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Social perception of the impact of AI algorithms on human work: the example of platform-mediated courier and driver work in Poland

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Abstract

Motivation: The use of automated management for allocating tasks, monitoring and evaluating the service of platform workers operating through digital labor platforms (DLPs) has given rise to numerous threats to human work. The article identifies the emergence of DLPs as a kind of institutional disruption that requires changes in the existing institutional order. The EU Directive on improving working conditions in platform work makes it worthwhile to discuss its provisions regulating algorithmic management, including the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on human work.

Aim: The aim of the article is to determine what adult Poles think about changes in the labor market institutions involving the shift towards human oversight of the AI-assisted automated management of platform work. It presents the findings of the Author's survey on society's attitude towards regulating how AI is used for managing a popular type of food delivery and passenger transportation services, ordered and executed through DLPs. Accordingly,

it draws on informal norms as the background for the implementation and development of formal institutions.

Results: The survey showed that respondents perceive AI control of platform work as a legitimate, modern development that ensures service quality and safety. Yet, they are also in favor of human oversight of decisions made by AI algorithms. The survey findings are relevant in view of implementing the provisions of the said EU Directive in Poland.

Keywords: artificial intelligence; digital labor platforms; institutions; platform work
JEL: J21; K31; O33

1. Introduction

In today's reality, we can observe a growing number of developments related to the platformization of the economy and the job market. Platformization embraces popular services, such as food delivery or passenger transportation, ordered through digital platforms using dedicated mobile apps or websites. This type of services is generally available in cities, because cities provide an adequately high volume of orders and a sufficient number of workers prepared to deliver a service (Bissel, 2020, pp. 102–108; Balkaya, Yarbaşhi & Tepeler, 2023). These services enjoy widespread popularity because they are cheaper than more traditional ones. In addition, it is relatively simple to order them, as platform owners are constantly improving the functionality of these solutions and developing network effects to make their use a mass phenomenon, as only then do they make sufficient profits (Schwellnuss et al., 2019, pp. 10–13).

Buyers of services ordered and delivered through platforms often remain relatively unaware of the working conditions of the contractors and, in particular, of algorithmic management (AM) using artificial intelligence (AI) tools, which is one of the premises of the precarious nature of platform work (Vandevenne E. & Vanroelen C., 2023, pp. 487–508; Aloisi & De Stefano, 2022, p. 24–26; Özbilgin, Gundogdu & Akalin, 2023, pp. 284–304). The controversies relating to these conditions caused the European Union to initiate the regulatory procedure. According to institutional economics, the emergence of digital labor platforms (DLPs) can be defined as a kind of institutional disruption. In order to draft national legislation in this area, it is important to know the institutional environment, including society's attitudes to the proposed changes. One of them involves the provision introducing the need for human oversight of algorithmic management (AM) to reduce its negative impact on platform workers, such as couriers and drivers working through popular DLPs.

The article aims to determine the attitudes of adult Poles regarding changes in labor market institutions involving the shift towards statutory human oversight of the control that AI algorithms execute over platform work. This examination is performed against a wider background of what Polish

society knows about such services and how to use them, on the example of platform courier and driver work. The survey results allow conclusions to be drawn about the anticipated public reactions to changes in legislation concerning the regulation of AI impact on human work. In theoretical terms, the survey is situated within the framework of the analysis of informal institutions as the ones that provide the conditions for the implementation and development of formal institutions of the labor market.

In addition to literature review and the analysis of the legal acts (the EU Directive), the article analyzes the data collected by the Author in the diagnostic survey. The article consists of the theoretical and empirical part. The theoretical part explains the relevant concepts regarding AM and demonstrates the need for regulation in this area. Then it presents the objectives of the EU Directive on improving working conditions in platform work in terms of human oversight of AM in the operations of DLPs. Finally, on the grounds of the new institutional economics, it explains the importance of social acceptance for the proposed legislative changes. The empirical part presents the results of the Author's diagnostic survey on society's attitude to the use of AI in platform work and the need for human oversight, using the example of couriers and drivers working via DLPs. The article closes with the discussion of the results and conclusions.

2. Literature review

2.1. Artificial intelligence in algorithmic management of digital labor platforms – the rationale behind the need for regulation

The concept of AI refers to systems that exhibit intelligent (i.e., human-like) behavior, are able to analyze their environment and take action – with a certain degree of autonomy – to achieve their goals (European Commission, 2019, p. 1; Owczarczuk, 2023, pp. 295–308). AI is closely related to AM, which is identified as work settings in which "human jobs are assigned, optimized, and evaluated through algorithms and tracked data", which is the definition proposed by Lee et al. (2015, p. 1603), later adopted by Berg, Cherry & Rani (2019, pp. 104–126). AI in decision-making, in simplified terms, can be equated with management algorithms (Aloisi & Potocka-Sionek, 2022, pp. 4–6; European Commission, 2019, pp. 2–3; Sheikh, Prins & Schrijvers, 2023, p. 15) and this simplification is adopted in the article.

According to Möhlman and Zalmanson (2017, pp. 5378–5379), five core functions of AM can be identified:

1) continuous tracking of worker/contractor behavior;
2) continuous evaluation of worker performance,
3) automatic decision execution without human intervention,

4) interaction of contractors with the "system" (rather than with people), which eliminates the opportunity to receive feedback or negotiate with supervisors;
5) low transparency, resulting from the concealment of the way algorithms work, but also because of their adaptive nature, depending on the collected data.

AM using AI controls the services performed by people through DLPs, especially those provided in the areas such as courier food delivery or passenger transportation, where fast response to demand matters (Nowik, 2020, pp. 269–290). AM is a distinctive feature of DLPs and a source of their low operating costs, which is referred to as "platform work managerialism" or algorithmic governance (Dif-Pradalier et al., 2023, pp. 637–648; Pulignano, 2024, pp. 1–10). DLPs coordinating the work performed in the field first emerged around 2010 (Potocka-Sionek & Aloisi, 2024), gaining in popularity since then due to the use of mobile apps, the relative ease and speed of ordering, and the competitive pricing of such services. By automating the process of coordinating task allocation to contractors and then monitoring and evaluating their performance, the number of staff hired by a platform can be kept to a minimum (they are usually involved in maintaining IT functionality, marketing and legal issues). Platform workers working through digital labor platforms, such as drivers or couriers, announce readiness to deliver services based on flexible hours, relative autonomy and the desire to earn an extra income (Hall & Krueger, 2017, pp. 705–732). This is also facilitated by low start-up costs that such workers have to incur (Pettica-Harris, de Gama & Ravishankar, 2020, pp. 36–57; Özbilgin, Gundogdu, & Akalin, 2023, pp. 284–302). They have the status of independent contractors, who are usually expected to register as self-employed, despite the significant dependence of contractors on the platform (European Commission, 2021a, p. 2; Peetz, 2023, pp. 840–853; Piasna, 2024, pp. 568–580).

In addition to the precarious nature of platform work and even "the pandemic of precariousness" (Aloisi, Rainone & Countouris, 2023, p. 7) in view of low income, instability of commissions and lack of social security (Berg, Cherry & Rani, 2019, pp. 104–128; Demir, 2023, pp. 86–101), AM attracts criticism as potentially harmful to people, imposing an unrealistic pace of work, excluding contractors working for a given platform for minor, unverified misconduct or unfavorable customer feedback, without giving them an opportunity to appeal against the "decision" of the machine (Nowik, 2020, pp. 269–290). The constant tracking of worker behavior is a source of technostress (Wiener, Cram & Benlian, 2023, pp. 485–507; Umair, Conboy & Whelan, 2023, pp. 206–240). AI algorithms are supposed to be neutral and more rational, which causes that their decisions are perceived as more accurate than human ones, but the performance of intelligent machines differs from intelligent human behavior. For this reason, the suggestions of AI are

neither tailored to specific individuals nor verified in any way and it is impossible to seek the explanation of its decisions (Sheikh, Prins & Schrijvers, 2023, p.153–154; Deranty & Corbin, 2024, pp. 675–688). This becomes a source of unfair treatment or discrimination against contractors.

The study conducted in 2021 showed that between 72.48 million and 101.05 million people in EU countries were exposed to automated management in their primary or secondary jobs, while 42% of enterprises used AI-based technologies (Aloisi & Potocka-Sionek, 2022, pp. 29–50). In contrast, approx. 21% of enterprises in the EU used AI in human resource management (Potocka-Sionek & Aloisi, 2024).

People's attitudes toward the use of AI and the regulation of this use are driven by trust in the tool. Studies conducted in the US, UK and Germany showed that public trust in both commercial enterprises and public organizations using generative AI in their operations was limited, although it varied between countries (relatively the highest trust was reported in Germany, while the lowest in the UK), but reflected the overall strength of the relationship between trust in institutions and trust in technology. On the other hand, organizations developing generative AI enjoyed greater trust than companies merely using it (Dutta & Lanvin, 2023, p. 19). These inconclusive survey results justify increased interest in the application of AI in processes where it interacts with people, including task allocation, work monitoring or incomes that people make.

2.2. The objectives of EU Directive on improving working conditions in platform work, concerning algorithmic management

In view of the prospective nature of the processes handled by DLPs and in response to numerous complaints and the poor quality of platform working conditions exposed by a number of studies (European Commission, 2021a; Jesnes et al., 2023, pp. 258–271), a draft EU Directive on improving working conditions in platform work was created. One of the objectives is to grant platform workers the employment status through a rebuttable presumption of employment relationship. Another of its provisions is, in addition to the right to self-organization and strike, the obligation of human monitoring of the impact of MA on platform workers.

On April 24, 2024, the European Parliament adopted and on November 11, 2024 was official published the EU Directive on improving working conditions in platform work (called the Platform Work Directive). One of the key issues involves the regulation of AM in the workplace. For example, it includes the monitoring of AM systems by qualified staff and the possibility for contractors to request a review of decisions made by AI (Rada UE, 2024a). These provisions are important in that they apply to all platform workers, regardless of their status, so they also embrace self-employed platform workers.

The directive distinguishes and defines automated monitoring systems and automated decision-making systems. According to the provisions of the directive: digital labor platforms should provide human oversight and regularly, at least every two years, assess the impact of individual decisions made or supported by automated monitoring or decision-making systems on individuals performing work through the platform, including, where appropriate, the impact on their working conditions and equal treatment at work. Workers' representatives should be engaged in the evaluation process. The staff overseeing these systems should have the competences and authority to reverse decisions made by automated systems and they should be protected from dismissal or other negative consequences for overriding such decisions. In addition, DLPs as enterprises should systematically review and remedy any shortcomings in automated monitoring and decision-making systems, and effectively address discrimination and other forms of violations of the rights of contractors working through DLP. All decisions of a platform unfavorable to the worker (e.g., refusal to remunerate the work performed) should be adequately explained (Rada UE, 2024b, pp. 27–29). This is a complex problem of ensuring the explainability of AI decisions made in a black box decision making system (Torre, Teigland & Engstam, 2020, pp. 116–145).

However, this problem can also be approached from a different perspective. While AI is skewed and suffers from cognitive biases of the people who create and train it, algorithmic management subjected to human oversight may also be affected by the biases of the people who will exercise such oversight. So this regulation can be perceived as a kind of experiment that will need further verification.

Once the directive has been approved by the Council and its text published, the member states are obliged to treat it as a minimum level of protection for platform workers in national legislation, which will have to be adequately transposed from the EU law (within 2 years). It cannot infringe on the more favorable regulations already established in some countries (e.g. Scandinavian countries – cf. European Commission, 2021b), which means that the relevant legislation will vary from one EU country to another. The DLP related regulations are a kind of test in this regard and may become a model for other regulations in this area in the future.

2.3. Institutional aspects of AM

According to the approach proposed by D.C. North (1992, pp. 9), institutions consist of formal rules, informal constraints (norms, behaviour, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct) and the enforcement characteristics of both. Formal institutions can also be defined as techniques that facilitate oversight over large numbers of individuals, so that they can be monitored and controlled more effectively than by informal institutions (Redmond,

2008, pp. 569–576). Informal institutions, on the other hand, insofar as they are consolidating and complementary in nature, fill in the "space" unregulated by formal institutions (Mazur, 2013, pp. 34–43). Additionally, they influence social perception of formal institutions and can either support or hinder their functioning. This relates to how well the elements of a given set of institutions fit together and whether they interact through conflict or cooperation (Pejovich, 1999, pp. 164–181).

Technological change is one type of an impulse that can trigger institutional change (Harries, 2012, pp. 115–141). DLPs are not institutionally neutral (Pulignano, 2024, pp. 1–10). The development of DLPs constituted a kind of institutional disruption in the existing institutional order. Within few years, DLPs revealed new ways to build reward and sanction systems, remuneration logic, sense of ownership, work relations, governance and organizational structures (Souza Ferreira et al., 2023). Finally, the process of institutional change was initiated.

The analyzed directive is an example of the development of constructed institutional order (Furubotn & Richter, 1998, p. 7), occurring when existing formal and informal institutions are insufficient to ensure acceptable and effective functioning. Public attitudes toward regulatory changes coming from outside the national system are important, as it is uncertain whether the need for them is understood by the society. Accepted regulations, which do not contradict social values (informal institutions), are respected and effectively enforced (Fiori, 2002, pp. 1025–1043; Ostoj, 2012, pp. 111–116). The demand for new institutions intensifies when people identify problems they cannot solve individually, as exemplified by the protests of Glovo food couriers (e.g., in 2021 in Bialystok and Gdansk). The creation of national regulations concerning platform work should also take into account path dependence relating to the institutional context of labor relations in a country (Jesnes et al., 2023, p. 259).

In Poland, regulations on human oversight of algorithmic management have so far not been introduced, due to the overall absence of DLP related legislation and the focus on the status of platform workers. In February 2022, the Polish government officially supported the draft directive, while stressing the importance of the principle of freedom of contract between contractors and platforms. Lewiatan, an employer organization that spoke on behalf of platform owners, adopted a critical position towards the draft directive (Owczarek, 2022, p. 4). If the public were also reluctant to regulate DLPs, the risk of law evasion would arise, e.g. of moving into the gray market.

It is worthwhile to undertake a survey of society's attitudes on the subject, because the draft directive is the first attempt to regulate by law the monitoring and control of human work by AI. Accordingly, its influence on the shape of future legislation on the impact of AI on people will be potentially extensive.

The following research questions were formulated:

1. How does society view the use of AI algorithms in monitoring and evaluating the work of platform workers?
2. Does society perceive the need for human oversight of AI in the algorithmic management of platform workers?

3. Methods

In order to answer the research questions, a field study was designed as a diagnostic survey using an online questionnaire. The questions asked for opinions on the use of AI algorithms in the work of couriers and drivers performing services through DLP and human oversight of this process. The survey was commissioned to Biostat, a specialized research agency with access to a suitable survey panel. The sample was limited to city residents, because food delivery or passenger transportation services ordered and coordinated via digital platforms are mainly offered in urban locations. It was important to reach people who had at least encountered these types of services, without necessarily using them. In determining the survey sample, a fraction size of 0.5 was adopted, with a maximum error of 5%. The survey was conducted on 5–7 December 2023.

Adult city residents (aged between 18 and 70 years) were invited to participate in the survey. The sample was calculated to include 401 people and was representative in terms of gender, age and city of residence (Table 1). Quota sampling was used.

The sample included 43.6% of respondents with higher education, 25.9% with post-secondary or secondary vocational education, 17.7% with general secondary education, 11% with vocational education and 1.7% with lower secondary education. An invitation to complete the survey was sent to 4,000 people registered in the research panel, the return rate was approximately 33%, but not everyone returned a fully completed questionnaire. Ultimately, those questionnaires that were completed and met the criteria for representativeness were selected for sampling.

It was first established whether the respondents had used food delivery or passenger transportation services ordered through a digital platform (Table 2). The representativeness of the sample in terms of age caused that over 70% of the respondents were individuals aged 35 and older, while nearly 30% – individuals over 55, which may have influenced the use of the services that are researched in the survey. The actual purchase of the services was not required to express an opinion, but it allowed for the verification of familiarity with this type of service, which increases the reliability of opinions.

Food and shopping delivery through dedicated platforms was ordered more often than the passenger transportation service. More than 40% of

respondents ordered food or shopping at least a few times a month. As many as 81.3% of respondents were familiar with this type of service. On the other hand, passenger transportation services ordered through platforms via mobile apps were frequently used by about 24% of respondents, with 66.8% of respondents being familiar with them. The frequency of ordering those services revealed no statistically significant differences by gender, but it was significantly different when broken down by age. In the case of food delivery ($p = 0.0004$), the highest percentage of respondents using the service very often or often was in the youngest age group (about 60%), while in the oldest group it was only about 24%. The passenger transportation service ($p = 0.003$) was mostly used by the respondents in the two younger age groups, approx. 34%, while in the oldest group it was only about 12%.

It can be assumed that the relative popularity of ordering services through digital platforms stemmed primarily from the functionality of the service. Ordering the food delivery service was considered easy by more than 80% of respondents, convenient by about 85% of respondents, and fast by about 78% of respondents. About 72% of respondents stated that the service was available at the place of their residence or work. Respectively, regarding passenger transportation services, almost 70% of respondents found ordering easy, 74% – convenient, and 71% – fast; the service was available at the place of residence for 64% of respondents. This implies the significant and potentially growing popularity of this type of services and, as a result, increased likelihood of resulting problems becoming more serious.

4. Results

Respondents' opinions were expressed on a five-point Likert scale from 1 – I completely disagree, 2 – I rather disagree, 3 – it is hard to say, 4 – I rather agree, to 5 – I completely agree. The responses to most of the questions did not reveal statistically significant differences by gender, age and size of the city of residence, so the results for total population are presented, while the interpretation refers to the cases in which such differences were found.

It was assumed that the opinion concerning human oversight of algorithmic management of platform work may stem from the respondents' attitudes to this type of work. Table 3 shows opinions on three selected characteristics of platform work.

Respondents consistently stated that both courier and driver work is dangerous due to participation in traffic: 75.3% and 60.1% respectively. Notably, only about a quarter of the respondents agreed with the statement that courier and driver work is risky due to AI management and control, but the percentage of the undecided was very high, which may mean that they found it difficult to answer conclusively. This, in turn, could imply that they did not

recognise potential risks and might not have knowledge of the mechanisms by which automated management (AM) affects human work.

A key part of the questions concerned attitudes towards the use of AI to manage the ordering and evaluate workers. Since respondents might not have been aware that orders placed through the platform are coordinated in an automated manner using AI, they were informed of this fact and asked to express their opinion. The structure of the responses is presented in Table 4.

The question exposed the respondents' difficulties in forming an opinion on the issue, but far more people considered the use of AI safe and fair compared to those who held the opposite view. Moreover, the vast majority of respondents rated task allocation to couriers and drivers by AI as justified, as it reduces costs (56.6%), and modern (71.8%) – here the percentage of those who were undecided was the lowest and the percentage of those who agreed with the statement was the highest. Slightly less than half of the respondents rated the mechanism for allocating jobs to couriers and drivers in an automated manner as inevitable. Approximately a third associated automated task allocation with the risk of unfair decision. However, a significant percentage of the respondents had no definite opinion on the matter.

Further on in the survey, the respondents were informed that the evaluation of the work of couriers or drivers is delegated to the customer and implemented using AI algorithms, which process reviews and create rankings of workers. The respondents were requested to share their opinion about this practice (Table 5).

Half of the respondents considered the practice normal, almost half expressed the view that it ensured high quality of service, while a lower percentage of respondents (about 43%) linked the use of AI for evaluating service quality with ensuring its safety. The largest percentage (52.6%) admitted that automation of the evaluation process exposed workers to unfair exclusion following low ratings and no right to appeal. This is a key finding, as it partly explains the structure of responses to the next question. At the same time, the respondents found it difficult to determine whether the practice was potentially unfair and unethical, although indirectly this may have stemmed from the earlier recognition of the worker's weak position when confronted with the negative rating delivered by AI, but only about 20% of the respondents viewed it as inhumane.

Finally, the respondents were asked for their opinion on whether AI management of couriers and drivers should be subject to human oversight. The structure of the responses is shown in Chart 1.

Nearly 65% of the respondents expressed an opinion that the impact of AI on the work of couriers and drivers should be subject to human oversight, whereas only about 9% held the opposite view. The percentage of the undecided was also relatively low. The conviction that AI should be controlled by people revealed statistically significant differences by age ($p = 0.009$). While

support for human oversight of AI management was 52.6% in the youngest age group and 48.7% among the respondents aged 25–34 (with the highest percentage of the undecided respondents in these groups), it rose to 76.7% in the oldest age group.

Although the respondents had been positive about the role of AI in the algorithmic management of platform workers in their earlier answers, they expressed explicit expectation of human oversight of AM.

5. Conclusion

A significant portion of society accepts the use of AI-driven automated management, seeing it as normal and beneficial for service quality. However, concerns and caution expressed while evaluating this practice were also apparent. The survey results align with findings from studies conducted in other countries, indicating limited trust in AI (Dutta & Lanvin, 2023). This is accompanied by a partial understanding of the risks associated with the impact of AI on people, as only about a third of the respondents considered it potentially unfair or unethical and about 20% viewed it as inhumane. This leads to the conclusion that society has a positive attitude towards innovative solutions accompanying the use of popular services. At the same time, the majority of the respondents expect human oversight of the process, which is in line with the objectives of the directive (Rada UE, 2024b; Directive (EU) 2024/2831). The rationale behind the need for regulation expressed in the literature is also confirmed by the opinions of the people who use or have some experience of services delivered by platform workers. Furthermore, the respondents from the youngest age groups were most likely to declare the actual use of food delivery or passenger transportation services, which means that they were familiar with the mechanisms of service execution, including, for example, how the work was evaluated, and yet a lower percentage of the respondents in this group saw the need for human oversight of the process. This implies that young people may have the most doubts about the need to adopt such regulation, which is important because platform work in the field is mostly done by young people and they are exposed to the negative impact of AM. The limitation of the study involved no possibility of conducting the survey among platform workers, because research panels do not provide access to this group.

In Poland, the EU Directive on improving working conditions in platform work is viewed as legitimate and aligned with social expectations. They are the reflection of informal institutions forming the background for changes in the law. This increases the likelihood that the provisions of the Directive will be accepted and respected. The transposition and implementation of its provisions, however, will pose a major institutional challenge. It is worthwhile to conduct further research in this field, as they would support creating the

conditions for the effective implementation of the Directive's provisions in Polish legislation. Such research could focus on a more precise definition of the prerequisites for granting platform workers employee status and the right to self-organization and strike.

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Appendix

Table 1. Structure of respondents (N=401)

Characteristic	Number	%
Gender		
Female	205	51.1
Male	196	48.9
Age		
18–24	38	9,5
25–34	76	19.0
35–54	167	41.6
55–70	120	29.9
City of residence		
City up to 50,000 residents	210	52.4
City above 50,000 residents	191	47.6

Source: Own preparation based on Author's research.

Table 2. Frequency of using the services through a digital platform (%)

Response	Food or shopping delivery (%)	Passenger transportation (%)
Never	18.7	33.2
Very rarely, occasionally	17.5	20.2
Rarely (less than once a month)	23.2	22.7
Often (a few times a month)	31.4	18.5
Very often (at least once a week)	9.2	5.5

Source: Own preparation based on Author's research.

Table 3. Structure of responses to the question: To what extent do you agree with the following characteristics describing the service of a courier delivering food, shopping, etc., or a driver transporting people, ordered through a dedicated platform via a mobile app or website (N=401)

Characteristic of platform work/ distribution of opinions	Courier					Driver				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Easy	17.2	33.2	22.7	20.0	7.0	5.0	27.4	30.4	32.4	4.7
Dangerous due to participation in traffic	2.5	9.7	12.5	52.4	22.9	2.7	14.2	22.9	43.6	16.5
Risky due to AI management and control	5.2	21.2	47.4	23.9	2.2	6.2	20.4	46.9	22.9	3.5

Source: Own preparation based on Author's research.

Table 4. Structure of the respondents' opinions concerning task allocation to couriers and drivers by AI algorithms (N=401)

Opinion	1	2	3	4	5
Safe	4.5	16.0	42.4	31.4	5.7
Fair	4.0	13.0	39.4	34.2	9.5
Justified because it helps reduce costs	3.0	11.0	29.4	45.1	11.5
Exposing to unfair task allocation	4.7	22.2	42.1	25.7	5.2
Modern	2.7	6.0	19.5	42.6	29.2
Inevitable	4.0	10.7	39.2	35.7	10.5

Source: Own preparation based on Author's research.

Table 5. Structure of the respondents' opinions on delegating the evaluation of couriers' and drivers' work quality to customers, using AI (N=401)

Evaluation	1	2	3	4	5
Proper	4.0	12.2	39.7	37.9	6.2
Normal	4.5	15.0	29.9	42.0	8.0
Ensuring high service quality	4.0	13.2	33.9	39.4	9.5
Ensuring service safety	5.0	13.0	39.2	37.2	5.7
Exposing to unfair exclusion of the worker if a customer ranks him low (no possibility of defense)	3.2	12.0	32.2	38.4	14.2
Potentially unfair	3.5	17.7	45.1	26.7	7.0
Unethical due to AI oversight over human work	6.0	24.7	38.9	23.9	6.5
Inhumane	13.2	28.7	37.4	14.0	6.7

Source: Own preparation based on Author's research.

Chart 1. Structure of responses to the question whether AI management of couriers and drivers should be subject to human oversight, in total and by age group



Source: Own preparation based on Author's research.