



# Global aspects of security environment — the ‘One Belt, One Road’ project

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## Abstract

**Motivation:** The security environment is evolving globally and more attention is given for other than military threats. They are major concern related to internal and external security of any country as their nature is complex and it is evolving crossing national borders.

Globalization is one of processes enabling freedom of operations for criminal, terrorist and other dangerous movements endangering security environment and economy. The ‘One Belt, One Road’ concept, promoted by China, is vulnerable for attacks along land and sea legs. To face threats an international cooperation of involved countries must create opportunities to counter all illegal acts.

**Aim:** The aim of the paper is to study security threats influencing security of economy processes by analysing the ‘One Belt, One Road’ concept. In the paper theoretical methods have been adopted.

**Results:** The research allowed drawing conclusions related to ways of overcoming the threats toward supply chains caused by evolving security environment based on the risks related to the ‘One Belt, One Road’ concept.

**Keywords:** security environment; non-military threats; Asia; ‘One Belt, One Road’

JEL: F52

## 1. Introduction

The security situation in the world is evolving very rapidly and new threats rise influencing all the domains of human activities. The challenge is that they have evolving nature and they are encroaching into new countries and continents. Among conventional threats, which are typical for interstate conflicts, there are varieties of asymmetric threats being invasive and their background is differing significantly. They are spread throughout nations and continents influencing global flow of goods. The purpose of the paper is to cover security threats which are influencing economy including supplies chains and logistics processes. The research will study the China-led future oriented concept ‘One Belt, One Road’ utilizing sea and land transport trade corridors which could be hurt by variety of asymmetric threats. The paper will focus on security within the land domain but recognizing fragility of maritime dimension as of piracy and islands disputes in Asia. The latter security challenges could ignite the whole region disrupting the flow of export and import with global consequences. It will allow answering the research question: What are major security threats influencing the project and what could be their implications for its future? The economic aspect of the research is not covered as the focus is on security.

The area of research is very complex internally and it is functioning in a multidimensional environment requiring a comprehensive selection of theoretical research methods as: comparative analysis, synthesis of source materials, and critical assessment of the literature, deduction and generalization. They have been used in conjunction with analogy and abstraction for: classification, opposing and comparing data, and compilation of results, grouping and separating cognitive content. It was used to allow identification of commonalities and divergent data in terms of subject and object of research and systematization of the results obtained. The authors’ knowledge acquired during education and research projects along with experiences and data received during conferences and seminars have been used. It was based on opinions of experts and to exchange of thoughts with speakers allowing improving awareness regarding security issues related to paper.

## 2. The nature of non-military/unconventional threats

The security environment is evolving as next to military related threats the more attention of every nation is given to those are linked with other than military ones. During peacetime they are major concern for internal and external security involving effort and funds to face them as they are complex and they evolve crossing national borders to earn dirty money. The international cooperation, closer relations among law enforcement agencies of involved countries, exchange of intelligence data are tools to create opportunities to counter illegal undertakings. Those are critical to enhance international unity to fight non-military dangers. As stated by P. Burgess (2008, p. 60) ‘across this wide range



of insecurities, two distinct features characterize threats to security: they surpass the boundaries of the nation-state and they are interconnected through processes of globalization. No one state can manage the array of threats to its own security or can anyone state manage the threats to the security of its neighbours both inside and outside of its region'. So, desired level of security is not exclusively related to single nation effort and investment into security related military and non-military services. As a result, 'security and insecurity are no longer considered as conditioned only upon geopolitics and military strength, but also on social, economic, environmental, moral and cultural issues' (Burgess, 2008, pp. 60–61). Factors influencing such understood security are for instance migration, poverty, limited access to basic human related services, shortages of supplies, and above all well organized and broadly widespread transnational organized crime. Those are underpinned by human weaknesses as susceptibility to corruption, nepotism or vulnerability toward blackmail.

Asian continent is facing all such the phenomena influencing significantly each domain of any nation's existence. They are linked with e.g. international network of drug trafficking, many forms of human trafficking, trade of weapon of mass destruction and toxic materials. The scope of challenges is broad as unconventional or non-military security threats include, but are not limited to, 'ethnic warfare; internal feuds and conflicts; territorial and national disputes; organized crime; terrorism; smuggling of people and of dangerous substances, weapons or drugs; money laundering; and major financial scams designed to destabilize the markets of established or newly-emerging democracies' (Lehmann, 2011, p. 2). The unconventional threats are complex being adaptable for any situation and environment as they are not limited by law. They are real danger as (Lehmann, 2011, p. 6):

- they consist of number of elements which interact across time and space;
- this interaction is rich, many elements influencing, and being influenced, by many others;
- these elements interact in often non-linear ways, making the development of the system only partially predictable;
- the systems are based on continuous feed-back loops (positive or negative) and extend across multiple and massively entangled levels of analysis;
- the systems are open to, and interact with, their environment;
- they operate under conditions far from equilibrium;
- they evolve and have a history impacting their current and future state of development;
- elements evolve according to local conditions, ignorant of the behaviour of the system as a whole.

There are many interactions among unconventional threats enabling them to be effective in spite of countermeasures using opportunities created by: a) environmental deterioration (space, atmosphere, lithosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere); b) environmental degradation (due to poverty, injustice, population growth); and c) self-reinforcing environmental degradation (refugees, food ri-

ots, urban violence) (Brauch, 2006, p. 30). This is why ‘the security between states in the Third world, among some of the former republics of the Soviet Union, and elsewhere has become increasingly dependent upon security within those states’ (Holsti, 1996, p. 15). That statement refers e.g. toward Central Asia. The security domain is closely linked with unconventional or non-military threats endangering all economy related initiatives in Asia by influencing their effectiveness and stability. It is linked with national endeavours and also big projects which could be helpful to contribute to development of all participants. To make them operational it is necessary to deal not only with legally selected bodies but also with illegal organizations denying their influences and profits. It was recognized by former US Secretary of Defence, Leon Panetta as ‘extremists have the potential to pose catastrophic threats that could directly affect our security and prosperity. For the foreseeable future, the United States will continue to take an active approach to countering these threats by monitoring the activities of non-state threats worldwide, working with allies and partners to establish control over ungoverned territories, and directly striking the most dangerous groups and individuals when necessary’ (Eikenberry, 2014, p. 5).

One of ongoing projects is China-led ‘One Belt, One Road’ which, if endangered, will not achieve desired capacity and profits for Beijing and all nations interested in it. So, the security of this vulnerable logistics project is the real issue.

### 3. ‘One Belt, One Road’ major aspects of the project

The 2013 leadership change in China was an important factor to push forward national ambitions as President Xi Jinping forwarded his motto: ‘Chinese Dream’. It was linked with Xi’s idea to invest in internal market and to speed up foreign direct investments based on an assessment that the pervious economic model would not support country’s development. It was based on four major steps including creation of comfortable society or stronger middle class to support national economy internally to achieve desired prosperity (Góralczyk, 2015). It was supported by: green and innovative economy, fight with corruption and enhancement of rule of law in country. The reforms were to make country stronger allowing using economy to involve and influence other nations regionally and globally based on view that ‘as China’s economy moves toward a structure more like that of the United States and other developed nations, trade relations are growing less complementary and more competitive. Chinese economists assess that future growth will depend heavily on the degree of the Asia-Pacific region’s integration with China’s economy, as well as issues related to global economic governance and international trade rules’ (Hetah, 2015).

The economic success is important for the Communist Party of China (CPC) as a failure could cause losing trust of Chinese society. Next to domestic demand the need to deeper integrate ‘with the global economy than ever before, preventing recession’ was recognized as it ‘increasingly requires China to exert

greater influence on the international order and in countries in which its economic interests are substantial' (Hetah, 2015). So, new initiatives for regional and global integration are supported by CPC as one of priorities including 'One Belt, One Road' project. It includes the maritime '21st-century Maritime Silk Road' and the land 'Silk Road Economic Belt' (picture 1) to enhance logistics chains of supplies between China and Europe via Central Asia using land road system and between China and Europe and Africa exploiting sea lines of communications (Kaczmarek, 2015). The silk roads are to run through many regions and countries including Central Asia, Iran, Turkey, Russia and their branches will cover other countries. The challenge is that all the entities are linked with variety of internal and external threats which could significantly hamper stability of the flow of goods. The maritime part is to cover fragile South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Horn of Africa reaching stable Europe and volatile Africa and again threats are facing sea routes. The land and maritime roads are closely linked with China's energy security.

Recognizing complexity of the safety of new roads China is making steps considering future security of logistics supplies chains. Land and maritime corridors will include also Myanmar, Bangladesh and India allowing Beijing's closer political and economic relations, common efforts and cooperation within security domain to achieve profits coming from trade and transit incomes. This is represented e.g. by inviting India to the project during 17th round of borders delimitations talks. Such the cooperation could be important also for India to support the Indian prime minister's project called 'Make in India' (Chandak, 2015). Also such infrastructure projects as opened in August 2015 the New Suez Canal will increase the flow of goods. It will shorten the transit time from 18 hours to 11 hours and will increase the average number of transiting commercial vessels from 49 up to 97 in 2023 (Suez Canal Authority, 2016; *The Economist*, 2015, p. 37). It will enhance future capacities of the 'One Belt, One Road' project. The Xi visits in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2016 presented importance of the Middle East for the concept as stable situation there and close cooperation could support undisturbed flow of trade along the Maritime Silk Road. It is backed by contracts related to logistics infrastructure like first Chinese navy base abroad in Djibouti.

The project was part of resolutions of the third plenum of the XVIII National Congress of the CPC in 2012. Two years later president Xi described it as one of major future priorities for China (Li, 2015, pp. 1–2). It became a vital element of national strategy related to international relations and internal economy linked with a concept 'Look West' to enhance economic development of the central and west part of China. The concepts are complex and costly requiring strong and constant political involvement. Up to 2014 investments in 'One Road, One Belt' exceeded 100 bln USD and as 'blueprint for greater regional cooperation and integration through an infrastructure network connecting all sub-regions in Asia and between Asia, Europe and Africa, is viewed as a mega project that will generate tremendous business opportunities' (*The Global Times*, 2015).



The project is supported financially to encourage other nations to cooperate based on future profits. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has been established which ‘welcomes all regional and non-regional countries, developing and developed countries that seek to contribute to Asian infrastructure development and regional connectivity’ (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 2016). Next, the Silk Road Fund (SRF) was initiated with 40 bln USD capital focusing ‘on infrastructure investment under the ‘Belt and Road’ initiative’ (The China Daily, 2015) and the ‘One Belt, One Road’ Energy Development Fund (20 bln USD) activated ‘by private Chinese enterprises’ (Hu, 2015). The comprehensive approach using all instruments of national power has encouraged partners to join e.g. AIIB joined some 50 countries including European nations. Yet, it will take time to make that logistics project fully operational along with many long term subprojects.

Within China the National Security Commission (NSC) has been initiated to support implementation of the ‘China Dream’ and to enhance effectiveness of ‘a more proactive foreign policy’, as ‘Xi Jinping defined his global strategy focusing on three areas in the coming years: a ‘New Silk Road’ through Central Asia reaching Europe, a ‘Silk Road on Sea’ reaching beyond the Arabian Sea and an ‘Economic Corridor’ connecting India, Myanmar and Bangladesh’ (Qin, 2014, p. 5). The NSC will support enhanced safety measures as according to Yan Xuetong from Tsinghua University ‘China now has a stronger wish to gain the political support of neighbouring countries in order to secure China’s economic, security and other interests’ (Qin, 2014, p. 5). However, there are no clear evidences that Beijing is eager to share its economic successes or abandon territorial disputes or to slow down modernization of People’s Liberation Army as assessed by Jonathan Holslag (Góralczyk, 2015). The army is key for security of land and maritime logistics supply chains and to make Beijing more powerful regionally and globally within multipolar global order. However, to make it happen the security of supply chains must be ensured as many regions and countries along new logistics corridors are fragile asking for transnational teamwork within internal and international security.

#### 4. Threats endangering the security of the ‘One Belt, One Road’

The ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ is starting from Xian and it goes west throughout one of five autonomous regions of China—Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; it is of vital importance as it is natural land link with Central Asia extending further toward the Middle East, Russia and Europe (picture 2). So, the security there has influence on many domains of national affairs. The challenge is that some 45% of population is composed of Uyghurs compared to 40% of Han people. The Uyghurs religion is Islam and it is different from the rest of population. So, religion, culture and history are dividing the region being the major sources of radicalism among majority there, which is supporting independ-



ence and Pan-Turkism. Both options are not acceptable for Beijing as losing the region would hamper national security and collapse of land part of the silk roads. So, 'Xinjiang's remoteness and terrain, as well as persistent security concerns about the region's restive Uighur Muslim population, will constrain Beijing's most ambitious visions of trans-Eurasian road, rail and pipeline systems' (Stratfor, 2013). The radical movements are active causing insecurity by terrorist activities and ethnic unrests at the beginning of current century. Those are supported by organizations abroad like 'separatist East Turkestan Liberation Movement, founded in Turkey in the late 1990s, and the World Uighur Congress, which was set up in Germany in 2004' (BBC, 2014). The attacks against local government, citizens and security forces are source of instability but they have no potential to achieve independence as the security control is very tight. Terrorists are not limiting attacks to the province but 'a dearth of opportunities to fight at home against China seems to make Uighur militants overseas turn to targeting Chinese economic interests in various conflict-ridden areas in which they are operating' as it happened in Afghanistan when Turkistan Islamic Party members attacked 'personnel of Chinese state-owned copper mine 'Mes Aynak' (Soliev, 2015).

If separatists could grow in power they could attack logistics infrastructure causing delays or termination of flow of supplies harming the project and discouraging investors. This is why regional security is causing Beijing to preserve strong security forces not only as of independence trends but also as of economic reasons. Moreover, the land connection is 'a far-sighted initiative and it will bring exciting development to Xinjiang' (Lee, 2015) as element of 'soft power' to ensure economic benefits for Uyghurs to disintegrate radical elements from moderate population. The Uyghur Muslim movement is linked with other countries, like Central Asia, being 'externally hook up with international Muslim movements throughout Asia and the Middle East, bringing with it an influx of Islamic extremism and a desire to challenge the Chinese central government' (Van Wie Davis, 2008). This is why Central Asia, being land extension of the land belt, has great importance as of geographic location and required partnership to decrease cross border relations of radical movements. Cooperation is enabling better supervision of borders, limitation of weapon and drugs smuggling, illegal crossing by fighters preventing hostile actions. It is based on common interest to keep trade relations for mutual benefits especially as 'Beijing came to see tight economic ties between Central Asia and Xinjiang as a way of ensuring stability in both, and consequently as another way to ensure its quest for a 'peaceful rise' to great power status. Since the early 2000s, it has been actively involved in a number of significant infrastructure projects, from roads to pipelines, linking Central Asia with Xinjiang' (International Crisis Group, 2013, p. 4). The cooperation is supported by Central Asian countries being afraid of Uyghur's and own radicals as each nation faces internal threats, corruption, and nepotism causing opposition toward governments. Governments of the Central Asia nations namely Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan,

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, are looking for partners to expand economic profits and ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ is offering an option as soon as the security will allow allocation of Chinese funds to develop the project. The implications of terrorist attacks against national economy were recognized in Indonesia which ‘represent the expansion of the IS to Southeast Asia, and clearly they will have other plots in the region. The regional governments should be prepared for future attacks and protect the region’s economy. One terrorist incident may not pose a direct and significant risk to the economy, but a series of attacks definitely will’ (Lee, 2014). It must be taken under consideration by Chinese authorities. As for now ‘China holds a stronger grip on the security in Xinjiang, even if we saw some disturbances there in 2009, and Kazakhstan emerges as one of the more stable states in the region despite tendencies for political and economic instability’ (Swanström, 2010, pp. 35–51). But the threat is still real and ‘political response has been the continuation, indeed the intensification, of very traditional political processes leading to very traditional policies in order to confront this apparently new security environment’ (Lehmann, 2011, p. 3).

China is treating cooperation very seriously aiming to achieve desired end state and giving also a hand to Central Asian countries by investing in logistics infrastructure. It is materialized by top level visits and bilateral economic agreements e.g. loans for Kazakhstan and Tajikistan during the Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2012 (Śliwa, 2012, p. 21). In 2013 president Xi visited Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to discuss future common projects and ‘Xi’s visits set a positive tone for China’s relationships with the four nations and strengthened cooperation in the fight against the ‘three evil forces’ to ‘boost security and stability in the region’ (Xinhua, 2013). So, ‘One Belt, One Road’ caused that ‘Central Asia has become a strategic partner of China in economic, trade and energy cooperation’ as stated by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (Xinhua, 2013) and ‘China forged a strategic partnership with Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan respectively, and deepened the already-established strategic partnership with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’ (Xinhua, 2013). The 38 agreements were clear declaration of continuity of the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ as win-win project (Jarosiewicz, 2013) as confirmed by Xi during the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia in 2014 (VOA News, 2014). He highlighted the importance of the project to support economic development mentioning that security is crucial factor.

China is already involved into many projects e.g. Aktobemunaigas, PetroKazakhstan, Kazakhstan–China Pipeline or consortiums like Uzbekneftegaz, Lukoil, Petronas and Korea National Oil Corporation (Saurbek, 2008, pp. 79–93). In Kirgizstan China has supported 200 projects (Kirgiz Ministry of Development and Economic, 2010, Давыдов, pp. 20–23); in Tajikistan examples are hydroelectric power plant Nurobad-I and road Duzanbe–Dangara; in Turkmenistan gas pipeline Turkmenistan–China. Those investments are to support the new logistics corridors and to enhance China’s energy security next to de-





velopment of smaller nations (Stobdan, 2011, p. 58). Common economic interests and cooperation within SCO are aimed to fight asymmetric threats as those are real challenge for common projects in short and long term. It is based on fact that Central Asian nations are too weak to support the security of the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and to deny direct attacks against critical logistics infrastructure interrupting flow of goods (Śliwa, 2015). Close cross border links create a tool to face the threats of terrorism, separatism and extremism more effectively.

## 5. Challenges for extending ‘One Belt, One Road’

The concept could be extended using high-speed rail network toward Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The challenge is however that those nations are recognizing Beijing policy in the region as potential threat for their national security. Some of them, e.g. Vietnam, are directly involved into island related disputes which cause military engagements in the past. Next, Chinese minority in all the nations is involved into businesses so there are suspicions that it will benefit first before any other entity could do it. The issue is that those nations are members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN); a security related organization but without unified military capacities. ASEAN is changing perception of China as presented by joint communiqué issued by the foreign ministers of the ASEAN during an organisational forum in Myanmar in 2014. Previously there was no common voice of members and they were even preventing each other from making joint statements related to Chinese assertive policy towards the maritime domain as during summit in 2012.

In 2014 the language was tougher: ‘we urged all parties concerned to exercise self-restraint and avoid actions which would complicate the situation and undermine peace, stability, and security in the South China Sea and to settle disputes through peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force’ (Hardy, 2014). Historical differences and past wars are further supporting mistrust. The regional fragility and economic problems of ASEAN nations are forcing reconsideration of approach to business projects recognising possible profits. The South China Sea Islands disputes are not supporting trust between ASEAN and Beijing e.g. Philippines signed an agreement with US to build military bases there. It was condemned by China as a part of US containment strategy and limitation for security of sea lines communications along the Maritime Silk Road.

Another option is a ‘1,125-mile-long bullet train will start in Kashgar and punch south through Pakistan to the Arabian Sea port of Gwadar’ (picture 3) (LeVine, 2015). It could significantly support Pakistan as China is planning to ‘spend \$46 billion here on an array of projects’ (LeVine, 2015) like power plants, highways or wind farms and solar parks. It is also linked with Beijing’s internal policy as ‘transport routes will allow China to expand its economy in Xinjiang, where violent attacks by ethnic Uighurs have risen sharply in recent years. Such investment could lead to a job boom in that region, spawning

a more diverse population that China hopes could make it more difficult for groups such as ETIM to thrive' (Craig & Fenyer, 2015). Such the common approach could limit number of safe havens and training camps in Pakistan for radicals linked with Xinjiang.

Security for logistics projects is still an issue as Islamabad is cooperating both with China and US and wants to exploit those relations for survival of government and to fight extremist Islamic movements. Those are very strong in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Baluchistan, in which important Gwadar seaport is located. As a result, the security and reliability of Pakistani leg is endangered by very complex situation there and lack of stability to guaranty that money invested will be paid back as 'One Belt, One Road' could good and pay-off target for terrorist and separatist movements to hit directly the government and Pakistani economy. Such the complexity of threats is creating significant questions about a decision where to allocate investments for extended supply chains.

After signing the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-Neighborly Relations between China and Pakistan in 2005, both 'firmly believe that to strengthen the overall good-neighborly friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation between the Contracting Parties is not only in the fundamental interest of the two countries and the two peoples, but also conducive to regional and global peace, stability and development' (The People Daily, 2005). The need to enhance security was discussed during President Sharif visit in Beijing in 2014 when he promised to unite efforts in fighting such Islamic movements as East Turkestan Islamic Movement (Bokhari, 2014). The Pakistani situation is further complicated by unstable Kashmir involving directly India. It is one of most militarized region globally and all three involved nations are nuclear powers. So, normalization of relations and cooperation must support creation of a new leg of the 'One Belt, One Road' logistics project.

For sea lines of communication '2014 may have been the most dangerous year for Asian seafarers in almost a decade..., 183 actual or attempted attacks took place in Southeast Asian waters during 2014. Picture 4. represents a marked increase from 150 in 2013 and 133 in 2012, and is the highest since 2006' (Hribernik, 2015). This is dangerous trend negatively influencing security of logistics chains of supplies and growing volume of trade encourage attacks requiring unified effort of all countries along coastline. The good initiative is cooperation of ASEAN nations which 'have participated in Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP), collectively guarding a key international waterway against maritime piracy and other threats' (Heydarian, 2015). But it is not enough as cooperation with players like China is key to fight against piracy effectively. China is already extending its maritime reach into Indian Ocean to create conditions for securing economic interests by creating so called 'String of Pearls'; a number of naval bases along sea trade roads (picture 4). China is contributing to antipiracy mission in the Gulf of Aden from 2008 as 'piracy has become a serious threat to shipping, trade and safety on the high sea' and 'the sea lanes through



the gulf and waters off the Somali coast are vital to China's economy for its growing export trade with Europe, and deep-sea fishing in the Indian Ocean' (The China Post, 2008).

This is an example of supporting naval security to gain experiences to better protect '21st-century Maritime Silk Road' when it will reach full capabilities. It was highlighted by vice Admiral Yuan Yubai as the situation on the South China Sea and piracy threat are creating 'opportunities for 'unimpeded trade' under China's 21st Century Maritime Silk Route initiative' (Hardy, 2015) being one of key concepts for Beijing.

## 6. Conclusion

The asymmetric threats are presenting real and powerful danger for any country and any economy project e.g. growing expansion of Islamic State (IS) presence could affect whole Asia being an effect of being slowly pushed out of the Middle East. Degrading security situation in Afghanistan is opening more options for radical movements and those could have new 'save heavens' in Central Asia with potential to be a window of opportunity for Xinjiang radicals. It would question Chinese efforts endangering critical space factor within long time-frame to continue the project. Such the threats are impeding flow of foreign direct investments, tempo of building infrastructure hurting economy of countries involved into silk roads projects and international economic integration. Security is critical to ensure that flow of supplies within logistics chains to meet expectations of importers and exporters. The doubted effectiveness of governance and stability of smaller nations e.g. in Central Asia and ASEAN could increase investment's as risky solution. The extension and south directed legs are further endangered by growing assertiveness between Pakistan–India making the Pakistan–China Economic Corridor through Kashmir not reliable option. Any conflict between them would cause regional conflict and as side effect enhance options for unconventional actors. There is already a rivalry between India and China for regional domination affecting overall security, and latter's support for Pakistan is making security to be on the edge. If not ensured opportunities offered by 'One Belt, One Road' will be terminated or abandoned as it would be recognized as too vulnerable and not reliable. The Chinese project is an example of close interrelations between security environment and logistics processes. It is presenting that only constant and close cooperation could ensure desired level of protection of logistics infrastructure enabling continuity of logistics processes. Both legs of 'One Belt, One Road', although using different domains, are equally vulnerable and only the nature of threats is differing. The complexity of unconventional threats is the real challenge as they are growing. It is enhanced by vulnerability of countries located along its land and maritime legs. So, the 'One Belt, One Road' is not only linked with investments and logistics infrastructure development as security is one of major challenges. The project is still under development but is worth of analysis along



with political and economic aspects of the Chinese march toward new markets and looking for new partners. The security and safe environment is supposed to be of great importance not only for Beijing but also for all countries interested in future profits. Another interesting aspect could be observation of the direction of Chinese armed forces development to protect national interests far away from the mainland.

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## Acknowledgements

Author contributions: authors have given approval to the final version of the article. Authors contributed to this work equally.

## Appendix

Picture 1.

The concept of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road



Source: LeVine (2015).


Picture 2.

Location of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in relation to China and Central Asia



Source: Stratfor (2013), republished with permission of Stratfor.

Picture 3.  
Pakistan–China Economic Corridor and the Karakorum Highway



Source: Craig & Fenyer (2015).

Picture 4.  
Sea Lines of Communications critical for Chinese economy



Source: Śliwa & Brązkiewicz (2011, p. 41).