

**Mirośław Banasik** 

Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce, Poland

## **BUCHAREST NINE IN THE PROCESS OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE ON NATO'S EASTERN FLANK**

### **ABSTRACT**

The purpose of the research presented in this article was to analyze the role of the Bucharest Nine States (B9) in shaping NATO's strategic deterrence mechanisms and to assess their effectiveness in ensuring the security of the eastern flank. When discussing the research problems, top-down and bottom-up approaches were adopted to confront NATO's deterrence initiatives with the expectations of B9. The research process revealed that B9 encourage the United States to engage in European security. They are aware of the need to pay a high cost for their own security, they make defensive efforts in projects implemented by the European Union, especially in acquiring capabilities that guarantee the defense of their own territory and deterrence through punishment. They create conditions for the operating of battalion battle groups on their own territory, or participate in them themselves, and make a large contribution to the reformed NATO response forces and command system. The B9 states actively participate in building allied horizontal deterrence mechanisms to prevent asymmetric escalation of conflict, as well as mechanisms of deterrence by denial to thwart the conquest of their own territory.

### **Key words**

Bucharest Nine States, strategic deterrence, Russian threats, European security, Eastern flank, NATO, European Union

## Introduction

The policy of revising the international order, which has been on the rise for more than ten years, materializing in the intervention in Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea, and the conflict in eastern Ukraine, has caused a deterioration in relations of the Russian Federation with the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the European Union (EU). The Russian Federation's quest to regain its sphere of influence in post-Soviet states and its superpower status was an expression of deepening international rivalry, resulting in an unpredictable international security environment. The challenges and threats posed by the aggressively pursued foreign policy of the Russian Federation have been a cause for the growing security concern among the states of the former communist bloc that directly neighbor Russia. The intensifying conflict in Ukraine has posed a serious threat to regional and global international relations as well as destabilized the region from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Hybrid threats have caused deterioration in transatlantic relations and created adverse consequences for political, military, economic, social, and information security, as well as for the functioning of the critical infrastructure of NATO's border states. From a geopolitical point of view, the Alliance's eastern flank was the most vulnerable to aggression, so states located in this area were forced to coordinate their security strategies following the annexation of Crimea.

In 2014 in Warsaw, Poland and Romania initiated consultations among the neighboring states of the Russian Federation, aimed at encouraging cooperation to stabilize international security. Common interests, shared history and close ties led Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic to promptly join the security talks and declare their willingness to participate in the new initiative of the Bucharest Nine. Thus the states associated in the Bucharest Format began to devise strategies that would respond to new challenges in international security. The common voice of the nine states was a strong message demonstrating the invalidity of stereotypes held by some Allies swayed by the Russian claim that Poland and the Baltic States were Russophobic.

B9 fit well with the broader geostrategic project known as the Three Seas Initiative, tasked with strengthening the Alliance's eastern flank and promoting cooperation among the Visegrad Group (V4), the Baltic States, Romania, NATO's Western Balkan states and the Nordic states that are members of NATO (Denmark and Norway), as well as non-NATO members of the Alliance, i.e. Sweden and Finland. With Poland and Romania as its leaders, the Three Seas Initiative

is to increase defense capabilities of the states participating in this project and to expand their strategic control over the sea routes from the Atlantic through the Danish Straits and the Baltic Sea basin, as well as to establish a buffer against Russia – the land belt stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

Europe also needed strong support from the US, so bilateral diplomatic efforts by the strongest B9 states were to set in motion processes that could effectively deter the aggressive intentions of the Russian Federation and safeguard the interests of Central and Eastern European states.

Review of the available literature indicates that there is a gap in knowledge regarding the activities taken by the B9 states on strategic deterrence. Most of the literature focuses on the description of the origins and evolution of the Bucharest Format and the initiatives undertaken either on their own or as part of European Union programs. The available works discuss the issue of the initiatives of NATO's eastern flank states more in the context of ensuring their own security and acquisition of their own defense capabilities than from the point of view of strategic deterrence. There are also no assessments of B9 initiatives from the perspective of the overall work of the North Atlantic Alliance and their influence on the systemic solutions undertaken in the area of deterring Russian Federation aggression and countering the threats this aggression creates.

The problematic situation so identified leads to the formulation of the main research problem: *What is the assessment of the participation of B9 states in the shaping of international security mechanisms and in NATO's strategic deterrence of the Russian Federation in the eastern region of the Alliance?* The main research problem included the following specific problems: 1) What steps are taken by B9 states to ensure international security? 2) What are the dilemmas of NATO's strategic deterrence? 3) What is the evaluation of NATO's strategic deterrence mechanisms against Russian aggression on the territory of B9 states?

The purpose of the research, the results of which are presented in this article, was to analyze the role of B9 states in shaping NATO's strategic deterrence mechanisms against Russian aggression on the eastern region of the Alliance and to assess their effectiveness in providing security.

Top-down and bottom-up approaches were adopted in order to answer the research problems. The top-down approach was used to analyze and evaluate the measures taken by NATO and the mechanisms put in place to serve the need to strengthen the eastern flank and, first of all, the effectiveness of conducting strategic deterrence aimed at the Russian Federation. In particular, the decisions taken by the Alliance in 2014, 2016, 2018 and 2019 were taken into account. The bottom-up approach was helpful in analyzing the initiatives and specific

actions taken by B9 states to improve the operational capabilities of individual states and the activities of the United States in the area of Eastern Europe, as well as confronting the expectations of B9 states with solutions adopted by NATO. The analysis of implemented mechanisms was based on deterrence theory, which made it possible to assess the effectiveness of systemic solutions introduced by the Alliance in order to ensure the security and stability of the eastern flank.

## 1. Initiatives taken by B9 states to ensure international security

B9 states are now members of the European Union and NATO, but similar negative historical experiences and the circumstances of Russia rebuilding its influence in the post-Soviet area by disregarding basic principles of the international law have forced them to close cooperation with the aim of strengthening their position in negotiations with their partners in the EU and NATO<sup>1</sup> in the face of risks and new security threats. Potential regional cooperation among states with similar threats (National, 2019) provided a good ground for creating mechanisms that could deter further aggression by the Russian Federation (Gerasymchuk, 2019, p. 5). B9 believed that in the face of military and political pressure from Moscow, it made the most sense to deploy strong, credible, operationally ready troops on NATO's most vulnerable eastern territory. In this aspect, the pursuit of their permanent presence became a top priority for B9. It was agreed that enhancing the ability to conduct collective defense and deter Russia should materialize through the adaptation of the Alliance's command and control system to the need of leading troops in the zone of hypothetical direct actions, raising the level of combat readiness, capabilities and interoperability of the armed forces of the Nine, as well as joint military exercises and cooperation of the arms industry. The need for the development of civil-military infrastructure in the region of Central and Eastern Europe was also recognized, ensuring high mobility of troops, especially needed for rapid movement of both NATO response forces and the main forces of the Alliance, after the start of an armed conflict (Joint, 2015). Nor was the need to steadily raise defense spending overlooked, which was particularly important in the light of its reduction between 2009 and 2014 (Terlikowski et al., 2018, p. 2 & 3). The transatlantic dimension is also worth noting. All members of the B9 group are in favor of maintaining strong ties with

---

<sup>1</sup> "Voice of the Flank" was the title of a seminar co-organized in November 2015 by the GMF Bucharest Office to spur a debate among experts and practitioners on the prospects of the Bucharest Format.

the United States. While they remain allies, they also seek to strengthen political and military relations and advocate increased US involvement in the stability and security of Central and Eastern Europe<sup>2</sup>, in particular the strengthening of US military presence in the region and the redeployment of troops stationed in Europe to the territory of the B9 states (Pawłowski, 2020, p. 22).

The agreed positions of the nine key Central and Eastern European states on Alliance security issues could not be ignored in international debates. In the context of tensions with the Russian Federation, the organization of high-level meetings of the heads of the nine states also attracted the attention of the United States. In the context of the failure of the Obama administration to pursue a policy of reset with Russia (Feith & Cropsey, 2012), before the 2016 Warsaw summit, it made the US more willing to listen to the voices of its eastern allies both within and outside NATO through informal bilateral talks. The deterioration of international security and of British and American relations with Russia made the nine states' claims more visible and gain legitimacy in the eyes of those who considered themselves critical allies (Borger, 2016). In the context of the announced Brexit, it was in the interest of the United States to strengthen NATO, in line with the political agenda of the Bucharest Nine. In this way, the B9 states de facto established themselves as the most relevant and influential Eastern format, displacing the Visegrad Four, which had been gradually losing ground in NATO due to internal disagreements (Kolmašová, 2019).

The Baltic States and Poland made efforts to deploy multinational battalions on their territory. The states on the southern flank also sought to promote their own interests and balance the efforts they put into providing security. They worked on developing concrete steps to counter threats from the South, in accordance with the NATO 360-degree principle. Southern European states sought to integrate efforts with the European Union (EU) because of joint operations in the Mediterranean (Doorstep, 2016).

Romanian political elites have turned to the United States for support to improve strategic imbalances and maintain Russia's deterrence capabilities in the Black Sea region. In the spring of 2016, the United States held a discussion

---

<sup>2</sup> The US military presence in Europe has shrunk by 85% compared with the height of the Cold War. In the 1960s, there were over 400,000 US troops in Europe, while the numbers had fallen to roughly 200,000 by the 1980s. Additional cuts to defence budgets were made as a result of the peace dividend, which today brings the number to approximately 60,000 authorized military personnel stationed across 28 European communities/operating sites (European, 2018, p. 3).

forum in Naples and proposed the idea of creating a Black Sea Flotilla that would include the five Black Sea states of Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine (Mutsushika, 2017, p. 5). The US undertook to create the Black Sea Flotilla to bolster NATO's presence in the Black Sea as Russia began expanding its forces in Crimea and implementing A2AD anti-access capabilities. There were also two other reasons that led the US. To propose the establishing of the Black Sea Flotilla. First, a permanent NATO Maritime Force could not maintain constant operational readiness. Second, the tonnage, types of ships, and length of time fleets of non-coastal states stationed in the Black Sea was limited by the Montreux Convention of 1936 (Mutsushika, 2017, p. 6). In this situation, the Ministry of Defense announced on 1 February 2016 that the creation of the Black Sea Flotilla is Romania's strategic priority for 2016. Subsequently, Bulgaria and Romania started discussions on Black Sea security cooperation at the presidential level. Since then, the two states have continued consultations on Black Sea security cooperation (Mutsushika, 2017, p. 6).

After the Kerch Strait incident on 25 November 2018, which was an act of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine (Baluk, 2020), at the initiative of Poland, the B9 states signed a letter on the proposal to start work in the Alliance on the "Black Sea package" (Budzisz, 2019). Proposals for improving the Alliance's situational awareness in the region, as well as new forms of political and pragmatic support for Ukraine and Georgia, were approved at the political level during the NATO Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Washington, D.C. on 3–4 April 2019 ("Jubileuszowe spotkanie," 2019). Poland, due to its location, is more absorbed with the security situation in the Baltic Sea and on its eastern borders. However, because Ukraine occupies a key place in Polish foreign policy, based on the experience of the Polish-Ukrainian battalion, an agreement was signed in September 2014 to create a joint Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian brigade located in Lublin, which reached combat readiness in 2017 (Andžāns & Vargulis, 2020, p. 90). The same year, the foreign ministers of the Bucharest Nine issued a joint declaration reaffirming their support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, as well as their non-recognition of the annexation of Crimea. In addition, they called on all signatories of the Minsk agreements to fully respect the signed commitments. In a joint statement, the B9 foreign ministers called on Russia to stop its aggressive actions and withdraw its troops from Ukraine (Gerasymchuk, 2019, p. 5). At a meeting in Warsaw in June 2018, leaders of the B9 member states expressed support for Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations and for the territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova (Joint Declaration, 2018). In November 2019 at the summit in Kosice, Slovakia the B9 group

opposed the military and non-military actions taken by the Russian Federation<sup>3</sup>, to pursue revanchist geopolitical goals (Declaration, 2019). At the 2020 Munich Security Conference, the defense ministers of Romania and Ukraine reached an agreement to increase joint exercises and improve bilateral cooperation and intelligence sharing (Ukraine, 2021).

For all B9 states the European Union is the second pillar of security, alongside NATO. For over a decade, the states have shared a fundamental vision of developing the Common Security and Defense Policy as complementary to NATO and avoiding unnecessary duplication of Alliance activities and structures. The B9 states understand that NATO's adaptation to new threats and the European Union's development in the area of defense should be fully synchronized (Shalamanov et al., 2019, p. 30). Since 2016, in the wake of Brexit, the intra-European balance of power has shifted. Coupled with the cooling of transatlantic relations, this has resulted in increasingly strong articulation of the call for European strategic autonomy and sometimes a European army. Some skeptics believe that these demands may call into question the coherence of EU and NATO efforts (EU-NATO, 2016) and threaten the security of the entire eastern region of the Alliance. For example, developing mechanisms for defense capability planning and coordination of defense cooperation among member states are duplicative of NATO's defense planning efforts. In the long run, this could lead to divergent requirements as to which defense capabilities should be acquired<sup>4</sup>.

The B9 states recognize that an effectively conducted EU Common Security and Defense Policy is a key tool for responding to asymmetric and non-military threats to European security that NATO as a political-military alliance cannot cope with. All B9 states have been particularly active in the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) program, following Donald Trump's announcements of reduced military engagement with Europe (Kacprzyk, 2017). Given the limited military capabilities of the B9 states, now PESCO becomes a mechanism to support military capacity building (Gotkowska, 2019, p. 32) and is an opportunity to strengthen defense capabilities as a result of the establishment of new priorities in 2018. These include: cyber response capabilities, information and communication technologies in space, information superiority, ground combat capabilities, strengthening of logistics and medical support capabilities, maneuverability of naval forces, underwater control of maritime space, air superiority,

---

<sup>3</sup> Ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine and growing tensions in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea stemming from the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia.

<sup>4</sup> Based on interviews with experts from NATO and the Polish Ministry of Defense.

air mobility, integrating air force capabilities into a changing aviation sector – all in all, integration of capabilities to achieve the level desired by the EU (“EU and NATO,” 2018). The defense capabilities of the B9 states leave much to be desired, so joint investment in priority EU capabilities can bring the greatest benefits. When deciding to join individual PESCO projects, the B9 states seek to meet the needs of strategic deterrence, achieve synergies in joint operations with the Allies, and improve their ability to conduct large-scale, high-intensity defense operations, which requires them to pull out old platforms and weapons systems and replace them sometimes by two or three generations with more modern equipment. Achieving such ambitious goals will only be possible by increasing defense spending (Permanent Structured Cooperation, 2018). Faced with this necessity, the B9 states are undertaking a formidable and costly process of modernizing their armed forces. The leaders in this regard are Poland and Romania, which spend the most<sup>5</sup>. Both states have purchased F-16 aircraft and are seeking to acquire US Patriot air defense missile systems. Also noteworthy are systems with deterrent capabilities, such as Poland’s acquisition of AGM-158 JASSM long-range cruise missiles, long-range unmanned aerial vehicles, F-35 nuclear-capable aircraft, and US HIMARS long-range rocket launchers. It is also worth noting that Poland has launched a regional PESCO project to acquire a new generation of tanks that could be built by B9 together with Germany and France (Terlikowski, 2018, p. 7). Romania is acquiring multi-role corvettes and submarines capable of carrying cruise missiles (Terlikowski et al., 2018, p. 5). There are heated debates in the public space about moving US nuclear weapons from Germany to Poland and allowing them to be used by the F-16 dual-purpose aircraft (USAF’s, 2017) of the B9 states or about using air bases located in B9 territories by US aircraft carrying nuclear weapons (Gotkowska, 2020). Poland is also considering joining NATO’s nuclear sharing program (Palowski, 2020), which could significantly increase the deterrence power against the Russian Federation.

The location of the B9 states in the east of NATO’s territory automatically necessitated a commitment to an initiative to improve military mobility within the European Union. This naturally involves accelerating the arrival and integration of the Alliance’s main forces into a possible battle. The action plan for enhancing military mobility includes: defining and agreeing on military requirements for military mobility, adapting infrastructure to civilian and military needs, simplifying regulatory and procedural issues related to the transport of

---

<sup>5</sup> Read more about B9 states’ acquisition of new capabilities in Gerasymchuk (2019).



troops and dangerous agents, as well as to customs duties and obtaining permits for cross-border movement (Joint Communication, 2018). In addition, the B9 states committed to developing national plans for military mobility, speeding up cross-border procedures for military transports to a maximum of five days for routine operations and a shorter time for the deployment of rapid reaction forces, speeding up communication and information exchange through the creation of national focal points, and using national military exercises to test the progress achieved in movement (Council Conclusions, 2018).

EU Battlegroups remain one of the EU's most significant threat response initiatives. All B9 states have been contributing to them for a long time and have gained considerable experience in their use. The potential of EU Battlegroups, especially those involving the B9 states, is an important contribution to strengthening EU cooperation with NATO on rapid response forces (European, 2018, p. 10). This cooperation is particularly valuable in the light of the implementation of increasing NATO's operational readiness and adaptation of NATO's response forces to threats created by the Russian Federation. For this reason, the B9 states are taking steps to increase the effectiveness of their rapid response capabilities. Skeptics, however, believe that the concept of battlegroups requires maintaining a certain number of troops in readiness and therefore depletes defense resources without producing tangible results. It is therefore advisable to take such actions that will make them truly operational and capable of deploying in conflict areas and undertaking tasks of a defensive nature ("Towards a New Level," 2020, p. 7). Then the battlegroups will also have a certain deterrent potential.

## 2. The dilemmas of NATO's strategic deterrence

Deterrence has a long history: it dates back to the Peloponnesian wars, in which it was practiced by the Athenians and Spartans. The theory of deterrence, the essence of which was based on the threat of immediate, severe and inevitable punishment can be traced in the works of classical philosophers Thomas Hobbes, Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham. It was thought that the harsher the punishment, the more likely it was that people would stop criminal activity. It turned out, however, that punishment that was too severe was unjust, and punishment that was not severe enough did not deter people from committing crimes (Eassey & Boman, 2015, p. 235). Deterrence theorists believed that if punishment is inevitable, certain, rational, and swiftly enforced, potential offenders will evaluate the gains and losses before they engage in crime, which will deter them from violating the law, especially if the loss is greater than the likely gain.

Classical philosophers believed that the inevitability of punishment was more effective in preventing crime than its severity (Eassey & Boman, 2015, p. 235).

Deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment are the forms most commonly described in the literature. Deterrence by denial involves building military capacity to prevent a potential aggressor from being able to succeed<sup>6</sup>. In its pure form, deterrence by denial may be indistinguishable from mere defense, since capabilities to deny are capabilities to defend. Thus it can be concluded that deterrence and defense are analytically distinct concepts, but in practice closely related (Mazarr, 2018, p. 2). The strategy of deterrence by denial seeks to deter an adversary's action by making it impossible or unlikely. In this case, the adversary cannot deploy his forces in a specific operational area or all attempts to do so fail. This creates what are called "restricted zones" or zones that make it difficult to operate in an area controlled by the deterrent party.

Deterrence through punishment risks incurring the costs of retaliation, which may be unrelated to the aggression itself and include such means as nuclear escalation or severe economic sanctions. In contrast, focusing on keeping the adversary from local targets of attack is a denial strategy that relies on raising the costs of aggression. Even if the actions taken by the opposing party are successful, they are still threatened by other consequences, that is, they are subject to incurring a broader penalty (Mazarr et al., 2018, p. 8). Deterrence by denial, on the other hand, is directed against military capabilities and the ability to conduct specific operational activities. The strategy of incurring punishment is mainly based on fear, while denial is aimed at preventing the adversary from achieving operational successes through the use of a variety of active and passive countermeasures (Schwarz, 2005, p. 8). The success of deterrence depends heavily on the credibility of the punishment, which is strongly related to the level of commitment to the deterrence strategy, which depends on the preferences, costs, and risks associated with carrying out the threat and the credibility of the promise of reward for fulfilling it (Shelling, 1981, p. 6).

Following the analyzed documents it can be concluded that the strengthening of the eastern and southern flanks takes place within the framework of the strategy of deterrence by punishment, although the Alliance does not explicitly indicate the type of strategy adopted (NATO 2020a). NATO strongly emphasizes

---

<sup>6</sup> Beaufre argues that in the pre-nuclear era, a capacity to deter simply meant a capacity to win (Beaufre 1965, p. 23). Later he describes the conventional deterrence dynamic as the "dialectic of expectation of victory on the part of the two opponents" (Beaufre, 1965, p. 23).

its respect for international agreements and commitments and declares that the purpose of the increased military presence near Russia's borders is to demonstrate allied solidarity (NATO, 2018). Moreover, it sends a clear message that any aggression against border states will be met with a collective response, thus leaving no doubt that deterrence through punishment is NATO's main strategy. One should also be aware that deterrence is based on the unity of all members, with the main burden of responsibility resting on the United States. Hence, it is necessary to send clear signals of readiness and determination to fulfill commitments to Europe (Shiffrinson, 2017, p. 111). The best example of this can be seen in the exercises conducted in early 2020, in which a fully combat-capable division was moved to Europe from the United States (Judson, 2019). However, not all European policymakers are aware that by opting for a less robust posture toward Russia on the eastern flank, relying on the threat of deterrence through punishment, the risk of having to face the dilemma between accepting defeat or nuclear war increases. Moreover, the current balance of power makes it difficult for NATO to respond incrementally to a deteriorating crisis situation or to decide whether to initiate military action, giving Russia an advantage in controlling the escalation of the conflict (Frisell et al., p. 50). Also, not everyone realizes that there is an imbalance of conventional forces on the eastern flank, which gives a predetermined advantage to the Russian Federation. This also offers an opportunity to launch a surprise, but limited in scale, attack on NATO territory and create a situation of so-called "accomplished facts", as happened in Crimea. The imbalance of power between the Alliance and Russia is tantamount to a time and space gap, which poses certain problems for NATO (Boston et al., 2018, p. 7).

The ultimate source of deterrence through punishment is nuclear weapons. In 2015, the Alliance resumed nuclear consultations and exercises based on a collective defense scenario. At the Warsaw summit, a new process of strategic thinking about the use of nuclear weapons began, but the main difference with the Russian Federation is that the Alliance intends to use them only as a last resort, while Moscow treats nuclear weapons as a complement to conventional weapons and envisions their use even at the tactical level (Doran, 2017, p. 13 & 14).

NATO members' views on deterrence strategy vary, driven by geography, threat perceptions, political considerations, and budgetary constraints. Although it is costly to prepare for conventional territorial defenses, the B9 states, since 2015, have been moving to push their deterrence strategy by denying (Frisell et al., p. 49). This is supported by the deployment of significant Russian armed forces near the NATO border (Lanoshka & Hunzeker, 2016, p. 16),

capable of conducting unannounced aggression, of which the Kaliningrad region is a prime example. On the other hand, Russia's anti-access (A2/AD) systems and precision-guided weapons, can neutralize or even destroy NATO forces deployed in the Baltic region, or before they can arrive (Lanoshka & Hunzeker, 2016, p. 12). Due to the range of its means of destruction, the Russian Federation could deprive NATO of air and naval superiority in the Baltic region, as well as in much of Poland and Germany. This, in turn, could lead to the Allies incurring significant costs (Noll, 2020, p. 112). This thesis tends to reject the implementation of strategy by punishment in favor of strategy by denial. However, it raises a legitimate question whether such a deterrent posture will deter large-scale Russian aggression (Noll, 2020, p. 112).

Deterrence by denial is only possible for NATO at the lower levels of command and focuses mainly on NATO's response forces, which are to create the conditions for the implementation of the follow-on force. Battalion Battle Groups deployed in the Baltic States and Poland as well as NATO naval forces in the Black Sea region are also supposed to play a large role in this regard (Rynning, 2020, p. 38). However, in the author's opinion, the task of these forces is only to launch processes that begin the realization of deterrence by punishment. According to experts, Russian aggression can be resisted to a very limited extent only by an American brigade, partially deployed in Poland (Rynning, 2020, p. 38). Based on simulations, it was determined that an effective defense against Russia could be provided by the deployment of 6-7 brigades, including 3 heavy brigades, in the Baltic States, along with sea and air support (Shlapak & Johnson, 2016, pp. 1-2). NATO is skeptical of over-strengthening forces near the Russian border due to concerns of an arms race. On the other hand, the divergent interests of individual states lead to deterrence by denial becoming unrealistic (Veebel, 2018, p. 239).

The deterrence strategy is part of NATO's broader military strategy, taking into account all the threats that the Russian Federation may generate. After it was accepted in May 2019 (Peach, 2019) and operationalized, it received political approval in June 2020, enabling the NATO Strategic Commander (SACEUR) to draw up concrete plans and directives for implementation by subordinate commands. The new military strategy includes two operational concepts. One covers the entire theater of combat operations, and the other is aimed at so-called horizontal escalation. The first concept takes into account the geographical area of the NATO territory and is based on flexible response according to the threats and deterrence in the entire Euro-Atlantic area. This means that NATO will not plan the use of military force on the territory of individual member states, nor

will it focus on specific regions. Instead, it will take an integrated and flexible approach to the problem of providing territorial defense and strategic deterrence. Following the Russian Federation's annexation of Crimea, Graduated Response Plans (GRPs) were developed, which were geographically divided and covered specific areas – with their borders delineated from the North Atlantic through Central Europe to the Eastern Mediterranean. It turned out that the weak point of such a philosophy of strategic thinking was NATO's limited ability to move across the divisions made. The solution to this problem was the emergence of the concept of so-called horizontal escalation, grounded in the idea of rapidly concentrating troops and achieving operational capability at a specific place and time (Rynning, 2020, p. 39). The key determinants in the success of this concept are the implementation of the NATO Readiness Initiative – the “Four Thirties” (Defence, 2018) and making changes to NATO's command system. Because threats can occur throughout the treaty area and escalation of a conflict can be asymmetric, the Alliance's response has been based on the principle of strategic deterrence through punishment (Rynning, 2020, p. 40).

Combining the concept of defending the entire NATO territory with the concept of horizontal deterrence creates a great deal of uncertainty for the Russian Federation, as it is unknown what the Alliance's intentions and capabilities of influence can be. Therefore it can be read as deterrence by denial, as the Alliance will keep the NATO Response Force on standby (NATO Response, 2018), with its numbers steadily growing thanks to the increasing presence of battalion battle groups near the Russian Federation. The defense capabilities of border states should not be forgotten either. However, in the case of a more serious threat from the Russian Federation, NATO will be forced to counter the threat of escalation of the conflict across the theater of operations. Thus deterrence through punishment should apply here (Rynning, 2020, p. 40).

### **3. Assessment of the mechanisms of strategic deterrence against the Russian Federation's aggression on the territory of the B9 states**

Based on the Cold War experience, it can be concluded that a complementary component of nuclear deterrence was a strong conventional military presence near the borders with the aggressor. The readiness of all components of the conventional armed forces to act immediately strengthened the credibility of deterrence and at the same time provided a reliable and effective deterrent element.

After almost two decades since the end of the Cold War, with the annexation of Crimea, strategic deterrence was again at the center of discussions devoted to ensuring European security (Driver, 2019, p. 14). In this aspect, all the states of the B9 group, despite the fact that it has not yet been formally established, have spoken unanimously about the need to adapt NATO's posture to the threats of the Russian Federation by changing the current deterrence mechanisms, which would be best served by the presence of significant military units near the borders with a potential aggressor.

At the 2014 Wales Summit (Wales Summit Declaration, 2014), it was decided that deterrence would be provided through a fair and balanced distribution of roles and responsibilities. At the same time, it was recognized that it was necessary for the Alliance to adapt to the doctrine and capabilities of the Russian Federation (Broeks, 2020, p. 59). It was decided to triple the size of the NATO Response Force to 40,000 troops and create within it a "strike force" called the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force – VJTF, ready for action within 2–3 days. Overall, the ground troops that could be deployed in the field were equivalent to a brigade and consisted of 10–15 Allied subdivisions, implying a broad representativeness similar to that of the 8 small multinational NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) that would be deployed on the territory of Allies in the eastern part of the Alliances (Driver, 2019, p. 15). Among the B9 states, however, doubts remained about their real deterrence effectiveness and the value of their defense capabilities vis-à-vis those of the Russian Federation. One must objectively agree with the statement that the brigade's key strength was more political than operational (Polcikiewicz, 2018, p. 105). Of significant value to the command of future operations on the eastern flank were the decisions to achieve full operational readiness by the Multinational Corps Command Northeast in Poland and the establishment of the Headquarters of a Multinational Division Southeast in Romania (Broeks, 2020, p. 59).

Due to its location Romania is the leader of B9 in terms of deterrence in the Black Sea region. The Russian Federation views any investment by the Alliance in military infrastructure near its own borders as a threat to its interests. In its view, the SM3 missile launcher base in Deveselu, Romania, which has been fully operational since May 2016 as a contribution to the US NATO missile defense system, poses a real threat to Russia and could become a target for a preemptive attack (Lorenz, 2017, p. 1). Understanding the gravity of the situation, Romania is active within NATO, taking its own initiatives for the Alliance, while expecting the Alliance to be active, especially in the Black Sea. However, the initiative to create a naval mission was torpedoed by Bulgaria. The decision taken

on the temporary presence of the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (Lorenz, 2017, p. 1), was a half-hearted solution that could not be treated as a credible deterrent. Generalizing, it can be said that the B9 states until the Warsaw Summit in 2016 failed to create deterrence mechanisms based on the continuous presence of operationally relevant troops on the eastern flank. In the author's opinion, NATO tried to adapt more to the changing international security environment rather than to present a readiness for deterrence through denial or punishment.

Success in strategic deterrence was not achieved by the B9 states until the Alliance realized that Russia's dynamic acquisition of anti-access capabilities could effectively prevent the movement of troops to the eastern flank from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, while creating conditions for limited aggression into NATO territory (Doran, 2017, p. 6). Thus there was a need for a permanent military presence in these regions and to ensure the ability to quickly and effectively reinforce the threatened allies. In this situation, the Warsaw Summit decided that the key imperatives for strengthening NATO's deterrence and defense posture would be to shape resilience, response capabilities, and ensure readiness to conduct collective defense with the main force (Brauß & Rácz, 2021, p. 21). The allies agreed to establish an enhanced forward presence of NATO troops in the three Baltic States and Poland (Warsaw, 2016) by deploying four multinational battalion battle groups integrated into the host nation's military structures. This increased deterrence capabilities but did not allow the repulsion of a short-term Russian attack (Shlapak & Johnson, 2016). The key role of the battalions was to "raise awareness that an attack on one ally will be treated as an attack on the entire Alliance", and to demonstrate the "solidarity, resolve, and ability of allies to act in response to any aggression" (Boosting, 2020). Following the Warsaw Summit, Poland proposed the creation of a Multinational Division North-East (MND NE) in Elbląg (Moller, 2019, p. 4), which would coordinate the activities of allied battalions deployed in Poland and Lithuania (Multinational, 2017). To strengthen deterrence and collective defense efforts in the Baltic Sea region, the Multinational Division North (MND-N) was established in July 2018 in Karup, Denmark, with its forward post in Ādaži, Latvia, responsible for defense planning and coordination in the Baltic States (Moller, 2019, p. 5). At the same time, through the tailored Forward Presence, the military presence on the southern flank was adapted to the needs of the Black Sea region (Broeks, 2019, p. 3). This decision reflected the Romanian initiative to create the Multinational Brigade Southeast (MNB-SE) in Craiova, and Multinational Corps Southeast (MNC-SE) in Sibiu. All are multinational but strictly land force HQs. Hence, there is an absence of naval or joint HQ in the region that is focused

specifically on the Black Sea (Doran, 2017, p. 43). The allies have only agreed to strengthen the air force presence in Bulgaria and Romania.

The multinational battle groups were designed as a “tripwire”, meaning that in the event of an attack, they would ensure the commitment of the entire Alliance by activating nuclear deterrence mechanisms<sup>7</sup>. In this situation, they can act as both a security brake and a lever to speed up the process of responding to threats (Stoicescu & Järvenpää, 2019, pp. 6–7). However, for the deterrence mechanism to work, it was necessary to have credible forces capable of conducting defense and resolving crisis situations. In this context, NATO’s posture towards Russia is evolving. Launching an initiative to acquire the capabilities to deploy 30 maneuver battalions, 30 air fighter squadrons, and 30 major naval units, along with support forces, in 30 days or less<sup>8</sup> on NATO’s eastern flank, in conjunction with the US European Deterrence Initiative<sup>9</sup>, can be seen as a shift from an attitude of deterrence by punishment to deterrence by denial (Shalamanov et al., 2019, p. 30). Representatives of the B9 states after the Brussels Summit, at a NATO-sponsored international conference in Sofia, Bulgaria, in 2018 during a special panel on deterrence and defense posture in Eastern Europe, agreed that further steps should be taken to improve interoperability and strategic deterrence (Shalamanov et al., 2019, p. 29).

One of those steps was to improve the rapid response capability through efficient political decision-making. NATO has changed its crisis management procedures so that decisions to deploy rapid response forces are made within 8–12 hours. Moreover, work is underway to improve NATO’s warning and alert system, especially in situations of sudden crises or the execution of a strike on Alliance territory without any warning (Brauß & Rącz, 2021, p. 22). In this context, to improve situational awareness, a Cyber Operations Center was established

---

<sup>7</sup> The logic of the tripwire force is not so much to deter aggression, but primarily to force the aggressor to withdraw, under the pressure of the threat of a significant commitment from the states that has deployed forces to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank.

<sup>8</sup> It was agreed that subunits assigned to NRIs should be fully staffed, equipped and trained and meet all interoperability criteria (NATO Agrees, 2018).

<sup>9</sup> The European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) was announced by US President Obama on 3 June 2014 and represents a direct response to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. It is meant to address European allies’ concerns about Russian aggression by means of increased US military presence on European territory. The 2017 US National Defense Authorization Act changed the name of the program to the European Initiative (EDI) to reflect the changes in the international security environment, which the US Congress saw as requiring deterrence rather than reassurance (European, 2018, p. 2).



at SHAPE in Belgium. To ensure the protection of transatlantic lines of communication, the Combined Forces Command was established at JFC Norfolk in the United States, while the logistics support command – the Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC) established in Germany – enables the smooth movement of troops and equipment to the Central and Eastern European region (Broeks, 2019, p. 3).

The B9 states agree that effective deterrence can be provided by an early warning system of Russia's intentions to conquer the territory of the eastern flank, as well as by troops capable of responding to threats, conducting effective defense, and having an adequate communications infrastructure (Hodges et al., 2018, p. 4). At the same time, the B9 states believe that NATO's current deterrent posture may not be sufficient and warn against the Russian Federation ("Ekspert ostrzega," 2021). Experts emphasize the need to support deterrence with airpower and nuclear weapons while ensuring the Alliance's political coherence. Even former NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander R. Vershbow and NATO Strategic Commander Philip M. Breedlove believe that it is necessary not to have a rotational but a permanent presence of significant Alliance forces on the territory of the eastern flank (Vershbow & Breedlove, 2019). Another way to accelerate reinforcement may be the deployment of equipment and ammunition in states on the eastern flank. In the author's opinion, keeping the current compromise of a limited Allied military presence could lead to the need to use the operational capabilities of the European Union (Frisell et al., p. 53).

The Baltic states and Poland are aware of the need to take greater responsibility for security and defense by increasing spending, acquiring new capabilities, and providing support for host troops, as demonstrated by the project to finalize the Baltic Railway connecting Tallinn, Vilnius, and Warsaw by 2026 (Andžāns & Vargul, 2020, p. 30). They recommend changes in NATO's command structures and processes, as well as in the ways strategic assessments are conducted. They call for adaptation of doctrinal provisions as well as educational and operational planning processes to the changes that have taken place in international security. The Baltic states also identify niches whose exploitation could contribute to the Alliance's resilience, for example in space (Andžāns & Vargul, 2020, p. 107). In the author's opinion, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, in order to strengthen their deterrence, should acquire air defense capabilities, which they do not currently possess. Such a move could hinder Russia's dominance in the Baltic airspace and slow down a possible attack. The Baltic states should also seek joint solutions to increase military presence in the Baltic Sea (Lawrence, 2020, p. 100, 102).

A forward military presence in the eastern territory of the Alliance strengthens deterrence on condition that the subdivisions are fully complemented, armed, aligned, and ready to conduct armed combat. Fulfillment of this condition requires verification of their combat potential, especially the capabilities they possess for air and missile defense, logistical support, intelligence, and reconnaissance (Kulesa, 2019, p. 66). The deterrent effect of battle groups could be increased by supplementing them with well-equipped US subunits. In addition, the so-called framework states should strengthen their cooperation with the states on which they are deployed in order to rapidly reinforce them in crisis situations and provide the necessary combat equipment and supplies (Brauß & Rácz, 2021, p. 26).

Obtaining another 80,000 troops under the NRI initiative will significantly strengthen NATO's deterrence potential<sup>10</sup>, but real results will not be seen until 2024. To maintain the Alliance's credible deterrence posture, it is imperative to continue working to improve the process of rapidly and timely reinforcing a threatened B9 state, in accordance with the "tripwire" principle<sup>11</sup>. Both improved mobility and adaptation to threats are key in this regard. In the author's opinion, it is necessary to strengthen NATO's command capability (NCS), especially in terms of the command capacity of the newly created international division posts (Brauß & Rácz, 2021, p. 26). Efficient command should enable military challenges to be met and security threats to be countered at any time, from any direction, which should ultimately enhance strategic deterrence capabilities and the conduct of collective defense (Broeks, 2019, p. 3). Moreover, establishing several additional larger formations (follow-on forces) is essential for improving NATO's full-spectrum warfare capability (Brauß & Rácz, 2021, p. 26).

Nuclear deterrence must not be forgotten, and NATO should be able to demonstrate its readiness to use sub-strategic capabilities. In this regard, it is necessary to accelerate the work to include the B9 states in the Nuclear Sharing Program and to intensify exercises that include a scenario for the use of nuclear weapons carried by Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA) (Brauß & Rácz, 2021, p. 27). These should send a strong message about NATO's readiness to use nuclear

---

<sup>10</sup> The NRI land component will be organized into brigades. Poland and Romania have pledged to command two brigades as framework countries.

<sup>11</sup> A tripwire force (sometimes called a glass plate) is a strategic approach in deterrence theory. The tripwire force is a military force smaller than that of a potential adversary, which is designed to signal the defending side's commitment to an armed response to future aggression without triggering a security spiral. Tripwire deterrence does not require regional military superiority: This is deterrence by punishment (Broeks, 2019, p. 3).

weapons, but should in no way, signal to the Russian Federation the possibility of lowering the threshold for their use. Moreover, it seems that demonstrating NATO's readiness to conduct integrated operations in cyberspace and space, combined with information operations, would demonstrate a mature and comprehensive deterrence posture of both the B9 states and the Alliance as a whole against the Russian Federation (Kulesa, 2019, p. 66).

## Conclusions

The B9 states are key to NATO, not only because of their strategic location, but also because of the contribution they make to defense capabilities and initiatives to ensure effective deterrence against threats posed by the Russian Federation. They recognize current security issues and seek to actively create them regionally, in accordance with the NATO 360-degree principle. Cooperation within B9 increases the North Atlantic Alliance's resilience to threats, improves regional security and the effectiveness of deterrence and defense of NATO's eastern flank, as well as ensures the ability to respond quickly to emerging crises. A central pillar in conducting strategic deterrence on NATO's eastern flank is the military presence and capabilities of the United States.

The research results indicate that US armed forces in Europe may not be able to meet new threats and to counterbalance military capabilities dynamically acquired by the Russian Federation. In such circumstances, the initiatives of the B9 states aimed at self-sufficiency in defense, and in particular at acquiring capabilities within the European Union, should be regarded as very expedient and pertinent. It seems that the use of instruments provided by EU institutions to deepen defense integration and coordinate defense planning will allow the states on NATO's eastern flank to gain some autonomy and bridge the gap created by Brexit. The bilateral initiatives undertaken by the B9 states should also not be underestimated in terms of long-term benefits for strategic deterrence.

The B9 states agree that instruments such as PESCO, the European Defense Fund or the Enhanced Military Mobility Initiative can contribute significantly to balancing the burden of providing security on both sides of the Atlantic and constitute an important factor for strengthening Europe's security. At the same time they see the need for coherence and harmonization of EU and NATO activities so as to not only avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts, but actually lead to the strengthening of both organizations. The B9 states postulate the need to verify the cooperation of EU battle groups with NATO's rapid reaction forces, especially with regard to joint exercises.

The decision of the B9 states to join PESCO projects and the growing interest in participation in the European Defence Fund should be seen as a mechanism for integrating defense efforts and deterring the Russian Federation. It makes it likely that the states on NATO's eastern flank will soon be among the most active in building European defense capabilities. However, it will be possible for the B9 states to gain strategic autonomy by integrating the acquired defense capabilities with NATO's deterrence mechanisms. In the author's opinion, joint defense efforts of the B9 states may soon constitute the foundation of European security and a guarantee of future peace in Europe. It should be borne in mind, however, that the position of the B9 states on the broader issue of European strategic autonomy is likely to continue to be dictated by the desire to use all available instruments to strengthen the credibility of NATO's deterrence and defense capabilities, which will be regarded as the foundation of European security and the best guarantor of future peace in Europe.

The B9 states participate in NATO's deterrence mechanisms and advocate the creation of a strong treaty territory defense system of NATO territory as a whole since they are currently unable to conduct their own territory defense and counter the superior forces of the Russian Federation. They incur high costs for acquiring new conventional capabilities, create conditions for permanent stationing of troops and equipment on their territories, and seek to introduce mechanisms of deterrence by denial. Nevertheless, NATO as a whole is only capable of effectively deterring the Russian Federation through punishment. The optimal solution would be strong conventional capabilities of the B9 states to immediately bear the costs of Russian aggression, combined with the benefits of participating in the Nuclear Sharing Program. However, to date such agreements technically, strategically, and politically have yet to be refined. The B9 states will remain extremely vulnerable to limited warfare and nuclear strikes against them until they are fully under the Alliance's nuclear umbrella.

NATO is trying to build some deterrence through denial by strengthening its presence in the most threatened areas. It is also aware that it is not in a position to defend its territory as Russia has a strategic advantage and can concentrate its troops at the borders and execute a surprise strike at any time and place. In this situation, the B9 states participate both in building horizontal deterrence mechanisms to prevent asymmetric escalation of the conflict and in conducting armed combat across the treaty territory. They create conditions for the functioning of battalion battle groups, or participate in them themselves, and make a large contribution to NATO's reformed response forces as well as the command and control system. Thus the flexible mechanisms of incremental deterrence give

rise to Russia's uncertainties about the time and character of NATO's response to the threats on its eastern flank as well as about the type and nature of punishment it can apply.

The challenges of strategic deterrence and ensuring the stability of the B9 states and the entire eastern treaty area are many. However, NATO's first military strategy since the Cold War was adopted in May 2019; the concept of strategic deterrence and the conduct of the defense of the Euro-Atlantic area have been refined and implemented as well. This should be considered as a welcome step towards developing an overarching framework for taking comprehensive measures to safeguard against the aggressive inclinations of the Russian Federation.

## REFERENCES

- Andžāns, M., & Vargulis, M. (Eds.). Towards #NATO2030: The Regional Perspective of the Baltic States and Poland. Riga: The Latvian Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved from [https://liia.lv/en/publications/towards-nato2030-the-regional-perspective-of-the-baltic-states-and-poland-896?get\\_file=1](https://liia.lv/en/publications/towards-nato2030-the-regional-perspective-of-the-baltic-states-and-poland-896?get_file=1)
- Baluk, W. (2020). Incydent czy akt agresji w rejonie Cieśniny Kerczeńskiej? *Wschód Europy • Восток Европы • East of Europe*, 6(1). Retrieved from <https://journals.umcs.pl/we/article/view/11216/pdf>
- Beaufre, A. (1965). *Deterrence and Strategy*. New York: Praeger.
- Boeke, S. (2020). Creating a secure and functional rear area: NATO's new JSEC Headquarters. *NATO Review*. Retrieved from <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/01/13/creating-a-secure-and-functional-rear-area-natos-new-jsec-headquarters/index.html>
- Boosting NATO's presence in the east and southeast. (2020, Oct 20). *NATO*. Retrieved from [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_136388.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm)
- Borger, J. (2016, Jun 8). NATO summit: US says it will deploy 1,000 extra troops to Poland. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/08/nato-summit-warsaw-brexit-russia>
- Boston, S. Johnson, M., Beauchamp-Mustafaga, N., Yvonne K., & Crane, Y. K. (2018). *Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance in Europe. Implications for Countering Russian Local Superiority*. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2402>
- Brauß, H., & Rácz, A. (2021). Russia's Strategic Interests and Actions in the Baltic Region. *German Council on Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from [https://dgap.org/sites/default/files/article\\_pdfs/210107\\_Report-2021-1-EN.pdf](https://dgap.org/sites/default/files/article_pdfs/210107_Report-2021-1-EN.pdf)
- Broeks, J. (2019). The necessary adaptation of NATO's military instrument of power. NDC Policy Brief No. 14. Rome: NDC Public Affairs Office. Retrieved from <https://>

- [www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep19843.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A7ca158f5401a96bdad6ecda75335736f](http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep19843.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A7ca158f5401a96bdad6ecda75335736f)
- Brussels Summit Declaration. (2018, Jun 7). Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 1–12 July 2018. NATO. Retrieved from [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_156624.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm)
- Budzisz, M. (2019, Apr 4). NATO w obliczu politycznego kryzysu. Gwarancje dla Polski mogą okazać się na papierze. *Salon 24*. Retrieved from <https://www.salon24.pl/u/wiescizrosji/946367,nato-w-obliczu-politycznego-kryzysu-gwarancje-dla-polski-moga-okazac-sie-na-papierze,2>
- Council Conclusions on Security And Defence in The Context of The EU Global Strategy. (2018, Jun 25). *European Commission*. Retrieved from <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10246-2018-INIT/en/pdf>
- Declaration Of The Heads Of State Bucharest 9 Meeting, Košice, 28th of February 2019. (2019). Retrieved from <https://www.president.pl/en/news/art,986,declaration-of-the-heads-of-state-bucharest-9-meeting-.html>
- Defence Ministers to agree NATO Readiness Initiative (2018, Jun 7). NATO. Retrieved from [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_155348.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_155348.htm)
- Doorstep statements by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and EU High Representative Federica Mogherini before the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers on cooperation with the European Union. (2016, May 20). NATO. Retrieved from [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_131283.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_131283.htm)
- Doran, P. B., Bugajski, J., & Brown, J. M. (2017). *Strengthening Strategic Security in Central and Eastern Europe*. Washington: Center for European Policy Analysis. Retrieved from [https://cepa.ecms.pl/files/?id\\_plik=4896](https://cepa.ecms.pl/files/?id_plik=4896)
- Driver, D. (2019). Deterrence in Eastern Europe in Theory and Practice. *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, 1–2, 11–24. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.18.1-2.01>
- Eassey, J. M., & Boman, J. H. (2015). *Deterrence Theory*. Retrieved from <https://marisluste.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/deterrence-theory.pdf>
- Ekspert ostrzega przed Putinem: Może zaatakować państwa bałtyckie. (2021, Mar 17). *Dziennik.pl*. Retrieved from <https://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/swiat/artykuly/812-2063,wladimir-putin-wojna-rosja-panstwa-baltyckie-ukraina-nato.html>
- EU-NATO cooperation and European defence after the Warsaw Summit. (2016). *European Parliament*. Retrieved from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/595855/EPRS\\_BRI\(2016\)595855\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/595855/EPRS_BRI(2016)595855_EN.pdf)
- European Deterrence Initiative: the transatlantic security guarantee. (2018, Jul 9). *European Parliament Think Tank*. Retrieved from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS\\_BRI\(2018\)625117](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2018)625117)
- Feith, D. J., & Cropsey, S. S. (2012, Oct 16). How the Russian ‘Reset’ Explains Obama’s Foreign Policy. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/16/how-the-russian-reset-explains-obamas-foreign-policy/>

- Frisell, E. H. (Ed.), Dalsjö, R., Gustafsson, J., & Rydqvist, J. (2019). *Deterrence by Reinforcement The Strengths and Weaknesses of NATO's Evolving Defence Strategy*. FOI-R--4843—SE. Retrieved from <https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--4843--SE>
- Gerasymchuk, S. (2019). Bucharest Nine: Looking for Cooperation on NATO's Eastern Flank? Kyiv: Ukrainian Prism. Retrieved from <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bue-ros/ukraine/15574.pdf>
- Gotkowska, J. (2019). *W stronę sojuszu wojskowego? Perspektywy Europejskiej Unii Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony*. Warszawa: Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich. Retrieved from [https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/Raport\\_PL\\_W-stron%C4%99-sojuszu-wojskowego\\_net.pdf](https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/Raport_PL_W-stron%C4%99-sojuszu-wojskowego_net.pdf)
- Gotkowska, J. (2020, Aug 14). USA – Germany – NATO's eastern flank. Transformation of the US military presence in Europe. *OSW Commentary*, 348. Retrieved from [https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/OSW\\_Commentary\\_348.pdf](https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/OSW_Commentary_348.pdf)
- Hart, L. (1960). *Deterrent or Defence: A Fresh Look at the West's Military Position*. New York: Praeger.
- Hodges, B., Bugajski, J., & Doran, P. (2018). *Securing the Suwałki Corridor. Strategy, Statecraft, Deterrence, and Defense*. Washington: Center for European Policy Analysis. Retrieved from [https://cepa.org/cepa\\_files/2018-CEPA-report-Securing\\_The\\_Suwa%C5%82ki\\_Corridor.pdf](https://cepa.org/cepa_files/2018-CEPA-report-Securing_The_Suwa%C5%82ki_Corridor.pdf)
- Joint Communication to The European Parliament and the Council on the Action Plan on Military Mobility (2018, Mar28). *European Commission*. Retrieved from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018JC0005&from=EN>
- Joint Declaration of the Heads of State Bucharest 9 meeting Warsaw, 8th June 2018. (2018). Retrieved from <https://dziennikurzedowy.msz.gov.pl/resource/Declaration%20B9%20Warsaw%202018%20EN.pdf>
- Joint Declaration on “Allied Solidarity and Shared Responsibility”, November 2015 Bucharest. (2018). Retrieved from <https://www.lrp.lt/data/public/uploads/2015/11/joint-declaration.pdf>
- Joint Declaration of the Heads of State Bucharest 9 meeting. (2018, Jun 08). Retrieved from <https://www.president.pl/en/news/art,775,joint-declaration-of-the-heads-of-state-bucharest-9-meeting.html>
- Jubileuszowe spotkanie ministrów spraw zagranicznych NATO. (2019, Apr 4). *Gov.pl*. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/jubileuszowe-spotkanie-ministrow-spraw-zagranicznych-nato>
- Judson, J. (2019, Oct 14). Fighting the bureaucracy: For NATO, the Defender 2020 exercise in Europe will test interoperability. *Defense News*. Retrieved from <https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/ausa/2019/10/11/fighting-the-bureaucracy-for-nato-the-defender-2020-exercise-in-europe-will-test-interoperability>
- Kacprzyk, A. (2017, Mar 23). U.S. Policy towards NATO: Continuation with Risk of Change. *PISM Bulletin*, 30(970), 23.

- Kolmašová, Š. (2019). Competing norms and strategic visions: a critical appraisal of V4 security potential. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 71, 225–248. DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2018.1562045
- Kulesa, Ł. (2019). The Future of Deterrence: Effectiveness and Limitations of Conventional and Nuclear Postures. In T. Valášek (Ed.), *New perspectives on shared security: NATO's next 70 years* (pp. 63–68). Brussels: Carnegie Europe. Retrieved from [https://carnegieendowment.org/files/NATO\\_int\\_final1.pdf](https://carnegieendowment.org/files/NATO_int_final1.pdf)
- Lanoszka, A., & Hunzeker, M. A. (2016). Confronting the Anti-Access/Area Denial and Precision Strike Challenge in the Baltic Region. *The RUSI Journal*, 161(5), 12–18. DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2016.1253367
- Lawrence, T. (2020). Continuing to Build Credible Deterrence and Defence in the Baltic Region. In A. Sprüds, M. Vargulis (Eds.), *Transatlantic Futures: Towards #NATO2030* (pp. 96–108). Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved from [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/345805638\\_Continuing\\_to\\_Build\\_Credible\\_Deterrence\\_and\\_Defence\\_in\\_the\\_Baltic\\_Region](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/345805638_Continuing_to_Build_Credible_Deterrence_and_Defence_in_the_Baltic_Region)
- Lorenz, W. (2017, Mar 3). Strengthening Deterrence in the Black Sea Region. *PISM Bulletin*, 22(962). Retrieved from [https://pism.pl/publications/Strengthening\\_Deterrence\\_in\\_the\\_Black\\_Sea\\_Region](https://pism.pl/publications/Strengthening_Deterrence_in_the_Black_Sea_Region)
- Mazarr, M. J. (2018). *Understanding Deterrence*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.7249/PE295>
- Mazarr, M. J., Chan, A., Demus, A., Frederick, B., Nader, A., Pezard, S., Thompson, J. A., & Treyger, E. (2018). *What Deters and Why. Exploring Requirements for Effective Deterrence of Interstate Aggression*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. Retrieved from [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\\_reports/RR2400/RR2451/RAND\\_RR2451.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2400/RR2451/RAND_RR2451.pdf)
- Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej. (2017). Wielonarodowa Dywizja. *Gov.pl*. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/web/obrona-narodowa/wielonarodowa-dywizja>
- Moller, S. B. (2019). Building the airplane while flying: adapting NATO's force structure in an era of uncertainty. *NDC Policy Brief*, 11. Retrieved from <https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1315>
- Mutsushika, S. (2017). Romania's Approach to the Negotiations over NATO Defense and Deterrence Strategy at the Wales and Warsaw Summits. Retrieved from <https://www.spf.org/projects/upload/Romania%E2%80%99s%20Approach%20to%20the%20Negotiations%20over%20NATO%20Defense%20and%20Deterrence%20Strategy%20%28Mutsushika%29.pdf>
- National Security Bureau head: Bucharest Nine unity strengthens NATO. (2019, Apr 5) *Prezydent.pl*. Retrieved from <https://www.prezydent.pl/en/news/art,1010,national-security-bureau-head-bucharest-nine-unity-strengthens-nato.html>
- NATO Agrees To 'Four 30s' Plan To Counter Russia. (2018, Jun 6). *RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty*. Retrieved from <https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-ministers-expected-to-okay-four-thirties-initiative-stoltenberg/29275979.html>



- NATO. (2018). Brussels Summit Declaration, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 11–12 July 2018. Brussels: NATO. Retrieved from [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_156624.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm)
- NATO. (2020a). Deterrence and defence. NATO. Retrieved from [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_133127.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_133127.htm)
- NATO. (2020b). Boosting NATO's presence in the East and Southeast. NATO. Retrieved from [https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics\\_136388.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics_136388.htm)
- NATO Response Force. (2018). NATO. Retrieved from <https://shape.nato.int/nato-response-force--very-high-readiness-joint-task-force>
- New 2018 EU Capability Development Priorities approved. (2018, Jun 28). *European Defence Agency*. Retrieved from <https://eda.europa.eu/news-and-events/news/2018/06/28/new-2018-eu-capability-development-priorities-approved>
- Noll, J., Bojang, O., & Rietjens, S. (2020). Deterrence by Punishment or Denial? The eFP Case. In P. Ooninx (Ed.), *The Netherlands NL ARMS. Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020: Deterrence in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century—Insights from Theory and Practice* (pp. 109–128). Breda: Springer. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8>
- Palowski, J. (2020, May 5). Nuclear Roulette of the German Left and the Polish F-35. *Defence24*. Retrieved from <https://www.defence24.com/nuclear-roulette-of-the-german-left-and-the-polish-f-35>
- Pawłowski, K. (2020). Bukareszteńska Dziewiątka: współpraca państw wschodniej flanki NATO. *Instytut Europy Środkowej Policy Papers*, 4/2020. Retrieved from <https://ud.interia.pl/html/getattach,mid,46930,mpid,6,uid,a2136f026b7ebbf8,min,0,nd,1,mimetype,application%2Fpdf,9ies-policy-papers-pl-2020-004.pdf?f=9ies-policy-papers-pl-2020-004.pdf>
- Peach, S. (2019, May 22). Press Statement by Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee at the joint press point with SACEUR and SACT following the Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence Session. NATO. Retrieved from [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_166242.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_166242.htm)
- Permanent structured cooperation (PESCO): Beyond establishment. (2018). *European Parliament*. Retrieved from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/614739/EPRS\\_BRI\(2018\)614739\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/614739/EPRS_BRI(2018)614739_EN.pdf)
- Polcikiewicz, Z. (2018). Change in Security Architecture of Central and Eastern Europe in the Context of the Situation in Ukraine. *Historia i Polityka*, 26(33), 97–109. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/HiP.2018.034>
- Rynning, S. (2020). Deterrence Rediscovered: NATO and Russia. In P. Ooninx (Ed.), *The Netherlands NL ARMS. Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020: Deterrence in the 21st Century—Insights from Theory and Practice* (pp. 29–45). Breda: Springer. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8>

- Schwarz, K-D. (2005), *The Future of Deterrence*. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Retrieved from [https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research\\_papers/Microsoft\\_Word\\_\\_\\_S13\\_05\\_swz\\_engl\\_ks.pdf](https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/Microsoft_Word___S13_05_swz_engl_ks.pdf)
- Shalamanov, V., Anastasov, P., & Tsvetkov, G., (2019). Deterrence and Defense at the Eastern Flank of NATO and the EU. *Connections*, 18 (1/2), 25–42. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.18.1-2.02>
- Shelling, T. C. (1981). *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press. Retrieved from <http://elcencia.com/iamapirate/schelling.pdf>
- Shifrinson, J. (2017). Time to Consolidate NATO? *The Washington Quarterly*, 40, 109–123. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302742>
- Shlapak, D. A., & Johnson, M. (2016). *Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. Retrieved from [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR1253.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html)
- Stoicescu, K., & Järvenpää, P. (2019). *Contemporary Deterrence: Insights and Lessons from Enhanced Forward Presence*. Tallinn: International Centre for Defence and Security in Estonia. Retrieved from [https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ICDS\\_Report\\_Contemporary\\_Deterrence\\_Stoicescu\\_%C3%A4rvenp%C3%A4%C3%A4\\_January\\_2019.pdf](https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ICDS_Report_Contemporary_Deterrence_Stoicescu_%C3%A4rvenp%C3%A4%C3%A4_January_2019.pdf)
- Szoszyn, R. (2020, Feb 16). Państwa bałtyckie na rosyjskim celowniku. *Rzeczpospolita.pl*. Retrieved from <https://www.rp.pl/Rosja/302139904-Panstwa-baltyckie-narosyjskim-celowniku.html>
- Terlikowski, M. (2018). PeSCo: The Polish Perspective. *ARES Policy Paper*, 32. Retrieved from <https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Ares-32.pdf>
- Terlikowski, M., Józwiak, V., Ogrodnik, Ł., Pieńkowski, J., & Raś, K. (2018). The Bucharest 9: Delivering on the Promise to Become the Voice of the Eastern Flank. *PISM Policy Paper*, 4(164). Retrieved from <http://www.pism.pl/Publications/PISM-Policy-Paper-no-164>
- Towards a New Level of European Defence Competence. (2020). *GLOBSEC European Security Initiative*. Retrieved from [https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/GLOBSEC-European-Security-Initiative\\_Enhancing-European-Defence-Competence-Feb2020\\_web.pdf](https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/GLOBSEC-European-Security-Initiative_Enhancing-European-Defence-Competence-Feb2020_web.pdf)
- Ukraine to cooperate with Romania to ensure security in Black Sea region (2020, Feb 14). *Ukrinform*. Retrieved from <https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-defense/2876558-ukraine-to-cooperate-with-romania-to-ensure-security-in-black-sea-region.html>
- USAF's F-16 aircraft conducts test release of inert B61 nuclear bomb (2017, Apr 17). *Airforce Technology*. Retrieved from <https://www.airforce-technology.com/uncategorised/newsusafs-f-16-fighter-aircraft-conducts-flight-test-on-b61-nuclear-bomb-5788282/>
- Veebel, V. (2018). NATO options and dilemmas for deterring Russia in the Baltic States. *Defence Studies*, 18(2), 229–251. DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2018.1463518
- Vershbow, I. R., & Breedlove, P. M. (2019). *Permanent Deterrence. Enhancements to the US Military Presence in North Central Europe*. Washington: Atlantic Council. Retrieved

---

from <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Permanent-Deterrence.pdf>

Wales Summit Declaration, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales. (2014, Sep 5). *NATO*. Retrieved from [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_112964.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm)

Warsaw Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016. (2016, Jul 9). *NATO*. Retrieved from [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133169.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm)