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SELF-REFERENCE AND THE DIVORCE BETWEEN MEANING AND TRUTH

Abstract. This paper argues that a certain type of self-referential sentence falsifies the widespread assumption that a declarative sentence’s meaning is identical to its truth condition. It then argues that this problem cannot be assimilated to certain other problems that the assumption in question is independently known to face.

Keywords: self-reference; truth-theories; meaning-theories; compositionality; natural language semantics

1. Introduction

Much contemporary work on the semantics of natural languages is guided by the assumption, inspired from Frege, that the meaning of a natural language sentence that is declarative in form is its truth condition. One kind of problem that that assumption (hereafter, “thesis F”) has been claimed to face, but which will not be my focus here, is that there exist declarative sentences that must have the same truth conditions even though they have evidently different meanings. Another kind of problem that it might face would be complementary to the above and would consist in the existence of declarative sentences that have the same meaning but must have different truth conditions. My purpose in what follows is to expose one problem of this second sort, on the basis of inter-linguistic and intra-linguistic evidence concerning the behavior of a particular kind of self-referential sentence.

A sentence is self-referential, as the term will be here understood, just in case it is the referent of one of its constituents. (Thus, the sentence
“The sentence hereby uttered is interesting” is self-referential, since it is itself the referent of its constituent noun phrase “the sentence hereby uttered”). Liar-sentences (for example, “The sentence hereby uttered is false”) are the most famous self-referential sentences in that sense, but none of those connected with the problem that I am about to describe are liar-sentences — and, as I shall argue, the problem’s significance derives in part from the fact that they are not.

2. What the problem is

If any statement of inter-linguistic synonymy is true, the following three certainly are:

(a) The English noun phrase “the sentence hereby uttered” has the same meaning as the German noun phrase “der hiermit ausgesprochene Satz”.

(b) The English verb phrase “is an example of an English sentence” has the same meaning as the German verb phrase “ist ein Beispiel eines englischen Satzes”.

(c) The English verb phrase “is an example of a German sentence” has the same meaning as the German verb phrase “ist ein Beispiel eines deutschen Satzes”.

From these obviously true statements of inter-linguistic synonymy, together with standard assumptions about the compositionality of the processes by which meaningful noun phrases combine with meaningful verb phrases in forming meaningful sentences of English and German, it follows, first, that the sentences in (1) and (2) have the same meaning,

(1) The sentence hereby uttered is an example of an English sentence.

(2) Der hiermit ausgesprochene Satz ist ein Beispiel eines englischen Satzes.

and, secondly, that the sentences in (3) and (4) have the same meaning:

(3) The sentence hereby uttered is an example of a German sentence.

(4) Der hiermit ausgesprochene Satz ist ein Beispiel eines deutschen Satzes.

It is clear, however, that, although (1) and (2) do have the same meaning, they cannot have the same truth conditions: The referent of the
noun phrase “the sentence hereby uttered” in (1) cannot be anything other than (1) itself, and (1) is consequently true just in case (1) is an example of an English sentence (which of course it is, hence (1) is true). On the other hand, the referent of the noun phrase “der hiermit ausge- sprochene Satz” in (2) cannot be anything other than (2) itself, and (2) is consequently true just in case (2) is an example of an English sentence (which of course it isn’t, hence (2) is false). Similarly, although (3) and (4) have the same meaning, they cannot have the same truth conditions. For, the referent of the noun phrase “the sentence hereby uttered” in (3) cannot be anything other than (3) itself, and so (3) is true just in case (3) is an example of a German sentence (which of course it isn’t, hence (3) is false); whereas the referent of the noun phrase “der hiermit ausgeprochene Satz” in (4) cannot be anything other than (4) itself, and so (4) is true just in case (4) is an example of a German sentence (which of course it is, hence (4) is true). It is not the case, then, that whenever two declarative sentences have the same meaning, they have the same truth conditions. And if this is so, a declarative sentence’s meaning cannot be identified with its truth conditions, contrary to what thesis F contends.

It might be thought that this sort of problem would be difficult to arise at the intra-linguistic level. In fact, however, it is easy to ascertain its existence at that level too.

For example, given that the noun phrase “the sentence hereby uttered” cannot be supposed to have a different meaning in each one of the different English sentences in which it might occur (though, of course, it will have a different referent in each one of the different English sentences in which it might occur), an adequate account of English that aims to compositionally derive the meanings of English sentences on the basis of the meanings of their constituents (and of the way these constituents are combined) would entail, among other things, that the sentences in (5) and (6) have the same meaning,

(5) The sentence hereby uttered contains exactly eight words.
(6) Exactly eight words are contained in the sentence hereby uttered.

that the sentences in (7) and (8) have the same meaning,

(7) The sentence hereby uttered ends with a verb.
(8) It is with a verb that the sentence hereby uttered ends.

and that the sentences in (9) and (10) have the same meaning:

(9) The sentence hereby uttered contains exactly eight words.
(10) Exactly eight words are contained in the sentence hereby uttered.
(9) The sentence hereby uttered isn’t one that doesn’t contain any contractions.
(10) The sentence hereby uttered is not one that does not contain any contractions.

However, no adequate truth theory of English could generate such entailments. Although (5) and (6) have the same meaning, they cannot have the same truth conditions: in (5), “the sentence hereby uttered” can only refer to (5) itself, and (5) is consequently true just in case it itself contains exactly eight words (which it does, hence (5) is true); in (6), on the other hand, “the sentence hereby uttered” can only refer to (6) itself, and (6) is consequently true just in case it itself contains exactly eight words (which it doesn’t, hence (6) is false). Similarly, although (7) and (8) have the same meaning, they cannot have the same truth conditions: what “the sentence hereby uttered” refers to in (7) can only be (7) itself, and so (7) is true just in case it itself ends with a verb (which it doesn’t, hence (7) is false); on the other hand, what “the sentence hereby uttered” refers to in (8) can only be (8) itself, and so (8) is true just in case it itself ends with a verb (which it does, hence (5) is true). Finally, although (9) and (10) have the same meaning, they cannot have the same truth conditions. For, in (9), “the sentence hereby uttered” cannot refer to anything but (9), and so (9) is true just in case it itself contains at least one contraction (which it does, hence (9) is true); whereas in (10) “the sentence hereby uttered” cannot refer to anything but (10), and so (10) is true just in case it itself contains at least one contraction (which it doesn’t, hence (10) is false). In short, the inter-linguistic evidence falsifies just as clearly as the intra-linguistic evidence does the thesis that whenever two declarative sentences have the same meaning, they have the same truth conditions. And if that thesis is false, it cannot be true, as F contends, that a declarative sentence’s meaning is its truth condition.

3. What the problem isn’t

It might be claimed that the problem that sentences such as those cited above create for thesis F is but an instance of the well-known problem that sentences containing indexical expressions (hereafter, “indexical sentences”) create for thesis F.

That claim does not withstand scrutiny, however. The problem that indexical sentences create for thesis F has two sources: first, that, con-
sidered in themselves (i.e. independently of their possible contexts of utterance), indexical sentences do not have any truth conditions; and secondly, that, considered in relation to their possible contexts of utterance, they can be associated with as many distinct truth conditions as there are relevantly distinct contexts in which they might be uttered (and so, in effect, with an infinite number of distinct truth conditions). For example, considered in themselves, the indexical sentences “Ich bin Deutsch” and “I am German” do not have any truth conditions; and when truth conditions are associated with them by reference to their possible utterers, each one of them gets associated with as many distinct truth conditions as there are distinct individuals who might utter it. As a result, if one were to identify, in accordance with thesis F, a sentence’s meaning with its truth condition, one would be forced to absurdly conclude, with regard to indexical sentences such as “Ich bin Deutsch” or “I am German”, either that they are meaningless or that each one of them has infinitely many distinct meanings. (Incidentally, the standard, Kaplanian, response to that problem involves abandoning thesis F: the meaning of an indexical sentence, in the Kaplanian framework, is its so-called “character”, and an indexical sentence’s character is definitely not its truth condition; see [Kaplan, 1989].)

Notice, however, that neither of the features that make indexical sentences troublesome for thesis F is a feature of the self-referential sentences responsible for the problem under discussion in this paper. For, first, none of these self-referential sentences lacks, considered in itself, a truth condition; and secondly, none of them is susceptible of being associated, when considered in relation to the infinite number of its possible contexts of utterance, with an infinite number of distinct truth conditions. Rather, each one of them has, considered in itself, a definite, unproblematically specifiable, truth condition, and that condition remains the same no matter what the context in which the sentence is uttered happens to be. So, the problem that thesis F has with these self-referential sentences cannot be that it wrongly entails, as it does wrongly entail for indexical ones, either that they are meaningless or that each one of them is associated with an infinite number of meanings. There is, consequently, no basis for supposing that the problem that the self-referential sentences considered above create for thesis F is an instance of the problem that indexical sentences are independently known to create for the same thesis.

One might grant that, for reasons such those just given, indexicality and self-referentiality should be acknowledged to be different things, but
nevertheless develop the hope that, since the most famously problematic self-referential sentences are liar-sentences, the problem that the sentences considered in this paper create for thesis F will somehow turn out to be an instance of the problem that liar-sentences create for that thesis.

That hope would be groundless too, however. The problem that liar-sentences create for thesis F is that, although such sentences are meaningful, their meanings cannot be specified, as F disposes one to suppose, by specifying their truth-conditions, since there can be no non-contradictory specification of their truth-conditions. And the source of that problem is not, of course, merely that liar-sentences refer to themselves, but, crucially, that what they predicate of themselves is a particular truth-theoretic property, namely the property of being false. (Indeed, it is arguable that self-referentiality not only is not sufficient but may not even be necessary for the generation of the kind of logically paradoxical result associated with liar-sentences; see [Yablo, 1993].)

Notice, however, that the self-referential sentences discussed in this paper are sharply different from liar-sentences in both of the above respects. First, each one of them has a truth condition whose specification is fully contradiction-free. And secondly, none of them predicates, of what it refers to, a truth-theoretic property of any kind (being a sentence of English, being a sentence of German, being a sentence of exactly eight words, being a sentence that ends with a verb, and being a sentence that contains at least one contraction, are certainly not truth-theoretic properties of sentences in any intelligible sense of the term ‘truth-theoretic’). It is therefore groundless to suppose that the problem that these sentences create for thesis F might turn out to be an instance of the problem that liar-sentences create for the same thesis.

4. Conclusion

Since there appears to be no chance of assimilating the problem examined in this paper to already known problems, I submit that it deserves its own distinctive place in the list of problems undermining thesis F.

To be sure, no problem is insurmountable if one is prepared to pretend that the evidence for its existence does not exist, and there are at least two ways in which one might attempt to do that in the present case. The simplest way would be to deny that (1)–(10) are sentences of
English or German — in other words, to claim that a grammar of German would be descriptively inadequate if it generated (2) or (4), and that a grammar of English would be descriptively inadequate if it generated any of (1), (3) or (5)–(10). I take this claim to be too obviously wrong to merit any consideration.

A slightly more complex, though no less futile, way would consist in suggesting that there might be a sense of “meaning” in which the sentences that the paper assumes to be synonymous are not in fact synonymous. In response to such a suggestion, I would simply point out that, although the word “meaning” may have more than one senses, it has none in which the sentences in question could be held not to be synonymous. In particular, there is no sense of “meaning” in which the noun phrase “the sentence hereby uttered” acquires a different meaning (as opposed to a different referent) each time it is used in a different sentence, and there is no sense of “meaning” in which the noun phrase “the sentence hereby uttered” means anything different from what the noun phrase “der hiermit ausgesprochene Satz” means; given these facts, and assuming that sentence meanings are determined compositionally on the basis of the meanings of sentential constituents, there is no way of avoiding the conclusion that the sentences the paper assumes to be synonymous are indeed synonymous, even though they cannot have the same truth conditions. Trying to ignore the trouble that this fact causes for thesis F by imagining senses of “meaning” that do not exist might be an understandable form of self-deception, but it would be a form of self-deception nonetheless.

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References


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