La fiabilidad teórica del determinismo. Un examen desde la propuesta de Mariano Artigas

Martín Montoya

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/SetF.2016.028

Abstract


The theoretical reliability of determinism.
A review from the proposal of Mariano Artigas

This article has two purposes. The first is to demonstrate that the theory of determinism, which claims to be based on the principles of experimental science, cannot be considered as an explanation compatible with such sciences. To do this, we use some ideas of Mariano Artigas on the explanatory power of scientific theories and their reliability from his book The Mind of the Universe. Through this process we seek to achieve the second objective: to show the importance of the work of Artigas to dissolve complex contemporary debates, such as the current discussion about the existence of human freedom.


Keywords


causation; empirical sciences; explanation; human freedom.

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