlike the voting power approach, the analysis does not focus on distribution of winning power in the Council, but on possibility of forming minimal blocking coalitions (MBCs), understood as a collective veto players. It can therefore be a useful complement to the former.

The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The next part of the article discusses the shortcomings of a *a priori* voting power theory in the context of assessing the distribution of votes in the Council. The following section outlines the methodological framework of the paper. Subsequently, the author introduces the new voting model for QMV in the Council. Then, a comparison was made of the *a priori* voting power of the Member States in the Council for the random and non-random voting models. The next section presents the possibility of using the analysis of the structure of blocking as a complement to the application of the voting power index approach to evaluate the voting system in the Council. The last part of the paper presents conclusions drawn from the analysis.

Shortcomings of a *a priori* power theory in the context of evaluating the voting system in the Council

Power indices theory is important in studies on political representation, especially in assessing the fairness and effectiveness of a voting system (Ion, 2023). Mathematical calculations of voting power depend on the adopted statistical (probabilistic) model of voting. The theory of *a priori* voting power “model[s] the voting system as an ‘abstract shell’, without taking into consideration the voters’ preferences, the range of issues over which a decision is taken, or the degree of affinity between the voters” (Lindner, 2008, p. 593). Thus, the voting situation is not a subject of analysis here, but only the voting rule,¹ considered in isolation from all other variables. Hence *a priori* voting power derives from the decision rule itself and cannot be identified with *actual* or *de facto* voting power, which is dependent on a number of other factors, such as actors’ preferences or strategies adopted by them. This influences the scope of possible application of this theory.

¹ The “voting situation” is understood as “a situation in which a set of voters faces decision-making according to the specifications of a voting procedure”, while “voting rule” is defined as a “well-specified procedure for making decisions by the vote of any kind of committee of a certain number of members” (Laruelle & Valenciano, 2005, p. 173).

The random-voting model is most often used to calculate indices of *a priori* voting power. It assumes that casting a vote for or against a randomly selected proposal is for each decision-maker random and equally likely, and they make their decision on how to vote independently of one another. Consequently, the formation of each possible coalition of players for a given voting body is equally probable. Thus, in this classical model it should be assumed that it is equally probable that the EC will submit an initiative that will be opposed during the voting by all the EU states and that it will submit an initiative supported by the entire Council.

Criticism on the use of power indices for measuring Member States' *a priori* voting power in the Council has been two-pronged. Firstly, the usefulness of the adopted voting model has been questioned. Secondly, it is also argued that the results of such analysis have little practical value for decision-makers.

The usefulness of mathematical indices for measuring Member States' voting power in the Council is questioned by some scholars. Garrett and Tsebelis (1999a, b) criticise the power index theory for the unrealistic assumption that different coalitions have equal probabilities, and in particular for omitting the preferences of players and an interplay of the institutions. As a result, the analysis considers many coalitions that are unlikely to be formed. It also leads to the overestimation of the voting power of those players who tend to take extreme positions, and to the underestimation of the power of actors whose preferences are situated centrally in the overall distribution of players' preferences. According to Barry (1980a, b), as indices entirely ignore the preferences of actors in voting games, they measure not the *power* of players but their *luck*, understood as a chance for a situation in which a member of a voting body will find themselves in a situation where their preferences will be to a large extent convergent with the preferences of other decision-makers. Albert (2003, 2004) represents a fundamental stance, arguing that the theory of power indices "should not [...] be considered as part of political science" because it is not a positive theory and thus has no cognitive or prospective value. In particular, Albert criticizes the assumption of "simple random voting" and application of the "veil of ignorance" (Rawls, 1971) argument to this theory.

This criticism is at least partly wrong and results from a failure to understand that a completely normative approach, focusing solely on the formal structure of the voting game, may sometimes be useful, depending on the research subject and goal. It should be noted that *a priori* voting power theory was never intended to be used to analyse voting situations or calculate *actual* power (Hosli & Machover, 2004). As List (2003) rightly notes, power indices are a statistical measure that can supplement other (positive or normative) theories. They can justifiably be used in designing formal solutions for establishing decision-making bodies, in particular in the evaluation

and comparison of different voting systems (Czaputowicz & Kleinowski, 2018; Laruelle & Valenciano, 2008; Hosli & Machover, 2004; Shapley & Shubik, 1954; Coleman, 1971). However, in the case of QMV in the Council, the random voting model is a far-reaching simplification which completely overlooks the role of the EC as an agenda-setter. As a consequence, this leads to including in the analysis many coalitions, the creation of which should be considered improbable.

It is noteworthy that, on average, almost two thirds of the text of any EU legislation originates in the agenda-setting phase (Laloux & Delreux, 2021). The process of drafting a legislative proposal by the EC includes external consultations and the preparation of an impact assessment. Moreover, when a qualified majority is required in the Council to adopt an act, the EC often focuses more closely on the positions of large Member States because their stance is crucial for the formation of a blocking minority (Bunse, Magnette, & Nicolaïdis, 2005, pp. 35–37, 44). Thus not taking into account the role of the EC as the agenda-setter in the voting model has a definitely negative impact on model adjustment. Shortcomings of random-voting model indicate the need to develop a new one, dedicated to the QMV in the Council.

However, the creation of a new voting model dedicated to the QMV does not dispel doubts regarding the practical value of results of the analysis based on voting power approach for decision-makers in the Council. Moberg (2007) and Sozański (2010) emphasise that Member States are predominantly interested in maximising their blocking power, understood as the capability to block any acts they oppose and thus they ascribe little importance to winning power, defined as the probability that they become a critical member of a winning coalition. Moreover, the calculation of classical power indices was based on the assumption that all coalitions are equally probable. In the case of the EU, whether with 27 or 28 Member States, this would require analysing tens of millions of theoretically possible winning coalitions. In practice, this makes it impossible for the Council members or EC to make political calculations based on the power indices.

During the work on the project of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and the negotiations of the Lisbon Treaty, the representatives of Member States were particularly concerned about the ability of specific states and coalitions to create MBCs in the Council (Moberg, 2007, 2014). Hence, they were primarily interested in the structure of blocking in a new voting system, which demonstrates how hard it would be to form a blocking minority and thus control the outcome of the decision-making process. To measure this ability in various variants of the voting system, a coefficient known as share of blocking minorities was used. It is computed by dividing voter *i*'s weight by the blocking threshold. Sozański (2010) rightly argues

that this is a very naive way to determine the blocking power of Member States in the Council. This shows the existence of a methodological gap because so far it has not been possible to create a reliable indicator of blocking power. A noteworthy attempt to bridge it was made by Sozański (2010, 2014). However, he himself draws attention to an important shortcoming in his proposal: the coefficient of blocking power he created completely ignores the problem of the size of the minimal blocking coalition, assigning the same value to each such coalition. In turn, Coleman's (1971) Preventive Power Index determines the percentage of winning coalitions in which a given player is a critical member. Hence, it does not measure a blocking power, but rather indicates how much more difficult it will be to build a winning coalition in a given decision-making body in the absence of support from a specific player. The solution to this problem may be the use of the research technique of blocking structure analysis (Kleinowski, 2023) to evaluate the vote weighting system in the Council.

Methods

Computer simulations of voting in the Council were carried out based on the theory of n -person weighted voting games (Felsenthal & Machover, 1998; Owen, 2013). Appendix I presents definitions adopted in this paper. Voting simulations were carried out for the so-called double majority system of weighting votes in the Council. In this system, if decision is made on the initiative of the EC or the High Representative, the qualified majority is at least 55% of the members of the Council representing the participating Member States, the total population of which is at least 65% of the population of these countries and a blocking minority, with 27 Member States participating in the vote, must include at least four Council members (TEU, Art. 16(4); TFEU, Art. 238(2)). Special cases where not all Council members participate in the vote, or the decision is not taken on the initiative of the EC or the High Representative, are extremely rare and therefore have not been included in the further analysis.

The study seeks to verify one research hypothesis and obtain answers to two research questions.

Hypothesis 1: When decisions in the Council are adopted by qualified majority, an EC's legislative initiative will almost never be contested by more than two large countries, and almost always at least 55% of EU states will be ready to support it.

Confirmation of the correctness of the hypothesis will allow us to build a non-random voting model for QMV in the Council. Stances taken by large states often delineate the area of possible agreement in the Council and are crucial for the possibility to form a winning or blocking coalition. Thus the EC cannot completely ignore their position when preparing a legislative proposal (Bunse et al., 2005, pp. 35–37, 44). Moreover, even in the case of strongly divisive legislative proposals, there was hardly any situation where nine or more countries in the Council strove to build a blocking coalition (Thomson, 2011). The verification of the hypothesis will be carried out in two stages. First, with the VoteWatch dataset (Hix, Fratescu, & Hagemann, 2022), the frequency of cases when the Council adopted a decision through QMV if it was contested (by objection or withholding a vote) by three large Member States will be determined. Then, based on the analysis of 105 cases of legislative proposals which were withdrawn by the EC or the work on which was halted, it will be determined whether there were situations when at least 55% of Member States in the Council were not ready to support the Commission's initiatives. All those legislative initiatives were proceeded in the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP), between July 1, 2009, and July 31, 2017 (full list in Appendix II).

Question 1: How does the use of a non-random voting model in the Council affect the value of voting power indices such as NBI, PPI, and PII?

Adopting a different voting model will affect the number of winning and non-winning coalitions that can be created in the Council and, consequently, also the value of voting power indices. However, this impact may vary depending on how the index is constructed. The NBI and PPI have been frequently used in the past to analyse the distribution of voting power in the EU Council (see, e.g., Grech, 2021, p. 239; Gábor, 2020; Kleinowski, 2018).

Question 2: How to apply blocking structure analysis in practice to assess the voting weighting system in the Council?

The analysis of the structure of blocking for a voting game requires determining what number of levels of this structure should be included in the research. The selection should be made taking into account the purpose of the research and the characteristics of the decision-making body. In particular, including too few levels of blocking structure in the analysis may negatively impact the validity of conclusions. The discussed research technique allows also to create more detailed variants of the voting model by making assumptions about the position of some players. Thus it

is necessary to consider which detailed models would be particularly useful in the evaluation of the voting system in the Council.

The research presented uses the analysis of the structure of blocking. It enables, i.e., description of the structure of blocking for a voting body or its particular players, as well as identification of the so-called key players for forming the minimal blocking coalitions (Kleinowski, 2023).

For a voting game, $bm, k(i)$ is the number of MBCs consisting of k members and containing voter i . The *blocking structure* is “the sequence of sequences ($bm, k(i)$: $i = 1, \dots, n$) with k ranging from k_{min} to k_{max} ” (Sozański, 2010, p. 84). To measure the share of a player i in all possible MBCs consisting of k members, the MBCs participation coefficient was used. It is calculated according to the following formula:

$$\beta_k(i) = \frac{bm, k(i)}{bm, k} \cdot 100\%$$

where:

bm, k – the number of MBCs consisting of k members;

$bm, k(i)$ – the number of MBCs consisting of k members and containing voter i .

If the MBCs participation coefficient takes the value $\beta_k(i) = 50\%$, it means that without the participation of player i , the number of blocking coalitions with k members that can be created will be halved.

The analysis of structure of blocking can be used in comparative analysis of different vote weighting systems for a specific voting body. Moreover, by knowing the structure of blocking for a voting system as well as the preferences of at least some of the most important players, it is possible to evaluate – at an early stage of the decision-making process – the possibility that a blocking minority will be formed on a specific issue. Learning a given player’s structure of blocking can form the basis for a qualitative analysis of the player’s capability to build MBCs. After key partners needed by a given player to form a blocking coalition are identified, the convergence between the player’s interests and those of potential coalition members can be assessed for different areas of decision-making.

Simulations of QMV in the Council were carried out using the POWERGEN 5.0 software. It offers the function of calculating the detailed statistics of coalitions for individual players. For a blocking minority, it can also indicate the minimum number of players required for its creation – this is important for the simulation of voting in the Council in accordance with the double majority system.² POWERGEN allows calculating, i.e., the following voting power indices: Normalized

² In case of the double majority system, a blocking minority must include a minimum number

Banzhaf Index, Absolute Banzhaf Index, Preventive Power Index, and Power to Initiate Index. It is distinguished by the ability to conduct simulations for various voting models. In order to carry out a voting simulation in the Council, the data on usually resident population as of January 1, 2022 (Eurostat, 2022) was used.

Non-random voting model

Taking into account the role of the EC as a project initiator in the voting model in the Council requires making assumptions as to the general distribution of the positions of the EU Council members on the EC's legislative proposal. For this reason, the H1 has been verified. It consists of two parts. The first one concerns the questioning of the Commission's proposal by large Member States and the second one concerns the minimum number of states ready to support the EC's initiative.

For the period between July 2009 and February 2022, the VoteWatch dataset does not contain any case of qualified majority voting in which the Council adopted a decision if it was contested (by objection or withholding a vote) by three large Member States. Three large states have been able to easily build a blocking coalition both in the Nice vote weighting system and in the double majority system. The stance of such a coalition simply cannot be ignored in the final negotiation outcome. However, there were numerous cases of the Council adopting decisions despite lack of support of two large states.³ Thus it seems justified to conclude that under QMV rule the initiative tabled by the EC will almost never be contested by more than two large states in the Council.

In H1, an assumption was also made that at least 55% of EU states will be ready to support an initiative prepared by the Commission. When the EC officially presents a legislative initiative, it usually does not have full information about the stances within the entire Council, or even the positions taken by all large Member States.⁴ However, Article 293(2) of the TFEU provides the Commission with the

of Council members representing more than 35% of the population of participating countries, plus one additional member (TFEU, Art. 238(2)).

³ An example here can be the experience from proceeding upon Directive 2018/957 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services. The Council accepted the position of the European Parliament during the first reading of OLP although, e.g., Great Britain abstained from voting while Poland recorded its objection.

⁴ Such situation can result, e.g., from the negotiation tactics adopted by some states; it can also happen when there are internal conflicts within a government, when an issue falls within the

possibility to modify a proposed text at a later stage.⁵ It should use its competences in a constructive way with a view to facilitate the legislative process.

As revealed by the analysis of 105 of ECs legislative proposals proceeded in the OLP between July 1, 2009, and July 31, 2017,⁶ that were withdrawn by the EC or the work on which was stopped, there were only two kinds of rare, specific situation – in which the majority of members of the EU Council was not ready to support the initiative presented by the Commission. The first type involved the Council faulting the EC for infringing the Council's sole competences by using inappropriate legal basis for a specific legislative initiative; during the investigated period, only three such cases were recorded. The second type was the situation when a conflict might arise between some Member States due to politically sensitive issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity. It was observed in four cases, all of which involved the status of Gibraltar. In all of those cases the Council did not adopt a common position, while the objective of Member States was to present a coherent position of the Council on the EC's initiative. No attempts to form a blocking coalitions were made. Thus, based on empirical data, it can be assumed that the EC's legislative initiative will almost always be able to count on the support of at least 55% of Member States in the Council. This means that H1 has been positively verified. Consequently, this allows the creation of a voting model – let us call it a non-random model – dedicated to deciding by a qualified majority in the Council and therefore eliminating from the analysis a large number of coalitions that are considered improbable or that can be formed only in very specific, rare circumstances.

The non-random voting model in the Council is based on an assumption that an EC's initiative will not be contested by more than two large Member States and that at least 55% of EU states will be ready to support it. Thus it rejects the assumption that all coalitions in the Council are equally likely to be formed and postulates that decisions in this institution are made on the basis of a non-random proposal prepared by the EC. Representatives of Member States in the Council can only vote for or against the submitted initiative, because in the case of the requirement to adopt a decision by a qualified majority, abstention counts *de facto* as a vote against the adoption of a legislative proposal.⁷ Hence, every decision involves

competences of federal countries, when it is necessary to obtain a negotiation mandate from the national parliament.

⁵ The Article 293(2) of the TFEU states that: "As long as the Council has not acted, the Commission may alter its proposal at any time during the procedures leading to the adoption of a Union act".

⁶ The oldest of the indicated 108 legislative initiatives was officially proposed by the EC in December 2005.

⁷ In real-life situations, the choice by the government of a Member State of how to show a dissent

the emergence of a coalition of players ready to support an initiative as well as a second one formed by states that refuse to support it. In the non-random voting model, players can cooperate within a coalition. It also allows making assumptions about how individual players vote.

Member States voting power in the Council under the non-random voting model

The adopted voting model determines the number of coalitions possible to form in a given voting body. Table 1 presents the statistics of coalitions in the Council in the case of decisions made by qualified majority, for random and non-random voting models. The voting model proposed in the previous section only slightly affects the number of winning and losing coalitions that are considered possible to form in this institution. However, it significantly affects the number of blocking coalitions. Compared to the random model, the number of all blocking coalitions decreases almost 3.3 times. The difference is even greater in the case of MBCs. After including the assumptions made for the new model, their number decreases over 14.5 times to only 245 346 coalitions. This has implications for the value of voting power indices such as NBI, PPI, and PII, as well as for the structure of blocking.

Table 1. Coalition Statistics in the Council under QMV for Random and Non-random Voting Models

No.	Voting model	Winning coalitions		Blocking coalitions		Losing coalitions	
		All	Minimal	All	Minimal	All	Minimal
1	Random voting	17 732 348	4 357 201	98 753 032	3 586 950	17 732 348	4 357 201
2	Non-random voting	17 731 462	4 357 018	30 117 504	245 346	17 731 462	4 357 018
3	Difference between random and non-random model (1 – 2 = 3)	886	183	68 635 528	3 341 604	886	183

Source: Author’s own calculations.

(e.g. through ‘No’ vote, abstention or recorded negative statement) is a strategic choice resulting from a cost-benefit analysis (van Gruisen & Crombez, 2019).

The number of winning coalitions and the so-called negative swings for individual players are crucial for calculating NBI and PPI (Banzhaf, 1965; Coleman, 1971). Since they differ slightly in the two voting models compared, the value of these indices for the Member States in the Council is almost the same. In the case of NBI, the difference for any country does not exceed 1.35%, while for PPI, it is a maximum of 2.12% (see: Table 1 in Appendix II). As Figure 1 shows, the situation is entirely different in the case of PII. The adoption of a non-random voting model leads to a profound change in the voting power of Council members measured by this index. This is due to the large difference in the number of blocking coalitions between the models. In the case of a non-random voting model, PII assumes a much higher value for seven EU countries with the largest populations. This seems rational because, assuming that the majority of Council members will be ready to support the Commission's initiative and no more than two large Member States will form a blocking coalition, a change of position by one of them usually means that the majority needed to adopt the decision will be formed and the blocking minority will cease to exist.




Figure 1. Change in the Voting Power of Member States in the Council, Measured by PII, as a Result of the Use of a Non-random Voting Model

Source: Author's own calculations.

Application of blocking structure analysis to the vote weighting system in the Council

Analysis of the blocking structure in the council should focus on the distribution of the number of MBCs with the size from $k_{min} = 4$ to at least $k_{max} = 8$. Hence, it should cover no less than the five lowest levels of blocking structure ($k_{max} - k_{min} + 1 = 5$). There are several arguments in favour of adopting this solution. Firstly, pursuant to Art. 16(4) TEU, in the case of decision-making in the Council by a qualified majority, a blocking coalition can be formed by at least four Member States; therefore, for the double majority system, the lowest level of the blocking structure is $k_{min} = 4$. Secondly, the practice of the decision-making process in the Council indicates that situations in which nine or more Member States try to build a blocking coalition are extremely rare. Third, the number of MBCs that can be formed by eight Member States in the Council is greater than the sum of all MBCs with $k = 4$ to $k = 7$ members.

Table 2 and Figure 2 present the blocking structure in the Council for QMV after Brexit. In particular, its graphical representation intuitively shows how individual Council members differ in their capabilities to build MBCs. It is particularly useful in presenting changes occurring in the blocking structure as a result of replacing or modifying vote weighting systems. When comparing the data in Table 2 for individual countries, it should be remembered that a single blocking four may provide a greater ability to block decisions than a dozen minimal blocking coalitions that could be built by five countries. To better understand the issue, let us provide an example. Before the UK's withdrawal from the EU, the combined voting weight of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Romania was too small to form a blocking coalition. However, they were able to build twenty blocking fives without the participation of another large Member State. After Brexit, these countries can build an MBC on their own, as well as twenty blocking fives which are not MBCs. The analysis of the structure of blocking makes it also possible to verify to what extent a given player's ability to build MBCs depends on cooperation with other members of the voting body. The more the state's ability to build blocking coalitions in the Council depends on, e.g., one specific partner, the more likely it is that a clientelistic relationship will develop. The data in Table 2 clearly show that the blocking structure in the Council changes radically, depending on whether Germany supports the proposed initiative or not. This is not surprising, considering that this country constitutes over 18.5% of the entire EU population, which is also over half of the population criterion necessary to build a blocking minority. Therefore, the analysis of the blocking structure in the Council should be carried out for at least two voting models, i.e., the non-random model and its modified version assuming that the Germans support the adoption of the proposed initiative.

Table 2. Minimal Blocking Coalitions Possible to Be Set Up in the Council after Brexit, Assuming That at Least 55% of Member States (EU27) and Three Large EU States Support the Initiative of the EC

Member State	All possible MBCs					MBCs not involving Germany				
	$k = 4$	$k = 5$	$k = 6$	$k = 7$	$k = 8$	$k = 4$	$k = 5$	$k = 6$	$k = 7$	$k = 8$
	$bm, k(i)$					$bm, k(i)$				
Germany	324	303	1219	2399	4617	—	—	—	—	—
France	212	163	1090	3410	7432	7	156	1081	3409	7432
Italy	110	231	800	2435	6018	7	144	669	2352	5979
Spain	15	170	1076	3153	7092	0	12	551	2361	6227
Poland	1	51	619	2501	7259	0	0	65	1102	4849
Romania	57	110	681	2047	5627	6	47	450	1715	4260
Netherlands	53	130	617	2112	5808	2	88	403	1693	4438
Belgium	40	89	631	1929	5230	2	16	415	1369	3909
Greece	38	92	559	2018	5320	1	32	315	1440	3956
Czech Rep.	38	90	554	2042	5340	1	31	310	1443	3975
Portugal	38	83	569	2008	5391	1	30	310	1418	4001
Sweden	38	86	572	2023	5378	1	30	316	1439	3998
Hungary	36	90	589	1943	5306	0	42	277	1391	3901
Austria	36	77	509	1997	5460	0	37	245	1313	4057
Bulgaria	30	86	500	1929	5148	0	18	267	1297	3766
Denmark	30	60	545	1804	5218	0	14	235	1164	3802
Finland	30	55	521	1764	5304	0	14	220	1084	3868
Slovakia	30	54	507	1734	5319	0	14	215	1055	3860
Ireland	29	47	493	1673	5340	0	14	192	1012	3873
Croatia	24	45	407	1538	5102	0	9	178	785	3667
Lithuania	18	53	324	1417	4440	0	8	118	775	2927
Slovenia	17	40	257	1255	4086	0	7	77	688	2660
Latvia	17	33	239	1197	3899	0	7	66	634	2530
Estonia	16	27	186	964	3211	0	6	39	512	2021
Cyprus	16	13	146	745	2634	0	2	32	367	1631
Luxembourg	16	9	111	567	2119	0	1	27	259	1293
Malta	15	8	91	473	1814	0	1	25	207	1096
Total (bm, k)	331	459	2402	7011	16864	7	156	1183	4612	12247

Source: Author's own calculations.




Figure 2. The Blocking Structure in the Council (for $k = 4$ to $k = 7$) in the Aftermath of Brexit, Assuming That at Least 55% of Member States Support the Proposition of the Commission and Maximum Two Large EU Countries Oppose the Initiative (Labelled with EU Country Codes)
Source: Author's own calculations.

A big advantage of the non-random voting model is the possibility of introducing modifications to it by making assumptions about how selected players vote. As a consequence, we can, e.g., examine what the blocking structure in the Council looks like when the Commission's initiative is supported by the German-French tandem (see: Table 2 in Appendix III). It also makes it possible to determine which countries will be crucial for the fate of the initiative in the event of the formation of two rival coalitions in the Council (e.g., Northern and Mediterranean countries).

Both Table 2 and Figure 2 show that after Brexit, the three most populous Member States outdistance others in terms of their ability to form blocking coalitions in the Council. It is impossible to build a blocking coalition of six or fewer countries without the support of Germany, France, or Italy. Moreover, the formation of a blocking four is almost entirely dependent on Germany's position. Berlin is an indispensable member of 98% of such coalitions. In the case of countries with a population not exceeding 12 million, their ability to build blocking coalitions with a size ranging from $k = 4$ to $k = 6$ members is strongly dependent on the stance of Germany, which has gained a lot of freedom in selecting partners for such coalitions. The ability of France, Italy and Spain to form blocking coalitions is similar, with the exception of blocking fours. However, in the latter case, many blocking coalitions can only be built with Germany's participation. This is also true in the case of Poland. As the blocking structure in the Council shows, the number of MBCs Poland can co-create with Germany is comparable to or even lower than for Romania or the Netherlands. This results from the assumption made in the voting model that the EC will select and aggregate various interests at the stage of preparing the initiative in such a way that it can gain support from at least three large Member States. In such a case, Spain and Poland are forced to build broader coalitions of at least 6–8 countries in order to form a blocking minority.

It should be noted that the blocking structure can be analysed not only from the perspective of a given voting body, in this case the Council, but also from the perspective of a specific member of this voting body. This lets a given player determine which partners will be crucial for him to build a blocking coalition. As an example, Table 3 and 4 in Appendix III show the blocking structure in the Council for Spain.

Conclusions

The mathematical indices of *a priori* voting power can justifiably be used in the evaluation and comparison of voting rules in the Council. They allow us to describe the distribution or shift of *a priori* voting power among members of a voting body.

However, the theory of voting power takes a purely normative approach, according to which all variables apart from the voting rule itself should be omitted – including the EC's role as an agenda-setter. Moreover, power indices focus almost exclusively on winning power, because so far it has not been possible to create a reliable indicator of blocking power. Consequently, the naive coefficient of blocking power, known as share of blocking minorities, was used by EU politicians during the negotiations of the Lisbon Treaty in order to compare the ability of individual countries to form small blocking coalitions.

The research indicates that the blocking structure analysis combined with a non-random voting model in the Council may fill the existing methodological gap, constituting a valuable complement to analyses based on the voting power theory. In particular, this enables a more comprehensive assessment of the vote weighting system in the Council, also taking into account the blocking structure for the QMV in this institution.

Positive verification of the hypothesis according to which in the case of decision-making by a qualified majority in the Council, the EC's initiative will not be contested by more than two large Member States and that at least 55% of EU states will be ready to support it made it possible to create a non-random voting model in the Council, taking into account the Commission's role as an agenda-setter and abandoning the assumption that each coalition of players is equally likely. As a result, it is possible to exclude from the analysis a large number of coalitions whose formation in the Council is unlikely. Moreover, non-random voting model allows analysing the blocking structure from the perspective of different states or coalitions in the Council. Germany's support or opposition to the initiative proposed by the Commission has a significant impact on the blocking structure in the Council. The difference is so big that we can talk about two different blocking structures. This is due to the high voting weight of this country in the so-called double majority system. Therefore, the analysis of the blocking structure in the Council should be carried out for two versions of the voting model: the standard, non-random model and its modification assuming that Germany will vote in favour of the presented initiative.

Replacing the random voting model in the Council with a new, non-random model only slightly affects the value of power indices such as NBI and PPI. Hence, in their case, not taking into account the role of the European Commission in the model did not lead to significant errors in the analysis results. However, for Coleman's PII, the discrepancy in the results for both models is substantial. This is because the non-random voting model excludes a large number of blocking coalitions and a relatively small number of winning and losing coalitions from the analysis.

Appendix I

The following definitions were adopted for the purposes of the article.

For a voting game in which n players (voters) take part, $N = \{i_1, i_2, \dots, i_n\}$ is a nonempty, finite set of players. S is a subset of N . Each subsets $S \subseteq N$ is referred to as a coalition, including empty set \emptyset which is a set $S \subset N$ that does not contain any player. Thus, any set of voters is called a coalition. The complement of set S , denoted by S' , is the set of all elements in the set N that are not in S .

Let W stands for the set of all winning coalitions. A proper simple game G is such a pair (N, W) that:

- $\emptyset \notin W$;
- $N \in W$;
- If $S \in W$ and $S \subseteq T$ then $T \in W$;
- If $S \in W$, then a coalition S' , complementary to the winning coalition S , cannot be a winning $S' \notin W$.

In a simple game, the characteristic function is a monotone 0-1 function $v(S) = \{0, 1\}$ for all $S \subseteq N$. The set S is the winning coalition $S \in W$ if passage of a motion, under the specific voting rule, is guaranteed by 'yea' votes from the voters in coalition S , therefore subset S is said to be a winning coalition if and only if $v(S) = 1$. Otherwise $v(S) = 0$. Player i has the so-called negative swing if $v(S) = 1$ and $v(S - \{i\}) = 0$.

MW is a set of subsets of N called minimal winning coalitions. The set $S \in MW$ if and only if $S - \{i\} \notin W$ for each $i \in S$. Therefore each member of a minimal winning coalition is a (negative) swing player.

The set of blocking coalitions is denoted as B . The set $S \in B$ if and only if $S \notin W$ and $N \setminus S \notin W$. The set S is a minimal blocking coalition $S \in MB$ if none of its proper subsets belongs to B ; thus:

$$MB = \{S \in B \mid \forall \text{ of the non-empty } T \subset S \wedge S \setminus T \notin B\}.$$

The set L consists of all the subsets N being losing coalitions. The set $S \in L$ if its complement $S' \in W$.

Appendix II

Based on the analysis of 10 cases of legislative proposals proceeded in the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP), between July 1, 2009, and July 31, 2017, which were withdrawn by the European Commission (EC) or the work on which was stopped,

it can be concluded that there were only two types of situations when the majority of states in the Council was not ready to support the EC's legislative proposal.

The first type of situation concerns cases where, in the Council's opinion, the Commission used an incorrect legal basis for the legislative proposal, which allegedly led to a breach of the Council's exclusive competences. Three such cases were identified:

- Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1342/2008 of 18 December 2008 establishing a long-term plan for cod stocks and the fisheries exploiting those stocks (COM(2012)0021);
- Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1098/2007 of 18 September 2007 establishing a multi-annual plan for the cod stocks in the Baltic Sea and the fisheries exploiting those stocks (COM(2012)0155);
- Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a multiannual plan for the Baltic salmon stock and the fisheries exploiting that stock (COM/2011/470/FINAL).

In the remaining identified cases, the lack of majority support in the Council was the result of the fear of causing a serious conflict between some Member States regarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of those states. However, there were only four such cases during the period of interest and all of them concerned the dispute between Spain and the UK over the status of Gibraltar:

- Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the allocation of slots at European Union airports (COM(2011)0827);
- Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights and Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 on air carrier liability in respect of the carriage of passengers and their baggage by air (COM/2013/130/FINAL);
- Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the implementation of the Single European Sky (recast) (2013/0186(COD));
- Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 in the field of aerodromes, air traffic management and air navigation services (COM(2013)0409).

List of Legal Acts Included in the Analysis[Last Update: 22.09.2023;
the DateOrder IsDay–Month–Year]

No.	EUR-Lex number (Institutional reference number)	Procedure status	Title	Date of transmission of the legislative proposal to the Council and the European Parliament	Date of withdrawal or rejection
1	2005/0254/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a Council Regulation on the indication of the country of origin of certain products imported from third countries	19.12.2005	16.04.2013
2	2006/0052/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a Council Regulation concerning the implementation of the Agreement concluded by the EC following negotiations in the framework of Article XXIV.6 of GATT 1994, amending Annex I to Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff	03.04.2006	18.09.2010
3	2008/0002/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on novel foods and amending Regulation (EC) No XXX/XXXX [common procedure]	14.01.2008	20.05.2017
4	2008/0090/ COD	on hold	Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents	30.04.2008	
5	2008/0193/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a Directive of the Euro- pean Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 92/85/ EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have re- cently given birth or are breastfeeding	03.10.2008	06.08.2015

No.	EUR-Lex number (Institutional reference number)	Procedure status	Title	Date of transmission of the legislative proposal to the Council and the European Parliament	Date of withdrawal or rejection
6	2008/0195/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2002/15/EC on the organisation of the working time of persons performing mobile road transport activities	16.10.2008	30.07.2011
7	2008/0256/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending, as regards information to the general public on medicinal products subject to medical prescription, Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use	17.12.2008	21.05.2014
8	2008/0255/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending, as regards information to the general public on medicinal products for human use subject to medical prescription, Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency	17.12.2008	21.05.2014
9	2008/0253/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a Council Directive laying down the principles governing the organisation of veterinary checks on animals entering the Community from third countries	19.12.2008	30.07.2011
10	2009/0025/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a Council Regulation amending the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement as regards long stay visa and alerts in the Schengen Information System	27.02.2009	02.06.2012

No.	EUR-Lex number (Institutional reference number)	Procedure status	Title	Date of transmission of the legislative proposal to the Council and the European Parliament	Date of withdrawal or rejection
11	2009/0048/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council adapting a number of instruments subject to the procedure referred to in Article 251 of the Treaty to Council Decision 1999/468/EC, with regard to the regulatory procedure with scrutiny – Adaptation to the regulatory procedure with scrutiny – Part Five	30.03.2009	30.07.2011
12	2009/0058/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 establishing an Instrument for Stability	21.04.2009	21.05.2014
13	2009/0057/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a multi-annual plan for the western stock of Atlantic horse mackerel and the fisheries exploiting that stock	21.04.2009	07.03.2015
14	2009/0063/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on aviation security charges	11.05.2009	07.03.2015
15	2009/0112/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a long-term plan for the anchovy stock in the Bay of Biscay and the fisheries exploiting that stock	29.07.2009	07.03.2015
16	2009/0123/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a Directive .../.../ EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of [...] on uniform procedures for checks on the transport of dangerous goods by road (Codified version)	04.09.2009	07.03.2015
17	2009/0149/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on statistical returns in respect of the carriage of goods by road (Codified version)	14.10.2009	02.06.2012

No.	EUR-Lex number (Institutional reference number)	Procedure status	Title	Date of transmission of the legislative proposal to the Council and the European Parliament	Date of withdrawal or rejection
18	2009/0151/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a Regulation (EC) no .../... of the European Parliament and of the Council of [...] on waste statistics (Codified version)	16.10.2009	07.03.2015
19	2009/0154/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council relating to the radio interference (electromagnetic compatibility) of vehicles (Codified version)	20.10.2009	16.04.2013
20	2009/0176/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports (Codified version)	20.11.2009	07.03.2015
21	2010/0047/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities	05.03.2010	07.03.2015
22	2010/0050/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings	11.03.2010	07.03.2015
23	2010/0194/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the marketing of material for the vegetative propagation of the vine (Recast)	05.07.2010	21.05.2014
24	2010/0199/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 97/9/ EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on investor-compensation schemes {SEC(2010) 845} {SEC(2010) 846}	12.07.2010	07.03.2015

No.	EUR-Lex number (Institutional reference number)	Procedure status	Title	Date of transmission of the legislative proposal to the Council and the European Parliament	Date of withdrawal or rejection
25	2010/0261/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the permissible sound level and the exhaust system of motor vehicles	27.09.2010	21.05.2014
26	2010/0260/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to units of measurement	27.09.2010	07.03.2015
27	2010/0264 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on rear-mounted roll-over protection structures of narrow-track wheeled agricultural and forestry tractors	28.09.2010	21.05.2014
28	2010/0267/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers	30.09.2010	07.03.2015
29	2010/0266/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)	30.09.2010	07.03.2015

No.	EUR-Lex number (Institutional reference number)	Procedure status	Title	Date of transmission of the legislative proposal to the Council and the European Parliament	Date of withdrawal or rejection
30	2010/0302/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on roll-over protection structures mounted in front of the driver's seat on narrow-track wheeled agricultural and forestry tractors	27.10.2010	21.05.2014
31	2010/0309/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on establishing a system for the identification and registration of ovine and caprine animals	08.11.2010	21.05.2014
32	2010/0348/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the installation, location, operation and identification of the controls of wheeled agricultural or forestry tractors	08.12.2010	21.05.2014
33	2010/0354/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards marketing standards	10.12.2010	07.03.2015
34	2010/0349/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on braking devices of wheeled agricultural or forestry tractors	10.12.2010	21.05.2014
35	2010/0365/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION (EU) No .../ OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 on the financing of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 165/94 and Council Regulation (EC) No 78/2008	15.12.2010	07.03.2015

No.	EUR-Lex number (Institutional reference number)	Procedure status	Title	Date of transmission of the legislative proposal to the Council and the European Parliament	Date of withdrawal or rejection
36	2010/0358/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the operating space, access to the driving position and the doors and windows of wheeled agricultural or forestry tractors	15.12.2010	21.05.2014
37	2010/0366/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amend- ing Council Regulation (EC) No 485/2008 on scrutiny by Member States of transactions forming part of the system of financing by the Euro- pean Agricultural Guarantee Fund	17.12.2010	07.03.2015
38	2010/0364/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amend- ing Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 on organic production and labelling of organic products	17.12.2010	07.03.2015
39	2010/0385 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL estab- lishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation)	21.12.2010	07.03.2015
40	2011/0053/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL relating to tyres for motor vehicles and their trailers and to their fitting	11.03.2011	12.05.2017
41	2011/0073/ (COD)	on hold then waiting for with- drawal	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents	30.03.2011	

No.	EUR-Lex number (Institutional reference number)	Procedure status	Title	Date of transmission of the legislative proposal to the Council and the European Parliament	Date of withdrawal or rejection
42	2011/0146/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on Eu- ropean statistics on safety from crime	08.06.2011	21.05.2014
43	2011/0147/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EC) No 1927/2006 establishing the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund	10.06.2011	21.05.2014
44	2011/0176 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL laying down general provisions for Macro-Fi- nancial Assistance to third countries	04.07.2011	08.05.2013
45	2011/0218 (COD)	on hold then with- drawn	Sustainable exploitation of fishery resources in the Med- iterranean Sea: alignment of the Regulation with the TFEU (Commission delegated powers)	09.08.2011	29.09.2020
46	2011/0206 (COD)	on hold then with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a multiannual plan for the Baltic salmon stock and the fisheries exploiting that stock	12.08.2011	20.09.2020
47	2011/0284/ COD	on hold then with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on a Common European Sales Law	11.10.2011	20.09.2020
48	2011/0290 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Council Regulation (EC) No 3/2008 on information provision and promotion measures for agricultural products on the internal market and in third countries	21.10.2011	07.03.2015

No.	EUR-Lex number (Institutional reference number)	Procedure status	Title	Date of transmission of the legislative proposal to the Council and the European Parliament	Date of withdrawal or rejection
49	2011/0327 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards driving licences which include the functionalities of a driver card	11.11.2011	21.05.2014
50	2011/0345 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1300/2008 of 18 December 2008 establishing a multi-annual plan for the stock of herring distributed to the west of Scotland and the fisheries exploiting that stock	22.11.2011	04.07.2018
51	2011/0397 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on groundhandling services at Union airports and repealing Council Directive 96/67/EC	01.12.2011	07.03.2015
52	2011/0391 (COD)	on hold	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on common rules for the allocation of slots at European Union airports	01.12.2011	
53	2012/0007 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous preparations	26.01.2012	07.03.2015

No.	EUR-Lex number (Institutional reference number)	Procedure status	Title	Date of transmission of the legislative proposal to the Council and the European Parliament	Date of withdrawal or rejection
54	2012/0013/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1342/2008 of 18 December 2008 establishing a long-term plan for cod stocks and the fisheries exploiting those stocks	31.01.2012	21.06.2019
55	2012/0035 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL relating to the transparency of measures regulating the prices of medicinal products for human use and their inclusion in the scope of public health insurance systems	01.03.2012	07.03.2015
56	2012/0077 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1098/2007 of 18 September 2007 establishing a multi-annual plan for the cod stocks in the Baltic Sea and the fisheries exploiting those stocks	02.04.2012	07.03.2015
57	2012/0082 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL simplifying the transfer of motor vehicles registered in another Member State within the Single Market	04.04.2012	03.07.2018
58	2012/0159 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006 establishing an Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA)	20.06.2012	07.03.2015

No.	EUR-Lex number (Institutional reference number)	Procedure status	Title	Date of transmission of the legislative proposal to the Council and the European Parliament	Date of withdrawal or rejection
59	2012/0162 (COD)	on holdth- enwith- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing	21.06.2012	29.09.2020
60	2012/0196/ COD	on hold (an- nounced to be reas- sumed)	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein (Recast)	19.07.2012	
61	2012/0201 (COD)	on hold then with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1100/2007 establishing measures for the recovery of the stock of European eel	26.07.2012	29.09.2020
62	2012/0208/ COD	on hold then with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amend- ing Council Regulation (EC) No 850/98 concerning the conservation of fishery resources through technical measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms	02.08.2012	29.09.2020
63	2012/0232 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on certain technical and control measures in the Skagerrak and amending Regulation (EC) No 850/98 and Regulation (EC) No 1342/2008	29.08.2012	07.03.2015

No.	EUR-Lex number (Institutional reference number)	Procedure status	Title	Date of transmission of the legislative proposal to the Council and the European Parliament	Date of withdrawal or rejection
64	2012/0285 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2187/2005 for the conservation of fishery through technical measures in the Baltic Sea, the Belts and the Sound	17.10.2012	07.03.2015
65	2012/0299/ COD	on hold then adopted	Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related measures	16.11.2012	
66	2013/0007 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 establishing a Community control system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the Common Fisheries Policy	18.01.2013	04.07.2018
67	2013/0048/ COD	on hold then with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on market surveillance of products and amending Council Directives 89/686/EEC and 93/15/EEC, and Directives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 1999/5/EC, 2000/9/EC, 2000/14/EC, 2001/95/EC, 2004/108/EC, 2006/42/EC, 2006/95/EC, 2007/23/EC, 2008/57/EC, 2009/48/EC, 2009/105/EC, 2009/142/EC, 2011/65/EU, Regulation (EU) No 305/2011, Regulation (EC) No 764/2008 and Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council	14.02.2013	29.09.2020

No.	EUR-Lex number (Institutional reference number)	Procedure status	Title	Date of transmission of the legislative proposal to the Council and the European Parliament	Date of withdrawal or rejection
68	2013/0049/ COD	on hold then with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on consumer product safety and repealing Council Directive 87/357/EEC and Directive 2001/95/EC	14.02.2013	29.09.2020
69	2013/0059/ COD	waiting for with- drawal	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a Registered Traveller Programme (2013 SMART BORDERS PACKAGE)	28.02.2013	
70	2013/0057/ COD	waiting for with- drawal	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data of third country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States of the European Union (2013 SMART BORDERS PACKAGE)	28.02.2013	
71	2013/0060/ COD	waiting for with- drawal	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 as regards the use of the Entry/Exit System (EES) and the Registered Traveller Programme (RTP)	28.02.2013	
72	2013/0072/ COD	on hold	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights and Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 on air carrier liability in respect of the carriage of passengers and their baggage by air	13.03.2013	

No.	EUR-Lex number (Institutional reference number)	Procedure status	Title	Date of transmission of the legislative proposal to the Council and the European Parliament	Date of withdrawal or rejection
73	2013/0087 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on fixing an adjustment rate to direct payments provided for in Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 in respect of calendar year 2013	25.03.2013	07.03.2015
74	2013/0137 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL On the production and making available on the market of plant reproductive ma- terial (plant reproductive material law)	06.05.2013	07.03.2015
75	2013/0181/ COD	on hold then with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the provision and quality of statistics for the macroeconomic imbalances procedure	07.06.2013	29.09.2020
76	2013/0187 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PAR- LIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 in the field of aerodromes, air traffic management and air navigation services	11.06.2013	04.07.2018
77	2013/0186 (COD)	on hold then with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the implementation of the Single European Sky (recast)	12.06.2013	03.07.2018
78	2013/0220 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL adapting to Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union a number of legal acts in the area of Justice providing for the use of the regulatory procedure with scrutiny	27.06.2013	07.03.2015

No.	EUR-Lex number (Institutional reference number)	Procedure status	Title	Date of transmission of the legislative proposal to the Council and the European Parliament	Date of withdrawal or rejection
79	2013/0218 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL adapting to Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union a number of legal acts providing for the use of the regulatory procedure with scrutiny	27.06.2013	07.03.2015
80	2013/0247 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)	11.07.2013	07.03.2015
81	2013/0305 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on new psychoactive substances	17.09.2013	20.05.2017
82	2013/0365 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL adapting to Article 290 and 291 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union a number of legal acts providing for the use of the regulatory procedure with scrutiny	30.10.2013	07.03.2015
83	2013/0432 (COD)	on hold then with- drawn	Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the Union legal framework for customs infringements and sanctions	13.12.2013	29.09.2020
84	2013/0433/ COD	on hold then with- drawn	Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the cloning of animals of the bovine, porcine, ovine, caprine and equine species kept and reproduced for farming purposes	19.12.2013	29.09.2020

No.	EUR-Lex number (Institutional reference number)	Procedure status	Title	Date of transmission of the legislative proposal to the Council and the European Parliament	Date of withdrawal or rejection
85	2014/0020 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on structural measures improving the resilience of EU credit institutions	29.01.2014	04.07.2018
86	2014/0012 (COD)	on hold then with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulations (EC) No 715/2007 and (EC) No 595/2009 as regards the reduction of pollutant emissions from road vehicles	31.01.2014	29.09.2020
87	2014/0033 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directives 89/608/EEC, 90/425/EEC and 91/496/EEC as regards references to zootechnical legislation	11.02.2014	20.05.2017
88	2014/0097 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on fixing an adjustment rate for direct payments provided for in Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 in respect of calendar year 2014	21.03.2014	07.03.2015
89	2014/0095 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a touring visa and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) No 562/2006 and (EC) No 767/2008	01.04.2014	04.07.2018
90	2014/0094 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the Union Code on Visas (Visa Code) (recast)	01.04.2014	04.07.2018

No.	EUR-Lex number (Institutional reference number)	Procedure status	Title	Date of transmission of the legislative proposal to the Council and the European Parliament	Date of withdrawal or rejection
91	2014/0120 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on single-member private limited liability companies	10.04.2014	04.07.2018
92	2014/0138/ COD	on hold then with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL laying down a prohibition on driftnet fisheries, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 850/98, (EC) No 812/2004, (EC) No 2187/2005 and (EC) No 1967/2006 and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 894/97	14.05.2014	29.09.2020
93	2014/0176 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the dissemination of Earth observation satellite data for commercial purposes	17.06.2014	06.08.2015
94	2014/0202/ COD	on hold then with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 as regards determining the Member State responsible for examining the application for international protection of unaccompanied minors with no family member, sibling or relative legally present in a Member State	26.06.2014	21.06.2019
95	2014/0201 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directives 2008/98/EC on waste, 94/62/EC on packaging and packaging waste, 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste, 2000/53/EC on end-of-life vehicles, 2006/66/EC on batteries and accumulators and waste batteries and accumulators, and 2012/19/EU on waste electrical and electronic equipment	23.09.2014	07.03.2015

No.	EUR-Lex number (Institutional reference number)	Procedure status	Title	Date of transmission of the legislative proposal to the Council and the European Parliament	Date of withdrawal or rejection
96	2015/0093 (COD)	on hold (on the list of files that Parliament should request the Commission to with- draw)	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amend- ing Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 as regards the possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the use of genetically modified food and feed on their territory	22.04.2015	
97	2015/0208/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL estab- lishing a crisis relocation mechanism and amending Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third country national or a stateless person	10.09.2015	21.06.2019
98	2015/0211/ COD	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing an EU common list of safe countries of origin for the purposes of Directive 2013/32/ EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on common procedures for granting and with- drawing international protection, and amending Directive 2013/32/EU	10.09.2015	21.06.2019

No.	EUR-Lex number (Institutional reference number)	Procedure status	Title	Date of transmission of the legislative proposal to the Council and the European Parliament	Date of withdrawal or rejection
99	2016/0133 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast)	04.05.2016	23.04.2021
100	2016/0236 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a Union certification system for aviation security screening equipment	08.09.2016	21.06.2019
101	2016/0398 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the enforcement of the Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market, laying down a notification procedure for authorisation schemes and requirements related to services, and amending Directive 2006/123/EC and Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System	10.01.2017	23.04.2021
102	2016/0402 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the legal and operational framework of the European services e-card introduced by Regulation[ESC Regulation]....	10.01.2017	23.04.2021
103	2016/0403 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL introducing a European services e-card and related administrative facilities	12.01.2017	23.04.2021

No.	EUR-Lex number (Institutional reference number)	Procedure status	Title	Date of transmission of the legislative proposal to the Council and the European Parliament	Date of withdrawal or rejection
104	2017/0068 (COD)	with- drawn	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL fixing the adjustment rate provided for in Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 for direct payments in respect of the calendar year 2017	30.03.2017	04.07.2018
105	2017/0810 (COD)	with- drawn	Recommendation for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Article 22 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank	07.07.2017	20.03.2019

Appendix III

Table 1. Distribution of Voting Power in the Council for Random and Non-random Voting Models

Mem- ber- State	Randomvoting model			Non-randomvoting model			Change of votingpower (%)		
	NBI	PPI	IPI	NBI	PPI	PII	NBI	PPI	PII
	1	2	3	4	5	6	$\frac{(4-1)}{1} \cdot 100\%$	$\frac{(5-2)}{2} \cdot 100\%$	$\frac{(6-3)}{3} \cdot 100\%$
Ger- many	0.1208	0.7959	0.1896	0.1208	0.7959	0.5026	0.65%	-0.12%	165.0%
France	0.1008	0.6644	0.1640	0.1008	0.6644	0.4049	0.55%	-0.22%	146.9%
Italy	0.0891	0.5873	0.1487	0.0891	0.5873	0.3572	1.23%	0.46%	140.1%
Spain	0.0767	0.5052	0.1322	0.0767	0.5052	0.3084	1.27%	0.50%	133.3%
Poland	0.0638	0.4206	0.1162	0.0638	0.4207	0.2586	1.27%	0.49%	122.5%
Roma- nia	0.0393	0.2587	0.0831	0.0393	0.2587	0.1446	-0.66%	-1.43%	74.0%
Neth- erlands	0.0377	0.2487	0.0811	0.0377	0.2486	0.1348	-0.74%	-1.51%	66.3%
Bel- gium	0.0306	0.2016	0.0716	0.0306	0.2015	0.0890	-1.20%	-1.97%	24.2%

Mem- ber- State	Randomvoting model			Non-randomvoting model			Change of votingpower (%)		
	NBI	PPI	IPI	NBI	PPI	PII	NBI	PPI	PII
	1	2	3	4	5	6	(4-1)/ 1*100%	(5-2)/ 2*100%	(6-3)/ 3*100%
Greece	0.0294	0.1936	0.0700	0.0294	0.1935	0.0812	-1.28%	-2.05%	16.0%
Czech Rep.	0.0293	0.1931	0.0699	0.0293	0.1931	0.0807	-1.28%	-2.05%	15.5%
Portugal	0.0291	0.1916	0.0696	0.0291	0.1916	0.0793	-1.29%	-2.06%	13.9%
Sweden	0.0292	0.1923	0.0697	0.0292	0.1922	0.0799	-1.29%	-2.06%	14.6%
Hungary	0.0283	0.1864	0.0686	0.0283	0.1864	0.0742	-1.32%	-2.10%	8.2%
Austria	0.0274	0.1808	0.0674	0.0274	0.1807	0.0687	-1,35%	-2,12%	1,9%
Bulgaria	0,0249	0,1641	0,0641	0,0249	0,1640	0,0525	-1,29%	-2,06%	-18,0%
Denmark	0,0237	0,1564	0,0625	0,0237	0,1564	0,0451	-1,17%	-1,94%	-27,9%
Finland	0,0234	0,1539	0,0620	0,0234	0,1538	0,0426	-1,10%	-1,87%	-31,3%
Slovakia	0,0232	0,1530	0,0618	0,0232	0,1530	0,0418	-1,08%	-1,85%	-32,4%
Ireland	0,0228	0,1501	0,0612	0,0228	0,1501	0,0389	-0,99%	-1,76%	-36,4%
Croatia	0,0213	0,1407	0,0593	0,0213	0,1406	0.0298	-0.74%	-1.51%	-49.9%
Lithuania	0.0201	0.1323	0.0576	0.0201	0.1323	0.0217	-0.30%	-1.07%	-62.4%
Slovenia	0.0192	0.1267	0.0565	0.0192	0.1267	0.0163	0.00%	-0.77%	-71.2%
Latvia	0.0190	0.1249	0.0561	0.0190	0.1249	0.0145	0.06%	-0.71%	-74.2%
Estonia	0.0183	0.1206	0.0553	0.0183	0.1205	0.0103	0.37%	-0.40%	-81.4%
Cyprus	0.0178	0.1172	0.0546	0.0178	0.1172	0.0070	0.65%	-0.13%	-87.2%
Luxembourg	0.0175	0.1151	0.0542	0.0175	0.1151	0.0050	0.79%	0.02%	-90.8%
Malta	0.0173	0.1141	0.0540	0.0173	0.1141	0.0040	0.86%	0.08%	-92.5%
Total (<i>bm.k</i>)	1.0	–	–	1.0	–	–	–	–	–

Source: Author's own calculations.

Table 2. Small, Minimal Blocking Coalitions Possible to Be Set Up in the Council (EU-27), Assuming That at Least 55% of Member States (Including Germany and France) Support the Initiative of the European Commission, and Maximum Two Large EU Countries Oppose It

Member-State	AllpossibleMBCs					AllpossibleMBCs				
	$k = 4$	$k = 5$	$k = 6$	$k = 7$	$k = 8$	$k = 4$	$k = 5$	$k = 6$	$k = 7$	$k = 8$
	$bm, k(i)$					$\beta k(i)$				
Germany	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
France	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Italy	–	–	8	237	1461	–	–	100%	100%	97%
Spain	–	–	8	208	983	–	–	100%	88%	66%
Poland	–	–	0	29	556	–	–	0%	12%	37%
Romania	–	–	8	153	742	–	–	100%	65%	49%
Netherlands	–	–	8	131	694	–	–	100%	55%	46%
Belgium	–	–	1	76	541	–	–	13%	32%	36%
Greece	–	–	1	71	508	–	–	13%	30%	34%
Czech Rep.	–	–	1	69	507	–	–	13%	29%	34%
Portugal	–	–	1	67	497	–	–	13%	28%	33%
Sweden	–	–	1	69	494	–	–	13%	29%	33%
Hungary	–	–	1	56	535	–	–	13%	24%	36%
Austria	–	–	1	58	459	–	–	13%	24%	31%
Bulgaria	–	–	1	47	327	–	–	13%	20%	22%
Denmark	–	–	8	237	1500	–	–	100%	100%	100%
Finland	–	–	0	41	347	–	–	–	17%	23%
Slovakia	–	–	0	40	352	–	–	–	17%	23%
Ireland	–	–	0	34	343	–	–	–	14%	23%
Croatia	–	–	0	20	315	–	–	–	8%	21%
Lithuania	–	–	0	8	220	–	–	–	3%	15%
Slovenia	–	–	0	3	181	–	–	–	1%	12%
Latvia	–	–	0	3	161	–	–	–	1%	11%
Estonia	–	–	0	2	110	–	–	–	1%	7%
Cyprus	–	–	0	0	72	–	–	–	–	5%
Luxembourg	–	–	0	0	53	–	–	–	–	4%
Malta	–	–	0	0	42	–	–	–	–	3%
Total (bm, k)	0	0	8	237	1500	0	0	8	237	1500

Source: Author's own calculations.

Table 3. Minimal Blocking Coalitions Possible to Be Created in the Council by Spain, Assuming That at Least 55% of Member States Support the Proposition of the European Commission and Maximum Two Large EU Countries Oppose to Initiative

Member-State	AllpossibleMBCs					MBCs not involving Germany				
	$k = 4$	$k = 5$	$k = 6$	$k = 7$	$k = 8$	$k = 4$	$k = 5$	$k = 6$	$k = 7$	$k = 8$
	$bm,k(i)$					$bm,k(i)$				
Germany	15	158	525	792	865	–	–	–	–	–
France	0	12	449	1432	2997	0	12	449	1432	2997
Italy	0	0	102	929	2998	0	0	102	929	2998
Spain	15	170	1076	3153	7092	0	12	551	2361	6227
Poland	0	0	0	0	232	0	0	0	0	232
Romania	8	46	376	941	1866	0	12	349	930	1860
Netherlands	8	32	302	1007	2088	0	12	263	984	2077
Belgium	2	47	290	780	2163	0	1	216	657	2055
Greece	2	40	259	901	2160	0	1	170	756	2033
Czech Rep.	2	39	263	891	2175	0	1	168	746	2045
Portugal	2	36	276	890	2183	0	1	162	746	2048
Sweden	2	37	273	906	2178	0	1	164	757	2048
Hungary	2	27	320	877	2133	0	1	142	746	1981
Austria	2	24	281	902	2275	0	1	123	728	2121
Bulgaria	0	41	162	938	2059	0	1	73	723	1801
Denmark	0	30	191	875	2199	0	1	59	640	1930
Finland	0	27	199	822	2284	0	1	57	590	1999
Slovakia	0	26	198	803	2280	0	1	57	568	1993
Ireland	0	22	207	729	2302	0	1	54	527	1997
Croatia	0	12	182	682	2351	0	0	50	366	2094
Lithuania	0	8	131	634	2029	0	0	35	309	1629
Slovenia	0	6	104	532	1817	0	0	21	275	1404
Latvia	0	5	96	495	1741	0	0	19	245	1324
Estonia	0	2	76	409	1414	0	0	9	196	1028
Cyprus	0	1	50	320	1147	0	0	5	142	783
Luxem- bourg	0	1	38	238	916	0	0	4	98	600
Malta	0	1	30	193	792	0	0	4	76	512
Total (bm,k)	15	170	1076	3153	7092	0	12	551	2361	6227

Source: Author's own calculations.

Table 4. Participation of EU States in Minimal Blocking Coalitions, Possible to Be Created in the Council by Spain, Assuming That at Least 55% of Member States Support the Proposition of the European Commission and Maximum Two Large EU Countries Oppose the Initiative

MemberState	AllpossibleMBCs					MBCs not involving Germany				
	$k = 4$	$k = 5$	$k = 6$	$k = 7$	$k = 8$	$k = 4$	$k = 5$	$k = 6$	$k = 7$	$k = 8$
	$\beta k(i)$					$\beta k(i)$				
Germany	100%	93%	49%	25%	12%	–	–	–	–	–
France	0%	7%	42%	45%	42%	–	100%	81%	61%	48%
Italy	0%	0%	9%	29%	42%	–	0%	19%	39%	48%
Spain	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	–	100%	100%	100%	100%
Poland	0%	0%	0%	0%	3%	–	0%	0%	0%	4%
Romania	53%	27%	35%	30%	26%	–	100%	63%	39%	30%
Netherlands	53%	19%	28%	32%	29%	–	100%	48%	42%	33%
Belgium	13%	28%	27%	25%	30%	–	8%	39%	28%	33%
Greece	13%	24%	24%	29%	30%	–	8%	31%	32%	33%
Czech Rep.	13%	23%	24%	28%	31%	–	8%	30%	32%	33%
Portugal	13%	21%	26%	28%	31%	–	8%	29%	32%	33%
Sweden	13%	22%	25%	29%	31%	–	8%	30%	32%	33%
Hungary	13%	16%	30%	28%	30%	–	8%	26%	32%	32%
Austria	13%	14%	26%	29%	32%	–	8%	22%	31%	34%
Bulgaria	0%	24%	15%	30%	29%	–	8%	13%	31%	29%
Denmark	0%	18%	18%	28%	31%	–	8%	11%	27%	31%
Finland	0%	16%	18%	26%	32%	–	8%	10%	25%	32%
Slovakia	0%	15%	18%	25%	32%	–	8%	10%	24%	32%
Ireland	0%	13%	19%	23%	32%	–	8%	10%	22%	32%
Croatia	0%	7%	17%	22%	33%	–	0%	9%	16%	34%
Lithuania	0%	5%	12%	20%	29%	–	0%	6%	13%	26%
Slovenia	0%	4%	10%	17%	26%	–	0%	4%	12%	23%
Latvia	0%	3%	9%	16%	25%	–	0%	3%	10%	21%
Estonia	0%	1%	7%	13%	20%	–	0%	2%	8%	17%
Cyprus	0%	1%	5%	10%	16%	–	0%	1%	6%	13%
Luxembourg	0%	1%	4%	8%	13%	–	0%	1%	4%	10%
Malta	0%	1%	3%	6%	11%	–	0%	1%	3%	8%
Total (bm, k)	15	170	1076	3153	7092	0	12	551	2361	6227

Source: Author's own calculations.

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