


Ceren Şengül 

Centre Maurice Halbwachs (École Normale Supérieure), France

YERLİ VE MİLLİ CITIZENS OF THE AKP: LOYALTY AS THE MEANS OF BOUNDARY MAKING

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the construction of *yerli ve milli* (local and national) citizens by the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*; AKP) of Turkey. Drawing on the boundary making approach, it discusses that loyalty to the AKP, more specifically to President Erdoğan (the founder of the AKP), acts as the main boundary marker for the construction of the AKP's *yerli ve milli* citizens. Unlike the preceding Kemalist rhetoric, drawing its fixed boundaries based on strict ideological principles (being “modern”, speaking Turkish, and being a secular Sunni Muslim), the AKP's *yerli ve milli* citizen construction is contingent and pragmatic. This paper analyzes three cases: the Gülen movement, the Republican People's Party, and Boğaziçi University, each of them representing a different ideological background, and illustrates that for the AKP loyalty trumps over all the ideological differences. This means that anyone, regardless of their ideological background, who has shown disloyalty to the AKP and/or Erdoğan, can become non-*yerli ve milli* overnight or, in the AKP's terminology – a terrorist.

Key words

Turkey, Erdoğan, the Gülen movement, CHP, Boğaziçi University, ideal citizens

On 20 September 2015 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the President of Turkey and the founder of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP)¹, stated in the public campaign for the upcoming general elections that he wanted the people to elect 550 MPs who are *yerli ve milli* (local and national) and who will work for the country with all their hearts and souls (BBC News, 2015). Apart from the controversy regarding the supposed impartiality of the President during a public campaign for a political party, this statement also illustrates the ambiguity and vagueness of the phrase *yerli ve milli*, an AKP term that signifies “nationness” in an empty way. It is not clear when exactly *yerli ve milli* became the official catchphrase of the AKP’s leaders, specifically of Erdoğan. However, it is possible to observe that it has been used consistently since the beginning of 2016. It has been applied extensively to describe technological, agricultural and industrial commodities as well as to works of culture and art created in Turkey (Baydar & Erbaş, 2020; Cengiz, 2018; Kocagöz et al., 2020). Yet, what does it mean to be a *yerli ve milli* MP, compared to non-*yerli ve milli* ones? How does one become *yerli ve milli*? Through a critical discourse analysis based on the media material, this article focuses on the construction of citizens who are *yerli ve milli*.

Similarly to other nation-states, the history of the Turkish Republic since its foundation in 1923 has also been a history of the construction of “ideal citizens” of Turkey. Hence, the AKP constructing its own ideal citizens, *yerli ve milli* citizens, is nothing new and should not be surprising. The feature that is unique to the AKP’s construction of its *yerli ve milli* citizens, as discussed in this article, is the pragmatic and contingent nature of this construction. Unlike the preceding Kemalist construction, it is not based on any strict ideological principles. Drawing on the literature on boundary-making, this article analyzes *yerli ve milli*

¹ A public referendum in 2007 decided that presidents of Turkey would from then on be elected through national votes instead of by the members of the parliament. The first presidential elections in 2014 saw Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the then-Prime Minister and the leader of the AKP, win 51.79% of the total votes. When Erdoğan took over as the President in 2014, he quit his role as the leader of the AKP. The fact that he officially campaigned for the AKP during the general elections of 2015 is another example of the pragmatic and contingent nature of the AKP period, which is the main focus of this article. Since another referendum on constitutional changes organized by the AKP in April 2017 resulted in “Yes” votes being 51.41% of the total votes, the President of the Turkish Republic can currently officially act as a political party leader.

citizens through Brubaker's concept of "groupness" as an event, "as something that 'happens'" instead of something that is "fixed and given" (2002, pp. 167–68). The blurred and fluid boundaries of the notion of a *yerli ve milli* citizen suggests that being *yerli ve milli* is contextual.

Until 2002, when the AKP came to power with a majority, the Turkish state rhetoric was dominated by the Kemalist ideology. The "high Kemalism" (Çagap-tay, 2006) of the early Republican period in the 1930s, the golden age of Kemalism, transformed into a softer version after the 1950s, when the first multi-party elections were introduced. The rather liberal environment of the 1960s and the 1970s resulted in the emergence of different ideological groupings, one of which was the National Outlook (*Milli Görüş*) introduced by Necmettin Erbakan. This ideology emphasized an Islamic worldview, and embraced the Islamic concept of *ummah*. Considering that Erdoğan was a former mentee of Erbakan and was active within the *Milli Görüş* cadres, it should be stressed that the current AKP rhetoric and its construction has its roots in the earlier periods of Turkey's 20th c. history. The 1990s saw for the very first time the victory of the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, RP) under the leadership of Erbakan in the general elections, and the brief period of a coalition government, of which RP was a part. This article acknowledges that the AKP period does not sharply differ from the preceding eras and there is no claim that the AKP's Turkey is a "new Turkey" while the previous periods represented an "old Turkey". The intertwined relationship between the AKP and Kemalism should be kept in mind while analyzing any AKP-related topic. What this article highlights is the difference in the construction of "ideal citizens" during the AKP period. The term "new Turkey" is commonly used both within the literature (Carney, 2018; Göksel, 2018; Waldman & Caliskan, 2017) and amongst the laypeople to describe the AKP period and to differentiate it from the preceding periods of the Republic². Even though at the structural level these differences between the AKP period and the earlier times remain superficial, their approaches to citizen construction show significant non-continuities which will be discussed later. The fundamental principles of the Kemalist ideology, briefly presented below, have dictated in strict terms who are the "ideal citizens" of Turkey, and people without those characteristics have historically been excluded from this group. The ideological principles of

² Kemalism, named after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, refers to the set of principles that has guided the leaders in their quest to build the ideal nation-state they had in mind. The followers of Mustafa Kemal and the adherents of his ideological principles are still called "Kemalists" today.

Kemalism determine the fixed boundaries of its “ideal citizens”. As noted above, Kemalism has been in constant transformation throughout decades, its most recent form being the neo-nationalist *ulusalçı* movement (Uslu, 2008). The basic ideological principles of it, however, have remained similar, hence the term “Kemalism” in this article refers to the general idea, not to the Kemalism of a certain period.

Within the literature, the boundary-making approach was pioneered by Barth (1969) and then recently expanded by Wimmer (2013) with regard to making boundaries, the means of boundary making, and boundary markers. Different strategies of ethnic boundary making have been identified such as boundary blurring, boundary crossing, and boundary shifting (Wimmer, 2008; Zolberg & Woon, 1999) or ethnic affinity (Kosta, 2018). Schwartzman (2007), and Loveman and Muniz (2007) demonstrated how these strategies have been effective across generations in Brazil and Puerto Rico, respectively. Within the literature on Turkey, Serdar (2017) illustrated how some of these boundary-making strategies are applied by the Laz minority group in Turkey. Goalwin (2017) analyzed the early Turkish nationalism from the perspective of boundary making, and argued that the early Republican Turkish nationalism transcended the “ethnic-civic” dichotomies. In a similar vein, this article uses the boundary-making approach to analyzing the construction of “ideal citizens” of Turkey, its *yerli ve milli* citizens, by the AKP. The concept of *yerli ve milli* has been discussed within the literature (both in Turkish and in English) in terms of everyday life (Yücebaş, 2016), *yerli ve milli* values and their imposition on society (Mutluer, 2018; 2019), and *yerli ve milli* politics (Aslan, 2017). How and in which contexts *yerli ve milli* citizens are constructed by the AKP, however, still remains under-researched. By showing how loyalty to the AKP, and more specifically to Erdoğan himself, acts as a boundary marker for the construction of *yerli ve milli*, this article contributes to the literature on Turkey and to our understanding of the concept of *yerli ve milli* citizens. This study first overviews the Kemalist era, its construction of “ideal citizens”, and its fixed boundaries. Then, it analyses how being a visibly practicing Sunni Muslim is the *sine qua non* of *yerli ve milli* citizens. Lastly, it illustrates how being a Sunni Muslim is a necessary but not sufficient feature of *yerli ve milli* citizen construction, and discusses how, based on three different cases – the Gülen movement, Boğaziçi University, and Republican People’s Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) – the construction of *yerli ve milli* citizenship is contingent and pragmatic, unlike the ideological construction of Kemalist citizens. Those three cases represent a wide ideological range within today’s Turkey: the Gülen movement, as will be discussed below, is a Turkish-Islam

synthesis movement that is led by Fethullah Gülen, and ideologically similar to the AKP in the sense that they both emphasize Sunni Islam in their teachings. However, the significance this “Muslim brotherhood” would eventually be of little importance when it comes to being *yerli ve milli*. CHP, representing Kemalist Turkey, has always been cast by Erdoğan in the role of the AKP’s “other”, and Boğaziçi University has been one of the most liberal academic institutions in Turkey. By taking the three cases representing different points on an ideological spectrum, this discussion emphasizes the irrelevance of ideological foundations for boundary construction of *yerli ve milli* citizens. Ultimately, this article argues that loyalty or, more specifically, being loyal to the AKP and to Erdoğan himself acts as the most important boundary marker for a *yerli ve milli* citizen. This study is based on the discourse analysis of media materials on the AKP leaders’ speeches and the AKP’s activities.

1. The ideological boundaries of Kemalist “ideal citizens”

The lands of Anatolia that the newly-established Republic inherited in 1923 from the disintegrated Ottoman Empire included various ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups. To build the monolingual and mono-national Turkish state, that the nation-state leaders led by Mustafa Kemal had in mind, precisely defined deals and principles were needed. These principles were guided by the Western ideals as the Kemalist leaders saw the Western civilization as a *telos* (Azak, 2010, p. 11) through internalizing the “Orientalist” (Said, 1978) dichotomies of “traditional East” vs. “modern West”. With this aim in mind, the Kemalist leaders took on a “white Turkish man’s burden” (Zeydanlıoğlu, 2008) to modernize a supposedly backward and traditional society. One of the essential tasks of this “civilizing mission” (Azak, 2010, p. 11) was to completely break away all the links with the Ottoman past as it was considered “backwards” and “Oriental”. As part of this modern/Western nation-state ideal, *laiklik*, i.e. “a specific version of secularism inspired by the French Jacobin tradition” (Azak, 2010, p. 8), was an essential ideological principle. The Kemalist interpretation of *laïcité* meant, however, that religion and all expressions of religion in public space needed to be controlled, yet in order to be considered “ideal citizens”, individuals still had to be Sunni Muslims. In other words, non-practicing Sunni Turkish Muslims, considered “modern and thus Western”, were fixed members of the “ideal citizen” group, whereas publicly-practicing Sunni Muslims, predominantly from Muslim communities with a “backwards” lifestyle such as Kurds, as well as non-Muslim citizens such as Armenians, Greeks and Jews were all excluded from

becoming “ideal citizens”. The difference between Muslim “non-ideal” citizens and non-Muslim “non-ideal” citizens was their categorization by the Kemalist state: Kurds and observing Muslim citizens were “invisible” within the Kemalist state, whereas non-Muslim citizens were officially recognized as minorities according to the Lausanne Treaty.

Language was another means through which “ideal citizens” were constructed. As the culmination of efforts to completely break away from the Ottoman past, the Latin alphabet was adopted for the Turkish language in 1928. Until then, Arabic letters had been used for Ottoman Turkish, and generations of the Ottoman intelligentsia had been educated on texts written in that script. The adoption of the “more modern” Latin alphabet meant they became illiterate overnight, and the Kemalist elites were free in constructing their own intelligentsia through this “linguistic engineering” (Çolak, 2004, p. 68) plan. Through “invented traditions” (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983) such as the pseudo-scientific Sun Language Theory claiming that Turkish was the basic source of all cultural languages, the role of the Turkish language in being an “ideal citizen” was firmly established.

Various strategies by the Kemalist state ranging from campaigns such as “Citizen, Speak Turkish!”³ (targeting non-Turkish speaking citizens) and policies such as “Wealth Tax”⁴ during World War II (targeting minorities, specifically the Jewish one) to massacres such as Dersim in 1937–38 (targeting Alewi Kurds) have reinforced the fixed boundaries of “ideal citizens” of the Kemalist state. These “ideal citizens” were delineated by strict ideological principles influenced by Western ideals (modernization, speaking Turkish, and a unique form of secularism that has constructed Sunni Muslim citizens who did not publicly express their religion). During the early AKP period, before the concept of *yerli ve milli* citizens was consolidated, the way in which Sunni Islam has been treated within the state rhetoric was modified. The following section discusses what this shift, involving the growing prominence of Sunni Islam in state rhetoric, means for the construction of *yerli ve milli* citizens.

³ Aslan (2007), Cagaptay (2006), and Yeğen (2004) discuss the details of this campaign that started in the 1920s and lasted well until the 1930s.

⁴ Akar (2000), Aktar (1999), and Bali (2005) discuss the details of the Wealth Tax and the labor camps to which individuals were forced to go.

2. Public practice of Sunni Islam as a *sine qua non* for being a *yerli ve milli* citizen

The first thing to note about the term *yerli ve milli* is the deliberate choice of the word *milli*, of Arabic origin meaning “national”, instead of the Turkish word *ulusal* having the same meaning. The *millet* system was used in the Ottoman Empire to refer to different religious communities: for example, Turks and Kurds, both Muslim groups, would be considered part of the same *millet*. The Kemalist revolutions during the early Republican period, aiming to break away with the Ottoman past as much as possible, replaced the traditional word *millet*, with the Turkish *ulus*⁵. Hence, bringing back *milli* into its rhetoric is largely an extension of the AKP’s “neo-Ottoman” vision.

When the AKP first came to power after the elections in 2002, having received 34% of the votes, it was described as “counterelites’ representing constituencies with ethnically specific grievances” (Aktürk, 2012, p. 5), and “a victory of ‘periphery’ over ‘centre’”⁶ (Şen, 2010, p. 60). This was due to the fact that for the first time in the history of the Republic, a political party that had not been affiliated with the Kemalist ideology came to power with the majority of the votes.

In this context, the Kemalists felt that the very existence of a secular state was in danger with the AKP coming to power. Even though Turkey is still a constitutionally secular state, the following years did bring a significant change in the state rhetoric: Sunni Islam, which had been under the Kemalist regime only covertly accepted as a criterion of an “ideal citizen”, has now become openly included in the state rhetoric. The increased and overt emphasis on Sunni Islam by the AKP, and particularly by Erdoğan, has materialized in Erdoğan’s repeated speeches expressing his desire to raise a religious generation, first in 2012 and then in 2016 (Diken, 2016). The term *yerli ve milli* and its derivatives such as *milli irade* (“national will”) and *yerli ve milli irade* (“local and national will”) have replaced the Kemalist term “Turkish nation”, while the notion of Turkishness, particularly in the version constructed by the Kemalist elites, has been gradually removed from the state rhetoric (Mutluer, 2018, p. 9).

⁵ It is no coincidence that *ulusalcılık*, the neo-Kemalist movement that has emerged in Turkish politics in recent years, derives from the word *ulus* instead of *millet*. Uslu (2008) discusses this movement in detail.

⁶ The concepts of “periphery” and “centre” were first used in the context of Turkish politics by Mardin (1973).

The Kemalist elites during the early Republican period, in accordance with their French-inspired principle of *laïcité*, banned the religious institutions such as *medreses*, *tekkes*, and *zaviyes* that had been a main influence within Ottoman society. However, the Kemalist interpretation of *laïcité* meant that the state needed to control the role of religion through various state institutions, the most important of which has been the Presidency of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı* or shortly *Diyanet*) that was established in 1924. To date, *Diyanet* is still “the only legally established state institution that regulates Sunni-Muslim religious affairs” (Mutluer, 2018, p. 1). It was not surprising that the AKP – whose “other” is not the Kurds, the minorities or the West but “old Turkey” (Bora, 2012, pp. 41–43) – was initially highly critical of *Diyanet*’s existence. The following years during the AKP period, however, saw the institutional responsibilities of *Diyanet* expanded and its budget increased to hitherto unprecedented levels. In fact, *Diyanet* has gradually been transformed into *the* institution to represent and to instill the new national values, *yerli ve milli* ones, and the neoliberal policies of the AKP (Mutluer, 2018, pp. 3–5).

In accordance with the just mentioned argument that the AKP has always positioned itself as the “others” of “Old Turkey”, the AKP rhetoric has very often consisted of populist elements. Erdoğan’s speech in 2011 stating “the elites have no longer power in this country; my nation (*millet*), and my brothers and sisters have the power” (Hürriyet, 2011)⁷ or his frequent references to himself as a “Black Turk” (*zenci Türk*)⁸, which he most recently utilized in 2018 before the general elections to compare himself to his “white Turk” rival (Hürriyet, 2018), are some examples of this populist rhetoric. Erdoğan refers to himself in this way to present himself as the “true offspring” of Turkey and to emphasize that *he*, along with his fellow observing Muslims, is the one who was “othered” by the Kemalist state⁹. Considering that “appealing to the people is a minimal and necessary condition” in all available definitions of populism (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007, p. 4), Erdoğan’s populist rhetoric is easily noted here. By placing himself and the AKP to the opposite of the Republican elites, Erdoğan has

⁷ Translated by the author from the Turkish original.

⁸ The word “Black” translates to Turkish as “*siyah*”, which makes the usage of a separate term such as *zenci* to describe the opposite of “white” problematic. This discussion, however, is beyond the purposes of this article. It is worth mentioning, however, that the term *zenci* is still commonly used amongst both the lay people and, as exemplified, state-level administration.

⁹ One of the speeches in which Erdoğan stated this by referring to himself as *zenci Türk* can be watched (in Turkish) at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JqBBMNYXTZY>.

instrumentalized the populist rhetoric to shape the *yerli ve milli* citizens. As Taggart argues, the concept of “the people” is essential in populist rhetoric since who “the people” are is shaped and constructed by populism. The emphasis in populism is on who “the people” *are not* instead of who they are and on who “the enemy” is (Taggart, 2000). Applying this populist logic to the AKP case, it is possible to observe that the AKP’s construction of “the people” does *not* include elites who were part of the Republican construction of the nation, and that “the enemy” is the “white Turks”. The overt and direct emphasis on Sunni Islam in the AKP’s populist rhetoric means that Sunni Islam is associated with “the people’s mainstream culture”, and thus is represented as a natural feature of national values (Koyuncu, 2014, p. 77).

Throughout the last decade, Erdoğan has increasingly taken on the role of the leader of the Islamic *ummah* around the world. Presenting the Turkish state as the natural Muslim heir to the Ottoman Empire started as early as 2006, when it became evident during Erdoğan’s press conference at the Turkey Summit of the World Economic Forum. He referred to the “United Nations Alliance of Civilisations”¹⁰, and stated that this alliance could be achieved through Turkey becoming a member of the European Union (EU). He continued:

I want this [EU membership] for “The Alliance of Civilisations” to be successful. I want this for the global peace. The whole Islamic world, which amounts to 1.5 billion people, wishes Turkey to enter the EU; they do not want this because they themselves will become EU members. They think that if Turkey is there [at the EU], the Islamic world with its 1.5 billion people or the Islamic civilisation will be represented there (Hürriyet, 2006)¹¹.

“The Alliance of Civilisations” initiative as a whole is an example of the AKP presenting Turkey as an Islamic civilization, and the above quotation highlights this by also casting Turkey in the role of the protector of the Islamic world due to its Ottoman heritage (Koyuncu, 2014, pp. 275–76). Later the AKP, and specifically Erdoğan, started to incorporate Islam into the *yerli ve milli* rhetoric. The convention “*Yerli ve Milli Will in the History of Turkish Politics*” organized in 2016

¹⁰ “The Alliance of Civilisations” is an initiative that was launched in 2005 by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the-then-Prime Minister of Spain, H. E. José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, aimed at “establishing a common political will in order to overcome prejudice, misperception and polarization” (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-alliance-of-civilizations-initiative.en.mfa>). It was also subsequently endorsed by the United Nations, and became a United Nations Initiative.

¹¹ Translated by the author.

illustrates how these two features are intertwined in the AKP's construction of its ideal citizens. During this convention, Erdoğan gave a speech in front of the representatives of Turkic and Muslim communities from around the world, and he reiterated Turkey's role within these communities by saying "as [we] fight for all [our] brothers and sisters in the Turkish world and in the Islamic world who put their hopes in [us], [we] are faced with many obstacles"¹².

With regards to Kurds of Turkey, the perpetual "others" of the Kemalist state, the emphasis on Islam in the state rhetoric meant that there was a space for Kurdishness as a separate ethnicity as long as there was loyalty to Islam, in line with the *ummah* approach. Compared to the strictly secular Kemalist ideology, this meant that different Muslim ethnic groups such as Kurds could be now recognized as Kurds, contrary to being non-recognized (invisible) within the Kemalist rhetoric. However, this also meant that other citizens who are not Muslims or who do not associate themselves with Sunni Islam – such as Alewis, Jews, and Armenians – have been clearly excluded from the definition of *yerli ve milli* citizens. Hence, when discussing the *yerli ve milli* citizen construction of the AKP, the religious aspect of this construction should be taken as a *sine qua non*. Koyuncu (2014) discusses the intertwined relation between Islam and national identity construction of the AKP by illustrating how Sunni Islam has gained importance as a "social and cultural capital", in Bourdieuvian terms, within the national identity. The relationship between the AKP's national identity and Sunni Islam is threefold: a) Islam as a justified and transformed capital within national identity, b) Islam as a unifying and regulating capital within national identity, and c) Islam as an exclusionary and discriminating capital within national identity (Koyuncu, 2014, pp. 317–320). In boundary making approach, this is understood as Sunni Islam dividing the people into "fixed and given" (Brubaker, 2002, pp. 167–168) groups. After establishing the embeddedness of Sunni Islam in the construction of *yerli ve milli* citizen, the following section will discuss the contingency and the blurred boundaries of this construction, illustrating that being a Sunni Muslim is its necessary but not sufficient feature.

¹² Translated by the author. The full original speech can be watched at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J9HkecbGgCE&t=1685s>.

3. The contingent boundaries of a *yerli ve milli* citizen

The referendum in 2017 and the preceding campaign was a clear indication which citizens were going to be considered *yerli ve milli*. The vote was on the proposed amendment to the constitution that would change the system to a presidential one where the President would have much more powers than in the current parliamentary system. As this amendment would significantly increase President Erdoğan's powers, he strongly advocated the "Yes" vote and launched a very active campaign, even though the constitution at the time prohibited the President from showing partiality. His and the AKP's leaders' rhetoric during the referendum campaign mostly focused on emphasizing the values of "Yes" voters and "No" voters. Erdoğan depicted "No" voters as those who side with and support "terrorist organizations"¹³; the then-Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım asked the voters to take into account that "the enemies of Turkey" and "terrorists" would be voting "No" (Hürriyet, 2017).

Erdoğan's and Yıldırım's usage of the phrases such as "terrorists" and "enemies of Turkey" is a reflection of the AKP's contingent and non-ideological construction of their *yerli ve milli* citizens. The case of the Gülen movement is one of the examples of how the boundaries of *yerli ve milli* citizen could be arbitrarily (re-)drawn. The Sufi scholar Fethullah Gülen and his movement is considered to be "liberal Turkish-Islam" (Aras & Caha, 2000). Koyuncu describes the Gülen movement as an "education movement" (2014, p. 298), which is significantly different from what the AKP emphasizes in its *yerli ve milli* citizen construction. The Gülenist movement consisted of "well-trained, educated and competent bureaucrats" (Yavuz & Koç, 2016, p. 136) who Erdoğan needed to transform the Kemalist state from within. In a way, the relationship between Erdoğan and the Gülen movement was "opportunistic" (Jovanović & Đidić, 2020, p. 105) as they had a common enemy in the Kemalist establishment. The Gülenist movement had been influential for a long time behind the scenes of Turkish politics. In exchange for providing support to the AKP through its trained and educated bureaucrats, the Gülen movement throughout the years spread its influence over the state bureaucracy, judiciary, and the police system (Sharon-Krespin, 2009). In time, however, the Gülen movement shifted from the "periphery" to

¹³ Throughout his referendum campaign in 2017, Erdoğan linked voting "No" to "terrorist activities" many times, and one of those campaign speeches stating this can be watched at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uWx6DUHB5aw> .

the “center” (Koyuncu, 2014). The culmination of this shift to the center was observed at “International Turkish Olympics” (*Uluslararası Türkçe Olimpiyatları*). This competition, the main aim of which is “to encourage learning Turkish and also advertise Turkey and Turkish culture”¹⁴, has been organized since 2003. Students from across the world, who study at schools established by the Gülen movement, participate in this competition. These schools are a reflection of the major feature in Gülen’s teachings: the reconciliation of religion and science, creating some form of “Islamized science” (Tee, 2016, pp. 3–4). Accordingly, these Gülen schools across the world follow a secular curriculum, and the standards for teaching subjects such as mathematics and sciences are usually high (Tee, 2016, p. 4). Koyuncu (2014) discusses how the Turkish Olympics has been gradually moved to the mainstream space that has been constantly (re-)constructed by the AKP. The climax of this move to the mainstream was observed during the 2013 Turkish Olympics, when Erdoğan in his speech referred to those in the audience and to the participants as the “true picture of Turkey”. Considering the timing of the competition in 2013 (the Gezi protest¹⁵ had already been sweeping through Turkey for several weeks), this was a clear reference to the Gezi protests and its participants. He presented the contrast between “vandalism” and “peace ambassadors”:

For the last three weeks, there have been two very contrasting pictures in Turkey... One is the picture of anger, hate, violence, and conflict; the other is a picture of peace, mercy, friendship, and solidarity... One side has insults, curse, and intolerance, whereas the other has tolerance and love. It is not the message of those who set the streets on fire for their momentary desires but the message of real Turkey that has carried the Turkish language, the ancient language, on its shoulders for thousands of years (Hürriyet, 2013)¹⁶.

¹⁴ The official website of this competition (in Turkish) is accessed at <https://turkecolimpiyatları.org/>.

¹⁵ The social movement commonly known as “the Gezi protests” first started in May 2013 out of environmental concerns when the government announced its plan to demolish the Gezi Park near the Taksim Square of Istanbul, one of the few green spaces left within Istanbul, to build an Ottoman-era military barracks. Shortly, however, the protests turned into state-wide demonstrations, mainly against the government and the authoritarian regime of Erdoğan. Özen (2015) discusses the transition of an environmental struggle into this state-wide mass movement.

¹⁶ Translated by the author.

What is relevant for the purposes of the discussion in this article is the transformation of the Gülen movement from “the true citizens of Turkey”, or *yerli ve milli* citizens, to “terrorists” and “the enemies of Turkey”, as mentioned at the beginning of this section. The pragmatic and opportunistic collaboration between the Gülen movement and the AKP collapsed once their common enemy, the Kemalist establishment, had been neutralized (Taş, 2018a). Thus the third term of the AKP (2011–2015), specifically since December 2013 when corruption scandals involving the AKP’s leaders broke out, saw a direct attack against Gülen and his followers, with Erdoğan calling them a “parallel structure” within the state. However, it was not until the failed coup attempt on 15 July 2016 that the Gülenist movement was officially recognized as a “terrorist” group (referred to by the acronym FETÖ). On the coup night, Erdoğan directly blamed Fethullah Gülen for the coup attempt and targeted him. It is beyond this article’s purpose and intentions to explore whether Gülen was really the brain behind that coup attempt (although it is now widely assumed that at least some elements of his movement were involved). What is relevant for the purposes of this article is to understand how Erdoğan used this coup attempt to neutralize not only all the Gülenists but also anyone who criticized him. Since 15 July 2016, the mass purge involved saw arbitrary dismissals of more than 100,000 public sector employees, ranging from members of the armed forces to judges, academics, doctors, and teachers (Yılmaz & Bashirov, 2018, p. 7). These dismissed public servants were replaced with those loyal to “Erdoğanism” (Yılmaz & Bashirov, 2018). Thus Erdoğan’s and Yıldırım’s use of labels such as “terrorists” and “enemies of the state” should be considered in this context. To emphasize the relationship between the 2017 referendum and the coup attempt of 15 July, Erdoğan frequently referenced the two dates together. He stated that 16 April¹⁷ was going to be the answer to 15 July and that the “No” voters sided with 15 July¹⁸.

Since the referendum in 2017, Erdoğan has consistently used the phrase *yerli ve milli*, and not being *yerli ve milli* started to be considered (by the AKP) equal to being a traitor; it became an expression of insult. For instance, a couple of months after the referendum, in September 2017, Erdoğan stated that the AKP and MHP (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* or Nationalist Action Party) were both *yerli ve milli*, whereas CHP and HDP (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi* or Peoples’

¹⁷ 16 April is the date of the 2017 referendum.

¹⁸ One of the speeches in which Erdoğan stated this can be watched (in Turkish) at <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MYrE2eolEN0>>.

Democratic Party)¹⁹ were not: “on the contrary, they [CHP and HDP] are always in coalition with those who attack this country, with those who try to stop Turkey”²⁰. It was no coincidence that the leader of the Turkish nationalist party MHP, Devlet Bahçeli, campaigned for the “Yes” vote for the referendum, whereas CHP and HDP supported the “No” vote. Erdoğan stated that CHP and HDP were not *yerli ve milli* enough because they acted against the interests of the AKP was supporting at the time; in this case, the “Yes” vote in the referendum. Actions against the AKP were again equaled to not being *yerli ve milli* in January 2018, when Mahir Ünal, the then-spokesperson for the AKP, criticized CHP for not being *yerli ve milli* and for advocating anti-Turkey lobbyists. Once again, this was due to CHP not being in accordance with the alliance that the AKP and MHP had formed at the time as illustrated by Ünal specifically pointing out that the “anti-Turkey lobbyists” supported by CHP those outside the AKP-MHP alliance (Cumhuriyet, 2018).

The same year, Erdoğan used the *yerli ve milli* concept to launch an attack against yet another organization that he saw acting against the AKP’s interests. In a speech he made at Boğaziçi University, one of the most prestigious public universities in Turkey, Erdoğan stated in January 2018 the following:

Whilst Boğaziçi University is still one of the most prestigious and most important institutions of Turkey, I have to state that it could not reach the status that we wanted (...) It has not reached its goals of becoming a global brand because it has not relied on the values of this country and this nation. The fact that our university is based on a foreign education system²¹ does not prevent it from being founded on these values (...). I ask, the universities at Western countries, do they not have diverse voices within them? Which one of them constantly acts against the values of its own state, of its own peoples? (...) Studying at the best universities in the world and adopting *yerli ve milli* values are not each other’s opposites (CNN Türk, 2018).

Throughout this speech, Erdoğan explicitly states that Boğaziçi University lacks the *yerli ve milli* values it needs to adopt to be transformed into the kind of institution that Erdoğan desires. The further developments illustrate

¹⁹ HDP is the pro-Kurdish party in the National Assembly.

²⁰ This speech in Turkish can be watched at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_dc-gMcw80c&t=274s>.

²¹ Boğaziçi University has its roots in Robert College, the oldest American College outside the United States, which was founded in 1863 by two American educators and merchants, Dr Cyrus Hamlin and Christopher Rheinlander Robert.

the importance of this for Erdoğan: on 1 January 2021, Erdoğan appointed Prof. Bulu as the Vice-Chancellor of Boğaziçi University. From 1992 up until 2016, the vice-chancellors of public universities would be nominated through elections within the universities. The list of the three candidates who received the most votes would be sent by the Council of Higher Education (*Yükseköğretim Kurulu*, YÖK) to the President, and the President would appoint the vice-chancellor, usually the one at the top of the shortlist. For Boğaziçi University, this practice was first abolished in 2016, when Erdoğan appointed Prof. Mehmet Özkan instead of Prof. Gülay Barbarosoğlu, who received 86% of the votes in the intra-university election. While Prof. Özkan held a post at Boğaziçi University, he was not even a candidate during the election. The appointment of Prof. Bulu took this unusual practice a step further in the sense that it was the first time in the history of Boğaziçi University that an academic from the outside was appointed as the Vice-Chancellor. Apart from the non-democratic procedure of this appointment, this also exemplifies how universities have become one of the main instruments for *yerli ve milli* citizen construction. The (re)shaping of Boğaziçi University, which Erdoğan described in 2018 as not being a *yerli ve milli* institution, would be facilitated through the appointment of a *yerli ve milli* vice-chancellor. For Erdoğan, this meant someone who had been an active member of the AKP, as the background of Prof. Bulu illustrates. The protesters against this appointment, consisting of both students and academics, were called “terrorists” by Erdoğan (Cumhuriyet, 2021). Once again, the label was used to castigate those acting against the AKP’s interests.

These three examples illustrate the range of citizens who can be considered as non-*yerli ve milli*. Instead of being constructed according to strict ideological principles as during the Kemalist era, the AKP’s “ideal citizens”, *yerli ve milli* citizens, are a result of contingency and pragmatism. The Gülen movement, sharing a similar worldview to that of the AKP, was deemed a “traitor” running a “parallel state” within the state once it became clear that the pragmatic alliance between the AKP and the Gülen movement was no longer needed, and has been officially labeled as a “terrorist organization” since the coup attempt in July 2016. It should be reiterated that the essential point here is not to elaborate on the behind-the-scenes details of how Gülen movement was involved; it is rather how not only the movement itself but an entire group of citizens, even those with the most tenuous connections to the movement (such as having an account in the bank affiliated with the movement), were purged from their official posts, had their licenses to perform their jobs revoked, and had their passports confiscated. With regards to CHP, it might be expected that as a party

representing the Kemalist ideology of the nation-state it would not be considered by the AKP to be *yerli ve milli*; as mentioned, the AKP, specifically Erdoğan, has always constructed themselves as the “other” of the Kemalist state²². However, some individuals affiliated with CHP are specifically labelled as “terrorists”, depending on their support for certain cases. For instance, the term “terrorists” Erdoğan used referring to the protesters at Boğaziçi University also included the provincial head of CHP for Istanbul, who joined the protests at Boğaziçi University on 4 January 2021.

The irrelevance of any ideological foundations for the construction of *yerli ve milli* citizen is exemplified once again by putting all the opposition to the AKP into one single category of “terrorists”. The statement of Erdoğan on the Boğaziçi protests after the appointment of Prof. Bulu sums up this categorisation:

A routine appointment is used to stir up trouble at universities (...). We have seen the actors of this dirty scenario at *Cumhuriyet Mitingleri*²³ when they called for a coup, at Gezi protests when they were looting (...). We have seen these actors supporting the separatist terrorist organisation²⁴ (...). We have seen them cheering for FETÖ during the 17–25 coup attempt²⁵. We have seen them during the coup attempt of 15 July when they marched between tanks and waited in front of the TV for the result (BBC News, 2021).

²² Cagaptay argues that Erdoğan has internalised the same orientalist teachings that the Kemalist state has taught its citizens for generations (Ottoman sultans being religious fanatics and obsessed with Sunni Islam) (2020, pp. 51–52), making Erdoğan himself a product of the Kemalist ideology.

²³ *Cumhuriyet mitingleri*, meaning Republican rallies, were organized in April 2007 to protest the upcoming presidential election process within the National Assembly. The rallies consisted predominantly of Kemalists as they feared that the next President (who would be the first one elected since the AKP came to power) would be a threat to the secular characters of the Turkish state.

²⁴ By “the separatist terrorist organisation”, Erdoğan here refers to the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê), Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the militia of the Kurdish movement in Turkey. PKK is officially designated as a “terrorist organisation” by the Turkish state.

²⁵ This process refers to the week of 17–25 December 2013 when a major corruption investigation involving some of the highest-ranking AKP officials became public, with several audio recordings claiming to capture the conversations of Erdoğan and his son also leaked. The AKP has claimed, as this quote also suggests, that this was a “coup attempt” by the Gülen movement; all the involved prosecutors, judges, and police officers were ultimately removed and arrested. This was the first time that the “pragmatic” collaboration between the AKP and the Gülen movement publicly showed signs of cracking.

This statement illustrates how three different groups within Turkey, coming from different ideological backgrounds (Gülen movement; those who joined *Cumhuriyet Mitingleri*, which means CHP and the Kemalists; and Gezi protesters, who included a variety of groups from different backgrounds) are all considered the same: non-*yerli ve milli* citizens, and hence “terrorists”.

In accordance with the definition of the AKP transformation period as “pragmatic” (Cizre, 2008), the construction of “ideal citizens” of Turkey has also shifted to a pragmatic and contingent one. While during the Kemalist era “ideal citizens” were constructed in accordance with strict ideological principles, during the AKP years *yerli ve milli* citizens are constructed mostly based on one thing: loyalty to the AKP and, more specifically, to Erdoğan. The previous section discussed the intertwined relation between Sunni Islam and *yerli ve milli* citizen construction. The Kemalist construction of its “ideal citizens” also included Sunni Muslims, yet these Muslims had to be, in accordance with the secularist (*lâik*) principles of the Kemalist state, non-visible within the public space in terms of practicing their religion. The “ideal citizen” also had to be “modern” in “Orientalist” terms (Said, 1978), and speak Turkish. Since the Kemalist “ideal citizen” was based on these ideological principles, the exclusion from being an “ideal citizen” relied on systematic methods: anyone or any group that did not speak Turkish, anyone who did not lead a “modern” lifestyle or was a practicing Muslim was excluded from the construction of the “ideal Turkish citizen”. The commitment to these Kemalist principles also suggests that individuals were not considered “ideal citizens” because they did not fit the model the Kemalist leaders had in mind. As the current *yerli ve milli* citizens are not determined through strict ideological principles (being a practicing Sunni Muslim is the only “necessary but not sufficient” criterion), all the citizens who define themselves as Sunni Muslims are initially treated as *yerli ve milli* citizens. If the subsequent events show their disloyalty to the AKP and particularly to Erdoğan, they are labeled as “traitors” and “terrorists”. This suggests that the AKP’s construction of *yerli ve milli* citizens reverses the Kemalist construction of “ideal citizens”: the citizens are denounced as not fitting the AKP model after they have already been discarded as non-*yerli ve milli*. In this way, whatever model the AKP has in mind for its *yerli ve milli* citizens is constantly (re-)shaped according to whoever proves to be the most loyal to the AKP and to Erdoğan at a given moment. Hence, for the AKP loyalty determines ideology, whereas for Kemalists their ideological principles determine the “ideal citizens”. This also suggests that the boundaries of *yerli ve milli* citizenship that the AKP constructs

are fluid and blurred compared to the Kemalist construction of “ideal citizens”, whose boundaries are fixed.

Conclusion

The construction of “ideal citizens” has been a common practice throughout the history of the Turkish Republic since its foundation in 1923, and the AKP has maintained this practice during its rule. This article discusses the ways in which the construction of “ideal citizens” has been modified during the rule of the AKP in accordance with the changes that the AKP has brought to its rhetoric during its “pragmatic” (Cizre, 2008) transformation period. Firstly, the term *yerli ve milli* started to be used in reference to the “ideal citizens” of the AKP. Secondly, being a Sunni Muslim, which was a subtle requirement during the Kemalist era due to the obsession with the secular characteristics of the state, became an overt *sine qua non* of the *yerli ve milli* citizenship of the AKP.

The most important change in the construction of *yerli ve milli* citizens, however, came in the form of constructing the boundaries of this citizenship. The Kemalist construction of its “ideal citizens” was based on strict ideological requirements such as speaking Turkish, leading a “modern” (as understood by Kemalist leaders) lifestyle, and being secular. For decades, these fixed criteria determined who belonged to the group of “ideal citizens”. Those who did not fit the Kemalist ideal were excluded from “ideal citizenship”. As such, the Kemalist construction of “ideal citizenship” had fixed, principle-based boundaries. The AKP’s construction of *yerli ve milli* citizens, on the other hand, is contingent on the loyalty shown to the AKP and to Erdoğan in particular. Initially, any citizens who are practicing Sunni Muslims are considered as *yerli ve milli*. However, as the case of the Gülen movement illustrates, showing disloyalty to the AKP and to Erdoğan results in being labelled as “traitors” and eventually as “terrorists” even if one is a practising Sunni Muslim. Moreover, this categorization as “terrorists” in the end erases all the ideological differences among those non-*yerli ve milli* citizens. This means that Sunni Muslims, Kemalists, and Gezi protesters can all be considered as one single group of “terrorists” due to their lack of loyalty. In contrast to the Kemalist construction of “ideal citizens”, the boundaries of *yerli ve milli* citizens are dynamic and fluid, with loyalty the main means of boundary making.

REFERENCES

- Akar, R. (2000). *Aşkale yolcuları: varlık vergisi ve çalışma kampları*. İstanbul: Belge.
- Aktar, A. (1999). *Varlık vergisi ve Türkleştirme politikaları*. İstanbul: İletişim.
- Aktürk, Ş. (2012). *Regimes of ethnicity and nationhood in Germany, Russia, and Turkey*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Aras, B., & Caha, O. (2000). Fethullah Gulen and his liberal “Turkish Islam” movement. *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 4(4), 30–42.
- Aslan, S. (2007). “Citizen, Speak Turkish!”: a nation in the making. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 13(2), 245–72.
- Aslan, A. (2017). Yerli ve milli siyaset. In İ. Çağlar, A. Aslan (Eds.), *AK Parti'nin 15 yılı: toplum içinde* (pp. 77–104). İstanbul: SETA.
- Azak, U. (2010). *Islam and secularism in Turkey: Kemalizm, religion and the nation-state*. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Bali, R. (2005). *The varlık vergisi affair*. İstanbul: ISIS.
- Barth, F. (1969). Introduction. In: F. Barth (Ed.), *Ethnic groups and boundaries: the social organization of culture difference*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Baydar, H., & Erbaş, S. (2020). Yerli ve milli aspir çeşitlerimiz: olein, zirkon ve safir. *Ziraat Fakültesi Dergisi*. Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/sduzfd/issue/52563/661223>
- BBC News. (2015, Sep 29). Erdoğan: Siz milli de yerli de olamazsınız. *BBC News*. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/09/150929_erdogan_yerli_milli
- BBC News. (2021, Jan 8). Boğaziçi protestoları: Erdoğan, Soylu ve Kaftancıoğlu, gösteriler ve suçlamalar için ne dedi? *BBC News*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-55588367>
- Bora, T. (2012). *Türk sağının üç hâli: milliyetçilik, muhafazakârlık, islâmıcılık*. İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları.
- Brubaker, R. (2002). Ethnicity without groups. *European Journal of Sociology*, 43(2), 163–89.
- Cagaptay, S. (2006). *Islam, secularism, and nationalism in modern Turkey: who is a Turk?* London and New York: Routledge.
- Cagaptay, S. (2020). *Erdogan's empire: Turkey and the politics of the Middle East*. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Carney, J. (2018). Projecting ‘new Turkey’ deflecting the coup: Squares, screens, and publics at Turkey’s ‘democracy watches’. *Media, Culture & Society*, 41(1), 138–48.
- Cengiz, F. Ç. (2018). The politics of development of Turkey’s indigenous and national (yerli ve milli) defense industry. In N. Bilici, R. Pehlivanlı, D. Zorlutuna (Eds.), *Innovation and Global Issues with Multidisciplinary Perspectives* (pp. 99–113). Berlin: Peter Lang.

- Cizre, U. (2008). *Secular and Islamic politics in Turkey: the making of the Justice and Development Party*. Oxon: Routledge.
- CNN Türk. (2018, Jan 7). Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi yerli ve milli değerlere yaslanamadığı için beklendiği yere gelemedi. *CNN Türk*. Retrieved from <https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/cumhubaskani-erdogan-bogazici-universitesi-yerli-ve-milli-degerlere-yaslanamadigi-icin-beklendigi-yere-gelemedi>
- Cumhuriyet. (2018, Jan 11). AKP Sözcüsü Mahir Ünal: CHP yerli ve milli değil. *Cumhuriyet*. Retrieved from <http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/akp-sozcusu-mahir-unal-chp-yerli-ve-milli-degil-902933>
- Cumhuriyet. (2021, Jan 8). Erdoğan'dan 'Boğaziçi' açıklaması. *Cumhuriyet*. Retrieved from <https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/erdogandan-bogazici-aciklamasi-1804586>
- Çolak, Y. (2004). Language policy and official ideology in early Republican Turkey. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 40(6), 67–91.
- Diken. (2016, Feb 27). Erdoğan hedefine bağlılık bildirdi: dindar nesil yetiştireceğiz. *Diken*. Retrieved from <http://www.diken.com.tr/erdogan-sozunden-vazgecmehedefimiz-dindar-nesil-yetistirmek/>
- Goalwin, G. J. (2017). Understanding the exclusionary politics of early Turkish nationalism: An ethnic boundary-making approach. *Nationalities Papers*, 45(6), 1150–66.
- Göksel, O. (2018). Uneven development and non-Western modernities: A historical sociology guide to the new Turkey. *New Middle Eastern Studies*, 8(1), 63–89.
- Hobsbawm, E. J., & Ranger, T. (1983). *The invention of tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hürriyet. (2006, Nov 24). Finlandiya'nın söylemleri bizi bağlamaz. *Hürriyet*. Retrieved from <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/finlandiyanin-soylemleri-bizi-baglamaz-5500058>
- Hürriyet. (2011, May 8). Başbakan'ın notları iPad'de. *Hürriyet*. Retrieved from <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/basbakanin-notlari-ipadde-17737311>
- Hürriyet. (2013, Jun 17). 11. Türkçe Olimpiyatları'nda görkemli kapanış. *Hürriyet*. Retrieved from <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/11-turkce-olimpiyatlarinda-gorkemli-kapanis-23521945>
- Hürriyet. (2017, Mar 22). Başbakan Yıldırım: hayır diyen katiyen terrorist değildir. *Hürriyet*. Retrieved from <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/basbakan-yildirim-hayir-diyen-katiyen-terrorist-degidir-40403659>
- Hürriyet. (2018, Jun 13). Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'dan İnce'ye 'Beyaz Türk' yanıtı. *Hürriyet*. Retrieved from <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogandan-onemli-aciklamalar-40866828>
- Jagers, J., & Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties' discourse in Belgium. *European Journal of Political Research*, 46(3), 319–45.
- Jovanović, S. M., & Đidić, A. (2020). Discursive governance: Erdoğan's populist discourses as a mode of power preservation. *The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies*, 1/2020, 101–20.

- Kocagöz, E., İğde, Ç. S., & Çetindağ, G. (2020). Elektrikli ve akıllı, yerli ve milli: Türkiye'nin Otomobili Girişim Grubu'nun tanıttığı araçlara yönelik tüketicilerin ilk değerlendirmeleri. *Erciyes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 49, 55–74.
- Kosta, E. B. (2018). Becoming Italian, becoming American: Ethnic affinity as a strategy of boundary making. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 42(5), 801–19.
- Koyuncu, B. (2014). “Benim milletim...”: AK Parti iktidarı, din ve ulusal kimlik. İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık.
- Loveman, M., & Muniz, J. O. (2007). How Puerto Rico became white: Boundary dynamics and intercensus racial reclassification. *American Sociological Review*, 72(6), 915–39.
- Mardin, Ş. (1973). Centre-periphery relations: A key to Turkish politics. *Daedalus*, 102(1), 169–90.
- Mutluer, N. (2018). *Diyanet*'s role in building the ‘yeni (new) milli’ in the AKP era. *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, 27, 1–24.
- Mutluer, N. (2019). The intersectionality of gender, sexuality, and religion: Novelties and continuities in Turkey during the AKP era. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 19(1), 99–118.
- Özen, H. (2015). An unfinished grassroots populism: The Gezi Park protests in Turkey and their aftermath. *South European Society and Politics*, 20(4), 533–52.
- Said, E. (1978). *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon.
- Schwartzman, L. F. (2007). Does money whiten? Intergenerational changes in racial classification in Brazil. *American Sociological Review*, 72(6), 940–63.
- Serdar, A. (2017). Strategies of making and unmaking ethnic boundaries: Evidence on the Laz of Turkey. *Ethnicities*, 19(2), 335–69.
- Sharon-Krespin, R. (2009). Fethullah Gülen's grand ambition: Turkey's Islamist danger. *The Middle East Quarterly*, 16, 55–6.
- Şen, M. (2010). Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the rise of the Justice and Development Party. *Turkish Studies*, 11(1), 59–84.
- Taggart, P. (2000). *Populism*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Taş, H. (2018a). A history of Turkey's AKP-Gülen conflict. *Mediterranean Politics*, 23(3), 395–402.
- Tee, C. (2016). *The Gülen movement in Turkey: The politics of Islam and modernity*. London & New York: I. B. Tauris.
- Uslu, E. (2008). *Ulusalçılık*: The neo-nationalist resurgence in Turkey. *Turkish Studies*, 9(1), 73–97.
- Waldman, S. A., & Caliskan, E. (2017). *The ‘new Turkey’ and its discontents*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wimmer, A. (2008). Elementary strategies of ethnic boundary making. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 31(6), 1025–55.
- Wimmer, A. (2013). *Ethnic boundary making: Institutions, power, networks*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Yavuz, M. H., & Koç, R. (2016). The Turkish coup attempt: The Gülen movement vs. the state. *Middle East Policy*, 23(4), 136–48.
- Yeğen, M. (2004). Citizenship and ethnicity in Turkey. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 40(6), 51–66.
- Yılmaz, I., & Bashirov, G. (2018). The AKP after 15 years: Emergence of Erdoganism in Turkey. *Third World Quarterly*, 39(9), 1812–30.
- Yücebaş, M. (2016). *Yerli ve milli gündelik hayat: Türkiye’de gündelik hayat pratikleri ve ideolojisi*. İstanbul: İletişim.
- Zeydanlıoğlu, W. (2008). “The white Turkish man’s burden”: orientalism, Kemalism and the Kurds in Turkey. In G. Rings, A. Ife (Eds.), *Neo-colonial mentalities in contemporary Europe? Language and discourse in the construction of identities* (pp. 155–74). Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Zolberg, A. R., & Woon L. L. (1999). Why Islam is like Spanish: Cultural incorporation in Europe and the United States. *Politics & Society*, 27(1): 5–38.