The Trajectory of Machiavelli’s Concept of State in Early Modern Politics

Abstract:
This paper suggests that the trajectory that Machiavelli’s concept of the state took by later political thinkers, active in reshaping the character of the political order they were working with, fundamentally shaped and altered the direction of the political development of Early Modern Europe. Looking at how later thinkers used Machiavelli’s concept and reframed it in their given political traditions and contexts often leads to how the concept evolved over time. This paper argues that there was a clear arch of how Machiavelli’s concept of the state was reformulated and repackaged by key legal and political thinkers such as Gentili, Bodin, Grotius, and finally Hobbes. Their reformation of Machiavelli’s state fundamentally altered the concept radically from what Machiavelli coined as an outcome of the given prince’s new modes and orders to Hobbes’s depersonalized Leviathan.

Keywords: Machiavelli, state, Hobbes, Gentili, Bodin, Grotius

The role of Machiavelli’s impact on the trajectory of the political development of Early Modern Europe and of Modern Political Thought itself is all too often taken for granted. But how and what exactly is the role that he is to take is very much a hot debate, still strongly debated by the various traditions of scholarship (see Meinecke, 1997). All can see his importance, but they fervently disagree about the way he impacts it. This paper claims that the real impact of Machiavelli and what is in fact the Machiavellian Moment is how Machiavelli’s concept of the state (lo stato), a term he coins in his writings, especially in the Prince and the Discourses, is transmitted from Florence and to the West, to England and France and how his concept was used and modified by the various statesmen and legislators who sought to use Machiavelli’s concept to strengthen the political order they lived in. Thus, this paper suggests that the trajectory
that Machiavelli’s concept of the state took by later political thinkers, active in reshaping the character of the political order they were working with, fundamentally shaping the direction of the political development of Early Modern Europe. Looking at how later thinkers used Machiavelli’s concept and reframed it for their given political traditions and contexts often leads to how the concept evolved over time.

This paper argues that there was a clear arch of how Machiavelli’s concept of the state was reformulated and repackaged by such key legal and political thinkers such as Gentili, Bodin, Grotius and finally Hobbes, whose reformation of Machiavelli’s state fundamentally alters the concept of the state so it radically transformed what Machiavelli coined. Realizing this trajectory shows what is in fact the “real” Machiavellian moment, where the Machiavelli’s concept of the state comes not only to dominate the political landscape but replace the older concepts of political community that came before it – that of the civitas/polis of the Ancients, Empire of the Romans and Christians, and the Feudal hybrids and mixes of institutions that shape the political thinking of the Middle Ages. But with this and clearly by the time of Hobbes, the state and the state alone is the only form of political community that is acknowledged as the form which political community is then embodied.

One could say that Hobbes’s re-formulation of Machiavelli’s concept of the state, the state seems to be the common point of reference for all later treatment in modern political thought (i.e., Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, et al.), where Hobbes fundamentally intertwines together things like state of nature, consent as the basis of legitimacy, sovereignty, and the body politic all into the state. Hobbes re-formulation of the state becomes the form that remains the basic for those later modern political thinkers who either give more depth to or reconstruct what they have taken from Hobbes, but in a way that remains more clearly resembling Hobbes than Machiavelli’s presentation of the concept. Thus, one could quip – echoing what Whitehead said about the remainder of philosophy in relation to Plato – that rest of thinkers (Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, et al.) of the modern tradition of political thought on the issue of the state are mostly footnotes to Hobbes. This is to say they seem to be fundamentally working from his same use of the concept and are only modifying it where they see inconsistencies or issues that need further clarification than Hobbes himself gave (see Tuck, 2001; Mansfield, 1983). What this paper seeks to offer is not a tracking of what followed from Hobbes but how Hobbes got there.

The basic trust of this paper will sketch out how Machiavelli’s concept of the state was embraced by various key legal and political thinkers of 16th and 17th centuries and how they modified Machiavelli’s concept to make it effective in helping to well administer and run their given political orders. I argue that the trajectory of Machiavelli’s concept goes through at least four re-formations by a leading legal and political
thinker. Each of these four reformulations has a thinker trying to frame Machiavelli’s state to the given political context and traditions that given thinker is confronting. This is not to suggest that such thinkers are merely creatures of their time, culture, environment, religion and/or language, but rather they were more like artists trying to take Machiavelli’s idea and re-present it so that instead of being something alien and new, thus something revolutionary that is coming to replace what was, but make it appear to be or even re-present the whole tradition of the given political order so that the powerful and key stakeholders believe that the new tool given to them by Machiavelli can be clothed in what each of them knows well and is near and dear to them. Here is the map of the given trajectory that I argue is how Machiavelli’s state transforms into the modern state as we currently held it since the 18th century.

The Machiavellian start

One of the strongest voices of criticism of the Roman Church and the Bishop of Rome and his interference in temporal matters was the former diplomat Niccolò Machiavelli, who served in the late Florentine Republic. Before the restoration of the Medici family over the city of Florence, Machiavelli served as a diplomat of the Republic to many powerful Courts of Europe, including to the Vatican. His first hand witness to the political intrigue that lead to the French and later Spanish Invasions of Italy and their power grab over parts of Italy led him to be highly critical not only of the current Italian political systems of City-Republics, but also the role the Vatican played in this sorry story. What Machiavelli sought was an Italy that would be free from Foreign Control, yet such an Italy would never come from the current set of political powers that governed Italy, and especially never from the Vatican and the Roman clergy.

What Machiavelli required was a revolution in thinking about the political system that would have to govern Italy if it was ever to become free. And for Machiavelli such a system would be the State led by and created by a strong and powerful Prince (or Lawgiver in his other work telling his readers, although those with more leisure given its size, about all he has learned about politics, *The Discourses*). For Machiavelli, the State would be the tool by which the Prince will establish his rule and free Italy from the foreign powers, including the Roman Church (note here how the Church was seen by Machiavelli as a foreign power, and as a corruptor of Italian virtue).

The term state as we use it is Machiavelli’s creation (see Strauss, 1962 [1936], xv; de Alvarez, 1989, xii–xvii, xxxii–xxxiii; Mansfield, 1983, 849–57; Hexter, 1956, 113–138; also see Strauss, 1988 [1959], 40–47). For Machiavelli the state is the instrument of the Prince’s (or ruler’s) will to shape the republic or principality so that it would be more effective than the forms of political rule one encountered among the various
city-republics and principalities of his time. Machiavelli's understands that the State was very much a tool and thus very much tied to a personal ruler or rulers. Although he sets the state by which community or people could be effectively governed and governed in such a manner that empowers the people that can seek glory and dominance over their peers.

The state is understood to be Machiavelli's over-turning of the classical modes and order and new creation (see de Alvarez, 1989: xii–xvii, xxxii–xxxiii; Hexter, 1956: 113–138; Mansfield, 1983: 849–857; Strauss, 1962 [1936]: xv; also see de Alvarez, 1999; Manent, 1994; Masters, 1989; Strauss, 1988 [1959] 40–47). In fact, Machiavelli’s use of the of the concept of ‘stato’ as an instrument of princely will to give ‘new modes and orders’ suggests that it is an instrument of form, that which gives shape to the principality or republic. That conceptually Machiavelli's concept of 'stato' has more in common with the Greek concept ‘politeia’ (regime/political system) than with the unit of political community – the polis or civitas – and thus different from how the state as transformed by Hobbes will appear. For Machiavelli, the state is that which forms and gives shape to the Prince’s will and thus gives order to the civic space, be it republic or principality (see Mansfield, 1983). It is thus the formal part that gives shape to the whole body of the civic space, as in classical political thought the ‘politeia’ shapes the ‘polis’ whole.

The state for Machiavelli is not an end or a goal in itself, but a “new” means to an old end. That end is the effectual rule that is able to achieve not only survival and prospering of a political community or realm but also glory for those who secure such things for men and their inheritors. Machiavelli seeks to secure what presently for him was far from secure and often all too unsecure. And the reason for this lack of political efficacy and the lack of security brought along with it was that the older political orders were simply no longer effective. Thus, Machiavelli sought new modes and orders that would be capable of securing not only man's stability and security but also the good things that human beings desire to go along with it and enjoy it (see Strauss, 1989 [1959], 40–49; Strauss, 1956; also see de Alvarez, 1999).

Now, given that the end to which Machiavelli and his new modes and order–his “state”–seeks to deliver is similar to that which Ancient modes and orders did occasionally deliver to men, albeit not as much as one would wish. Yes, because the goal or end which both Machiavelli’s new creation and the Ancient political form share are relative similar (although Machiavelli’s will tend to focus more on the material benefits much more than the Ancient forms will) this does not mean that Machiavelli's new state is either the same as or the same as the Ancient forms of political rule (see de Alvarez, 1999 and Strauss, 1989 [1956], 40–47). Yes, “the state” that Machiavelli creates
is a forum where “the political” is taking place, that is to say, where “the political” happens and inhabits. Yet, its form is wholly new.

Machiavelli crafts his new concept from the use of the term ‘stato’ from the Latin status, which originally meant nothing more that the status or condition of things. Machiavelli takes what refers to a state-of-affairs or condition of things into a thing that is able to secure a good and preferable status or state-of-affairs (see Hexter, 1956 and Mansfield, 1983). Now Machiavelli’s “state” differs from the older Ancient forms of political community, the polis or civitas (the city) and also from the late Roman and Christian “empire”. Now the civitas/polis and empire were very much the Ancient and Christian political forms which traditionally formed the teachings regarding the political communities.

With the collapse of the Roman Empire in the West in the 7th–8th centuries and the reversions to the surviving institutions that organized what would be from the political life of the Middle Ages in Europe, the estates (the households units), the Roman Church and its various units, and revitalized tribal networks. These various bodies all interacting and cooperating, in various ways, to form the feudal networks that shaped the Middle Ages that emerge and prosper from the 9th through the 11th century.

On top of this feudal system of tribal connections, estates and the Roman Church, there were first the surviving or reborn civitates or cities. These cities were firmly urban areas tied to trade and the various surviving routes of trade. They often had independence from the estates communities that governed rural areas. The second was attempts to reestablish the Empire. The most successful and longest lasting was the Holy Roman Empire established by the Frankish kings (by Charlemagne on December 25, 800). Thus, the working of medieval politics were all of these institutions all claiming some level and scope of authority over the others and all vying for power and control for either what they could control or maintain control over. Not only was this a mess, it really did not work that well either. And you then add into this the teaching of Christian political theology and the recovered Ancient humanists. Political teaching recovered first by the 11th/12th century re-discovery of Aristotle and then the 16th century Renaissance (helped on by the fall of Constantinople in 1453 bringing more and more access to Roman and Greek texts held by the Byzantines or by the Arabs), the actual mess got messier in Machiavelli’s estimation and he sought to fix things by a formation of a new way of thinking about politics and ruling and that new thinking would require new institutional forms to supersede the Ancient forms. The state was Machiavelli’s tool to create the new political order that would bring security and prosperity to realms that often lack both.

Machiavelli’s creation of ‘the state’ as a tool, which emerges out of the will of the one who yields/uses it, to overcome the limits that human beings find themselves in
both nature and the fortunes of the times they find themselves in. Nature, or the good inherent within nature, is no longer to be normative or limiting man in what he can achieve. The state is something willed by and created by man to help man overcome the condition man finds himself in (see Strauss, 1956 and Strauss, 1983, 210–228). Thus, the human condition is no longer to be guided by nature, but rather by the human will and the desires that human beings have and the things or conditions they want to come into being.

For Machiavelli, the will in question is the will of the ruler (or rulers) who are using the state to rule more effectively—that is being able to bring into fact the good things and conditions they want and desire to be for both them and their subjects. Machiavelli seems to suggest that the older form of the *polis* or *civitas* seems not able to bring about the good man wants because the scope of authority of the *polis/civitas* is limited by nature in ways that Machiavelli’s state is not. The *polis/civitas* being formed by nature are limited by nature in Machiavelli’s thinking, whereas his “state” is the production of a human actor willing to into being. But this is not to say the “state” is something merely willed, it is something that needs to be made into a thing that manifests control and power over a bodies and territory. The limits of the *polis/civitas* mean that it is simply not able to deliver to man what man might want or that what man might need now or come to need in the future.

Machiavelli’s state is thus no longer limited to the forces of nature that fundamentally limited the Ancient political form of the *polis/civitas*. Thus, “the state” needs not face the same challenge of size that the *polis/civitas* did. The *polis/civitas* was fundamentally limited by the question of size, in that their nature had a built in limit, so that once it grew too large the very structure and workability of the *polis/civitas* would break down or transform into a form of despotic rule. Thus for the *polis/civitas* its growth had to be guarded, else it could lose itself into something different. Now this was very tied to the ability of the political community to hold together as a single community, where they would have the same good(s) and all have a common goal of living together well. If they become too big and too large it would be ever increasing more difficult to insure that all shared in this common sense of having the same good or end. The state by being a product of human willing, and not something created by nature, has the potential to overcome the limits that the *polis/civitas* faced and struggled with. Thus, Machiavelli’s new mode and order was to overcome the limits inherent in the Ancient forms.

As for Empire, the Ancients never really saw it as a political form, but as a negation of the political form. Thus, when the *polis/civitas* grew so that they ruled and controlled territory and peoples, they could only remain a *polis/civitas* when they ruled them in a confederated network where those political communities would remain and maintain but serve and work under the authority and leadership of the hegemonic *polis/civitas*.
that had established their dominance and power over them. Thus, in the Ancient view, an empire was ruled despotti\text{cally, not politically. Now the Roman Empire was a hybrid where a} civitas rule over it and the regime that ruled the Roman civitas ruled over the Empire, but soon the civitas was replaced by an Imperial household that acted as the ruling part over the whole Empire – but this seemed to have the same limitations the polis/civitas had as the Fall of the Roman Empire clearly indicates. Yet, although the Roman Empire lasted rather long, its political form was lost early and despotic character increased over time and predominated its later history. Yet, Machiavelli’s critique of the Roman Empire hints that his new mode and order might help preserve and maintain its political character in ways the Ancient modes and orders could not.

Now when we claim that Machiavelli created the state, we mean that there was no concept of the state before Machiavelli’s creation of it. Now there might have been practices and actions that approximate what Machiavelli’s state seeks to do, they could be pre-manifestations of it, but they are not yet ‘states’. Thus, to call the polis or the civitas a ‘state’ is simply incorrect. Yes, it is often done, but doing so one is committing an historical anachronism in the state did not yet exist as a concept. Also one is not paying close attention to how Machiavelli’s concept (and the later ones following from him) of the state are radically different from the Ancient concept of either the polis or the civitas. And not to pay attention to this fact is to be a sloppy and inaccurate scholar.

Also to put the state back into the times of the Ancient Greeks, Romans, Chinese, etc. is to again engage in a massive historical anachronism and thus again to be very sloppy at the level of concepts. Those who put the state back into earlier time are (1) either unintentionally doing this not knowing that the state is a modern invention coined by Machiavelli to replace Ancient and older political orders or (2) those who know this but seek to rewrite and rework the past so the break from the past is at best not noticed or no longer even remembered (this is what Hegel was up to in his Philosophy of History). In either case, the past is not being accurately portrayed and scientific/scholarly accuracy is being sacrificed because of ignorance, laziness, or some political or intellectual agenda.

Returning to Machiavelli’s creation of the state. We see that how he turned a word that mostly dealt with the status or condition of events or persons, into referring to a thing that helped establish not only such status or condition but good status and great conditions. We now come to see the place and time where Machiavelli’s concept “the state” is coined and the concept of the state as we will come to now originates. In understanding this development as something crafted initially by Machiavelli but to come to fruition requires the work of others craftsmen and thinkers. By following what Machiavelli did here and what he left for others to carry on, we can see how “the state”
developed and evolved as a concept to help us not only understand political rule, but help more perfectly achieve effective and beneficial political rule.

**Gentili and the real Machiavellian moment**

Alberico Gentili was a young Italian lawyer born to a Protestant family. It is common to hold that Gentili, along with Grotius and Suarez, is credited with being one of the founders of the modern formulation of International Law. Gentili fled the Counter Reformation Italy and ended up in England’s Queen Elizabeth’s court. He became one of England’s leading jurists aiding the English court concerning the key international conflicts that beset England at that time. Now Machiavelli’s thought had already its influence in the court of Henry VIII and the reign of his three children as seen in the important role both Thomas Cromwell and Stephen Gardner played in successive royal administrations (see Elton, 1956; 1977; see Coby, 2012 and Coby, 2009; see Donaldson, 1992). Gentili was one of the first who made the case that Machiavelli was not really an advocate for tyranny, but was in fact truly a defender of republican or decent government (see Gentili, 1585). Additionally, Gentili added to the Machiavellian state by his pointing out the ways in which laws and the legal frameworks operated within this new Machiavellian environment.

From what has been said above we can see that Machiavelli’s ideas have been transmitted and reformulated by key European political thinkers and legislators, one needs must pay attention to this period of English political history (see Rahe, 2008). And when we look at this period, especially in the reign of Elizabeth I, we ought to pay close attention to what Gentili’s role was to recast this new concept – the state. Generally, he did this recasting in order to make it be seem to be less revolutionary, less over-turning of the existing legal and political framework in order to help it to be seen what it truly was, that of a rather helpful and beneficial reformation of the legal and political framework, one that would provide greater effectiveness in the key political institutions which in turn would bring greater security and peace to the country and its inhabitants.

Now the role that Gentili played here was taking those concepts Machiavelli created and showing the legal and underlying concern for true justice that is often masked by Machiavelli’s rhetoric (Gentili, 1586). Much of the resistance and hostility to the Machiavellian state was the perception that it was not something governed by law, nor really concerned with justice, but rather for power stake. Now this perception is one that pays too much attention on the style and tone of Machiavelli’s rhetoric and does not work through the logic of the new orders that he brings into being and the benefits to human beings they portend to offer. Now it is very much true that Machiavelli,
especially in chapter 12 of the *Prince*, does seem to dismiss the need to discuss the role of law in political things and suggest that arm [hence the use of force and power to use it] was of higher import. Yet again, this pays too much attention to the rhetoric and fails to see the implicit claim being made that law is implicitly addressed within the discussion of good arms (because as Machiavelli claims there, that good arms presuppose good laws).

Gentili shows how law and justice is very much part of the Machiavellian state and plays a very important tool by which the state can effectively secure the security and benefit of the people it is governing (Gentili, 1933 [1953]). Now Gentili is not merely adding legal forms to the Machiavellian state, he is showing how these states need must working within a framework of laws in order to be effective in relation with others rulers and their states. He shows how the new systems of laws and institutions that emerge out of the Machiavellian state creates the new framework to get states to more effectively interact with one another (Gentili, 1933 [1589]). Gentili in his examination of the demands one can make of foreign enemies shows that the new base line for the authority of law is the relations between your ruler and foreign rulers. This is very much a truncated and compressed view of the role and authority of law, either found in Medieval Thomistic/Scholastic view of the natural law or the Roman view of the *ius gentum*, or the Ancient Greek view of natural right (the just by nature). And it very much adds on to Machiavelli’s state, a dimension that Machiavelli himself did not explicitly include (Gentili, 1933 [1589]).

One can see this when one looks at both Gentili’s *De armis Romanis* and especially his *De iure belli libri tres* which is held to be his magnum opus, where one sees the way Gentili uses the new modes and orders created by Machiavelli but using them in ways that suggest a continuation with the older Roman past than some radical break from the past which Machiavelli in his own voice so loudly and boldly proclaims (Gentili, 1933 [1589] and Gentili, Kingsbury, Straumann, and Lupher, 2011; also see Kingsbury and Straumann, 2010a; Kingsbury and Straumann, 2010b). In his *De legationibus libri tres* claimed that much of the criticism that Machiavelli’s work attracted arose from people not correctly understand what Machiavelli was in fact teaching in his works (Gentili, 1585). Rather most critics were relying on personal slanders and attack on a caricature of his work than on the actual arguments and their design (Gentili, 1585). Gentili argued that Machiavelli’s goal was not to instruct would be tyrants but rather give man the means to escape from the various forms of tyranny humanity has been subjected to since the loss of Roman rule and the peace that Rome once gave to the known world (Gentili, 1585; Gentili 1933 [1589]; and Gentili, Kingsbury, Straumann, and Lupher, 2011).
Also in his *De armis Romanis*, the heart of the text is more of a debate between two opposing arguments about the way the Romans waged war. Each book presents an argument divided into 13 chapters, first con then pro, like a legal argument presenting both sides of the case, although not directly by Gentili himself, rather by two personas – the con by someone from the same city as Gentili and the pro by a Roman (Gentili, Kingsbury, Straumann, and Lupher, 2011). Although the themes and concepts of Machiavelli are present throughout *De armis Romanis*, the only place he or any of his works are actually directly referred to or quoted is in Book II, chapter 12, by the Roman and the work is Machiavelli’s *Art of War*. This is in the form of a Socratic dialogue rather than a treatise and it was the only work on history or politics that was published in Machiavelli’s lifetime. The similarities between Gentili’s text and Machiavelli’s *Art of War* open some rather interesting arenas of seeing the transmission of Machiavelli’s thought in later political and legal thinking. Here, Gentili suggests that the Machiavellian modern turn offers means by which the new modern order might better secure the peace than the Ancient Romans did and do so with less violence and more humanity. It is in this critique of Roman practices Gentili offers the various teachings from Machiavelli’s *Art of War* suggesting that Machiavelli offers a criticism of Roman practices and rather offers improvements on the art of arms via the creation of new mode and orders, which point the reader to both the *Prince* and the *Discourses*. Gentili argues that it is the creation of these new modes of orders – the state – that allows the moderns to avoid the errors of the Romans (Gentili, Kingsbury, Straumann, and Lupher, 2011).

**Bodin’s turn**

If Machiavelli still to a great degree relies upon an older version of the ruler and bodied sovereign, Bodin offers a more important transition to the modern conception of sovereignty as the territorial body politic of a nation or people (Bodin, 2013). Although Bodin’s understanding of sovereignty still rests on kingly power under the norms of law, and justice as found in the natural law teaching of the Catholic Church in the late Middle Ages, his introduction of the concept of the Body Politic provides the needed segue to what Hobbes does with this concept.

This is done because Bodin is trying to find a place for the recovery and revival of political rule and the return to the reign of political forms over the rule of persons, households, and estates that made up the political landscape of the Middle Ages. The rediscovery of the political, and of the possibility of political forms followed the renaissance rediscovery of classical thought and the power of various Italian city republics and principalities. After the Fall of the Roman Empire in West Europe in
8th–9th century, if there remained any political order it was nothing more that the household rule and extended and modified forms of household/estate rule. But this new politics was not a return to the Ancients. And that recovery was made possible not only by the rebirth of a politics on the basis of civic or political order which harkened more to the politics of the Ancient world rather than the rule of landed estates and their owners both secular and clerical that shaped the politics of the Middle Ages. Thus, the recovery of classical understanding of politics, the Renaissance with its recovery of the knowledge of the Ancients, pointed back to a time when political rule was a form of ruling that fundamentally differed in kind from household rule. Rather it was something new, but yet one that used Ancient forms. Yet initially this return of the political lacked the proper frame that could clearly give it the means to succeed against these larger powers with larger resources at the disposal that emerged out of the feudal orders (that is the Kingdoms of France and Spain). The city republics and the principalities of Italy could not muster enough resources and their political forms were too ineffectual, so taught Machiavelli.

Now Machiavelli offered his new mode and order of the state to offer a tool that could not only muster vast resources but as a means be more effective and thus more powerful than not only what was provided by the older classical political forms, but also the Medieval ones as well. And Bodin sought to give to the French political order the new tools that this new Machiavellian state, which offered not recovery of the political, a new modern form which not only gave the political form its distinct in kind from the kind of extended rule of households and estates that so shaped the medieval feudal order, yet it would also be able to martial the resources and power that those large feudal orders help create (something the Ancient political teachings for the most part did not think possible).

Yet Bodin realized something, the rise of the new Machiavelli state with its offer of the possibility of successful civic or political rule and required either a change of political speech, which at the time spoke of princely rule and the princely body – his body and his territorial body, or a whole new political language (Viroli, 1992a; Viroli, 1992b; Rubinstein, 1987; compare Rahe, 1992 and Rahe, 2008). Also, given the negative reaction to Machiavelli’s even minor revolution, any perceived radical break with the political concepts and language of the past would not be successful. Thus, to avoid the perception that monarchy and the princely system and the newly created Machiavellian state were fundamentally different on their level of being and thus incompatible to each other, Bodin had to find a way to allow both systems to find a common political language. So using the language of the sovereign's body and allowing the political community to be understood as this territorial body, Bodin finds a way to connect these two traditions of rule.
Thus, Bodin’s reading of both the classical political tradition and newly created Machiavellian state works within the linguistic construct of reality of feudal and kingly rule of the French. This is to say, Bodin using the clearly feudal framework that one found in the French Court, and by using the known structures and relations sought to reframe those structures and relations in the new Machiavellian framework of “la stato” – the state. And this was to be accomplished by separating the civic space from the territory of the household.

One must remember the existing feudal order that was the French court (ala the *Ancient Regime*) was the very one where the political form was that what emerged out of the interconnecting interdependencies of those different household-estates. In this environment, one must keep in mind the intimate connection between property owner and his property (as most clearly expressed in the concept of the King’s two bodies) and how this would blur household rule and political rule if this connection had to be extended to non-monarchical/princely forms of rule. And that important subordinates of the King needed to have enough resources of their own to field enough of a force of arms to secure the various regions that compose the kingdom. Thus, the whole political character of the feudal political order was the use of private resources that was the resources of the given feudal household-estate to give service to the king.

The origins of the “body politic” language is firmly a product of the medieval Christian political thought (see Black, 1992 and Canning, 1996). One of the most explicit treatments of it is by Christine de Pizan in her *The Book of the Body Politic* (see de Pizan, 1994). De Pizan and her treatment of the body politic is a secularized version of what Ernst Kantorowicz in his 1957 classic of *The Kings Two Bodies* points to as the formation of medieval politics (see Kantorowicz, 1957). Kantorowicz suggests that the connection between the ruler and his land was to be understood in light of the Catholic teaching on Christ’s two bodies – that of him and the church, as well as Christ as God and Christ as the host in the Eucharist. Thus, the dual nature of Christ was transferred to the earthly embodiment of Christ’s rule, the king – where as for the secular rule the two bodies were his corporal body and the land that belong to that ruler (see Kantorowicz, 1957).

In this view the body politic was thus the landed and territorial body of the King, versus his corporal body. And thus the territorial reign of the given ruler thus increasing came to be understood as a body. And the body metaphor for the political thinkers of the middle ages, contra the metaphor of the soul (*psyche*) – which was the metaphor Plato and Aristotle used – became increasingly used as the dominant way to understand the nature of the political community. This reliance on the political community as being understood via the analogy of the body led to the view that the teaching of Plato and Aristotle about the political community was “organic”.


The real political danger here in this feudal order was that each subordinate “Lord” was subordinate in relation to authority or status but not necessarily in regard to resources. And the fact that in terms of resources the King all too often needed to rely on the assistant of his subordinate Lords to wage effective war would be risky in the eyes of Machiavelli because that would be relying on the arms of others and thus to be subject to fortune. The new modes and order provided by Machiavelli's concept of the state was that it would provide the ruler with an instrument by which he had access to resources that were not belonging to him or were controlled by others. Thus, the concept of “owning of property” (or the territory under his rule being his possession) had to be extended to mean all the territory including that of the subordinates that were in under his protection or in his service also was included into this common body. Hence is why Bodin sought to have the King not to rely on taxes (monies raised by his subjects) to maintain the needed resources to support the forces needed to maintain his rule over his kingdom and the territories it embodies (Bodin, 1986 [1576]). Thus Bodin wanting the king to rely on resources of his own estates rather than through taxing is very much a Machiavellian theme that a Prince ought to not rely on fortune (that is upon others – or things not one's own) and the problem of avoiding being rapacious in the discussion of liberality (Bodin, 1986 [1576]).

The need to move the French Kingdom from being an association of discrete yet interconnected and interdependent household-estates to a more powerful and more secure from outside threat of the Persian form of unitary political form that Machiavelli contrasts. Now this new modern unitary political form provided by Machiavelli’s concept of the state is framed within the language of the king's larger territorial body – the territorial body of his collective realm, that is all the subordinated and obligated household-estates that own allegiance to his person (Bodin, 1986 [1576]).

So what was in the feudal political order a personal relation and an obligation among persons and their estates is now to be framed or embodied into a single unitary body – the body politics. But to escape this being merely the inter-relation between persons and allow the focus to move to the territorial body being seen as a unitary unit, the feudal view of the interconnection between the Lord and his land needed to be overcome or reinterpreted. So the ruler’s actual physical body had to be divorced from the territorial body, especially if this concept was going to be working when speaking about political systems where there were numerous persons sharing in rule. Thus, Bodin’s treatment of the body politic offers a solution to this problem, yet at the same time he really had no way to resolve the tension between monarchy and political rule (Bodin, 1986 [1576]). Yes, they could now talk to each other and explain their forms of ruling in the same way, but Bodin's solution was not a solution but more of a ruse to mask the problem, so to protect this infant recovery of classical politics from
the ruling order from suppressing it, as previous projects of philosophic/intellectual recovery had been throughout the Middle Ages (Bodin, 1986 [1576]; see Black, 1992 and Dunning, 1896; contrast Kantorowicz, 1957 and Canning, 1996).

In looking at Bodin, let us turn to what many find to be Bodin’s key innovation and modification to Machiavelli’s concept of the “state” – that is Bodin’s creation of the concept of sovereignty, which becomes with Hobbes, almost identical with the state and its power. The very term is coined by Bodin in the *Les Six Livres de la République* (Bodin, 1986 [1576]; also see Dunning, 1896). And it is because of this concept that Bodin, when he is talked about at all by political scientists or students of international law, remains to be thought of as a very important thinker for those interested in the state and the affairs of state (Bodin, 1986 [1576]; also see Dunning, 1896). Yet for Bodin, sovereignty is about transferring the power from the person to the exercise of an office which executes the power of the body politics in behalf of (and for the benefit of) the body politic. The very term itself reflects the transferring of the source of the power to the very power or activity itself and in doing so looks as the start of the de-personalization of the “state” (Bodin, 1986 [1576]; also see Dunning, 1896).

The very word sovereignty (*souveraineté*) plays on its connection to the Sovereign – the ruler, that is to say the Prince (Bodin, 1986 [1576]). The Sovereign is the person, sovereignty is the sovereign acting, doing. Recall for Machiavelli, the state was the new mode and order by which the prince creates to allow him to achieve what he wills to be. Now for Bodin sovereignty, is the doing that not only the ruler, sovereign, does, but also given the interconnection between ruler and the body politic, it also becomes the activity and doing of both the sovereign and the body politic (Bodin, 1986 [1576]). So with these terms we see the start of the de-personalization of Machiavelli’s state.

If Bodin’s use of the concepts of the body politics and sovereignty to help connect the Machiavellian state to the traditions of the French political order of Monarchy and royal rule, Hobbes then takes Bodin’s concepts and fundamentally recasts them both on firmly on clear and consistent philosophical ground (Bodin, 1986 [1576]; contrast Hobbes, 2012 [1651]). Because it was Hobbes who reframed the modern concept of Sovereignty. He gives to the concept a clear formulation and expression, arguing that it emerges out of how the body politic comes to be. And that it’s power and authority is merely an expression of the collective willing of all those who constituted the body politics. For Hobbes, the formation of the body politics and its sovereign body arises from the social contract, where people consent to form such a body for their mutual security and protection from the war of all again that nature permits (see Hobbes, 2012 [1651]).
Grotius’ role

It could be said that the Treaty of Westphalia merely recognized the reality of a system of states and established a set of norms by which states would be guided by to prevent future break down into total war. The horrors of the Thirty Year War were so recognized and so destructive that no state actor, especially those Germanic-Bohemian state actors who bore the burnt of the war’s consequences any repeat of such a war was to be avoided as best as one could. Thus, a new international law to guide the community of states was therefore needed. This is where Hugo Grotius comes into play. It could be rightfully said that he helped to shape the Westphalia system that would govern affairs up until our very current time.

Grotius, not being so indebted to nor much enamored with this Scholastic-Thomistic tradition, was not adverse to following in Machiavelli’s footsteps and establish new modes and orders. Although for him the older pre-Thomstic natural right traditions were still helpful, the need was to help allow the modern state to work within a framework that was not create to deal with. Whereas Machiavelli had no concern with the claims of natural right or at least openly made no attempt to give head to those claims, Grotius sought to find the natural right that would work for states and help govern and balance the actions of states per se. Thus, although for Grotius the establishment of modern international law as a system of natural right for the modern state.

Thus, Grotius used the older classical tradition of natural right and the Roman law notion of *ius gentium* but not for their own stake, but to recast them so they framed and provided an environment for the Machiavelli’s state to grow in a productive way, one that brought peace and greater security. Now Grotius was well aware that neither the Roman law tradition of the *ius gentium*, nor the classical tradition of natural right were strictly compatible with the ultimate logic of the Machiavellian state (Grotius, 2005 [1925]). And yes, it is true that the actions of states and the very concept of the state was radically alien to both the tradition of classical natural right and the Roman legal tradition of the *ius gentium*. Yet, it did not hurt Grotius’s effort that the underlying rationalism that Machiavelli had when he crafted his understanding of the state and its nature and the nature of humans who formed such states were still roughly consistent with the Aristotelian language of political reason, although in a rather decayed form, but still roughly resembling it (see Strauss, 1958; and also de Alvarez, 1999).

The fact that classical natural right was not established for states but the forms of political community that preceded (the polis and later the empire as a form of cosmopolis as found in the Stoic rewrite of natural right) also leads to the fact that it also was not necessarily able to deal with various political concepts that emerge out of the modern state – that of sovereignty, legitimacy, etc. If one looks within classical
natural right for the concept of either sovereignty or legitimacy – to name the biggest two new items that flow from the concept of that state – you will look in vain as these concepts are nowhere to be found in the works of authors of classical natural right because they did not exist per se. Thus, natural right needs to either be modified or re-casted to allow for the state to fit within it. Yet, Grotius opted for a refit but a more thorough refit than Suárez could offer, given the political and religious context he faced (see Grotius, 2005 [1925]).

Grotius recasts the classical tradition of natural right within the frame of the Roman legal concept of the *ius gentium* (law of nations) and using this framework he gives to Machiavelli’s concept of the state an environment where he can claim there exists an extensive body of norms that states needs must operate within (Grotius, 2005 [1925]; see Straumann, 2015; also see Bobbitt, 2002). Now this system of norms is not only above the law of existing states, but also of the Church or of any Church community, it is truly universal to all humanity. Thus, Grotius's system of norms which acts as a legal framework for states is creating what we today would call International Law (Grotius, 2005 [1925]; see Straumann, 2009; and Straumann, 2015; also see Bobbitt, 2002).

This recasting of the classical natural right tradition, is how Grotius introduction of the realm of nature (albeit a nature that is inherently social) out of which states are to emerge (Grotius, 2005 [1925]). This new realm of “nature” that Grotius speaks about is one that exists prior to the creation of the state. Grotius clearly recognizes that the state is something new and also something that is simply not universally present, at every time and in every place. Thus, Grotius accepts that it is historically a fact, that given the state is only a product of modern political thought and something newly created, there was a time (and for some places, there remains a time) where there exists no state. Thus, Grotius speaks of this condition as a “state of nature” and this “state of nature” helps him explain the situation human beings are in prior to the emergence of state.

Now the “state of nature” is brought in because Grotius realizes that the state is an emerging political property and not simply one that would be found continually in all human history (Grotius, 2005 [1925]). So there is a period of political or social action prior to the existence of the state that needed to be addressed and thus with this state of nature can help explain the interaction between the pre and post state stage of political development. Nonetheless, Grotius ‘state of nature’ remains more true to the Classical natural right tradition of classical political philosophy because it remains social (Grotius, 2005 [1925]). The historical contingency of the state leads to a separation of the state per se and the natural social state of man, thereby the state is that political form allow for a more perfect ordering of man's social nature (Grotius, 2005 [1925]). Although Grotius’ use of a state of nature allows for Hobbes to seem to follow in his shoes with his similar insistence there exists this state of the human
condition prior to the happening of the state. But unlike Grotius’s use of this concept, Hobbes’s state of nature is not only pre-state but also pre-social per se (see Hobbes, 2012 [1651]; see Strauss, 1962 [1936] and Strauss, 1988 [1959]).

**Turning to Hobbes and his reformulation of Machiavelli’s state**

For Hobbes, the commonwealth that emerges from the social compact is said to be an artificial person. All too often people misread Hobbes and his discussion here, and read the creation of the commonwealth with that of an actual incarnate, i.e., bodied, sovereign. This is far from what Hobbes is up to. The sovereign in Hobbes cannot be embodied by a single being, in that it is the collective agreement, the collective will of those who agreed to form the commonwealth (Hobbes, 2012 [1651]). Thus, the sovereign is the collective embodiment of all those who form the commonwealth and caused it creation out of the chaos of nature. Thus, the sovereign in Hobbes is the collective wills of those who created the political community via. “the social contract” (Hobbes, 2012 [1651]). So for Hobbes, the body politic, the commonwealth, the State and the Sovereign are different terms all ultimately expressing the same thing (Hobbes, 2012 [1651]).

Thus, sovereignty is the will of those who form the civic association, body politics, political community, state, or whatever you call it (Hobbes, 2012 [1651]). Thus, in Hobbes’s reasoning, the state is the whole, not an instrument or part as it was in Machiavelli (Hobbes, 2012 [1651]; see Mansfield, 1983; and Strauss, 1989 [1956]). Thus, Hobbes is much more radically breaking with classical teaching about the political community than is Machiavelli, in that for the classical model the ruling element is a part of the whole (that claims to be acting for the whole’s best interest and for its good–yet it still remains a part of the whole) rather that the body politics or political community in itself. In classical political thought the ruling part or ‘politieia’ (regime/political system) is not identical with the political community, rather it is the part that gives shapes to and forms the given direction by which the political community will go (see Mansfield, 1983; and Strauss, 1989 [1956]). Whereas for Hobbes, the state is the whole community, per se, for it is constituted by those who forming it when they form the social compact that solidity and confirm their creation of one single community (Hobbes, 2012 [1651]).

Thus for Hobbes the community is a product of human willing, not of mere human association. So the creation of a community is a product of human will, not human nature. Thus, being a product of human willing, the political community knows no limit. So the territory of the body politic is not a factor in the logic of Hobbes’s thinking. Territory is tied to people who form the community when they join together via the
social contract (Hobbes, 2012 [1651]; also see Strauss, 1989 [1956]; and Strauss, 1962 [1936]). So the act of willing to join together that frame the contractual character of the origins of the state in Hobbes, merely takes for granted given communities of people or nations. But there is no logical reason within Hobbes’s framework that contracting parties must be of the same racial, ethic, or territorial make up. Yes, such condition will make contracting easier, but such parts or limits have no role in the basic logic of the Hobbesian state.

Yet, when one looks closely what the new concepts for use regarding political things to be rather similar in character to the concepts that were just transcended or overcome by the new ones. We, thus, find ourselves almost full circle where we started from. It is my overall contention that we are in this mess is because of the role of Thomas Hobbes and shaping the meaning and understanding of the key concepts of politics that we mentioned earlier.

I blame Hobbes because the concepts we find ourselves keep returning to are the ones that he chose to frame by his new science of politics. Yet, even after the utter rejection of the Hobbesian political science by the contemporary traditions of political and social science – especially found in the traditions of behavioralism and postivism or the reactions against them – we see that such approaches to studying political things still implicitly or unknowingly rely on those key concepts that shaped Hobbes’s political science. Hobbes is the turning point. It is with him and the structures are a vision of total modernity on the level of political philosophy becomes possible.

Although he still uses the old terms and concepts, he writes their meanings and how they are to be understood, so that they no longer mean what they formally meant but now are the key concepts that will shape the modern world. One needs only to look at the first book of the Leibniz where Hobbes starts by redefining all the key terms about man, mind, and reason that are so commonplace that their absence would surely raise suspicions of advancing some heretical and thereby unsound teaching (see Hobbes, 2012 [1651]). But Hobbes was too cautious (remember his own remark that he was the twin to ‘fear’) to be so openly radical.

But when looking at what Hobbes does to reason and rationality, we see the reduction of reason to mere logic and logical reasoning. We also see a radical reliance on a reductionist mechanistic understanding of nature, very much in spirit of the work of early modern physics. From this new view of physics and the new understanding of nature that comes from it, Hobbes rejects the classical stance that man’s nature or the nature of man is innately political or social. Rather, given how he presents the workings of both man’s physical and psychological nature would not allow for such a view of man as political or social being. Thus, Hobbes holds that although logic would suggest man ought to be social or political but for the limits of man’s ability within
nature (both of his intellect and his capacity to bring about the goods he desires). So in nature humans are selfish atoms whom due to their desires and the lack of natural norms controlling those desires lead to an environment where any possibility of man’s natural sociability is improbable.

The a-social character of man in nature and the horrific implications of that state for man and his well-being leads one to reason the need to make for man an artificial state or condition where man can escape the natural outcome of man’s nature. Yet for Hobbes for that state to come into being would require men to give up their claims to their claims (rightful due to the lack of a clear system within the nature of things simply to regulate the desires of man to produce an outcome of mutual benefit for all) to whatever they would want.

Now for Hobbes this surrendering of man’s rights, his natural powers, would require some form of legitimatization. Hobbes in dealing with the issue of what could legitimate the surrendering of man’s natural rights (except the right to self-preservation which Hobbes held no man would rationally surrender to another) to secure an artificial social state that would in fact secure man’s life and security would have answer the question that plagued the whole history of political philosophy – what is justice.

Hobbes’s answer to the question of justice seeks to answer this question once and for all and answer it so that no other answer but his would dare come forth from this point forward as what justice truly is. Hobbes thus in establishing that only consent can be the basis one could justly surrender those rights or powers that rightfully by nature belong to him (all others means to transfer or take those rights are seen to be clearly unjust or unworkable) put the end to one of the key questions that drove politics for classical political thought.

Prior to Hobbes, the claims of what was the heart of the issue were more problematic than clear. Hobbes demand for precision and clarity leads him to give a very clear and precise claim about what Justice is and in doing so hopes to put an end to the debate about justice. Also prior to Hobbes’s declaration about justice resting solely on the concept of consent, the previous answers to the question of justice here ‘provisional’ at best, each pointing to more and more questions. Some would hold that the older position that kept open the question of what was justice kept the politics alive. For politics, as understood by the classics, was debate about what was just among the differing parties whom were advancing differing specific claims. Now most of such claims often failed the test of being justice simply. But on the level of practice, the inherent limits of human knowledge about the whole of human things simply due to the problems of contingency and temporality of man nature that is found in practice (praxis) often left many of those claims having various levels of truth at the level of practice in various circumstances.
The limits of knowledge on the level of practice over the question of the just allowed the various parties to continue to make claims holding the rightness or truth about their particular claim concerning the just. This condition is what ensured the possibility of pluralities of communities and established that overall environment of human politics was heterogeneous in character rather than homogeneous.

The heterogeneous environment was possible only due to the limits of human knowledge to give a simple and universal answer about the just that could be applied in practice in the same way and same scope everywhere and every place and for all time. If such knowledge of the just and its applicability universally possible then the oneness of such a universal justice would establish the true state for mankind and thus ensure a homogeneous environment that would allow for the fulfillment of the human condition.

Thus, Hobbes with the social contact does two things – he gives us the origins of human political community, how it came to be, its nature and its power and functions, and by showing how this order is legitimate and what legitimates it puts an end to the question of justice in the history of political thought. The social contact with its view that consent solves not only the question of “what is justice?” but also the question of “how the state emerges?” from the pre-political start of the state of nature.

Thus, for Hobbes, political philosophy is at an end. The questions that drove political philosophy has been resolutely answered. The answer is ‘consent’ and only ‘consent’ and from consent everything else flows. But what does this imply to Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, etc.? Well they will only be refining and improving upon the Hobbesian answer, not really offering fundamental alternatives or refuting it but merely tweaking it, by correcting small errors within Hobbes's portrayal of this answer. And the errors that one finds particulars of Hobbes's answer might be more due to the rhetorical needs to present his teaching in a way that would be accepted by his audience. Thus, one could quip – echoing what Whitehead said about the remainder of philosophy in relation to Plato – that rest of thinkers (Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, et al.) of the modern tradition of political thought on the issue of the state are mostly footnotes to Hobbes. This is to say they seem to be fundamentally working from his same use of the concept and are only modifying it where they see inconsistencies or issues that need further clarification than Hobbes himself gave.

So yes, others (e.g., Rousseau, Kant, etc.) will find aspects in Hobbes's teaching that they say highlights contradictions in the logic of his key insights and then they will offer solutions or modifications which resolve the issue. Their resolutions to the various contradictions or problems they find in his argument nevertheless remains true to the core Hobbesian insight. So the remainder of modern political thought and not political philosophy per se, as given the fundamental question of political philosophy has been
answered and what only remains the ever increasing flushing out the Hobbesian answer and how to best implement it in the world. This then leads to more and more need to work out the issues that arise in the act of implementation and consequences of that implementation of Hobbes's core political teaching.

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