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# Migration from Venezuela and Ukraine: a comparative analysis of settlement intentions and labour market outcomes in Peru and Poland

# Marcin Stonawski<sup>1,3, CDFM</sup>, Jan Brzozowski<sup>2, CMR</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Krakow University of Economics, Center for Advanced Studies of Population and Religion (CASPAR), Kraków, Poland; <sup>2</sup>Jagiellonian University, Jagiellonian Centre for Migration Studies, Kraków, Poland; <sup>3</sup>International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria; <sup>1</sup>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4550-2824; <sup>2</sup>e-mail: jan.brzozowski@uj.edu.pl (corresponding author), <sup>2</sup>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8517-3485

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**Abstract.** Prior to 2022, when the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, both Ukraine and Venezuela were significant sources of economic and politically driven migration on a global scale. The recent emigration from both countries shares similarities and key differences, warranting comparative analysis. This study examines adaptation strategies among Venezuelans in Peru and Ukrainians in Poland, using 2022 survey data around 2022. It explores settlement intentions, full-time employment prospects, and overqualification risks. Findings show that employment status does not significantly influence migrants' intention to stay. Among Venezuelans, higher education increases the likelihood of full-time employment, but this trend is absent for Ukrainians. Overqualification risk is linked to post-secondary education in both groups, with older and female Venezuelans particularly vulnerable.

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# 1. Introduction

The recent migratory movements from Ukraine and Venezuela are regarded as two of the most significant contemporary global migration flows (UNHCR, 2023a; Bonilla-Mejía et al., 2023). Since 2015, it has been recorded that ~7.7 million Venezuelans have departed their country, with a further 6.5 million settling in Latin America and the Caribbean (Bonilla-Mejía et al., 2023). Prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022, 6.1 million Ukrainians were already residing in other countries (Albrecht & Panchenko, 2022). Despite their distinct geographical contexts, these migration flows share common characteristics, rendering them a compelling topic for joint analysis. A close examination reveals that these migratory patterns are driven by a unique combination of political and economic motivations, underscoring the necessity for a more nuanced approach to migration studies that extends beyond the simplistic dichotomy of forced versus voluntary migration (Erdal & Oeppen, 2018).

In Ukraine's case, following the Revolution of Dignity and a pro-Western political shift, the country experienced Russian aggression, including the annexation of Crimea and conflict in Donbas. Combined with economic recession, these factors resulted in widespread internal displacement and significant migration, particularly to EU countries like Poland (Borkowski et al., 2021). By early 2020, Poland hosted ~1.3 million Ukrainian citizens, a number that remained high even before the 2022 invasion (Duszczyk et al., 2023). While relatively few among these migrants had been granted refugee status, their movement was influenced by a combination of political and economic factors.

A similar blend of voluntary and forced migration is seen in Venezuela, where the political and economic crisis has been exacerbated by the suppression of democratic freedoms under the incumbent President Nicolás Maduro since the death of Hugo Chávez in 2013 (Rosales & Jiménez, 2021). Severe inflation, unemployment, crime, and shortages of basic goods have driven millions of Venezuelans to emigrate (Boruchowicz et al., 2021), particularly to Colombia (2.8 million) and Peru, which hosts ~1.5 million Venezuelans (UNHCR, 2023b). There is ongoing debate over the most appropriate categorisation of Venezuelan migration (Freier & Pérez, 2021; Aron Said and Castillo Jara, 2022). Scholars have proposed the term "forced migrants", while international institutions advocate for the recognition of Venezuelan migrants as "refugees" under the terms of the Cartagena

Declaration (Blouin & Borios, 2023). Nevertheless, economic push factors remain central to most decisions on migration (Posso et al., 2023).

This study is a response to calls for the examination of the interplay of voluntary and involuntary factors in migration. It analyses the adaptation strategies of Venezuelan and Ukrainian migrants in two key host countries: Peru and Poland. The investigation draws upon two 2022 surveys: the ENPOVE survey, which was directed at the Venezuelan population residing in Peru, and the FUME survey, which focused on Ukrainians in Poland. The study utilises these datasets to analyse settlement intentions, employment prospects and the risk of overqualification. The study makes a contribution to the field of migration studies by offering insights into socio-economic adaptation strategies, settlement versus return intentions, and the comparison between South-South (Venezuela-Peru) and North–North (Ukraine–Poland) migration flows. The analysis of these ongoing exoduses provides important insights for the management of migration flows, with implications for regional bodies such as the EU and Mercosur. The failure to accommodate migrants in these countries could have broader consequences for neighbouring states.

The article is structured in the following manner: firstly, a review of the literature on immigrant adaptation strategies and theoretical foundations for hypothesis development is provided; secondly, the datasets and empirical methodology are discussed; thirdly, the analysis results are presented; and finally, the study's limitations are discussed, along with suggestions for further research.

# 2. Literature review and hypothesis development

The classical push-pull migration theory, as proposed by Lee (1966), is the basis for the subsequent discussion. This theory identifies four key factors that influence mobility: (a) those related to the origin area, (b) those related to the destination, (c) intervening obstacles and (d) personal factors. Push factors are defined as those that drive people away from an area, while pull factors are defined as those that attract them. Empirical studies confirm that these factors shape migration decisions (Brzozowski & Coniglio, 2021). In this study, it is hypothesised that push factors, particularly the socio-economic and political crises in Venezuela and Ukraine, along with Russian military aggression, will dominate the decision to migrate. Pull factors, such as the relative attractiveness of Peru and Poland, will influence the

choice of settlement, with geographic and cultural proximity playing a key role for Venezuelan and Ukrainian migrants.

The push-pull model is extended by the neoclassical approach, which views migration as a rational decision aimed at maximising utility (De Haas et al., 2014). In this view, migration is often permanent, with return migration occurring only in cases of failure to adapt. Migrants who fail to integrate into the host country are more likely to return, while successful adaptation typically leads to permanent settlement. In contrast, the new economics of labour migration theory posits that migration is a temporary process shaped by household strategies, with return anticipated after accumulating savings (Stark & Bloom, 1985). However, both theories concur that successful adaptation, such as securing full-time employment, reduces the likelihood of return (Coniglio & Brzozowski, 2018). Furthermore, migrants who are able to successfully integrate into their host country often transfer their family life to that country, while those who are planning temporary stays invest less in adaptation (Grzymala-Kazlowska & Phillimore, 2018).

In the present study, the decision-making process of Venezuelan and Ukrainian migrants regarding future migration is examined in the context of significant uncertainty, precipitated by the ongoing instability in their respective countries' socio-economic and political situations, which exhibits minimal improvement. The Russian offensive in Vuhledar in September 2024 and the rigged presidential elections in Venezuela in July 2024 serve as indicative events of the prevailing instability. Consequently, the presence of substantial push factors hinders the return of these migrants to their respective countries of origin. However, the decision to remain in the host country is influenced by a variety of factors. Drawing upon extant literature, we hypothesise that intentions to remain in Peru or Poland are shaped by successful socioeconomic adaptation, particularly the securing of full-time employment. Our first hypothesis is thus:

Hypothesis 1: The intention to stay in Poland or Peru is related positively to full-time employment in the host country.

The new economics of labour migration focuses on the household as the key decision-making unit (Stark & Bloom, 1985). Rather than focusing on the maximisation of individual utility, the objective of households is to minimise risk and diversify income. This approach is especially relevant in developing economies, where unfavourable socioeconomic conditions drive households to send members abroad in order to diversify income sources (Coniglio & Brzozowski, 2018).

To address economic constraints, households develop ad-hoc strategies by assessing their situation and choosing the best option, a process known as "coping" (Lazarus, 1993). According to Lazarus and Folkman (1984), coping involves cognitive and behavioural efforts directed at managing challenging situations. Coping becomes particularly important during major life changes, such as migration (Kuo, 2014). It has been defined as the cognitive and behavioural efforts applied to the management of situations that strain or exceed personal resources (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; 1991). The present study, with a focus on forced migration and refugee flows, emphasises that coping is a key aspect of migrants' acculturation. Berry (1997) defines cultural adaptation as the process of adjusting to a new cultural environment, and the extant literature based on his work is widely studied, though still under-reviewed (Kuo, 2010). While coping and acculturation are frequently discussed, research specifically linking these concepts in migrant groups remains limited (Kuo, 2014).

The present study adopts Berry's (1997) conceptualisation of adaptation as "changes in individuals or groups in response to environmental demands", a framework that facilitates comprehension of the manner in which the host nation's culture and socio-economic system influence migrants' attitudes, behaviours and strategies. Berry (1997) observes that, while short-term adaptation may entail challenges, the majority of individuals undergo positive long-term adaptation over time.

In the field of migration studies, the terms "coping" and "adaptation" are frequently used interchangeably, yet with different emphases. The term "coping" typically refers to the short-term survival tactics of vulnerable groups, such as refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants who arrive under traumatic conditions, including war or persecution. Critics contend that the term "coping strategy" is a misnomer, as these migrants frequently encounter such profound daily challenges that long-term planning becomes unfeasible. This argument suggests that "coping tactics" may be a more accurate term to describe their behaviour (Datta, 2007).

In contrast, the term "adaptation" suggests a longer-term commitment to the host country and refers to "livelihood strategies or measures of economic success" (Brzozowski, 2017). In this study, we define coping tactics as the short-term actions taken by Venezuelan and Ukrainian forced migrants to ensure day-to-day survival for themselves and their families in both the home and host countries.

The extant academic literature on immigrant adaptation typically addresses three dimensions: cultural, socio-economic, and psychological (Brzozowski, 2017). The present study focuses on the socio-economic dimension, which is often seen as a prerequisite for successful adaptation in the cultural and psychological areas. Higher labour market participation and upward occupational mobility enhance migrants' well-being and increase their exposure to the host society (Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2008).

Socio-economic adaptation is typically measured by indicators such as economic activity status, fulltime employment, income levels and qualification matching (Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2008). Research indicates that refugees generally score lower in adaptation compared to economic migrants (Buchanan, 2018), primarily due to the additional barriers they face, such as psychological stress, limited preparation time for migration, and inadequate social and financial capital (Renner et al., 2020). In accordance with human capital theory, the successful integration of immigrants and refugees into the labour market is contingent on individual competencies, with key factors including education level, work experience, language skills and overall health (Van Tubergen et al., 2004).

A salient issue is the transferability of migrants' and refugees' human capital, which, as Murthy (2018) posits, positively influences socio-economic adaptation. However, significant disparities in educational systems between home and host countries frequently impede the recognition of qualifications. This has resulted in a considerable proportion of migrants, including those with advanced qualifications, encountering discrepancies between their educational attainments and available employment opportunities. This phenomenon, often referred to as "brain waste", signifies the relegation of these individuals to low-skilled roles that do not fully utilise their educational background and competencies (Banerjee et al., 2019). The risk of overqualification is exacerbated by the characteristics of the local labour market, as most available positions are in the secondary labour market, which tends to be less appealing to the native population and requires minimal skills (Coniglio & Brzozowski, 2018). A significant barrier to utilising the human capital of immigrants and refugees in host countries is language proficiency. Mastery of the host country's language is crucial for successful socio-economic adaptation (Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2008).

This study examines the socioeconomic adaptation determinants for two forced migrant groups: Venezuelans in Peru and Ukrainians in Poland, with language proficiency being a key distinction. The Venezuelan population shares the same language as Peruvians, while Ukrainians speak a different language from Poles, and only a small fraction of Ukrainians learned Polish before arriving in Poland (Rebisz and Grygiel, 2018).

Furthermore, the Ukrainian diaspora in Poland is linguistically diverse, with many individuals being bilingual in Ukrainian and Russian. However, the level of proficiency in each language varies significantly, with some individuals only speaking Russian, which is culturally more distant from Polish (Bilewicz et al., 2021). Access to education also varies, with different levels of educational attainment across different regions. The higher education systems of Venezuela and Peru exhibit significant alignment, particularly with regard to curriculum and educational quality, though challenges related to overcrowded schools in Lima limit access (Summers et al., 2022). In contrast, Poland, as an EU member, has higher education institutions that are well-integrated with Western European systems. By contrast, Ukraine is still in the early stages of EU integration, resulting in its universities being more conservative and poorly connected to Western ones (Kozinchuk et al., 2022; Gromov et al., 2022). Consequently, the following interconnected hypotheses are formulated on the adaptation of Venezuelans and Ukrainians and the role of human capital in this regard:

Hypothesis 2: Venezuelans with higher education are at lower risk of job overqualification than Ukrainians with the same educational level.

Hypothesis 3: The likelihood of becoming full-time employed is higher for Venezuelan higher-educated individuals than for Ukrainians with higher-education status.

# 3. Data and methods

For the purposes of this empirical analysis, data from two surveys has been considered. In the case of Venezuelan migrants, the focus is on the most recent ENPOVE-2022 survey (Encuesta Dirigida a la Población Venezolana que Reside en el País), which was carried out in Peru by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (INEI) in 2022. Additionally, we utilise the findings from the ENPOVE-2018 survey to illustrate changes over

time in the characteristics under consideration. The ENPOVE-2022 survey is considered representative of the Venezuelan population residing in Peru, with a sample size of 8.8 thousand respondents in 2018 and 11 thousand in 2022. It is worth mentioning that the majority of the Venezuelans reside in the city of Lima. For the purpose of our analysis, we selected individuals aged between 20 and 64 who were born in Venezuela, amounting to 6,885 persons. For Ukrainian migrants, as there is no dataset available for the same period, we exploit the recent survey conducted within the FUME project (Future Migration Scenarios in Europe - H2020 Grant ID 870649, cf. Pedziwiatr et al., 2021). The survey was carried out by the Center for Advanced Studies of Population and Religion at Krakow University of Economics in Małopolska voivodeship - an important region hosting Ukrainian migrants - in Southern Poland, between October 2021 and January 2022. The survey is representative of the population of foreign-born individuals from third countries in Małopolska (i.e., non-EU nationals) and includes 507 respondents. However, for the purpose of our analysis, we focus on a sub-sample of Ukrainian migrants (427 persons).

#### 3.1. Variables

In order to verify the hypotheses of the present study, three dependent variables were selected. The first of these is an indicator of respondents' intentions to remain in Peru or Poland, as opposed to migrating elsewhere or returning home. The second variable measures overqualification in respondents' current jobs in comparison to their previous jobs in Venezuela or Ukraine. For the case of Peru, International Classification of Occupations (ISCO) three-digit codes and corresponding skill levels from the International Labour Organization (ILO) were used. In instances where a respondent's skill level in their previous occupation exceeded that of their current job, we categorised this as overqualification. Within the FUME survey, respondents directly evaluated their qualificationjob alignment on a scale ranging from 0 (no match) to 10 (full match). For the purpose of comparison with Peru, we operationalised overqualification as a dummy variable, assigning a value of 1 for overqualification (ratings of 0-3, assuming that strong discrepancy indicates a higher qualification than needed) and 0 for all other scenarios.

The third dependent variable indicates full-time employment, for which two measures of Venezuelan data were used: (a) hours worked in the previous week and (b) whether this workload was typical. Work of 40 hours or more was classified as fulltime. In the Polish survey, full-time employment was a straightforward option, as Polish law generally defines full-time work as 40 hours per week.

The primary independent variables are: (a) fulltime employment as described and (b) education level, categorised into three groups using UN ISCED-2011 mappings for the Venezuelan and Peruvian education systems: Primary and lower (ISCED levels 0–1), Secondary (3–4), and Postsecondary and higher (5–8). This categorisation was also applied to the Polish dataset, where postsecondary education typically equates to at least a Bachelor's degree.

In addition, individual-level control variables were incorporated to ensure comparability across diverse socio-economic backgrounds. Age was categorised into three groups: 20-34 years (young adults), 35-44 years (high mobility adults), and 45-64 years (low mobility adults). Sex was indicated by a dummy variable for males. Marital status is categorised as follows: (a) single, (b) married or cohabiting or (c) divorced, separated or widowed. Housing type reflects living conditions: (a) owned, (b) rented (reference category) or (c) other arrangements. To differentiate migration patterns to Peru and Poland, we included an arrival period indicator: (a) 2014–18 (reference category) and (b) 2019–22, excluding those who arrived in Peru before 2014 due to the small number of observations.

#### 3.2. Models

In order to verify the three hypotheses described above, we estimated several logistic regression models. The first of these (Model 1A) is concerned with the individual intentions to stay in the country of destination, with full-time employment as the explanatory variable. Additionally, we included controls for other characteristics in Model 1B. The second model (Model 2A) focuses on the relationship between occupational overqualification and the level of education of individuals, and the second model (Model 2B) includes controls. Finally, Model 3 is built for the likelihood of full-time employment explained by variation in education level (3A) with a set of control characteristics (3B).4. Results of empirical analysis

# 4. Results of empirical analysis


#### 4.1. Intentions to stay in the host country

A significant change in migratory intentions is observed among Venezuelan immigrants residing in Peru. According to the ENPOVE survey, in 2018, 93.5% of Venezuelans aged between 20 and 64 expressed a desire to remain in Peru (Fig. 1A). A comparatively smaller proportion, 4.2%, considered moving to Chile or Argentina, while only 2.3% considered other options, such as moving to another country or returning to Venezuela. A subsequent analysis revealed a decline in the proportion of those intending to stay, with the 2022 survey indicating a 76.7% retention rate, while ~21% expressed a desire to return to their country of origin. It is noteworthy that the prospect of further migration was considered by a mere 2.1% of respondents.

With regard to Ukrainian immigrants in Poland, in 2022, 81% of respondents aged 20–64 indicated a desire to stay in the country permanently, while only 5% declared intentions of return to their home country. The share of individuals considering reemigration to another Western country, especially within the European Union, was minimal (1.9%). It is noteworthy that 12.6% of the respondents did not have clear intentions regarding further stay or migration (Fig. 1B). The descriptive findings suggest that there is no difference in intentions between Venezuelans who have full-time employment in Peru and those who have other types of work arrangement (e.g., parttime job[s]). The results presented in Table 1 on migratory intentions by different socio-economic status show that there are no statistically significant differences between Venezuelans of different characteristics. There is no observable difference in intentions by age, sex, marital status, education or qualification mismatch. The only variable that differentiates the share of responses is housing arrangement, with people who own their place of residence (~4% of respondents in 2022) being more willing to stay in Peru.

In a similar way, the results on Venezuelans' migratory intentions among Ukrainians with different socio-economic characteristics are not statistically different (see Table 2).

The results from Model 1 (1A and 1B) suggest that the likelihood of Venezuelan migrants intending to stay in Peru is not associated with their employment status. Individuals in full-time employment are no more likely to stay in the country of destination than those who do not have this type of employment arrangement, even when controlling for socio-economic characteristics (Table 3a). This suggests that our hypothesis regarding a significant positive association between these variables should be rejected. This finding is at odds with those



**Fig. 1.** (A) Migratory intentions of Venezuelan immigrants at age 20–64 in Peru in 2018 and 2022; (B) Migratory intentions of Ukrainian immigrants at age 20–64 in Poland in 2022 Source: INEI (2018) and INEI (2022); CASPAR (2022)

Variable	(unwe	r of cases righted) hare			Ũ	ion intentions		
				· · ·	n Peru			to Venezuela
	2018	2022	2018	CI	2022	CI	2022	CI
Age	7093	6885		[0.04.0.0.1]				
20-34	70.42	62.78	0.93	[0.91;0.94]	0.77	[0.75;0.79]	0.21	[0.19;0.22]
35-44	19.83	20.93	0.96	[0.94;0.97]	0.77	[0.74;0.8]	0.21	[0.18;0.24]
45-64	9.75	16.29	0.94	[0.91;0.97]	0.73	[0.69;0.77]	0.25	[0.22;0.29]
Sex	7093	6885						
Males	53.55	47.85	0.93	[0.92;0.94]	0.77	[0.75;0.79]	0.21	[0.19;0.23]
Females	46.45	52.15	0.94	[0.92;0.95]	0.76	[0.74; 0.78]	0.22	[0.2;0.24]
Maritial status	7093	6885						
Single	32.72	19.45	0.90	[0.88;0.92]	0.75	[0.72;0.78]	0.21	[0.18;0.24]
Married/cohabitation	62.57	68.11	0.95	[0.94;0.96]	0.76	[0.75;0.78]	0.22	[0.2;0.24]
Divorced/Separated/Widow	4.71	12.44	0.97	[0.91;0.99]	0.78	[0.73;0.82]	0.20	[0.16;0.24]
Education	7093	6872						
Primary and lower	14.7	32.21	0.95	[0.93;0.97]	0.77	[0.74; 0.8]	0.22	[0.19;0.24]
Secondary	30.69	32.11	0.94	[0.93;0.96]	0.75	[0.73;0.78]	0.23	[0.2;0.25]
Postsecondary+	54.61	35.67	0.92	[0.91;0.94]	0.76	[0.74;0.79]	0.20	[0.18;0.23]
Full-time job		5588						
Full-time (40h weekly or more)	x	67.52	x	x	0.77	[0.75;0.78]	0.21	[0.19;0.22]
Work with less hours	x	32.48	x	x	0.78	[0.74;0.8]	0.21	[0.18;0.24]
Skills Mismatch	5244	4480				[011 1,010]		
Negative	48.78	45.44	0.93	[0.92;0.94]	0.78	[0.75;0.8]	0.20	[0.18;0.23]
Lack	45.25	46.71	0.94	[0.92;0.95]	0.74	[0.72;0.77]	0.23	[0.21;0.26]
Positive	5.97	7.85	0.94	[0.92;0.96]	0.77	[0.74;0.8]	0.20	[0.17;0.24]
Skills Mismatch (with unempl)	7092	6874	0.21	[0.72,0.70]	0.77	[]	0.20	[]
Negative	42.16	42.68	0.94	[0.92;0.95]	0.79	[0.76;0.81]	0.19	[0.17;0.21]
Lack	42.10 37.14	36.23	0.94	[0.92,0.95]	0.75	[0.72;0.78]	0.19	[0.2;0.25]
Positive	20.71	21.09	0.93	[0.91;0.93]	0.75	[0.77;0.88]	0.23	[0.1;0.21]
			0.92	[0.00;0.90]	0.04	[0.77,0.00]	0.15	[0.1,0.21]
Housing	7093	6885	0.00	[0,5,0,00]	0.04	[0.89;0.96]	0.00	[0.03;0.11]
Owned	0.32	3.96	0.88	[0.5;0.98]	0.94		0.06	
Rented	97.48	91.8	0.93	[0.92;0.94]	0.76	[0.74;0.77]	0.22	[0.21;0.23]
Other	2.2	4.24	0.97	[0.85;1]	0.73	[0.63;0.81]	0.25	[0.17;0.35]

Table 1. Migratory intentions of Venezuelans in Peru by chosen characteristics in 2018 and 2022

Source: own calculations based on (INEI, 2018) and (INEI, 2022)

reported by Wentzel et al. (2021) on intentions to stay of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, which suggest that structural integration, measured by employment, is negatively associated with intention to stay. However, this difference in intention to stay can be easily explained: while Colombia is a neighbouring country for Venezuelans, Peru is a very distant location. A substantial proportion of Venezuelans (over 90%) have travelled to Peru by bus via Colombia and Ecuador, traversing a challenging 4,500-kilometre route (Uscategui and Andrea, 2019). This extensive journey has likely necessitated a considerable investment of time and resources, potentially leading to a greater propensity to remain in Peru compared to Colombia.

Furthermore, it was found that only two independent variables demonstrated a statistically significant association with the likelihood. Older adults, specifically those between the ages of 45 and 64, were found to be less inclined to remain in Peru compared to younger individuals. The odds of this demographic group intending to stay were observed to be ~25% lower than those belonging to the 20– 34 age category (b=-0.29, OR=0.75). The strongest predictor of intentions to stay is housing arrangement (Wald chi-square test = 23.42). Owning a place of residence is associated with an approximately four-

Variable	Number of cases (unweighted) / Share		intentions
	2021-2022	Stay in 2021-2022	Poland CI
Age	414		
20-34	47.2	0.81	[0.75;0.86]
35-44	23.9	0.87	[0.79;0.92]
45-64	28.9	0.76	[0.62;0.85]
Sex	414		
Males	42.8	0.83	[0.77;0.88]
Females	57.2	0.79	[0.71;0.85]
Maritial status	408		
Single	31.7	0.79	[0.7;0.86]
Married/cohabitation	60.6	0.82	[0.75;0.87]
Divorced/Separated/Widow	7.7	0.81	[0.55;0.93]
Education	414		
Primary and lower	1.1	1.00	х
Secondary	43.9	0.78	[0.69;0.85]
Postsecondary+	55.1	0.83	[0.77;0.87]
Work	409		
Employed	87.9	0.80	[0.75;0.85]
Unemployed	12.1	0.83	[0.69;0.91]
Full-time job	414		
Full-time	81.3	0.81	[0.75;0.86]
Other work	18.8	0.80	[0.68;0.88]
Skills Mismatch	355		
Negative	19.1	0.79	[0.67;0.87]
Lack	19.3	0.86	[0.73;0.93]
Positive	61.5	0.79	[0.72;0.85]
Skills Mismatch (with unempl)	414		
Negative	18.2	0.77	[0.65;0.85]
Lack	17.9	0.87	[0.75;0.93]
Positive	63.9	0.80	[0.74;0.86]
Housing	414		
Owned	11.8	0.92	[0.8;0.97]
Rented	69.8	0.86	[0.81;0.89]
Other	18.4	0.54	[0.39;0.69]

Table 2. Migratory intentions of Ukrainians in Poland by chosen characteristics in 2021-2022

Source: own calculations based on (CASPAR, 2022)

	J	Intention to	stay in Po	eru	
Independent variables	Mod	el 1A	Mo	del 1	В
	b	SE	b		SE
Main Characteristics					
Labour status (ref. Others)					
Full-time job	0.026	0.083	0.012		0.089
<u>Control Characteristics</u>					
Sex (ref. Male)					
Female			-0.025		0.090
Age (ref. 20-34)					
35-44			-0.001		0.103
45-64			-0.290	***	0.111
Education (ref. Primary&lower)					
Secondary			-0.175		0.109
Postsecondary+			-0.081		0.104
Maritial status (ref. Single)					
Married/Cohabitation			0.088		0.101
Divorced/Separated/Widow			0.243		0.156
Housing (ref. Rented)					
Owned			1.521	***	0.324
Other			-0.254		0.245
Arrival period (ref. 2014-2018)					
Period (2019-2022)			-0.080		0.085
Constant	1.164 **	** 0.045	1.246	***	0.154
Wald chi-square	0.	09	3	5.38	
df		1		11	
Pseudo R-Square	0.0	000	0.0	0111	

Table 3a. Main results of the model on intention to stay in Peru

Source: own calculations based on INEI (2022) \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

and-a-half-fold increase in odds of intention to stay in comparison to renting (b=1.52, OR=4.57). In a similar manner, Wentzel et al. (2021) found no significant associations between demographic and social variables (including age, sex, marital status and education) and the intention to stay in one's origin country (e.g., Venezuela in Colombia) among Venezuelans residing in Colombia.

In the context of Polish and Ukrainian migrants, the labour status was observed to demonstrate no significant effect on the intentions to remain in the country (see Table 3b). This observation was consistent with other socio-economic characteristics that were found not to be statistically related to the propensity of individuals to intend to stay in Poland. For Ukrainians within the 20–64 age group, this proportion approximated 80%. This phenomenon can be readily explained by the highly favourable current labour market situation in Poland and the Małopolskie region (in January 2022, the unemployment rate in the country stood at 5.5%, which is below the EU mean) and the fact that the majority of the Ukrainian subjects in the sample (74%) had full-time employment.

	In	tention to	stay in Poland	
Independent variables	Mod	el 1A	Model 1	В
	b	SE	Ь	SE
Main Characteristics				
Labour status (ref. Others)				
Full-time job	0.086	0.354	0.223	0.372
<b>Control Characteristics</b>				
Sex (ref. Male)				
Female			-0.376	0.306
Age (ref. 20-34)				
35-44			0.454	0.372
45-64			-0.456	0.439
Education (ref. Secondary&lower)				
Postsecondary+			0.017	0.318
Maritial status (ref. Single)				
Married/Cohabitation			0.264	0.377
Divorced/Separated/Widow			0.160	0.706
Constant	1.366 **	* 0.311	1.368 ***	0.462
Wald chi-square	0.	06	6.87	
df	1	l	7	
Pseudo R-Square	0.0	002	0.022	
N	42	12	406	

Table 3b. Main results on intentions to stay in Poland

Source: own calculations based on (CASPAR, 2022) \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

### 4.2. Risk of job overqualification

The data indicates that Venezuelan migrants in Peru have a higher level of educational attainment than the overall population of the country of origin and Peru. This is particularly evident among immigrants who arrived between 2014 and 2018. According to the ENPOVE survey, in 2018, approximately five out of ten men and six out of ten women aged 20-64 had received at least postsecondary education (see Fig. 2). The 2019-22 wave was characterised by a significant decline in educational attainment, with the proportion of individuals aged 20-64 who had received postsecondary or higher education standing at 26.5%. By 2022, this figure had increased to ~32% among men and 39% among women in the same age group. In contrast, Venezuela, according to estimates by Lutz et al. (2018), had a share of  $\sim$ 23% (17.5% among men and 28% among women) of persons aged 20-64 with at least postsecondary education in 2015. Consequently, it can be posited

that immigrants are more likely to be drawn from the educational elite of their respective countries of origin, and their emigration has the effect of significantly reducing the overall stock of human capital available in Venezuela.

Despite their high level of education, Venezuelans are employed in roles that primarily require lowskilled labour. In 2018, 36% of immigrants were engaged in elementary occupations (according to the International Labour Organization [ILO] scale, the lowest level of skills - level 1). By 2022, this figure had increased to 43% (see Fig. 3). The second and third most prevalent groups among Venezuelan immigrants in Peru are service and sales workers, as well as craft and related trades workers (both skill level 2), constituting ~43% of immigrants aged 20-64 in 2018 and 42% in 2022. Notably, highly skilled occupations were assigned to a mere 8% of immigrants in 2018 and 5.5% in 2022. This suggests that a significant proportion of Venezuelan immigrants may be experiencing occupational




Fig. 2. Educational attainment of Venezuelan immigrants at age 20–64 in 2018 and 2022 by sex Source: own calculations based on INEI (2018) and INEI (2022)

overqualification, which can be regarded as a form of "brain waste".

In this paper, an attempt is made to estimate the level of overqualification using information on the occupation level of the last job that immigrants held when in Venezuela and of their current work. The procedure is explained in the Data & Method section. The findings suggest that, among persons aged 20–64 who worked both in Venezuela and Peru, ~49% experienced a negative mismatch between qualifications and job requirements in 2018 and 45% in 2022. This phenomenon is particularly evident among individuals who possess at least postsecondary education, with 55% of Venezuelans working below their qualifications in 2022, compared to ~40% of those with secondary education (see Fig. 4).

The findings of this study indicate that Venezuelans residing in Peru who have attained at least postsecondary education are more likely to experience occupational overqualification (see Table 4a). This association is further supported by Model 2B, which demonstrates a statistically significant relationship (Wald ch2 = 49.78). When controlling for socio-economic characteristics, a person with the highest education level has ~95% higher odds of being overqualified than those with a secondary education level (model 2B) (b=0.67, OR=1.95). Holding all other variables constant, having postsecondary education gives a 0.55 probability of overqualification. It is also worth mentioning that age and sex are statistically significant predictors of a negative mismatch. Specifically, Venezuelan women exhibit almost 39% higher odds of being overqualified for a job in Peru compared to men. Furthermore, the odds of being overqualified increase by a factor of two among older workers (45–64) compared to those aged 20–34.

In the context of Ukrainian immigrants in Poland, the model indicates that education level serves as a statistically significant predictor of negative mismatch in the labour market. When all other variables are held constant, the odds of encountering negative mismatch are 2.8 times higher for individuals with postsecondary education compared to those with lower education (b=1.03, OR=2.8) (see Table 4b). According to the model (3B), the likelihood of experiencing negative mismatch among individuals with postsecondary education and higher education is ~25%, while those with lower education have a probability of ~10% of encountering negative mismatch.



**Fig. 3.** Venezuelans at age 20–64 by occupation in Peru in 2018 and 2022 Source: own calculations based on INEI (2018) and INEI (2022)




Fig. 4. Share of persons with overqualification (negative mismatch) by education level in 2022 Source: own calculations based on INEI (2018) and INEI (2022)

#### 4.3. Full-time employment

According to the ENPOVE survey, ~67% of Venezuelans aged 20–64 working in Peru had a job equivalent to full-time employment, working 40 or more hours per week on their main job (see Table 1). The models (3A and 3B) suggest that having a high level of education is significantly associated with the likelihood of having a full-time job (Table 5a). The odds of securing a full-time position are 38% higher for individuals with postsecondary education compared to those with primary or lower education (b=0.319, OR=1.376), when all other control variables remain constant (Table 5a). The predicted probability of Venezuelans aged 20–64 working full-time is 0.71. Model 3B also reveals that sex, age and marital status are statistically significant predictors of full-time employment. For example, being a woman decreases the odds of having a full-time job by 66%. Another interesting finding

 Table 4a. Main results of the model on negative mismatch of qualifications of Venezuelans in Peru

		Nega	Negative mismatch	ch
	Model 2A	2A	V	Model 2B
Independent Variables	q	SE	Ą	SE
Main Characteristics				
Education (ref. Secondary)				
Primary&lower	0.102	0.120	0.075	0.123
Postsecondary+	0.688***	0.103	0.668***	0.104
<b>Control Characteristics</b>				
Sex (ref. Male)				
Female			0.327***	0.093
Age (ref. 20-34)				
35-44			0.291***	0.104
45-64			0.708***	0.124
Labour status (ref. Others)				
Full-time job			-0.078	0.101
Arrival period				
(ref. 2014-2018)				
Period (2019-2022)			0.125	0.091
Constant	-0 A81***	0.081	***Y02 U-	0.133
	10110		0,000	
Wald chi-square	55.13			112.79
df	2			7
Pseudo R-Square	0.0178	8		0.0369
Ν	4 427			4 425

Source: own calculations based on INEI (2022) \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table 4b.** Main results of the model on negative mismatch of qualifications in Poland

		Neg:	Negative mismatch	4
Independent variables	Model 2A	2A	V	Model 2B
	q	SE	p	SE
Main Characteristics				
Education (ref.				
Secondary&lower)				
Postsecondary+	1.209***	0.3083	1.031***	0.347
<b>Control Characteristics</b>				
Sex (ref. Male)				
Female			0.488	0.287
Age (ref. 20-34)				
35-44			-0.196	0.301
45-64			-0.652	0.508
Labour status (ref. Others)				
Full-time job			-0.127	0.342
Arrival period (ref2013)				
Period (2014-2018)			0.986	0.549
Period (2019-2022)			1.046	0.625
Constant	-2.282***	0.266	-3.038***	0.711
Wald chi-square	15.38	\$		24.24
df	1			7
Pseudo R-Square	0.0488	8		0.0672
Ν	414			393

Source: own calculations based on (CASPAR, 2022) \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table 5a**. Main results of the model on full-time employment of Venezuelans in Peru

reru				
		Full-time	Full-time employment	
Independent variables	Model 3A	3A	Model 3B	3B
	þ	SE	þ	SE
<u>Main Characteristics</u>				
Education				
(ref. Primary&lower)				
Secondary	0.139	0.113	0.152	0.116
Postsecondary+	0.249**	0.106	0.319***	0.112
<b>Control Characteristics</b>				
Sex (ref. Male)				
Female			-0.823***	0.091
Age (ref. 20-34)				
35-44			-0.085	0.111
45-64			-0.439***	0.126
Maritial status (ref. Single)				
Married/Cohabitation			-0.341***	0.109
Divorced/Separated/Widow			-0.236	0.160
Arrival period (ref. 2014-2018)				
Period (2019-2022)			-0.162	060.0
Constant	0.591***	0.083	1.385***	0.145
Wald chi-square	5.55		122.01	1(
df	2		8	
Pseudo R-Square	0.0018	8	0.039	9
Ν	5 449	(	5,442	2

Source: own calculations based on INEI (2022) \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table 5b**. Main results of the model on full-time employment of Ukrainians in Poland

	Fu	l-time ei	Full-time employment	
Independent variables	Model 3A	3A	Model 3B	3B
	q	SE	q	SE
<u>Main Characteristics</u>				
Education (ref. Secondary&lower)				
Postsecondary+	-0.683	0.489	-0.636	0.644
<b>Control Characteristics</b>				
Sex (ref. Male)				
Female			0.724	0.521
Age (ref. 20-34)				
35-44			0.294	0.499
45-64			1.133	1.022
Maritial status (ref. Single)				
Married/Cohabitation			0.113	0.489
Divorced/Separated/Widow			-0.508	0.796
Arrival period (ref2013)				
Period (2014-18)			0.419	0.650
Period (2019-22)			-0.251	0.830
Constant	2.976***	0.422	2.300***	0.771
Wald chi-square	1.95		20.43	3
df	1		8	
Pseudo R-Square	0.0140	0	0.0712	2
Z	355		333	
<pre>Source: own calculations based on (CASPAR, 2022) *p&lt;0.1; **p&lt;0.05; ***p&lt;0.01</pre>	R, 2022)			

is that those in a personal relationship (married or cohabiting) have lower odds of having a full-time work arrangement than do singles.

Our model for full-time employment for Ukrainian migrants suggests that education is not statistically significant predictor of full-time employment in Poland (Table 5b). This phenomenon may be attributed to the conditions of the Polish economy and the relatively low unemployment rate. However, it is also plausible that the bifurcation of the labour market, characterised by a high demand for foreign workers in the secondary labour market (Müller, 2003), plays a role. In this segment, tertiary education does not appear to be a significant predictor of employment, as the majority of jobs are for unskilled and semi-skilled workers.

# 5. Conclusion

This study employs a comparative analysis of settlement intentions and labour market outcomes for two major migration flows: Venezuelans in Peru and Ukrainians in Poland. Despite the geographical and cultural differences between the two groups, a number of common features are identified, including the fluidity of economic and political factors influencing migration decisions. The paper examines three aspects of the respondents' situation: (1) their settlement intentions, (2) their prospects for securing full-time employment, and (3) the risk of overqualification.

Studies have previously indicated that intentions to remain in a host country are dynamic and influenced by factors such as employment, life satisfaction, psychological support and migration policies (e.g., Adda et al., 2006; Waldorf, 1995; Torunczyk-Ruiz & Brunarska, 2020). However, the findings of the present study reveal that full-time employment is not significantly associated with the likelihood of staying in Peru or Poland. A significant proportion of the respondents, ~80% of those aged between 20 and 64, expressed no intention of migrating again, with only 21% of Venezuelans and 5% of Ukrainians having expressed in 2021/22 a desire to return home.

Moreover, the majority of Venezuelans (67.5%) and Ukrainians (81.3%) are employed full-time and appear well integrated into their respective labour markets (INEI, 2018 & 2022). Notably, respondents from the FUME project survey showed strong economic and socio-cultural integration in Poland, with intentions to settle permanently (FUME, 2022). Aggregate-level characteristics, particularly push factors from the home countries, significantly

influence these intentions – especially in Venezuela, where political and economic conditions discourage return migration (FEME, 2022). Furthermore, changes in migration policies and anti-migrant discourse in Peru between 2018 and 2022 impacted intentions to stay, which dropped from 93.5% in 2018 to 76.7% in 2022 (INEI, 2018 & 2022).

It is evident that both migrant groups encounter considerable overqualification, with ~50% of Venezuelans and 20% of Ukrainians confronted with this challenge in their respective host countries. The extent of overqualification is found to be contingent on the educational attainment of the migrants. Specifically, the probability of experiencing negative mismatch in the labour market is found to be significantly higher for Venezuelans with postsecondary and higher education (55%) compared to Ukrainians (25%). This finding calls into question the second hypothesis that welleducated Venezuelans experience a lower risk of overqualification. Despite their education and language proficiency, many Venezuelans accept any available jobs to support their families back home, largely due to the high presence of the informal sector in Peru, especially in rapidly growing areas like tourism. The exacerbating discrimination in the labour market, intensified by the pandemic (Groeger et al., 2024), compels many Venezuelans to acquiesce to underqualified positions.

In Poland, employment opportunities for immigrants are predominantly concentrated in semi-skilled or low-skilled sectors, including agriculture, construction, gastronomy, logistics and care services. The relative overqualification of some Ukrainian migrants is counterbalanced by higher earnings compared to those available in Ukraine (Pędziwiatr et al., 2021; Duszczyk et al., 2023).

We found that education impacts the likelihood of full-time employment among Venezuelans in Peru, but this correlation is not statistically significant for Ukrainians in Poland. Overall, ~70% of Venezuelans and ~80% of Ukrainians are employed full-time. Model predictions indicate a 71% likelihood for well-educated Venezuelans and 81% for Ukrainians to secure full-time jobs. It is notable that full-time employment is more prevalent in Poland, where the labour market conditions in January 2022 exhibited a low unemployment rate of 5.9% on a national scale and 4.6% within the Małopolska region. The competitive nature of the Peruvian job market, as previously discussed, underscores the critical role that education plays in securing more favourable positions. Conversely, the robust Polish economy offers a wide range of fulltime employment opportunities, primarily in simple

occupations within the secondary labour market (Pędziwiatr et al., 2021).

It is important to note that the present study was conducted prior to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Although migration motives for Ukrainians moving to Poland were varied until 2022, with economic factors playing a significant role, migration after 2022 has largely been driven by involuntary reasons, as many Ukrainians seek safety. A further notable shift in demographic characteristics was observed, with the FUME project survey indicating that 59% of Ukrainian respondents were male, whereas the most recent wave of waraffected refugees is predominantly comprised of women with young children (Kohlenberger et al., 2023). This recent influx of predominantly waraffected refugees exhibits distinct economic activity patterns compared to those observed prior to the invasion, underscoring the necessity for further investigation. Due to limitations in the available data, we were unable to explore changes in coping and adaptation characteristics among immigrants, which would have provided additional insights into these processes. It should also be acknowledged that our analysis is subject to certain limitations. Both surveys offer slightly different measures of immigrant overqualification measurement, and despite attempts to use the common denominator for this index, some calculation bias is possible. Additionally, the empirical analysis for Peru relied on country-level surveys, whereas the Polish survey - due to the lack of comparable datasets at a macro level - included information from the Małopolska region. Consequently, generalisations are possible for the subnational level only. Finally, it is important to note that there is a potential endogeneity (reverse causality) bias in our empirical analysis between full-time employment and individuals' intentions to stay, as those migrants who exhibit intentions for a temporary stay may be less inclined to make long-term commitments by taking a full-time job. Although the majority of respondents expressed an interest in full-time employment, this potential bias is not considered to be significant.

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