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Postulates and Proposals of Members of the Polish Government-in-Exile for Poland's Economic Security in the Context of the Reconstruction of the State in 1944–1945: Selected Examples

Postulaty i propozycje członków Rządu RP na Uchodźstwie dla bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego Polski w kontekście odbudowy państwa w latach 1944–1945 – wybrane przykłady

• Abstract •

The article aims to indicate selected, postulated directions of Poland's economic recovery in the early years after World War II, considering the contribution made by the Polish Government-in-Exile (Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile). The analysis includes a query of archival documents from 1944–1945 and a review of scientific literature.

The thesis has been put forward that the substantive developments from the years 1944–1945 prepared by the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile may constitute a valuable cognitive source for the analysis of possible directions of reconstruction and development of the Polish economy after the destruction caused by the events of World War II.

• Abstrakt •

Artykuł ma na celu wskazanie wybranych, postulowanych kierunków odbudowy gospodarczej Polski w pierwszych latach po II wojnie światowej, z uwzględnieniem wkładu Rządu RP na Uchodźstwie. Analiza obejmuje kwerendę dokumentów archiwalnych z lat 1944–1945 oraz przegląd dostępnej literatury naukowej.

Postawiono tezę, że opracowania merytoryczne z lat 1944–1945 przygotowane przez Rząd RP na Uchodźstwie mogą stanowić cenne źródło poznawcze do analizy możliwych kierunków odbudowy i rozwoju polskiej gospodarki po zniszczeniach spowodowanych wydarzeniami II wojny światowej.

Wykazano, że Rząd RP na Uchodźstwie stworzył liczne opracowania dotyczące odbudowy

It has been shown that the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile created numerous studies on the economic recovery of the country after World War II, even before the armed conflict formally ended. Many of the valuable guidelines referred to the reconstruction and development of the coal mining industry, oil industry, and forest management.

Keywords: economy; state reconstruction; the Polish Government-in-Exile

gospodarczej kraju po II wojnie światowej, jeszcze przed formalnym zakończeniem konfliktu zbrojnego. Wiele cennych wskazówek dotyczyło odbudowy i rozwoju górnictwa węglowego, przemysłu naftowego i gospodarki leśnej.

Słowa kluczowe: gospodarka; odbudowa państwa; Rząd Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na Uchodźstwie

Introduction

The end of World War II for the Polish state was connected to considerable territorial, population, and economic losses. The state's area decreased from 389.7 to 312.7 thousand square kilometres (by about 20%) (Łuczak, 1993). The personnel losses were estimated at 6.028 million people, of which 5.384 million losses from the occupiers' terror, and 644 thousand as the effect of direct (frontal) warfare (*Sprawozdanie w przedmiocie strat i szkód wojennych Polski w latach 1939–1945*, 1947; Grabowski, 2018; Jezierski & Leszczyńska, 2003; Łuczak, 1994; Gawryszewski, 2005; Roszkowski, 2010). When it comes to economic losses, postwar Poland had to struggle with material damage and lost production worth about 258.4 billion zlotys, of which 89 billion zlotys were direct and 169 billion zlotys indirect losses (*Sprawozdanie...*, 1947; Jezierski & Leszczyńska, 2003; Madajczyk, 1970).

Under the above conditions, it proved necessary to rebuild and develop destroyed Poland. The members of the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile also formulated key directions for reconstruction. It should be noted here that the undertaken deliberations in the article focus on the analysis of the archival materials collected in the Archives of the Józef Piłsudski Institute in America (AIJP in America) and – only to an auxiliary extent – the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum in London. The finds concerning the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping gathered in the Archives of Modern Records in Warsaw have been omitted as they may constitute separate sources that require further examination and at the same time may prove useful for a possible continuation of the considerations initially outlined by the authors in this paper. It should be noted that apart from the internal conditions resulting from the new political authorities' decisions, numerous external factors had to be taken into consideration. One example is the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) work, which was established

in Washington in November 1943 to support the reconstruction of the destroyed economies of European and Asian countries. The United States played a special role in financing the reconstruction of destroyed European economies, including Poland. The contribution of such countries as the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Switzerland as foreign directions of covering the needs of the Polish economy from as early as 1944–1945 is also noted in the archives (*Notatka w sprawie podziału zapotrzebowania powojennych*, [1944/1945]). What is more, the literature emphasizes that UNRRA's activities also aimed at helping people who found themselves outside their home countries as a result of warfare. Assisting repatriates remained a key area of the organization's activity (Florczak, 2014). Another external factor is the Stalinization of the Polish economy due to the Soviet Union's influence on decisions in reborn Poland (Sudziński, 1999). In the history of post-war Poland, the role of a significant emigration centre – the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile – that had resided in London since June 1940, also became apparent. For that reason, it is sometimes referred to in the literature as the “London Government” (Friszke, 1999).

The historiography presents the organization and staffing (Duraczyński, 1993; Friszke, 1998; Górecki, 2002; Hładkiewicz, 1995; Hułas, 1996) of the Polish Government in London and the foreign policy of this emigration centre after World War II in an exhaustive way (Machcewicz, 1999; Tarka, 2003, 2002a, 2002b). The researchers dealt with issues related to substantive concepts and postulates of the émigré community regarding Poland's economic reconstruction from war damage to a much lesser extent. During the process of reviewing this paper, an article by Mikołaj Getka-Kenig (2020) was published in historiography. The author referred to similar issues, but strictly in relation to the proposals and plans to rebuild destroyed Warsaw. The Polish Government-in-Exile had been formulating such ideas since 1944. The time caesura was justified by the fact that in above mentioned years, the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile issued the documents which dealt with the selected research subject. The positions presented by the members of the Government-in-Exile may complement the discussion on the problems of Poland's economic reconstruction in the declining period of World War II in the perspective of the situation in the first post-war years.

The authors devoted much attention to postulates and proposals of the members of the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile for the economic recovery of the country at the end of World War II. One should remember that the efforts of the Polish Government-in-Exile did not include formal plans to rebuild the country as the Polish state was under the actual occupation of two neighbours – Germany and the Soviet Union. It is impossible to present the reconstruction plans legally sanctioned for the years 1944–1945 since the Polish Government-in-Exile did

not have formal tools to implement such programs. The postulates and proposals presented might be a valuable source of substantive analyses that could have been considered in the post-war reconstruction of the Polish economy.

Poland's economic reconstruction in the postulates of the Polish Government-in-Exile: decision-making institutions and sources of information

Economic programs in the years 1944–1945 were formulated by both economists in occupied Poland and economists and practitioners of economic life associated with the Polish Government-in-Exile in London. In the emigration community, plans for the reconstruction of the country were created and discussed among the Committee for the Economic Plan established in 1942 at the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping. The Committee specialized primarily in the work on post-war plans for the reconstruction of Polish roads, water facilities, airports, and sea ports. Moreover, from 1944 on, plans to rebuild the war damage were carried out in the following Departments of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping: Economic and Trade, Industrial, Communication, Construction and Public Works, Agriculture and Agricultural Reform, as well as Maritime Affairs. The contribution of the Sea Council operating at the Ministry was also important in the described process of economic recovery (Polak, 2011).

The work of the Commission for the Economic Plan and the above-mentioned organizational units of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping were supported by members of the Association of Engineers and Technicians, the Association of Polish Lawyers in the United Kingdom, the 6 Months Commission and the Association of Polish Economists in Great Britain (Chumiński, 2021). The Polish Government-in-Exile obtained information in cooperation with social and professional organizations. The cooperation was conducted with highly qualified specialists with technical education, bearing in mind the fact that many social activists and people supporting the efforts of the Polish Government-in-Exile were staying in Great Britain at that time. The Government obtained opinions of Polish engineers on the development plans of post-war Poland. A Planning Committee on Social Income Development was also established during this period (Petz, 1989).

Another important institution working on the plans for the economic reconstruction of Poland in the years 1944–1945 was the Social and Economic Commission of the National Council of the Republic of Poland. The National Council of the Republic of Poland remained the consultative and opinion-making body of

the President and the Polish Government-in- Exile in the 1939–1945 period (and during the functioning of the Polish People’s Republic from 1949). The Commission presented the assumptions of the economic reconstruction of war-devastated Poland from July 1942, and its aim was to bring about not only economic reconstruction, but also unification of the country in terms of politics and morality (Polak, 2011).

Information on the war damage in Poland was obtained thanks to the activities of the Government Delegation for Poland as the secret supreme administrative authority in occupied Poland, functioning until July 1, 1945, as the civil authority of the Polish Underground State, which was subordinate to the Polish Government-in-Exile. The organizational units of the Government Delegation for Poland dealing with the broader economic intelligence included: the National Economy Department as part of the Presidency Office, the Press and Information Department, the Agriculture Department, the Treasury Department, the Industry and Trade Department, and the National Council for Reconstruction. Each of these authorities obtained and transferred reports from occupied Poland to the Polish Government-in-Exile. The Government Delegation for Poland also had a field structure, which made it easier to obtain information on war damage in individual regions of the country. Diplomatic communication posts were also maintained in the civil division of the Polish Underground State in order to enable contact and exchange of information with the Polish Government-in-Exile. Additionally, as indicated in the literature, the secret structures of the Home Army (AK) carried out extensive statistical work on economic intelligence in occupied Poland. The results of this work were sent to the Government headquarters in London (Łazowska, 2017).

The main assumptions of the economic reconstruction of the country in the opinion of the Government-in-Exile

The positions of the representatives of the émigré community, although ultimately in many points not overlapping with the intentions of the new communist authorities after 1945, undoubtedly deserve attention, as evidenced by the earlier review of historical sources concerning the political development of post-war emigration. Economic issues remained a critical area in the postulates presented by the Polish Government-in-Exile. In the document entitled *Odbudowa kraju po II wojnie światowej. Podstawy faktyczne i założenia* [Rebuilding the Country after World War II: The Factual Basis and Assumptions], the government presented numerous postulates concerning required changes in Poland. The examples include striving to raise national income from increasing production in all economy branches and changing

the production structure towards satisfying mass needs instead of production for the war economy. The employment growth using public works and the development of production and consumption most commonly and uniformly possible (especially in the production and distribution of basic foodstuffs) were considered equally important. The position of the Government-in-Exile also considered three options of conducting economic policy in the initial years after World War II: the liberal option, the option of far-reaching economic rationing, as well as the indirect option using the solutions of the neoliberal system in some areas, while in others the developed rationing. In the field of the economy led by state institutions, the main issues to be addressed comprised property control and the associated development of cooperatives and utilities, the complex system of social assistance for the population, and quantitative rationing regarding price formation policies in specific industries and agriculture. In turn, the recommendations specific to the liberal economy (in today's assessment it can be presented as a free market economy) included, above all, the development of institutional and commercial links in the international context within the European and, more broadly, world economy (*Odbudowa kraju po II wojnie światowej...*, [1944/1945]). In fact, after World War II, the national authorities decided to introduce a model of a guided economy, otherwise centrally planned, with a wide range of rationing in all areas of economic life. It is worth noting that the literature indicates that until 1947, the changes in the economy towards central planning were sectional, covering selected sectors, and only since the turn of the 1940s and 1950s should the authorities' efficient actions be found for full economic rationing (Luszniewicz, 2009).

The document prepared by the circles of the Government-in-Exile formulated an interesting classification of the division of Polish expenditures in the years 1919–1945. The following calculations concerning the development of Polish investments were indicated (*Schemat podziału inwestycji w Polsce w okresie 26 lat*, [1944/1945]):

- construction – 40 billion zlotys, including housing (29 billion zlotys), public (7 billion zlotys), and commercial (4 billion zlotys);
- industry – 30 billion zlotys, including the largest share of investments in heavy industry (16 billion zlotys);
- communication – 21.5 billion zlotys, including the largest share of investments in land roads (7.50 billion zlotys) and railroads (7.25 billion zlotys);
- agriculture – 10 billion zlotys.

The above classification presents a valuable image. It shows how the investments in the Polish economy were distributed in the period from regaining independence in 1918 to the end of World War II. It reveals potential problems that the Polish economy could have faced after the major military conflict in the 20th century.

Difficulties were associated primarily with underestimating the role of agriculture, even though that sector had a critical share in the employment of a significant part of the population, especially in the areas of the so-called Poland “B”. In the contractual division, Poland “A” (the lands of the former Prussian partition) and Poland “B” (the lands of the former Austrian and Russian partition) shared significant disparities in economic and social development, taking differences in the population’s employment structure into account. British sources indicate that Poland “A” occupied 36% of the country’s area with a population of 51.7% and an industrialisation rate of 87.8%. For comparison, Poland “B” occupied the area of 64% of the country with the population of 48.3% and the industrialization index of only 12.2% due to the domination of agriculture, both in the structure of economic production and employment in the national economy (The Central Industrial Region – A Polish T.V.A., 1945). The problem of overinvestment in heavy industry, with emphasis on the armaments industry, due to the end of the war conflict and the difficulties in adapting large masses of people previously working in the armaments industry to the labour market, turned out to be equally crucial after 1945. The literature indicates that the problem of employment in heavy industry in the new conditions of Poland’s development was revealed especially during the so-called six-year plan (1950–1955), when it was decided to reorganize industrial production and return to heavy industry expansion (Szpor, 1983). The years 1944–1950 were a transition period when the main goal was to eliminate differences in economic development between individual areas of Poland, which made it impossible to develop the scale of industrial production (also in the heavy industry) from the end of the interwar period. In 1946, industry employed only 52.8 people per 1,000 inhabitants (Jeziński & Leszczyńska, 2003). It was only after 1950 that the communist authorities decided to direct the economic development of the country to the expansion of heavy industry, allocating about 4/5 of all investment outlays for that purpose. It led to further significant changes in the employment structure of the national economy in favor of heavy industry in 20th-century Poland (Przedpelski & Smoliński, 1970).

Interestingly, in the opinion of the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile expressed in October 1942, i.e., in the period preceding the years analyzed in the article, a model of heavy industry development was proposed. It was the opposite of later changes implemented in practice in the socialist system of post-war People’s Poland. There it was stated that: “The internationalization of heavy industry, or the enfranchisement of smaller enterprises by a multitude of workers, is not an issue for the Polish conditions of today. That is because in a country with a reasonable planned policy of prices, earnings, taxes and tax breaks, and

credit policy, private capital gives the lowest cost of administering and managing capital (if there is much capital); it is socially the cheapest system of exploitation” (Zagrodzki, [1942]).

This position determines the demands of the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile to maintain private property in the heavy industry while having broad access to foreign capital. It is worth mentioning that immediately before the outbreak of World War II, the leading areas of heavy industry were dominated or at least included a large share of foreign capital. For example, in the coal mining sector, Polish capital accounted for a total of 30.58% (of which private capital 10.73%) in 1937, while the share of German capital exceeded 42%, with a high share of the French capital (17.12%). In turn, in oil production, French capital (51.3%) prevailed over Polish capital (41.2%, of which private capital 39.4%). The advantage of the Polish capital was noted in natural gas production (68.25%, of which private capital 40.65%). For comparison, the share of the leading foreign, i.e., French, capital in this field was 29.7% in 1937. Finally, the share of foreign capital in the Polish steel industry was at a high level of 43% (Wandycz, [1944]).

In the field of reconstruction of the so-called second sector of the economy, the Government-in-Exile concentrated on the complete recovery of the destroyed branches of the raw materials industry, including wood, chemical and synthetic fibres, refinery, and mineral industries. Another postulate concerned the expansion and modernization of the metallurgical, metal-processing, electrotechnical, automotive, textile, aviation, food, and tanning sectors violated by the war. The primary way to quickly rebuild those branches was to be a system of public works organized by the state (Wandycz, [1944/1945a]).

A separate postulate of the Government-in-Exile was to work out the basis for the development of relatively new or previously neglected industrial sectors in post-war Poland. It was intended to include the light metal and machine and electrical industries, as well as the food industry, following the example of solutions developed and functioning in the UK (*Rozbudowa i modernizacja przemysłu*, [1944/1945]). It was proposed to base the process of rebuilding the destruction of industry on cooperation and foreign funds. In the opinion of Jan Wszelaki, a Polish diplomat and economist, Polish activist and secretary of the Polish embassy in London, the basic thesis for the quick and effective reconstruction of economically destroyed Poland was the involvement of foreign capital, mainly from the United States and Latin American countries, including Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil. The financial assistance provided by Switzerland, Portugal, and Ireland may have been of lesser importance, although still relevant for the implementation of the above-mentioned action. The author also proposed to base the process of rebuilding Warsaw on the

initiative of assistance from American cities and the American government apparatus through funds provided by UNRRA (Wszelaki, [1944/1945]).

Another document presents the position that at the turn of 1944 and 1945, the relations of the Government-in-Exile with the UNRRA boiled down to “submitting to them and discussing detailed specifications to the items reported in general demand. These specifications are submitted on our own initiative as they are developed by various departments, or in response to requests from individual UNRRA officers. In the latter case, we receive a simple query in the form of «I ask for specifications for such and such items». [...] In general, in terms of organization and division of work, there seems to be a lot of chaos” (*List L. Zienkowskiego do D.S. Wandycza...*, [1944]).

It is worth noting that the postulate of using the support from foreign capital in the process of economic reconstruction of the country was widely shared by the Government-in-Exile in London. It became apparent especially in the context of the need to quickly rebuild the capital. The beginning of efforts aimed at making Warsaw’s reconstruction on an international scale was to be the task not only of the Interministerial Committee established for this purpose, but also of the Civic Committee for the Reconstruction of Warsaw, as a social body independent of the Committee (Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping, 1944). The Committee was also to promote the issue of Warsaw’s reconstruction among Polish organizations abroad, maintain relations with the authorities of London and major British cities, and to work for the creation of the Committee for the Reconstruction of Warsaw among British society of Polish citizens living in the United Kingdom. The Committee’s activities were also focused on encouraging Polish citizens living abroad “to make sacrifices for the Committee’s purposes and offer cooperation on specific issues” (*Program działalności Komitetu Obywatelskiego Odbudowy m.st. Warszawy...*, 1945).

The Polish Government-in-Exile also assessed the demand for human labor in the national economy, estimating that in post-war conditions in 1945, the number of needed workers would exceed the demand from September 1939 by at least over 402,000. people The estimates of the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile showed data on the demand for workers to rebuild the national economy in general, without division into individual economic sectors. It was determined for 2,294,945 workers, including 560,995 professionals, 417,750 apprentices, and 1,316,200 non-qualified workers. At the same time, the need to train 382,120 specialists, including 11,530 engineers, 51,750 technicians, 97,760 skilled craftsmen, and 163,080 people apprenticing to specialized jobs, was also identified. The upper limit of employment in the industry alone was estimated at 1.06–1.1 million people, which, in the opinion of the representatives of the Government of the Republic of

Poland in Exile, required an inflow of about 200 thousand workers compared to the state achieved in the national economy on September 1, 1939 (*Wyciąg z referatu o fachowcach dla planu 5-letniego*, [1944/1945]).

Coal mining industry

The reconstruction of the destroyed sector of the mining industry, which primarily included the extraction and processing of hard coal, belonged to the priorities of the new Polish authorities at the end of the war. The role of this developmental factor was also recognized in the assessments of the Polish Government-in-Exile. It is worth noting that the War Compensation Office of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers estimated the material losses in the mining sector at 721 million zlotys in 1947. That was less than 1/10 of the losses incurred in Polish industry in the years 1939–1945 (*Sprawozdanie...*, 1947).

In the view of the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile, the issue of rebuilding the potential of the Polish coal industry, treated as strategic for the economic growth and thus Poland's rise after the destruction of World War II, was imperative. The members of the Government-in-Exile saw an opportunity for the development of the sector in the renewal of the Polish-British coal agreement reached in the mid-1930s. The potential renewal of the coal agreement was justified particularly by the position of the countries, both in the production of the raw material and its export on the European continent. It was noted in the archives that, in 1938, Poland was ranked 4th in coal production with a result of 39 million cubic tons per year and 3rd in raw material exports (with a share of 11.6% of total coal exports among European countries). The United Kingdom was ranked 1st in both classifications (with production at the level of 232 million cubic tons per year and 49.5% share in the export of raw material in Europe). The cooperation in these conditions was a substitute of uncontrolled competition in coal trade (for more information on the basis of the agreement between Poland and Great Britain of the mid-30s, see: Kaliszuk, 1977). In their opinion, the coal industry should have been stabilized thanks to the international agreement with the British. The encouragement of numerous economic migrants to return to mining was assessed as equally vital. It was noted that the difficulties in the period before and during the outbreak of World War II caused many Polish workers to leave to work in mines in France and Belgium, weakening the possibility of increasing extraction in the first period after the war. According to the members of the Polish Government-in-Exile, in addition to an agreement with the British, cooperation with the United States should have

been sought. It was to prove a favourable condition for the reconstruction of the coal industry in war-ravaged Poland. The cooperation was to contribute to stabilizing demand for Polish coal exports in foreign markets (*The British-Polish Coal Agreement*, [1944/1945]). It should be added that external conditions were also important, as was the difficult situation within the country. This unfavorable factor was present even before the outbreak of World War II. Especially, the remoteness of Polish exports from the sales markets and the threat of price dumping in those years were noticed (Łazor, 2016).

An additional problem, which was assessed as significant, was the regulation of the workers' legal situation in coal mines concerning compensation for accidents at work. Although the statistics presented by the analyzed emigration centre covered the end of the interwar period, it should be assessed with a high probability that they were also justified in the period of the end of World War II and the new realities of the Polish economy. For example, in 1937, the number of accidents in mines was 10,434, while in 1935 it was 8,263. The number of accidents on the surface also increased – from 1,860 to 2,348. A similar trend was observed in the case of fatal accidents in coal mines – from 134 people in 1935 to 154 people in 1937 (*The Organization of Safety Measures for Labor and Accident Compensation in Polish Coal-Mining*, [1944/1945]). In the opinion of the Government-in-Exile, in the new post-war conditions, the prevention of incidents and other dangerous events in the mines had to be improved, including the introduction of additional safety devices to those required by law, or the planning of buildings and communication routes. Equally important activities were to cover modernization of ill-functioning lighting, ventilation and heating systems, as well as necessary changes in social legislation related to the issue of compensatory benefits for miners for accidents at work (*The Organization of Safety Measures for Labor and Accident Compensation in Polish Coal-Mining*, [1944/1945]).

In the opinion of the members of the Polish Government-in-Exile, the recovery of the Polish coal mining industry required the employment growth of at least 26 thousand workers. In the plans, the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile also estimated the total cost of investments in the coal industry, extending the investment costs to the production of kerosene. The required outlays were to amount to nearly 650 million zlotys, which was the third place in the investment structure in individual sectors of the country's industry in the first five years after World War II. More significant investment outlays were envisaged only for the expansion of metal processing (760 million zlotys) and the chemical industry (670 million zlotys). The cost of required expenditures per one worker in the coal mining industry was the highest of all economic sectors. The cost of investment in coal

mining was estimated at 25 thousand zlotys per one employee. For comparison, for metal processing it amounted to nine thousand zlotys, while for the chemical industry it was 23 thousand zlotys (Zienkowski, [1944]). Another issue in the development of the coal mining industry in Poland was the need to expand thermal power plants. The Polish Government-in-Exile postulated to expand and modernize about 16 thermal power plants, which required the acquisition of nearly 340 million zlotys (Zienkowski, [1944]). The above actions required the development of a plan for electrification of Poland in new post-war conditions. The Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping was responsible for creating the basis for determining the needs and cost estimate of electrification. In carrying out the task, the Ministry made use of commissioning expert opinions to relevant institutions within the framework of subsidies granted to them (Kaliński, 1977).

The oil industry

Following the estimates from 1947, due to the warfare Poland lost 229 million zlotys of coal and oil reserves, compared to the reserves at the disposal of the Polish Armed Forces and the Ministry of Communication on September 1, 1939 (*Sprawozdanie...*, 1947). What is more, total oil production decreased already in 1943 by over 20% in comparison with the situation in 1938, when it reached the value of over 507 thousand tons. Another problem was the outdated infrastructure of oil extraction on Polish lands in contrast to other countries' infrastructure. The significantly deteriorating condition of the infrastructure of the fuel and energy industry contributed to a fall in productivity and safety in oil extraction and processing (Wandycz, [1944/1945c]). In the result of the occupation of neighbouring countries, about 70% of the Polish oil industry was in Soviet hands in 1939–1945, while almost 30% of fossil fuels, including oil, were exploited for German purposes (Wandycz, [1944/1945d]). In turn, the inclusion of the so-called Recovered Territories (or Regained Territories) into Poland's administrative borders should be regarded as one of the favourable post-war conditions for the development of the Polish oil industry and, more broadly, mineral and mining, and fuel and energy industries. Given the problems of heavy industry development, regaining the Silesian region by Poland was of strategic importance (Kociszewski, 1995).

In the opinion of the members of the Polish Government-in-Exile, the growing demands of various industry sectors and the population's consumption needs required increased production of, above all, petrol. While in 1938 the consumption of fuel in Poland amounted to about 110 thousand tons, in the first year since

the end of the war the needs of the economy and population were estimated at about 200.3 thousand tons per year, including 120 thousand tons for cars and motorcycles, 57 thousand tons for agricultural tractors, 13.3 thousand tons for aviation, and 10 thousand tons for industrial plants (*Explanatory Notes. Note of Polish Crude Oil and Petroleum Products, Requirements Presented to the UNRRA*, [1944/1945]). In the years 1944–1945, the demand for petrol, initially estimated at 200.3 thousand tons per year, was increased to 282 thousand tons, especially taking into account the growing demand of all industrial sectors in the post-war Polish economy. The necessity of achieving kerosene production at the level of about 180 thousand tons was determined, compared to the consumption of 136 thousand tons in 1938. The economy's demand for diesel oil and light heating oil was set at 100 thousand tons, i.e., 23 thousand tons more than in 1938, while the required lubricant production was estimated at 52 thousand tons, i.e., 10 thousand more than before World War II. After the war, the asphalt production was assessed as insufficient to meet the actual economic needs (45 thousand tons of demand per year compared to 36 thousand tons in 1938) (Wandycz, [1944/1945b]). The above data, developed with the participation of specialists from the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile, indicated the directions of development of the oil industry, also confirming the need to ensure stable import of the above fuels after the war. The postulates developed by the émigré community were partly implemented in practice by the new Polish authorities, who were faced with the necessity of supplying the development of individual industry sectors with necessary fuels and energy resources. The literature emphasizes that the dynamics of fuels and energy resources import to Poland weakened only in 1950–1955 (Skodlarski, 2000). Representatives of the Polish Government-in-Exile claimed that it was necessary to increase oil production (Kowalewski, [1944/1945]). As stated, the use of deposits located in the Małopolska region could have been particularly important for the development of the oil industry in post-war Poland. The raw material wealth of this region was treated after 1918 as a key factor of the country's economic growth, although the authorities were not able to take full advantage of this factor due to the sale of oil in Polish brands at unfavorable prices to European markets before the denomination period and the introduction of the Polish zloty (Kowalewski, [1944/1945]).

The Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile indicated an estimate of equipment that could be imported from the UK to improve the situation in the oil industry. The cost of the necessary machinery and equipment was estimated at about 265 million zlotys. It was proposed to spread the cost over 5 years, with 10% of the debt to be repaid in the first year, 20% each in the second and third year, and

25% each in the fourth and fifth year. The possible purchases were divided into the following categories (Kowalewski, [1944]):

- oil drilling – purchase of rotary bolts for work at depths of 600, 1,800 and 3,000 m respectively, rotary and core cranes, pumps for exploitation, and equipment for mine workshops and geophysical one – a total cost of 101.4 million zlotys;
- gasoline plants and gas – import of apparatus and purchase of licenses with a total cost of 2 million zlotys;
- transport – purchase of 600 road tankers, 10 thousand steel cylinders and 10 gas compression stations – a total cost of 111.7 million zlotys;
- refineries – including the import of new and modernization of existing refinery equipment and equipment for research stations – a total cost of 25 million zlotys;
- production of synthetic gasoline – purchase of Fischer and Tropy brand production equipment, allowing achieving production capacity of 150 thousand tons per year – a total cost of 25 million zlotys.

Another proposal was to reduce the disproportions between exploitation and exploration drilling. In the opinion of the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile, the national authorities developed the latter insufficiently, which contributed to the lack of recognition of actual field reserves of minerals. The Government-in-Exile proposed an investment program of about 300 million zlotys, including the development of the refining industry with greater emphasis on the search for new oil deposits. Besides, it was proposed to build a synthetic gasoline plant as a supplemental measure to cover the needs of the national economy for fuel. The described program postulated to expand the gas pipeline network in Poland. Building a natural gas soot plant at the cost of 3–4 million zlotys and investment involving the construction of smaller sections of the gas pipeline network between Tarnów and Cracow at the cost of about 4 million zlotys per 100 km of new pipeline branches were also postulated. A detailed catalogue of proposals also included the possibility of implementing the postulates abandoned before the war, developed in 1938 by the Association of Polish Oil Industry Engineers. The reform of the oil industry was to cost 317.4 million zlotys and concern the start of exploratory drilling in the Carpathian Mountains, starting from 500-meter wells and ending with wells up to 3 thousand meters. It was also proposed to start drilling at 20 points in the foothills of the Świętokrzyskie Mountains with a total area of about 30 thousand square meters. Another proposal was to start 50 exploratory drillings in Pomerania and Kujawy at the depth of 2 thousand meters and total area of 100 thousand square meters. Those activities required earlier geological and geophysical research, as well as about 2.5 thousand auxiliary drillings

with the depth from 100 to 400 meters as part of necessary preparatory research works. The deadline for the investment program implementation was estimated at 3–5 years, depending on the possession of the required equipment and the work intensity. It was accepted that most of the machinery and equipment would have to be imported from abroad, while about 2 million meters of drilling pipes would be produced in Poland. In turn, within the framework of the exploitation drilling that was to be continued in parallel with the investment program in the exploration drilling, it was estimated that the number of needed pipes is about 900 thousand meters within five years after World War II. The proposed investment activities also included the expansion of the refinery apparatus, with the presentation of two alternative proposals, i.e., the construction of one large plant or the expansion of existing refineries. According to the presented estimates, under the first proposal, maintaining the processing capacity of one plant at the level of 300–350 thousand tons per year would be the cost of 23–27 million zlotys each year within 5 years after World War II, while the alternative proposal, i.e., modernization of the existing refineries – the cost of about 20 million zlotys per year. Finally, it was postulated to expand warehouses, distribution facilities, and the liquid fuel transport system. The expenses were to close at about 11.5 million zlotys, of which the largest share in the cost structure were such activities as supplementing the fleet of rail and road tankers (4 million zlotys), and developing the activities of research institutes and laboratories (3 million zlotys) (Klimkiewicz, [1944/1945]).

Forest management

According to estimates of the post-war Polish authorities, forestry (classified together with hunting and fishing) suffered losses of 28% compared to production in September 1939. Direct losses in the management of forests in Poland were estimated at 3,579 million zlotys, the largest share of which were losses in the stand (2,465 million zlotys), followed by losses in private forests (621 million zloty) (*Sprawozdanie...*, 1947). In the opinion of the members of the Polish Government-in-Exile, more emphasis should have been placed on forest management in the economic recovery of the country after the war damage. Reconstruction and protection of forests against destruction and uncontrolled exploitation was an essential postulate presented by the emigration community. It was proposed to introduce transitional forms of forest management within six months from the formal end of World War II to stabilize normal conditions of production, trade, and use of wood for own purposes. It was noticed that warfare and earlier

overexploitation of forests in the interwar period contributed to a decrease in Poland's forest cover from 37% to 22% (*Wytyczne uruchomienia gospodarstwa leśnego w okresie pierwszych 6 miesięcy*, [1944/1945]). Another point of the reforms was to stop the so-called wild parcelling of forest land, i.e., activities carried out without the authorities' permission and in violation of public interest. The problem of wild land parcelling was growing especially after 1925, when new laws on agricultural reform were introduced in Poland. They met with resistance of some citizens, owners of farms (Nowosielski, 2007).

Another problem noticed by the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile was the drop in the productive capacity of forests. The essence of this decline was presented in the following way: "By making excessive cuts and simultaneously neglecting the afforestation of logging areas, we have reduced the stock that produces wood, and thus we have reduced the growth of wood, which is the basis for use. By increasing the annual cut above the standard of this growth, we have reached the share capital, accumulated over long periods through natural processes and thus destroyed the workshop without being able to rebuild it at any time" (*Wytyczne uruchomienia gospodarstwa leśnego...*, [1944/1945]).

According to the Government-in-Exile, the state's role in the process of controlling the use of private forests should be increased. That justified the need for the state authorities to participate in organizing forest and timber production in private forests more intensively than in the years 1918–1939. It was stated that only less than 1/3 of private forests were subject to afforestation, which led to the accumulation of costs of future post-war afforestation at about 45 million zlotys. The elements of changes in forest management were also supposed to be the application of an appropriate price policy in the market so that the owners of the farms could obtain a minimum income from the forest, increase the industrialization of the forest farms, as well as secure the sale of wood and other forest products to protect the interests of the forest farms. Another solution was to reduce the public law burden of farm owners on the state and local government in relation to taxes and tributes and thus adjust the fees to taxpayers' real financial possibilities (*Wytyczne uruchomienia gospodarstwa leśnego...*, [1944/1945]).

Direct war damage was a separate issue. In effect of the German occupier's actions, "the entire forestry industry was directed to supplying considerable quantities of wood that were considered necessary for the German war economy" (Stachura & Pazdur, 1970).

The robbery element was a key aspect about weakening the development potential of Polish forestry on the eve of the end of World War II. At the same time, the literature shows that the forest management of the Polish state did not

cope well enough with the losses suffered during World War I, from which a new military conflict broke out in a relatively short time. It is estimated that during World War I, Poland suffered losses of about 72 million cubic meters of wood material, which could not be potentially used for the development of the national economy also after World War II (Domański, 1985). In turn, losses from the latter conflict were estimated at less than 35% of pre-war production in agriculture, of which the plundering of forests, both by the Third Reich and the Soviet Union, amounted to more than 100 million cubic meters of wood (Dominiczak, Halaba, & Walichnowski, 1984). Another source points to the loss of 132 million cubic meters of firewood and construction timber as a direct consequence of the German and Soviet occupiers' robbery (Iwanowski, 1961).

Most of the plants, machinery, and equipment used in the wood industry were destroyed, while forest robbery increased the risk of natural disasters, with floods at the forefront. An important demand of the Government-in-Exile was to base the reconstruction of state and private forests on significant restrictions on their use. For many farms, that meant a complete loss of freedom of forest management, including nationalization of part of the property with compensation. Increasing employment in the wood industry was also considered to be vital for the state economic policy. The state's primary task was to ensure the capital inflow from activating forest credits and monitoring the profitability of activities carried out by companies operating in the described national economy. That concerned in equal measure the restoration of the position of the public and private sector in relation to the wood industry companies. In the opinion of the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile, the smallest forest holdings should be covered by the aid offered by cooperative forest organizations and economic self-government in the first months after the restoration of national independence (*Wytyczne uruchomienia gospodarstwa leśnego...*, [1944/1945]).

The Polish Government-in-Exile saw the need to unify the system of control over the use of wood to serve individual economy sectors after World War II. It was proposed to establish the Central Wood Office with its seat in Warsaw as the executive body of the Minister of Agriculture and Agricultural Reforms, and district wood offices at provincial offices under its authority. The Central Wood Office would be responsible for the division of timber in the economy, control over its economical and rational use, and setting prices for the raw material and wood materials (*Wytyczne uruchomienia gospodarstwa...*, [1944/1945]). Similar discussions took place in the communist government in Poland, which resulted in the creation of the Central Board of the Wood Industry, which, however, was finally established in 1948 (Order of the Minister of Industry and Trade..., 1948).

In post-war Poland, the ownership structure of forest holdings was formed, which proved to be a factor hindering the use of the potential of this national economy sector. The majority of private forests were in the hands of small and medium landowners, which at the time of land parcelling led to the threat of farm owners' inability to live independently. What is more, after World War II the relation between capital and labour input in private forests increased significantly in favour of the former, which was an additional burden for forest owners to be able to manage the destroyed forest areas effectively. Finally, the significant constraint was the lack of professional staff to manage private forests. The percentage of the so-called professional personnel in private forests in Poland was to be about 11%. Under those conditions, the private forest nationalization was a postulate acceptable to members of the Polish Government-in-Exile due to the need for stabilizing forest management. It is worth mentioning that in the draft agricultural law of 1944, the Government-in-Exile put forward a proposal that all forests, except for small properties with areas below 50 ha and communal forests, should become state property. It was proposed that the nationalization of the forest farms should involve compensation for their owners. The amount of compensation was to be the subject of a separate regulation at the statutory level. The period of execution of the act was estimated at 5 years, and until the end of the process the existing owners were to be responsible for the property management. The reform assumed that the state took over private forests together with the previous owners' obligations towards third parties (*Wytyczne uruchomienia gospodarstwa leśnego...*, [1944/1945]). However, the agrarian reform carried out by the communist authorities in Poland from 1944 ignored the proposals presented by the Polish Government-in-Exile. In fact, the authorities represented by the PKWN issued a decree on agricultural reform on September 6, 1944, the provisions of which also applied to forest estates. All the estates with a total area of more than 100 ha or 50 ha of agricultural land were expropriated and parcelled out, while in the Silesian, Pomeranian, and Poznań provinces the estates with a size of more than 100 ha were expropriated, regardless of the share of agricultural part. All forests exceeding 25 ha were expropriated (Decree of the Polish Committee for National Remembrance of September 6, 1944 on Agricultural Reform, 1945). The State Land Fund was responsible for carrying out the agricultural reform, while a detailed census of the effects of the land estate nationalization was conducted by the poviats land offices cooperating with the delegates of poviats and commune land commissions (Gajda, 2004). It is estimated that in the years 1944–1948, when the agricultural reform was carried out, the state took over 9,707 land estates with a total area of less than 3.50 million hectares. The forest land – classified together with water farms and other land excluded from parcels – constituted about 2.3 million ha of the total

area of 3.50 million ha (Basista et al., 2000). However, as the literature points out, the Decree did not provide for compensation for landowners, but: “only the right to receive an independent farm outside the area of the estate or a monthly supply equal to the salary of a civil servant of group VI” (Durakiewicz, Osiński, & Śląddecka, 2016).

This may prove that in the fundamental areas of reconstruction of Poland’s post-war economy, the communist authorities adopted divergent directions from those proposed by the Polish Government-in-Exile.

The issues of the Regained Territories and Poland’s economic recovery: an initial outline

When writing about the post-war economic reconstruction of destroyed Poland, it is worth mentioning the importance of the so-called Regained Territories. Nevertheless, it should be limited to the research area adopted in the article. The general position of the Polish authorities in exile towards the Regained Territories during the analyzed turn of 1944 and 1945 was limited to joining to Poland those areas that had previously been occupied by Germany after the September campaign. This concerned in particular the Pomorskie, Śląskie and Poznań voivodeships, parts of the Łódzkie voivodship, Suwałki Region and other regions located in the central and south-western part of the Second Polish Republic before World War II. It can be concluded that the plans for the reconstruction of the Polish economy formulated by the Polish Government-in-Exile mainly concerned the territories lost as a result of the German occupation. In the context of considering the matter of the Regained Territories, these are the plans developed and discussed before the decisions made during the Yalta conference, which means that they were made before February 1945. Thus, the postulates and calculations presented by members of the Polish Government-in-Exile concerned areas that did not fully coincide geographically with the areas known as Regained Territories after the decisions made in Yalta. Importantly, the Polish Government-in-Exile did not have the power to put pressure on the Soviet Union regarding the position discussed in Yalta on the western and northern borders of Poland after World War II. Furthermore, severance of diplomatic relations between the Polish Government-in-Exile and the Soviet Union in April 1943 prevented mutual discussions on the subject of the Regained Territories.

The Council of National Unity, established by the Government Delegation for Poland, which was the political representation of the Polish Underground State from January 1944 to July 1945, agreed on March 15, 1944, a declaration on the western

border of Poland in the context of the post-war reconstruction of the country. It was expected that East Prussia, the Free City of Gdańsk, the Pomeranian wedge between the Baltic Sea and the estuary of the Oder and the Noteć, the areas between the rivers Warta and Noteć, and Opolian Silesia with an appropriate safety area, will be incorporated into Poland. The Polish Government-in-Exile also expected to guarantee the protection of national economic interests in the Polish-German borderland, designated on the Oder River and in the Oder ports (Deklaracja Rady Jedności Narodowej, 1989).

In December 1944, the Prime Minister of the Polish Government-in-Exile, Tomasz Arciszewski, in an interview for the *Sunday Times* magazine, criticized the Soviet position postulated at the turn of 1944 and 1945, which was finally presented at the Yalta conference in February 1945. In the opinion of the Polish Government-in-Exile, extending the border to the west to include West Pomerania with Szczecin and Lower Silesia with Wrocław would mean the inclusion in Poland of areas inhabited by 8–10 million Germans. The position revealed potential ethnic and national problems for Poland after 1945. Instead, the Government demanded the integration into the new borders of Poland of ethnically and historically Polish lands that were under German occupation during the war. The Prime Minister Arciszewski repeated the same position during a secret meeting of the National Council of the Republic of Poland on January 15, 1945. He criticized the idea of joining the Polish cities of Szczecin and Wrocław, dominated by the German population. However, this idea was presented in the propaganda activities in Poland by the State National Council as a self-proclaimed Polish parliament established by the PPR. The position of the Polish Government-in-Exile on Regained Territories at the turn of 1944 and 1945 (and before the Yalta decisions) should be considered divergent in many respects from the postulates of the Soviet Union and the State National Council. These differences became one of the grounds for criticism of the Polish Government-in-Exile by the communist authorities in the Polish People's Republic. Joseph Stalin finally proposed in Yalta to move the Polish western border along the Oder River to the mouth of the Lusatian Neisse River and from there to the border with Czechoslovakia. It was a different solution from the one proposed at the turn of 1944 and 1945 by the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile (Jankowiak, 2018).

Despite political differences with the authorities in Poland, the Polish Government-in-Exile repeatedly assessed various issues regarding the reconstruction of the northern and western territories in the documents in the analyzed period at the turn of 1944 and 1945. Polish politicians from London analyzed various economic effects of joining new regions to Poland. That was visible first and foremost in the

field of the broader understood fuel and energy industry. A similar conclusion can be drawn from the situation in the service and agricultural sectors. The London Government stood for far-reaching benefits from the expected inclusion of the Regained Territories in Poland. The members of the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile defined the destruction and industrial potential of the Regained Territories in relation to the situation in central, southern, and eastern Poland as follows: "In the Western Territories, the occupation policy has led to the reduction of production capacity in some areas, but this phenomenon does not affect a number of the most important areas and is partly compensated for by the aforementioned reconstruction. In the rest of Poland, the mass closure of production workshops and the impossibility of renewing the production apparatus led to a general destruction and reduction of production capacity. [...] The Western trade apparatus is of sufficient size for the current turnover, but while it is entirely in German hands, it will be automatically decommissioned and partly reorganized. [...] In agriculture, the changes in the Western Territories were not significant; in the rest of the region, plant production suffered severely only in the east, while breeding also suffered in the General Government" (*Odbudowa kraju po II wojnie światowej...*, [1944/1945]).

The incorporation of the Regained Territories resulted in the takeover of a significant part of the Baltic coastline and the accompanying port infrastructure, which provided a new basis for the development of the Polish maritime economy (Domke, 2009). The broader issue of the development of maritime economy in connection with the expected expansion of the access of the reborn Polish state to the Baltic Sea was, in turn, an essential subject of interest for members of the Polish Government-in-Exile. They believed that investments in regained seaports should reach at least 1 billion zlotys in over 2.5 decades to ensure a minimum level of maritime safety for the newly reborn Polish state (*Schemat podziału inwestycji w Polsce w okresie 26 lat*, [1944/1945]).

The Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile also had data showing the benefits of the projected inclusion in Poland of the areas of Upper and Lower Silesia, with coal and oil basins located in the vicinity of such cities as Zabrze, Gliwice, Dąbrowa Górnicza, and Bytom. The possibility of taking over large industrial cities in Western Pomerania (Szczecin) and Gdańsk Pomerania (Gdańsk) was also of some importance for the development of the oil industry. Only Silesia played the dominant role in the industrialisation of the Regained Territories, which was visible in the sectors of oil extraction and hard coal and lignite. As it turned out after World War II, the region of Lower Silesia played a vital role in financing investments in the industry after the creation of a special Investment and Protection Fund for the Regained Territories Industry (about 70% of the expenditures and 30% of

participation in the development of industrialization from among all regions forming the Regained Territories) (Kociszewski, 1995).

The importance of the Regained Territories also became apparent in the agricultural sector. It is estimated that while farms with an area clearly below 50 hectares dominated Polish lands, the situation in the Regained Territories was the opposite – “on western and northern lands, the largest part of the area was occupied by farms over 50 hectares” (Kociszewski, 1995).

As regards the integration of the Polish economy with the Regained Territories, it should also be emphasised out that the latter had a surplus of land in comparison with the needs of the settlers. That was evident even in the Lubuskie Land and gave grounds for stimulating the development of agricultural production after 1945 (Osękowski, 2018). Therefore, based on the discussed examples, the strategic role of the Regained Territories in rebuilding the destroyed Polish economy at the time when they were incorporated into the administrative borders of Poland after World War II cannot be omitted. It is worth noting that the Regained Territories also remained regions with a high level of war damage in terms of loss of industrial potential in comparison with the situation before 1939. Namely, after warfare, 72.7% of industrial plants were completely or partially destroyed between 1939 and 1945, and settlement difficulties were an additional problem due to the dominant share of the German population in most of the districts belonging to the Regained Territories. These difficulties gave rise to high costs due to the subsequent deportation of the German population and the bringing of the Polish population to develop the Regained Territories (Albert, 1995).

Summary and conclusions

In July 1944, power in Poland was taken over by the Polish Workers' Party (PPR) as a political representation in a non-sovereign state under Soviet domination. It is characteristic that the official position of the Polish Government-in-Exile on the economic reconstruction of Poland was different from the very beginning and opposed to the postulates presented at that time by the Polish Workers' Party. For example, while the PPR initially wanted to make some attempts to reach an agreement with the Government Delegation for Poland, unlike the situation in Czechoslovakia, there was no agreement between the communists and the Polish Government-in-Exile. This result made it impossible to conduct mutual discussions on the plans for the reconstruction of Poland (Jeziński & Leszczyńska, 2003). The Polish Government-in-Exile, both in the declining period of World War II

and after its end, treated the communists as Soviet agents in Poland. Although it was recognized that economic policy in the post-war period should use planning instruments, it should be emphasized that the Government decided that it should be done while maintaining the fundamental principles of the pre-war economic system of the Second Polish Republic. The reconstruction plans included respect for private property and the principles of a market economy (Surdykowska, 2010). It should be assessed that the above discrepancies prevented cooperation between the Polish Government-in-Exile and the Polish Workers' Party as a temporary authority in the country, and later the government under Soviet domination after 1945, when it comes to the issues of economic reconstruction.

The arguments presented allow formulating additional conclusions according to which:

1. The Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile expressed their deep interest in the issues of Poland's economic reconstruction as early as 1944–1945, creating numerous substantive studies in the form of proposals and recommendations for such recovery. The arguments presented by the members of the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile prove that the Government residing in London recognized complex aspects and diverse areas within Poland's economic reconstruction. The reconstruction required the reorganization of economic and social life and economic institutions, the maintenance of internal bases and international connections of free-market character, as well as the integration of the Polish economy with the so-called Recovered Territories.

In the view of the authorities of the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile, the interest in the economic affairs of post-war Poland was characterized by the diversification of attention to individual sectors of the national economy, taking into account the analysis of both the industry and the agricultural sector represented by the forestry. The importance of financing the proposed directions of changes was also raised by the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile. Attention was paid to financing with equity, using funds provided through UNRRA, increasing imports of selected raw materials, and the role of maintaining foreign capital in strategic areas of heavy industry. It should be emphasized that Government residing in London systematically supported Poland's inclusion in the international system of economic reconstruction after World War II. In the second half of the 1940s, its representatives prepared a special Memorandum on Poland's participation in the action of rebuilding Europe (Memorandum Rządu Polskiego w sprawie udziału Polski we wspólnej akcji odbudowy Europy, 1947).

It was the reaction of the Polish Government-in-Exile to the Marshall Plan. Under pressure from Moscow, the communist authorities in Poland rejected the

possibility of using funds from the Marshall Plan. The vision of the economic reconstruction of Poland presented by the Polish Government-in-Exile significantly differed also in this aspect from the vision actually implemented in Poland dominated by the Soviets.

2. The main directions of reconstruction of the destroyed Polish economy after World War II were to include the development of production in the mining and mineral industry, as well as fuel and energy industry, with simultaneous electrification and communication, and investments in construction. In terms of agricultural reconstruction, the postulates of maintaining private property and land consolidation were taken into account, following the example of larger farms operating on northern and western lands (referred to after the war as the Recovered Territories). At the same time, changes in the agricultural sector of the economy were raised to the rank of changes in forest management.

3. The developments prepared by the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile make numerous references to statistical data, which is an additional source of information when evaluating the contribution of the examined emigration centre in determining the desired directions of development of the post-war Polish economy.

The discussed examples of the positions declared by the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile on economic matters should be regarded as valuable material, thanks to which it is possible to understand better the conditions of reconstruction of destroyed Poland in 1944–1945. The positions of the emigration camp, not entangled in the communist ideology, constitute an additional source of information on the condition of the Polish economy and the needs for the economic recovery of the destroyed country. That is even though since the end of World War II, in many areas of discussion – including commenting on economic issues – the programme postulates of the civil authorities of the Government-in-Exile were lagging behind the actions of the military authorities in exile (Wolsza, 1998).

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