




The illiberal model of state capitalism in Poland

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Abstract

Motivation: There is growing awareness that a new model of capitalism is emerging. The 2008–2009 Global Financial Crisis was a catalyst for redefining the role of the state in the economy, and as a result state involvement in the economy has been on the rise since then. We can also observe changes in political situation: democracy has been backsliding globally, authoritarian, and populist tendencies are growing. In some countries, those two tendencies are present, and as a result the illiberal model of state capitalism emerged. In recent years, in Poland, state involvement in the economy was growing and authoritarian tendencies were visible. In this context, it is worth asking if there is an illiberal model of state capitalism in Poland?

Aim: The aim of the presented paper is to evaluate the political and economic situation in Poland and to check whether there are changes that could be interpreted as building illiberal state capitalism.

Results: The results indicate that in Poland many illiberal statist tendencies could be identified.

Keywords: *state capitalism; populism; autocracy; democracy*

JEL: *P10; P16*

1. Introduction

Two trends could be observed in global economy and politics in recent years. First, there is a growing wave of state interventionism and an increasing role of the state and state-owned enterprises in the economy (Bałtowski & Kwiat-

kowski, 2022; Bremmer, 2009; Kurlantzick, 2016; Szarzec, 2022). Second, we can observe backsliding of democracy and growing populism (Diamond, 2017; Haggard & Kaufman, 2021; Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019; Vachudova, 2020). The global financial crisis and the great recession in 2007–2009 have strengthened these tendencies. Lately, they were reinforced by the global spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, the number of people who have democratic rights has recently plummeted. Between 2009 and 2021, this number fell from 3.4 billion to 2.3 billion people (Herre, 2022), and the role of the state has increased dramatically. These two tendencies, although universal, are especially visible in middle-income and low-income countries and also in young democracies. In some countries, both tendencies are present simultaneously. Growing state interventionism in the economy often goes hand in hand with autocratic and illiberal tendencies in politics. Using the system paradigm proposed by Kornai (2000), Ricz (2021) has formulated a thesis that a new system is emerging — the illiberal model of state capitalism.

The article addresses the question of changes in the Polish economy and politics. Statist and autocratic tendencies have been visible in this country for some time. Polish experiences will be evaluated using the Ricz's illiberal model of state capitalism. The paper is structured as follows: in the next section, a short theoretical background based on the Kornai system paradigm is presented. The third section presents the anatomy of the illiberal model of state capitalism. Fourth, the evaluation of Polish experiences is sketched. The final section concludes.

2. Theoretical background: the system paradigm

Changes in contemporary capitalist economies are usually analysed using a comparative capitalist research perspective. It has been revived by the seminal work of Hall and Soskice (2001). The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) were firm-centered, and two ideal types of market economy were described: Liberal Market Economy and Coordinated Market Economy. Following this work an extensive literature has emerged analysing different capitalism variants but focusing mainly on advanced economies (see e.g. Amable, 2003; Baumol et al., 2007; Coates, 2005). Later this literature was extended to cover postsocialist countries (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012; Cernat, 2006; Farkas, 2011; Feldmann, 2019; Lane & Myant, 2007; Nölke & Vliegthart, 2009; Rapacki, 2019) and also other emerging economies (Schneider, 2013; Walter & Zhang, 2012).

Although the VoC research explained different institutional environments of capitalist economies, they focused on the economy only and did not touch on political issues. To understand recent changes different perspective, encompassing political institutions is needed. Therefore, in this paper, the Kornai's system paradigm is used. The main attributes of this approach were summarized by Kornai (2000).

- researchers are concerned with the system as a whole, and with the relations between the whole and its parts;

- analysis is embedded in comprehensive and general social science, and special attention is paid to the interaction between the economy, politics, culture, and ideology;
- concentration on institutions with a crucial distinction between the system-specific attributes and other attributes, which are rather traceable to circumstances other than the system itself;
- history matters, and to understand economic and political institutions, a historical perspective is needed;
- individual preferences are formed by systems, and when systems change, preferences change as well;
- focus on changing society, concentration on the big changes, the big transformations;
- researchers are interested in the intrinsic dysfunctions of the system that cannot be eliminated but that can only be ameliorated, because the propensity for them to reproduce is deeply rooted in the system;
- an attribute of a system is explained by comparing it with a corresponding attribute of another system; this comparison is mostly qualitative, although some attributes are easily measured, which offers a chance to make quantitative comparisons.

Kornai (2000; 2016) writes about two great economic systems: the capitalist and the socialist system, which represent two types of socio-political formation. These two types are a theoretical construct. Kornai is aware that actual individual historical constructs differ from each other in important respects. However, he wants to find the characteristics which, on the one hand, distinguish the capitalist and socialist systems; and on the other hand, show commonalities beyond the many individual phenomena occurring in each country belonging to the same type in a given period. For this purpose, Kornai (2016) identified primary and secondary characteristics of the capitalist and socialist system (see: Table 1). Primary characteristics determine the system as a whole, and their presence is a necessary and sufficient condition for the appearance of secondary characteristics. It could also be said that the primary characteristics form the minimum conditions for the existence of the capitalist or the socialist system. However, this hierarchical relation between the primary characteristics and the secondary ones is not deterministic but a stochastic one.

In the political realm, Kornai (2016) describes three types of political-governmental forms: democracy and dictatorship, which are usually distinguished, and a third form, called autocracy (characteristics of these systems, see: Table 2)¹. It must be stressed that autocracy is not a kind of middle way between democracy and dictatorship. As Kornai (2016) wrote: “It is a theoretical construct that in my approach is distinct from two other types”.

The relation between these two economic systems and three types of political-governmental forms is as follows: capitalism can operate without democracy

¹ Bonet & Zamorano (2021) indicate that different forms of government are connected with different cultural policy.

and is feasible with autocratic or dictatorship form of government. Democracy cannot operate without capitalism; socialism is possible only when the Communist Party rules in an autocratic or dictatorial way (Kornai, 2016).

3. Methods

To evaluate the political and economic situation in Poland and to check whether there are changes that could be interpreted as building illiberal state capitalism the approach proposed by Ricz (2021) was used. Ricz (2021) used the Kornai system paradigm to explain the growing state interventionism, populism, and the backsliding of democracy. She pointed out that to understand current statist tendencies, it is necessary to pay attention to interactions between politics and economy. According to this author, the two processes of autocratic political changes and the increase of state interventionism in the economy are interconnected and mutually strengthened. Ricz (2021) put forward the thesis that a new model of capitalism is emerging, which she called the illiberal model of state capitalism.

The most important feature of the regime of illiberal state capitalism is its ultimate aim, that is, the monopoly of political power and time in power. To achieve these objectives, different forms of state intervention in the economy are used for purely political purposes. Although one can observe growing state interventionism in illiberal state capitalism economies, they stay capitalistic and all three primary features of capitalist system, mentioned by Kornai (2000) are present. In the political realm, they are illiberal, which means that constitutional limits on power are routinely ignored, and citizens are deprived of their rights and freedoms (Zakaria, 1997). These regimes are also autocratic in the Kornai's (2016) sense. This means that the political playing field is not leveled, but seriously tilted against opposition. Institutions that function as "checks and balances" are weak and non-independent. The rule of law, which is fundamental to the functioning of any democratic state, is also increasingly seen as not applying to the political elite. Political power is also supported by removing potentially critical voices, which can result in restrictions on the freedom of the press and the media, civil organizations, and academic freedom (Ricz, 2021).

Ricz (2021) published a list of the features and tendencies which are characteristic for the illiberal state capitalism regimes. The following characteristics were mentioned:

- the return of the state as the architect of economic development (the role of the active characterisation of economic structures is derived from a variety of channels, from ownership rights and regulatory mechanisms to selective policy measures);
- the overall tendencies of centralization prevail in the decision-making and exercise of power (in politics and the economy alike);
- the increasingly complicated relationship between business and politics is being strengthened, leading to state/business capture;

- wide-ranging corruption (rent-seeking, patronage, and cronyism) dominating, as an integrated social phenomenon, a special tool of economic coordination;
- the legitimacy of powerful leaders/states, which is rooted in socially expected paternalism;
- attacks on institutional checks and balances, and restrictions on the independence of institutions and agencies;
- attacks on the media and free press;
- attacks on minorities and marginalized groups of society (and their social mobility);
- attacks on non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, and human rights organizations;
- attacks on the autonomy of science and education;
- attacks on environmental sustainability and justice (and the fight against climate change).

Polish experiences will be evaluated using the Ricz's illiberal model of state capitalism.

4. Illiberal state capitalism: a Polish case

We can observe backsliding of democracy, growing populism, and increasing state interventionism also in post-socialist countries, including Poland. In case of post-socialist countries, Ratajczak (2017) put forward the hypothesis that we are experiencing a second systemic transition. During the first systemic transition, these countries were trying to build a capitalistic market economy in place of a centrally managed economy, replace dictatorship with democracy, and build civil society instead of forced collectivism. Not all countries achieved success and many problems are still unresolved. During the second systemic transition, some countries are strengthening democracy and civil society and making the economy fairer and more inclusive to solve their social and economic problems. This is a positive scenario. However, others choose to go a different way: to use populist rhetoric and weaken checks and balances institutions, and in this way, making political system more autocratic; weaken civil society and instead build more paternalistic relations between government and people; increase government interventions in the economy. This is a negative scenario². As a result of these changes, an illiberal model of state capitalism emerged. It appears that we are experiencing this negative scenario of the second systemic transition in Poland.

With the victory of the Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) in both the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2015 the situation in Poland has changed significantly. According to the new government leaders' an-

² Hausner (2020) and Hausner & Mazur (2015) presented two scenarios of how the situation in Poland could develop, which align with the vision of a positive and negative scenario of the second systemic transition.

nouncements, their government would lead to reverse or correction of systemic reforms that occurred in Poland after the fall of communism, including those that affect the most important institutions. As a result, an illiberal, authoritarian (see: Chart 1) and the statist turn in Poland happened, which is well documented in the literature (see: Bugarič, 2019; Dąbrowska, 2019; Ginsburg, 2020; Grzymala-Busse, 2018; Kozarzewski & Bałtowski, 2022; Markowski, 2019; Sadurski, 2019; Smiecinska, 2020). It is not my goal to summarize the literature. Instead, looking at the situation in Poland, I will try to identify the features and tendencies described by Ricz (2021) as characteristic for the illiberal state capitalist regimes.

The return of the state as the architect of economic development is clearly visible in Poland. The PiS government officially adopted the Strategy for Responsible Development (SRD) in February 2016 (Morawiecki, 2017). In this document, the state is defined as the crucial agent in economic development, with a role that goes beyond regulation and supervision, and commits the government to greater support of large-scale infrastructure projects and selected industry sectors such as aviation, automotive, rail vehicles, and shipbuilding. The state plays a greater role as a direct participant in economic life by the nationalization of some private companies and banks and the subject of many new investment projects, both infrastructure (Central Communication Port, Vistula Spit canal) and production (ferries, electric cars, drones, high-speed trains, etc.) and through the Polish Development Fund, which selectively invests in selected private companies (Bratkowski & Kotecki, 2021). These actions are an example of development statism that is on the rise in Central and Eastern Europe in countries ruled by conservative governments (Bluhm & Varga, 2020; Jasiński, 2019).

Centralization tendencies are present in many areas. First, the centralization of economic decisions and the enormous role of state entities in generating economic growth are a characteristic feature of SRD (Dobrowolski & Pawłowski, 2017). Furthermore, the current Polish government supports a model of “state capitalism” based on vertical coordination of the economy and other areas of social life (such as social policy, housing, civil society, local government, or media) in the hands of central government officials (Jasiński, 2019). This development was demonstrated by recentralization of state power and partial reversal of privatization, which reduced horizontal coordination between economic actors (Błaszczak, 2016). Poland already has a large state-owned sector, among the largest in post-communist ECE (Matuszak & Szarzec, 2019), and the government introduced further restrictions on the sale of public property (companies, health care, land, water, etc.). Following the concept of a unitary state, central authorities reduced the competences of regional and local bodies, as, for example, with the central takeover of voivodship environmental protection funds and government opposition to regionalism (Jasiński, 2019). Central government actions systematically undermine and weaken local self-government (Fandrejewska-Tomczyk, 2020; Izdebski, 2020). They do it, *inter alia*, through

the extreme use of the political perspective in their approach to individual units of local government (ours — not ours)³, and thus reducing local government units to the role of a petitioner. Political power is also centralized. J. Kaczyński, the leader of PiS, although he does not have a formal position in the government, has centralized political power both within PiS and in the government (Grzymala-Busse, 2018; Pytlas, 2021).

The relationship between business and politics in Poland is very complicated and leads to state and business capture. An important channel of influence for politicians is employment policy. PiS set out to fill positions not only in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and civil service with political loyalists, but also in state economic administrations and business institutions (government agencies, economic diplomacy, etc.) (Jasiecki, 2019; Kopińska, 2018). Although the tradition of treating SOEs as a justified political trophy for the newly elected candidates and partisans of any given political party is not new in Poland; however, it was clearly strengthened after PiS election victory⁴. When selecting managers, greater importance is given to political loyalty, which makes SOEs an additional channel for direct implementation by them of the political and economic goals of the state. There are many examples of actions taken by SOEs that are politically motivated. Polska Fundacja Narodowa, established in 2016 on the initiative of Prime Minister Beata Szydło, on the basis of donations made by the largest SOEs, financed a political campaign supporting controversial changes in the judiciary and hitting the judicial community (Makowski, 2020). One of the largest Polish SOEs, KGHM Polska Miedź bought medical equipment (including face masks that do not meet European standards) during the COVID19 pandemic in 2020 which was the basis for the great PR action of President A. Duda and Prime Minister M. Morawiecki (Mikołajewska, 2020). Moreover, SOEs are the largest donors of various social and cultural events in line with the government's policy and the most serious advertisers in the media supporting the government.

Despite numerous scandals and other activities that are on the verge of breaking the law or even breaking it, corruption indicators in Poland worsened only to a minor extent in recent years (see: Chart 2). In order to understand this situation, it should be noted that rent-seeking, patronage, and cronyism, although they are harmful, in particular from the point of view of a democratic state, which is expected to act in accordance with the logic of the rule of law,

³ Matuszak et al. (2022) showed that mayors aligned with the central government were significantly more likely to receive the funds from the Governmental Fund for Local Investments, as well as in higher per capita values, than mayors aligned with the opposition or unaligned with any party in parliament when the allocation was based on a discretionary decision.

⁴ Szarzec et al. (2022) showed that the scale of changes of the members of supervisory and management boards in SOEs is higher than in privately owned companies and is connected with political elections. They also showed that it is visibly higher after PiS election victory in 2015 than in previous elections.

and therefore equality before the law, may not be explicitly regulated in law as a criminal activity.

During its rule, PiS created the ground for the development of “grand corruption”, destroying the separation of powers and the system of mutual control between the executive, legislative, and judiciary, departing from the rule of law and weakening the system of checks and balances. PiS creates a legal framework and institutions that guarantee them a privileged position and facilitate access to public resources (Makowski, 2020). These activities are often motivated by an important social interest or patriotic reasons; however, they are nontransparent and raise suspicions of mismanagement. Journalists describing irregularities are accused of supporting the opposition, and the media favorable to the government defend it against accusations, creating the impression that any criticism of the government is solely politically motivated (Sękowski, 2021). As an example of “grand corruption”, the following can be mentioned: (1) staffing of SOEs, civil service, state economic administrations and business institutions with political loyalists (Kopińska, 2018; Paczocha, 2018); (2) creating various types of funds, agencies and foundations dependent on the state but outside the structures of public administration, which makes it easier to channel funds to people associated with the ruling political party (Money.pl, 2021); (3) ministerial subsidies or advertising budgets of SOEs, largely reaching government-friendly media without economic justification (Radkowski, 2021); (4) allocating grants to NGOs ideologically similar to the authorities despite dubious substantive justification (Pankowska, 2022). Such corruption is inherently systemic (that is, built into institutions) and involves political and economic elites. As Balcerowicz (2016) observed, there is a danger that Poland is moving towards “crony capitalism”.

According to opinion surveys, Poles expect the state to be strong and paternalistic (Arak, 2016), to play a significant role in the economy (PIE, 2021), and to increase social spending (OECD, 2018). The PiS government is pursuing a policy that is in line with these expectations and consistent with the conservative message of this party. The conservative concept of social redistribution is centered on the “traditional” family, which is the “nucleus” of the nation, and the increase in (family) income, reproduction, housing, etc. (Bluhm & Varga, 2020). The most popular project of the government, the child benefit program Rodzina 500+, enjoys a very large public support, and even the opposition is in favour of it. This program is not only popular, but also brings tangible benefits to the ruling party. As Gromadzki et al. (2022) showed the introduction of Rodzina 500+ had a significant and positive impact on the changes in the vote share for PiS in the 2019 parliamentary elections.

Attacks on institutional checks and balances and restrictions on the independence of institutions in Poland since 2015 are very well described in the literature (see: Ágh, 2018; Kelemen & Pech, 2019; Kinowska-Mazaraki, 2021; Koncewicz, 2018; Sadurski, 2019; Skąpska, 2017). The visible result of these actions is rule of law backsliding (Godłów-Legiędź, 2020; Sękowski & Pułról,

2021) which could be seen looking at indexes of rule of law and judicial independence (see: Chart 3). The more important and gloomy consequence is that: “The ruling elite has a firm stranglehold on nearly all public institutions with its effective capacity to suppress dissent, to enrich itself, and to further consolidate its power” (Sadurski, 2019). At the same time, entities that can review the actions of the authorities, like the independent media and non-governmental organizations, are attacked. The PiS government from time to time is trying to weaken independent media, to discourage them from criticizing the government, and to weaken their economic base (Chapman, 2017)⁵, while the party’s control of public media outlets has made them into the government’s propaganda machine (Grzymala-Busse, 2018).

The PiS government since 2015 has also been increasing pressure on non-governmental actors, especially civil society organizations, to comply with its illiberal norms and practices (Chrzczonowicz, 2020; Wachowiec, 2022). “Such pressures have taken the forms of diminished financial support, smear campaigns, and intimidation practices that have affected the scope of the economic, symbolic, human, and social resources available to civil society” (Kravchenko et al., 2022). Furthermore, for political reasons, the Polish government attacks minorities and marginalized groups in this way, protecting Polish citizens from different imaginary enemies, including Muslims, refugees and the gay and lesbian community (Follis, 2019; Kinowska-Mazaraki, 2021). NGOs that defend minorities against politically motivated attacks by the government are particularly targeted.

Other features of the illiberal state capitalism model, i.e. attacks on the autonomy of science and education and attacks on environmental sustainability, are not so pronounced in Poland. However, one can point to some disturbing facts: a change, introduced by the Minister of Education and Science, of the list of scientific journals one month before the evaluation of universities (Leszczyński, 2021); a bill increasing the competences of school superintendents and reducing the independence of schools (Ambroziak, 2022); or statements by leading representatives of the ruling party and pro-governmental media on climate change and environmental protection (Michalak, 2021; TVN24.pl, 2019; Żuk & Szulecki, 2020).

5. Conclusions

There have been visible changes in the Polish economy and politics in recent years. State intervention is on the rise in the economy. At the same time, one can observe backsliding of democracy and growing populism. In this article, Polish experiences were evaluated using Ricz’s illiberal model of state capitalism. The results of this study suggest that illiberal state capitalism is built in Po-

⁵ As a result of these actions, the World Press Freedom Index in Poland published by Reporters Without Borders is down from 87.29 in 2015 to 65.64 in 2022 (score from 0 to 100. The higher the score, the more free are the media in the given country).

land. Almost every characteristic of the illiberal state capitalism regimes were identified in Poland. State intervention in the economy is used for mainly political purposes. Limits on power are routinely ignored, the political playing field is not leveled, and the rule of law is backsliding.

This constitutional breakdown, as Sadurski (2019) calls it, could potentially have bad consequences. First, Metelska-Szaniawska (2016) showed that the constitutional framework had a significant effect on performance in post-socialist countries: the constitution has an important role in building the commitment of political actor vis-à-vis economic actors and the entire society. This role of the constitution was weakened in Poland. Second, inclusive institutions, that is, democracy, rule of law, and economic freedom, are needed for long-term economic growth (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Piątek, 2016), so changes in Poland could lead to slower economic growth. Third, as Szarzec et al. (2021) showed under bad institutions, SOEs are detrimental to economic growth, and Poland has a large state-owned sector.

It will not be easy to change this situation. As in every system, political and economic institutions in illiberal state capitalism strengthen each other. There is a risk that the vicious circle (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012) will emerge — in case of opposition winning the elections, a new government will use autocratic institutions to strengthen its grip on power. Also, restoring the rule of law and strengthening judicial independence without breaching the law will be very difficult (Sękowski & Pułról, 2021). As Holmes (2018) wrote about the situation in Poland: “liberal democracy will need some kind of miracle to help it back to life”.

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Appendix

Table 1.
Characteristics of the capitalist and socialist systems

No.	Capitalist system	Socialist system
Primary characteristics		
1.	Relation of the political sphere to property forms and coordination mechanisms: the ruling political group ensures the dominance of private property and market coordination	Relation of the political sphere to property forms and coordination mechanisms: the ruling political group, i.e., the Communist Party, enforces the dominance of public property and bureaucratic coordination
2.	Dominant form of property: private ownership	Dominant form of property: state ownership
3.	Dominant form of coordination mechanism: market coordination	Dominant form of coordination mechanism: bureaucratic coordination
Secondary characteristics		
4.	Surplus economy, i.e., the buyers' market, is the dominant state of the market for goods and services	Shortage economy, i.e., the sellers' market, is the dominant state of the market for goods and services
5.	Labour surplus is the dominant state of the labour market	Labour shortage is the dominant state of the labour market
6.	Fast technical progress; the system often generates revolutionary innovation	Slow technical progress; the system rarely generates revolutionary innovation
7.	High income inequality	Low income inequality
8.	Hard budget constraint for organizations in a quite broad sphere	Soft budget constraint for organizations in a quite broad sphere
9.	Direction of corruption: it is mostly the seller who bribes the buyer	Direction of corruption: it is mostly the buyer who bribes the seller

Source: Kornai (2016, p. 553).

Table 2.
Characteristics of democracy, autocracy, and dictatorship


No.	Democracy	Autocracy	Dictatorship
Primary characteristics			
1.	The government can be removed through a peaceful and civilized procedure	The government cannot be removed through a peaceful and civilized procedure	The government cannot be removed through a peaceful and civilized procedure
2.	Institutions which jointly guarantee the conditions of removing the government are strong	Institutions which could jointly guarantee the conditions of removing the government are either formal or weak	Institutions which could jointly guarantee the conditions of removing the government do not exist
3.	Legal parliamentary opposition exists; multiple parties run for elections	Legal parliamentary opposition exists; multiple parties run for elections	No legal parliamentary opposition; only one party runs for elections
4.	No terror (large-scale detention in forced-labour camps and executions)	No terror (large-scale detention in forced-labour camps and executions), but various means of coercion are occasionally used against political adversaries (imprisonment with false allegation, or even politically motivated murder)	Terror (large-scale detention in forced-labour camps and executions)



No.	Democracy	Autocracy	Dictatorship
		Secondary characteristics	
5.	No repressive means are used against parliamentary opposition	Repressive means are used against parliamentary opposition	No parliamentary opposition
6.	Institutions of “checks and balances” are active and independent	Institutions functioning as “checks and balances” are weak and non-independent	No institutions have been created to act as “checks and balances”
7.	Relatively few officials are appointed by the ruling political group	The ruling political group appoints its own cadres to virtually all important offices	The ruling political group appoints its own cadres to all important offices
8.	No legal constraints against civil protest; strong civil society	No legal constraints against civil protest; weak civil society	Civil protest against the government is prohibited by law
9.	Interested persons and their organizations take part in many forms and to relevant degrees in preparations for decision-making (significant levels of participation)	There are legal frameworks for participation but they are practically not applied	Participation is not even formally prescribed
10.	Freedom of the press is guaranteed by law, and is actually enforced	Freedom of the press is constrained by legal and economic means	No freedom of the press

Source: Kornai (2016, p.565).


Chart 1.
Democracy indexes in Poland, 2010–2021



Notes: Score from 0 to 1. The higher the score, the more democratic the given country is.

Source: Own preparation based on Varieties of Democracy (2022).


Chart 2.
Corruption indexes in Poland, 2010–2021



Notes: Score of Corruption Perception Index from 0 to 100 and Control of Corruption from –2.5 to 2.5. The higher the score, the more free from corruption is the given country. Corruption Perception Index is published by Transparency International. Control of Corruption is published by the World Bank in The Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset.

Source: Own preparation based on Transparency International (2022) and The World Bank (2022).

Chart 3.
Rule of law indexes and Judicial independence index in Poland, 2010–2021



Notes: Score of WJP Rule of Law Index from 0 to 1; Control of Corruption from –2.5 to 2.5 and Judicial Independence from 1 to 7. The higher the score, the better for the rule of law and the higher the judicial independence in the given country. WJP Rule of Law Index is published by World Justice Project from 2015. Rule of Law is published by the World Bank in The Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset. Judicial independence index was published by the World Economic Forum in a series of reports The Global Competitiveness Report till 2020.

Source: Own preparation based on Transparency International (2022), The World Bank (2022) and The World Economic Forum (2022).

