The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of the war in Ukraine on different sectors of Poland’s security and the sense of security of Polish citizens. To allow a broader discussion on the issue, the article starts with a definition of security and how this notion can be divided into different types. This is followed by a brief overview of Poland’s relations with Russia and an analysis of the main security sectors endangered by Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, i.e., energy, food, and cybersecurity in Poland. Finally, the author examines how secure Polish citizens feel and analyzes the results of social surveys carried out in Poland by the Centre for Public Opinion Research (CBOS).

**Keywords:** war in Ukraine; security; sense of security; Poland

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Celem artykułu jest dokonanie analizy wpływu wojny na Ukrainie na konkretne sektory bezpieczeństwa państwa polskiego oraz na poczucie bezpieczeństwa obywateli Polski. Aby przejść do szerszych rozważań na temat bezpieczeństwa, na początku wywodu została wprowadzona definicja bezpieczeństwa i jego typy. W dalszej części zostały pokrótko przedstawione relacje Polski z Rosją oraz analiza głównych sektorów bezpieczeństwa zagrożonych w związku z toczącą się wojną Rosji w Ukrainie, a mianowicie: energetycznego, żywnościowego oraz cyberbezpieczeństwa w Polsce. Następnie autorka omawia poczucie bezpieczeństwa polskich obywateli oraz analizuje wyniki badań społecznych przeprowadzonych w Polsce przez Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej.

**Słowa kluczowe:** wojna w Ukrainie; bezpieczeństwo; poczucie bezpieczeństwa; Polska

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The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the official positions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland.
Introduction

The sense of security of citizens is a multidimensional phenomenon, therefore the perception of threat depends on many factors. The main ones include the geopolitical location of the country or region, as well as socio-cultural, economic, and business factors. Therefore, it is very difficult to compare sense of security in different states including, e.g., the Visegrad Group.

Security is an overriding human need, which affects not only individuals but also social groups, local communities and citizens of various countries, while insecurity creates anxiety for individuals, families and can occur on a national or international scale (Koziński, 2011, p. 29). Security is perceived as a crucial value, strictly connected with peace, life, or health, which are recognized as the most important values by Europeans (Kancik-Kołtun, 2021, p. 214). The beginning of the war between Russia and Ukraine in February 2014 received brief media coverage and was quickly forgotten by European politicians and citizens. However, the awareness of Russia’s hybrid warfare persisted in the former communist bloc countries, particularly those bordering Ukraine. At that time, indications of unrest and danger for the citizens of Central and Eastern European countries were already emerging. When an all-out war between the Russian Federation and Ukraine broke out on February 24, 2022, the security of the citizens of the V4 and the Baltic states became particularly relevant. Various aspects of security have risen to the fore of national policies since that moment, including energy, food, information, as well as military security.

The aim of this article is to analyze how secure Poles feel after the start of Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and present the security sectors at risk along with the Polish government’s attempt to protect them. The main hypothesis is that the sense of security in a country/place of residence is influenced by the current developments of an armed conflict raging in a bordering country. To obtain the most reliable results when examining this multifaceted problem, the following methods were used: content analysis, statistical analysis, comparative method, and historical method.

Types of security

The term ‘security’ is very broad and concerns many areas of life (social, political, cultural, ecological, military). Consequently, it can be understood and defined in many ways, as evidenced by the extensive literature on the subject. Security is closely associated with the phenomenon of threat. For this reason, different types/categories of security are distinguished in relation to a specific threat – e.g., counter-terrorism,
cybersecurity, information, data, ecological security, etc. Therefore, the following types of security may be distinguished: military, ecological, economic, political, physical, social, informational, and cultural. Security itself, on the other hand, is perceived as the absence of threat, thus providing a sense of certainty and guaranteeing stability. To quote the definition from *Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa* [The Dictionary of Security Terms], “[t]he subject of security is any entity to which/whom security is attributed. In this perspective, it can be either a thing (object, machine, infrastructure), a person (individual, family, social group, society, humanity), an association (body, institution, state, alliance), activities and processes (traffic, sea and air traffic, supplies, logistics), categories (OSH, power industry, health)” (Pawłowski, Zdrodowski, & Kuliczkowski, 2020, p. 163). As regards the endangered area, we can differentiate between national, regional, international and global security. On the other hand, taking into consideration the territory of a particular country, we distinguish external and internal security. Waldemar Kitler perceives security on three levels: unitary/individual – the sense of personal security felt by individual citizens and their assessment of threat; national – how citizens feel about the security of the country as a whole; international – the situation of the country in the international arena (2009, p. 15).

The main objective of state security policy is to guarantee the safety and independence of the country in relation to outside threats and to counteract such threats. “Ensuring national security is one of the supreme categories, it concerns the survival of the country and the whole society, the protection of its territorial integrity and political independence, values such as: the sovereignty and autonomy of the country, human survival, the durability of the social and economic system, the reigning ideology, the prestige of the country in the international environment, the interests of its citizens abroad, economic progress, the people’s standard of living” (Pawłowski et al., 2020, p. 27). As Stanisław Koziej writes, “National security (security of the nation) and state security (security of the country) – are actually different conceptual categories. But from a practical point of view, at the current stage of historic development (the era of the nation states), they can conventionally be regarded as identical. Such a practice can be found in the Polish legal system, where the constitution speaks once of state security (the Republic of Poland) and at other times of national security (by establishing, for example, the National Security Council [Rada Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego])” (2011, p. 20).
The impact of the war in Ukraine on the security sectors of Poland and Europe

Russia’s war in Ukraine has significantly affected the security of Central and Eastern Europe countries. The future outcome of the war is going to exert an influence on the structure of the security not only of the whole Europe, but also the whole world, due to the fact that Russia is an international player.

Poland’s relations with Russia have always been peculiar, on account of the historical background and geopolitical situation of Poland – at the confluence of civilizations, politics, the EU, and NATO. The basis for the development of bilateral economic relations between Poland and Russia is provided by the Agreement between the Polish Government and the Government of the Russian Federation on Economic Cooperation of November 2, 2004, published in the Official Journal of the Government of the Republic of Poland [Monitor Polski] on February 14, 2005, under which the Polish-Russian Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation [Polsko-Rosyjska Międzyrządowa Komisja ds. Współpracy Gospodarczej] was established. It is the main institutional forum for economic talks held between Poland and Russia. Moreover, the relations between both countries are ruled by a number of intergovernmental agreements relating to specific branches of business and inter-regional contacts, as well as cooperation in the fields of energy, transport, border infrastructure, and tourism (GOV, n.d.-a). After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and as a result of aggressive Russian policies in eastern Ukraine, most of the above-mentioned forms of Polish-Russian economic cooperation were frozen by the Russian side (GOV, n.d.-a). Since February 24, 2022, Polish-Russian relations have deteriorated significantly; more sanctions have been imposed and both countries have started to communicate in terms of power and fear management, using propaganda. Generally, Polish-Russian relations have never been good, and there have been many areas of conflict, including: Polish support for Chechnya, NATO expansion, the anti-missile shield, the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine supported by Poland, or the conflict over the war in Georgia (Jagusia, 2022).

Undoubtedly, a number of events should also be considered bones of contention: the Smolensk air disaster, Polish efforts to spread democracy in Belarus, the migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border, and friction regarding aid for Ukraine.

Aspects of security such as energy, cyberspace, food, and society – through price increases and changes to living standards – should be considered as sensitive security areas, which were and are of importance in the international security space, and have been threatened by the Russian-Ukrainian war. Energy security is a part of the national security system, as it significantly affects the state’s economy. Energy
security means the economic capability of a country to guarantee energy supply as defined by the resilience of the energy system to exceptional and unpredictable events that can threaten the physical integrity of energy flow or lead to an unstoppable increase in energy prices regardless of economic foundations (GOV, n.d.-b). Generally speaking, every country develops an individual model of economic security, taking into account contemporary economic realities, the external international environment and relations with the economies of neighboring states and the global economy as a whole, as well as resilience to factors from the internal environment (Siemiątkowski, 2018, p. 9). Economic security incorporates the security of finances, raw material and energy, food, and technology (Siemiątkowski, 2018, p. 9). In connection with the war in Ukraine, two of them – raw materials and energy, and food – are the main factors affecting economic security in Europe and the world. Europe was predominantly dependent on imports of energy resources from the Russian Federation.

It is worth mentioning that the Russian Federation has attempted to rebuild its pre-1990 position on the international order and the global economy. Russia has repeatedly used its gas deposits for political purposes, as evident in the case of Ukraine, which was badly affected by the gas crisis in 2008/2009, which had a destabilizing effect on the country’s political situation. Europe has had to deal repeatedly with Russia’s energy blackmail, which effectively resulted in the lack of response from European countries to Russia’s accession of Crimea in 2014. The Russian Federation wanted to reduce the transit role of Ukraine and expand direct gas connections with Germany, to this end promoting the construction of the Nord Stream II pipeline, which was opposed by bypassed countries, including Poland and the Baltic States (Ruszel & Podmiotko, 2019, p. 5). “Russia’s cutting off of gas supplies to Poland and Bulgaria has triggered a wave of discussion in Europe about further steps by the Kremlin to use hydrocarbon exports to the West as a tool of political blackmail against countries supporting Ukraine, which is defending itself against Russian aggression” (Stefan, n.d.). Poland already took steps to make itself independent of supplies from the east even before the war in Ukraine, while many countries, such as Germany, Italy and even Austria, faced a major problem in this regard. When the gas supply was cut by Gazprom, the EU countries began to look for other sources and purchase options, choosing supplies of liquefied natural gas (LNG), as well as pipeline fuel from suppliers in Norway, Qatar, the US, Canada, Azerbaijan, Algeria. Thus, after decades of dependence on raw materials from Russia, the EU – the main consumer of Russian gas – replaced it with gas purchased from other sources. It should be kept in mind that prices of energy raw materials, such as gas, coal and oil, determine the prices of many products and industrial goods
and services, the production of which requires energy, and in this way affect the standard of living of consumers.

The Energy Policy of Poland until 2040 strategy states that, “[t]he goal of the state’s energy policy is: energy security while ensuring the competitiveness of the economy, energy efficiency and reducing the impact of the energy sector on the environment, with the optimal use of own energy resources” (GOV, n.d.-c).

The second major sector within the economic security threatened by the war is global food security. “Food security is the activity that countries undertake to ensure that society has access to food. Food security exists when there is no shortage of good quality food in a country and it is available to everyone” (Polish Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, n.d.). The Russian invasion of Ukraine significantly threatened the food security of developing countries, mainly in Africa and the Middle East, which depended on grain exports from Ukraine and Russia. Besides, there have been very large increases in the price of food products on the global market along with rises in the price of energy raw materials and fertilizers. It is worth noting that Ukraine and Russia are the world’s main producers of agricultural products. “According to UNCTAD, in 2020, 36% of exports of sunflower oil and seeds, 13% of the corn, 11% of rye, 10% of colza, and 9% of wheat came from Ukraine. The corresponding figures for Russia were 17%, 1%, 12%, 6%, and 18%. […] While Ukraine and Russia account for 27% of world wheat supplies, in 2018–2020 they provided 44% of imports of the grain to Africa (Russia 32%, Ukraine 12%), and some countries are extremely dependent on these sources (Somalia and Benin 100%, Egypt 82%). The largest purchasers of wheat from Ukraine in 2019 were Egypt ($685 million), Indonesia ($603 million), and the Philippines ($242 million)” (Kugiel, 2022). Due to the blockade and loss of control of Ukraine’s seaports (Chornomorsk, Mykolaiv, Yuzhne, Odessa, Mariupol, Kherson), from which agricultural products were transported, many countries did not receive the requested deliveries. As Polish authorities assure, there should be no shortage of food in Poland, and “the issue of food security and safety is one of the main objectives of the Strategy for Sustainable Development of Rural Areas, Agriculture and Fisheries 2030. With the ongoing war in Ukraine, this is currently one of the main topics discussed in international forums (EC, WTO, FAO, or OECD)” (Polish Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, n.d.).

The IT revolution has changed the image of modern societies, which have become information-based and have begun to use digital technologies, which also involves numerous risks. A digital society faces numerous dilemmas, and with the development of cyberspace, new threats are constantly emerging (cyberterrorism, information smog, digital divide, cyberpolitics, cyberdemocracy, loss of identity,
Internet addictions, viruses, privacy violations, stalking, data security, cyberespionage, cybercrime, cyberattacks are just some of the problems facing the cyberworld and modern societies), as in cyberspace, the Internet often becomes a trap for its users, as humans are unable to take in and process so much (Kancik-Kołtun, 2018, p. 8). Within cybersecurity, the following sectors can be distinguished: cyberspace security, data security, information security, network security, and ICT security. “Cyberspace security should be defined as part of the security of an entity (state) comprising a set of organizational, legal, technical, physical and educational actions aimed at ensuring the undisturbed functioning of cyberspace, including public and private ICT, critical infrastructure, as well as the processing of information resources” (Pawłowski et al., 2020, p. 22). Cybersecurity is one of Poland’s strategic security objectives and provides protection for key sectors of the economy, citizens and businesses (NASK, n.d.). As for the actual strategy on cybersecurity in Poland, it is laid out in the Cybersecurity Strategy of the Republic of Poland for 2019–2024 (Polish Ministry of Digital Affairs, 2019).

Due to Poland’s proximity to neighboring Ukraine and the ongoing war there, the geopolitical situation in the region and increased Polish-Ukrainian border traffic, alert levels have been introduced in Poland to ensure that services are ready for possible security threats. The Regulation of the Prime Minister of Poland on the scope of activities carried out in alert states and CRP levels dated July 25, 2016, is the legal document that determines the activities conducted in a particular alert level (Dziennik Ustaw, 2016). Poland recognizes four levels of alert regarding a terrorist threat or event: ALPHA, BRAVO, CHARLIE, DELTA. On the other hand, in the case of threats of a terrorist nature that relate to ICT systems of public administration bodies or ICT systems that are part of critical infrastructure, four CRP alert levels are distinguished. Information about the introduced alerts and their validity periods is published on the website of the Polish Ministry of the Interior and Administration. “The occurrence of potential risks to the security of ICT systems due to identified threats resulting from the tense situation in the region was in force in whole Poland from January 18, 2022 to January 23, 2022 and from February 15, 2022 to February 21, 2022: alert level ALFA-CRP. The third alert level CHARLIE-CRP has been in force across the entire territory of Poland since February 21, 2022 (to May 31, 2023). The second alert level (BRAVO) has been introduced across the entire territory of Poland, effective from April 16, 2022 until May 31, 2023” (Polish Ministry of the Interior and Administration, n.d.).
Poles’ sense of security in connection with the war in Ukraine

Security is one of basic human needs, which motivates people to undertake activities and gives them the feeling of certainty and stability. The feeling of safety is a subjective perception of different states; this subjectivity means that people perceive and interpret different factors in relation to themselves as threatening or safe (Marciniak, 2009, p. 58). The sense of security is one of the most important human needs, which, if not met, may result in the inability to build a well-rounded identity; it also correlates with the concept of trust understood as an element of social personality which is a category for describing social reality (Zychowicz & Halista-Telus, 2021). According to Ewa Marciniak, the structure of the sense of security consists of four elements:

– “a sense of being informed – people faced with worrying and potentially dangerous situations need to obtain information that will allow them to take appropriate steps (information about institutions responsible for protecting people, places to obtain medicines, e.g. potassium iodide, institutions defending human rights);
– a sense of certainty/stability – is based on the individual’s perception of the surrounding reality as relatively stable and predictable, which allows one to act in accordance with established norms and rules;
– a sense of belonging to a social community – is manifested in the emotional, material and social support received from a social group, where this trust forms the basis for interaction and problem-solving;
– sense of efficacy – expresses the confidence in one’s own competence, effectiveness and abilities. A sense of efficacy is also the awareness of having major opportunities to act in different spheres of life and the ability to influence one’s own situation” (2009, pp. 60–61).

The sense of security may depend on subjective factors, i.e., those dependent on the individual, and objective factors, i.e., those independent from one’s own actions. Subjective factors, also known as intrinsic factors, include: personality type, motivation, prejudices, work situation, feeling of support from loved ones. On the other hand, subjective – or external – factors include: weather conditions, state of war, crime rates, low retirement benefits, poorly functioning health services, reception and processing of information. Individual experience of sense of security, in addition to being shaped by the above, can vary by age, gender, country or region of residence, financial income, education, awareness, or one’s knowledge of a particular threat. The sense of security undergoes changes, as it is a dynamic process conditioned by different phenomena, such as war in the region,
terrorist attacks in the country, disasters or, most recently, the infectious disease pandemic – COVID-19. Often in such situations, there is a barrage of information and misinformation, or even propaganda. An individual in an emergency caused by a particular factor experiences a threat to his or her own safety, an amplification of anxiety, inability to think logically, state of terror, sadness, and can focus exclusively on this unique problem. Undoubtedly, sudden and unexpected changes defined in traumatogenic terms throw members of society out of their daily routines, resulting in a disruption of their activities in all spheres of life, hindering and even breaking off interpersonal relationships and leading to a decrease in their sense of ontological security (Zychowicz & Halista-Telus, 2021, pp. 93–94). Russia’s regular war in Ukraine was no different in this respect, being a very traumatic situation for Ukrainians, while the citizens of the former Soviet bloc countries, including those of the Visegrad Group, experienced disruptions and a radical sense of undermined security. It is not possible to eliminate threats in people’s life; individuals can only adapt to them and governments try to combat or neutralize dangers, as happened during the COVID-19 pandemic or the current war in Ukraine. Given the diminished sense of security among Poles after the outbreak of Russia’s regular war against Ukraine, Polish people showed their social sensitivity by helping Ukrainian refugees on a large scale. Undoubtedly, such activities strengthen the Polish sense of security by fostering pro-community, helping attitudes. Moreover, they bring together people providing assistance to those in need and Ukrainian citizens who rely on such support. It is also worth noting that in many European countries, at the beginning of the hostilities, social insensitivity to the war in Ukraine was observed – such behavior is detrimental to sense of security.

The analysis of the public’s sense of security was mainly based on data from the Centre for Public Opinion Research (CBOS). After the end of EuroMaidan (February 2014), the CBOS monitored Poles’ opinions on Ukraine and their state of security. Interestingly, as many as 78% of the respondents claimed then that the situation in Ukraine threatened Poland’s security (CBOS, 2014).

When Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, the Centre for Public Opinion Research launched a social survey monitoring Poles’ opinions on the war in Ukraine, which were presented as research reports. The first CBOS survey took place from February 28 to March 10, 2022, on a sample of 1,078 people (including: 56.0% by CAPI, 28.4% by CATI, and 15.6% by CAWI) (CBOS, 2022a, p. 1). Table 1 contains the questions asked about the situation in Ukraine during the survey. It results that as many as 88% of the respondents followed events in Ukraine closely, while as many as 68% helped Ukrainians and 57% avoided buying Russian products.
Table 1. Questions about the Situation in Ukraine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are you following the events in Ukraine closely?</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you helping Ukrainians in any way, e.g., in kind or financially?</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you avoiding buying Russian products?</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you stashing cash?</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you stocking up on food and other essentials?</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you planning or considering moving to a safer place abroad?</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you planning or considering moving to a safer place in the country?</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you stocking up on fuel?</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from: CBOS, 2022a, p. 2.

On the other hand, when asked the question “Do you think that the war in Ukraine threatens Poland’s security?”, as many as 47% of the respondents said “definitely yes”; 38% were of a “rather yes” opinion, making a total of 85%. In contrast, 10% thought “rather no”, 1% “definitely no”, and 4% indicated that it was “difficult to say” (CBOS, 2022a, p. 3). 84% of the respondents believed that the war in Ukraine threatened security in Europe, while according to 75%, the war in Ukraine threatened security worldwide. In the survey, 77% of the respondents said that Russia could use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, while 65% were concerned that Russia could use nuclear weapons against Poland, and slightly less, 62% of the respondents, thought that Russia could use nuclear weapons against other NATO countries.

Figure 1 shows monthly surveys on security threat in Poland due to the war in Ukraine. In March 2022, most respondents (85%) were of the opinion that the war threatened Poland, while the lowest number of respondents claiming so was in May (73%). The biggest changes can be observed between the “definitely yes” and “rather yes” results: 47% of the respondents answered “definitely yes” in March as compared with 34% in October.

In September, the respondents asked about the future of the war – Figure 2 – were in the majority (53%) convinced that the war would not spread to other countries. The later results from October, on the other hand, indicate that 44% of those surveyed were of the opinion that the war would not spread to other countries, in contrast to the 28% who claimed there would be an escalation of the conflict and the war would involve other countries; for 27% it was difficult to say.
Figure 1. Threat to Poland’s Security
Source: CBOS, 2022b, p. 2.

Figure 2. Further Fate of the War
Source: CBOS, 2022b, p. 3.
Table 2. Concerns about the Use of Nuclear Weapons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Towards whom</th>
<th>Date of survey</th>
<th>I am very much afraid of this</th>
<th>I am rather afraid of this</th>
<th>I am rather not afraid of this</th>
<th>I am not afraid at all</th>
<th>Difficult to say</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>III 2022</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X 2022</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>III 2022</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X 2022</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other NATO countries</td>
<td>III 2022</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X 2022</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from: CBOS, 2022b, p. 5.

Concerns about the use of nuclear weapons by Russia affect the sense of security, as shown in Table 2. These concerns were the highest in March – 31% of the respondents strongly believed that Russia might use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, 25% – against Poland, and 21% – against other NATO countries. In the October survey, these numbers amounted to 18% of those afraid of Russia using nuclear weapons against Ukraine, 11% – against Poland, and 7% – against other NATO country, so a decrease of a few percent, compared to earlier results, was noted. There was also an increase in October, compared to March, in the percentage of respondents who said that Russia would not use nuclear weapons. As regards the feeling of nuclear threat against Poland, it should be noted that 65% of the respondents feared this in March compared with 47% in October, which may indicate a downward trend. All the results of the surveys cited above show that Poles see the war as a security threat, whether to Ukraine, Poland or other countries.

Summary

Russia’s full-scale war taking place in Ukraine – i.e., on European territory – has significantly undermined the general sense of security felt by citizens and states. A decrease in the sense of security is noticeable in individual areas of security – energy, food, cyber or military – especially in the Central and Eastern European region and the Baltic States, which is undoubtedly influenced by the proximity of these countries to the conflict zone, as well as by historical circumstances. The further a country is geographically removed from the area of armed conflict, the more secure its citizens feel.
The outbreak of war should not have come as a great surprise, because NATO and US news reports had already mentioned a likely armed conflict well before the beginning of the current war in Ukraine. Ukraine is being helped in this war not only by NATO and EU states, but also other countries providing humanitarian, military, and financial assistance. The enormous scale of the destruction of infrastructure, razing of cities to the ground, genocide, shelling of civilian facilities, deportation of Ukrainian citizens to Russia, migration of refugees are contrary to all moral values and, first and foremost, human rights, the rules of war and humanitarian aid. It thus constitutes a violation of International Humanitarian Law and the UN Charter.

The importance of Poland and Polish diplomacy in multi-faceted assistance to Ukraine is very significant. To implement its policy of deterrence and demonstrate its ability to defend the countries of the alliance, NATO has strengthened its presence on its eastern flank, thereby also increasing the number of US and allied troops stationed in Poland, among others. This decision is also intended to improve the security of NATO member states and its citizens. NATO’s main task is to prevent a full-scale war in Europe. Russia, in turn, is threatening to use nuclear weapons to prevent Western countries from arming Ukraine. It is not out of the question that the armed conflict will spread to other countries, and Russia’s possible invasion of Moldova is often mentioned. NATO’s chief stated in December 2022 that the fighting in Ukraine could spin out of control and become a war between Russia and NATO (RP, 2022). Polish citizens are therefore justified in feeling insecure, and the Polish government responds to the threat by improving various strategic areas of security, including the country’s military security – for instance, by purchasing various types of weapons, increasing the number of troops, providing military training for citizens, and manufacturing military equipment.

Undoubtedly, a process of remodeling the world order (also as regards China, India, or Taiwan) and the regional order, in which Poland is one of the players, is currently taking place. It should also be noted that it is, to some extent, a struggle between a democratic system and an authoritarian one. The reunification of the Western countries should not only consist in the development of an international security strategy, but also in maintaining and redefining the model of democracy. With no peace between Russia and Ukraine on the horizon at the moment, there will be various tensions, threats and instability caused by the war in this region of Europe, and the idea of a NATO peacekeeping mission is rather unlikely to come into play as it would trigger a NATO-Russia conflict.
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