Heaps and gluts: Paraconsistent logic applied to vagueness
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.1999.015Abstract
This paper is an attempt to show that the subvaluation theory is not a good theory of vagueness. It begins with a short review of supervaluation and subvaluation theories and procedes to evaluate the subvaluation theory. Subvaluationism shares all the main short-comings of supervaluationism. Moreover, the solution to the sorites paradox proposed by subvaluationists is not satisfactory. There is another solution which subvaluationists could avail themselves of, but it destroys the whole motivation for using a paraconsistent logic and is not different from the one offered by supervaluationism.References
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