Conflict Mediation: The Qatari Experience

Abstract: The object of the analysis of this paper is Qatari mediation. The role of facilitation as a tool of conflict management in Doha’s foreign policy as well as its modus operandi and the conditions for successful facilitation are the main issues examined here. In conclusion, it is revealed that mediation is only one tool of the Qatari foreign policy among many others. Moreover, the presence of the window of opportunity, the conflict parties’ inclusion and cohesion, and the acceptability of an intermediary are crucial for the successful conflict mediation. The use of reward power, the absence of the follow-up mechanism, the trained administrative staff of the foreign policy apparatus, and the war-weariness are the main obstacles for the transformations of Qatari conflict mediation into conflict resolution.

Keywords: mediation, conflict management, conflict resolution, Qatar, foreign policy

Introduction

Mediation is one tool for conflict management which has also become the instrument or the strategy of the Qatari foreign policy during the reign of Sheikh Hamid bin Khalifa Al Thani, who after the bloodless coup in 1995 became the new Emir of the State of Qatar. At the beginning of the 21st century, Doha invested many different types of resources in the process of mediation contributing both to the practice and the theory of facilitation by giving more cases to study. However, it is only one tool among many others which are aimed at solving the security dilemma of the small country and increasing its influence. Therefore, the goal of this paper is to analyse Qatari experience in conflict management in order to reveal the place which mediation occupies among other foreign policy tools of Doha as well as the peculiarities of its modus operandi to determine the necessary conditions for successful facilitation.
Firstly, it is analysed the development of mediation as an institution of diplomacy as well as theoretical discussions concerning the main controversial issues, such as impartiality of the facilitator and the use of reward power. Moreover, the definition of mediation as a process of conflict management which does not always provide for conflict resolution is given in order to facilitate the determination of the success of Qatar’s facilitation. Secondly, it is discovered that mediation is only one strategy of the Qatari policy to obtain its security and to enhance its influence. The reasons of Qatari activism in this sphere are widely discussed among scholars, and different points of view are critically presented in the essay as well as the well-grounded conclusions are proposed in determining mediation as a means of the Lilliputian’s policy to assure its security and strengthen its influence.

The following sections emphasize the necessary conditions for a successful process of conflict mediation on the basis of the Qatari experience. The presence of the window of opportunity, consultations with second-tier stakeholders, acceptability for the conflict parties, and the latter’s inclusion and cohesion are factors which are crucial for the positive outcome of mediation.

Further, reasons why Qatar’s mediation is not transformed in a long-term conflict resolution are defined. They include the use of reward power, the absence of the follow-up mechanism, highly qualified administrative and diplomatic support, and mutually hurting stalemate. While defining all these conditions, the theoretical discussions concerning the most controversial ones are critically examined.

The Historical and Theoretical Background

A) Mediation as third-party conflict management

Mediation is a type of negotiations with the involvement of the third party. According to Jacob Bercovitch, “Provisions for some form of third-party mediation were recently discovered in the Amarna letters (these refer to the reign of King Amenhotep IV around 3,500 years ago)”¹. The references to the facilitation can be found in the Bible, Homer’s Iliad, Sophocles’ Ajax, Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet. This method of conflict management was also known in ancient China and in the system of Greek city-states, in Renaissance diplomacy, etc. During the first 1899 Hague Conference, the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of

International Disputes was signed, Article 2 of which states: “In case of serious disagreement or conflict, before an appeal to arms the Signatory Powers agree to have recourse, as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly Powers”. In the contemporary legal system the most important juridical basis for this form of conflict management is Article 33 of the UN Charter that indicates: “The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice”. Nevertheless, theoretical studies of it appeared only in the second half of the 20th century and 21st century.

The most prominent scholars of mediation whose works or ideas are utilised in this essay are Eileen Babbitt, John H. Barton, Jacob Bercovitch, Melanie G. Greenberg, Margaret E. McGuinness, Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Lawrence Susskind, Saadia Touval, and William Zartman. The major divergence of opinion is observed concerning the “ripe” of the conflict for a third-party involvement and the usefulness of the usage of reward and coercive power which are discussed in the text on the basis of the Qatari experience. Concerning the Qatari mediation, the most remarkable researches which are employed in critical manner here are works of Sultan Barakat, Andrew F. Cooper, Mohamed H. Gaas, Stig J. Hansen, Mehran Kamrava, Halvard Leira, Bessma Momani, Sara Pulliam, David B. Roberts, and Kristian Coates Ulrichsen. The main difference of views is found concerning the issues of reasons for Qatari mediation and some of its tools and techniques which are discussed thereafter.

Before focusing on the Qatari mediation, it is important to admit several nuances. Firstly, the term “mediation” is used here in its definition given by J. Bercovitch, id est, “[...] a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties’ own efforts, where the disputing parties or their representatives seek the assistance, or accept an offer of help, from an individual, group, state or organization to change, affect or influence their perceptions or behavior, without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law”. Secondly, as it derives from the accepted definition, mediation is a process of conflict management, not solely of conflict resolution. The reasons for resorting to this tool can be different; e.g.,

---

4 J. Bercovitch, op. cit., p. 7.
tension reduction. As M. Kamrava admits, “Mediation is necessary but by itself insufficient component of conflict resolution”.

Thus, mediation is one tool of conflict management, and it has various forms of implementation according to the context of the conflict, the nature of parties and mediator(s), etc.

**B) Qatar’s mediation as one tool of its foreign policy**

Qatar became independent only in 1971. A long time before the independence, the Al Thani dynasty continued to experience the so-called small state’s security dilemma. Sheik Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani resolved this problem by relying upon Saudi Arabia’s protection. The situation changed only in 1995 when Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani became the new Emir after the bloodless coup. He changed the foreign policy of the country and introduced innovations. In order to understand the role of mediation in external affairs, the cornerstone of the Qatari foreign policy should be discovered.

H. Leira criticises in his article the approach that explains Doha’s foreign policy implementation from the point of a small state’s security dilemma as insufficient. He indicates that “If Qatar had been a thorough security-maximizer, [...] we should expect to see a much more consistent policy towards both the external hegemon (the US) and the local great powers (Saudi Arabia and Iran)”.

The author adds, inter alia, system maintenance to the reasons and causes of Doha’s foreign policy actions. The maintenance of the regional system of international relations corresponds to the security maximization of Qatar. The preservation of the regional system with the state sovereignty as the main principle of international law ensures the security concerns of this Lilliputian. Mediation facilitates the promotion of image as the peace broker, as the protagonist of peace. These principles can also serve the purpose of the regional system maintenance. Moreover, the status quo of regional balance of powers is crucial for the survival of Qatar. The 1991 Gulf War made this conclusion apparent as Kuwait is a similar small state of the same region. Qatari mediation in Yemen, Lebanon, and Darfur can be explained as a part of the strategy to limit the growth of Iran’s proxies. However, it doubtfully can be among the main reasons of such involvement. Thus, security assurance is the main aim of the foreign policy of Qatar.

---


The latter can be interpreted in a broader sense, including its financial and economic aspects. A number of the Qatari mediation efforts have contributed also to economic and financial security of Doha. For example, after Darfur mediation “Qatari investments assumed a strategic dimension through the acquisition of farmland for Qatar’s National Food Security Programme”7. As D. Roberts also points out, “Qatar’s precarious food security is potentially significantly strengthened with extensive contacts in Sudan”8. Mediation of conflicts with the involvement of Iran’s proxies can also be part of such economic considerations as “having shared gas fields with Iran means Qatar needs to play an important balancing act”.

Another strategy that aims at security is manoeuvring. It includes the efforts to keep good relations with everyone. “The idea is to try to keep everybody happy – or if we can’t, to keep everybody reasonably unhappy”10 states R. Worth, citing a former Qatari official. Doha is able to keep relations with Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia, and the US at the same time. In 1996, Israel and Qatar exchanged the trade offices. During the conference of the Organisation of Islamic Countries in 2000 Doha did not support the ban of Israeli trade office, proposed by Iran. In 2008, it temporarily suspended the presence of the trade office of Tel Aviv in Doha; however, it kept relations with Israel. At the same time, it supplied the humanitarian aid and positive image via the Al Jazeera to Hamas. Doha also signed a plethora of agreements and cordial military exchanges with Iran while hosting the American military base in Al Udeid and the headquarters of the US Central Command. Mediation can serve this purpose as well. It allows Doha to present itself as an impartial actor which is part of the resolution of its security concerns.

Another goal of the sheikhdom’s foreign policy is influence or leadership. The second and third circles of recognition where Qatar presents itself as “a state working for unity within [Arab world and the Muslims]”11 and the fourth one where it endeavours to be the first among the small-state equals indicate acting for this aim. Doha with its wealth has the resources and the will to influence the regional system of international relations. It tries to utilise available opportunities. As a re-

8 D.B. Roberts, Qatari Mediation, http://www.academia.edu/336597/Qatari_Mediation (accessed 27.05.2015).
result, it can also acquire a more secure environment by this means. Mediation can be another tool to achieve this goal.

Influence can be also enhanced by soft power. Economic liberalisation of Qatar facilitated not only the diversification of country’s economy and the accumulation of enormous amount of wealth. The political reforms here were top-down, and they were not demanded by people. In 1999, universal suffrage was introduced; in 2000, a Ruling Family Council was established; in 1995, the elections to the Central Municipal Council were announced with the right for women to vote and be elected. However, as S. Pulliam admits, “It was not until 2003 that a female was elected to CMC”\(^{12}\). Because of uncertainty about the consequences of elections for the Shura Council, the latter were postponed. This means that the reforms are aimed at soft power. Mediation can be another means for the latter. Article 7 of the 2003 Constitution contains the provision that the foreign policy of Qatar “is based on the principle of strengthening international peace and security by means of encouraging peaceful resolution of international disputes”\(^{13}\). Mediation strengthens the soft power of the Lilliputian. It was noticed by François de Callières in his famous work *The Art of Negotiation with Sovereign Princes* that “nothing [other than mediation] is more proper to raise the reputation of his [Prince’s] power, and to make it respected by all nations”\(^{14}\). Such soft power highly contributes also to the legitimacy of the emirate in the international arena, its status, and standing on the world scene, and, in turn, it can further the Qatari influence and security.

State branding is a strategy to multiply and amplify the efforts of the sheikhdom at soft power and influence. Qatar disseminates its attractive image. The main implement to scatter this image is the Al Jazeera which was founded in 1996 and started to broadcast in English in 2006. Formally, the media network is independent and free from any censorship. However, it relies on state’s funding and, therefore, “self-censorship still plays a significant role”\(^{15}\). The regime enhanced its control over the Al Jazeera when in 2011 its director Wadah Khanfar was substituted by Sheikh Ahmad bin Jassim Al Thani. Moreover, Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani is the chairman of the Al Jazeera Media Network. Thus, the

\(^{12}\) S. Pulliam, *Qatar’s Foreign Policy: Building an International Image*, Khamasin: The Journal of the American University in Cairo’s Department of Political Science 2013, p. 4.

\(^{13}\) K.C. Ulrichsen, op. cit., p. 1.


\(^{15}\) S. Pulliam, op. cit., p. 7.
channel provides the image which is important for the influence and soft power of the emirate. Mediation of concrete conflicts is always accompanied by the broadcast by the Al Jazeera.

On the basis of the aforementioned, it can be concluded that the main goals of the Qatari foreign policy are its security and influence. For the former, the main contributors are its efforts of manoeuvring, regional system maintenance, and economic and financial aspects of survival. For the latter, the emirate utilises opportunities and endeavours to acquire soft power which also contributes to its legitimacy and status. Mediation is only one tool to achieve these aims and goals. Conflict resolution is not a prime motivation to mediate. The reduction of tension in most cases is enough to provide the image of the impartial peace broker, security, and influence.

In the following section the tools, resources, and modus operandi of the Qatari mediation are analysed. The necessary conditions for tension reduction and reasons why Doha mediation in the major cases was not transformed in conflict resolution are discussed thereafter. The conclusions are based on the comparative analysis of mediation in Lebanon in 2008, between Hamas and Fatah in 2006 and 2012, in Yemen in 2008, 2010, and 2011, between Eritrea and Djibouti in 2010, and in Darfur during 2008–2011. It should be mentioned here that the separate case studies are not relevant for the aim of this paper. They are utilised here as a source and to the extent which gives the basis to answer the second part of the research question posed above (as the first one is already answered).

**Necessary Elements of Qatari Conflict Mediation**

**A) Second-tier stakeholders**

Qatari mediation experience reveals that dealing with second-tier stakeholders is crucial for the success of conflict management. This is what S. Hansen calls the window of opportunity. Qatar in most cases of its mediation was not a primary choice for a facilitator. It took the floor only when other countries agreed or were not against it. In Palestine, Doha mediated after the failure of Egypt (pro-Fatah) in 2006, Egypt, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia’s failure in 2008. Friendly relations with the Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt) assisted the closing of the Doha Agreement in 2012. The involvement of Doha in the Djibouti-Eritrean conflict was possible only because “Ethiopia had little leverage.”16 However, the most remark-

---

16 S.J. Hansen, op. cit., p. 60.
able example is Yemen. The results of Qatari efforts in 2008 and 2010 to mediate Sa’dah war failed because of Saudi Arabia’s negative attitude towards them, inter alia. However, joint intervention in 2011 led to the acceptance of the departure by A. Saleh. Furthermore, L. Susskind and E. Babbitt admit that “a mediator must understand the interests of these ‘second-tier’ parties and consult them during negotiations”\(^{17}\). In Lebanon, only after “Emir telephoned Syrian President Bashar al-Assad […] they [Hezbollah negotiators] announced their assent to the terms of the agreement”\(^{18}\).

Thus, the creation of the window of opportunity, the acceptance of the mediation itself and its results by second-tier stakeholders are vital for the success of conflict mediation.

**B) Inclusion and cohesion of conflict parties**

In the literature on mediation, the need for the involvement of a broad set of actors in the process of mediation is often emphasized. Such inclusion is important for conflict resolution; however, for conflict management, it is enough to involve the main opponents, the conflicting parties. In Darfur, the failure to handle a strife owed, inter alia, to unsuccessful attempts to involve the Justice and Equality Movement, a crucial belligerent, after the signing of a deal of the Sudanese government with the Liberation and Justice Movement.

The case of Yemen reveals the necessity of conflicting parties’ cohesion. The failure by Qatar to involve all tribes in the process contributed highly to almost immediate resumption of fighting in 2008.

**C) Impartial or acceptable mediator**

The question about impartiality is one of the most controversial. On the one hand, “[...] the choice of the mediator appears to be based on [...] most of all, neutrality and impartiality”\(^{19}\), according to J.H. Barton and M.C. Greenberg. On the other hand, S. Touval and W. Zartman indicate that “only biased mediator [...] will be credible in this context”\(^{20}\). However, in the second case, the facilitator has to be perceived by another party as not biased, or at least not an enemy. In 2011,

---

\(^{17}\) L. Susskind, E. Babbitt, *Overcoming the Obstacles to Effective Mediation of International Disputes* [in:] *Mediation in International Relations...*, p. 45.

\(^{18}\) M. Kamrava, op. cit., p. 548.


\(^{20}\) M. Kamrava, op. cit., p. 543.
A. Saleh “requested Qatar to remove itself from the peace process”\textsuperscript{21} as it was no longer perceived as impartial and acceptable.

Qatari relations with Hamas, Hezbollah, and different Sudanese fractions mainly by means of humanitarian relief or other types of aid made it acceptable as a facilitator in the future. S.J. Hansen claims that Doha was biased in Lebanon and Palestine; however, it was still acceptable as it kept positive contacts not only with Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran but also with Israel, the US, etc. Mediation would not be possible if Qatar was not accepted as a friend or at least as not an enemy by two or more parties of the disputes. “It enables the third party [Qatar] to be trusted by both parties”\textsuperscript{22}, according to Jeffrey R. Berridge. In the Djibouti-Eritrean conflict, Doha had friendly relations with both countries; during the Sa’dah war Qatar was acceptable for A. Saleh whom it supported in 1994 uprising and 1996 Hanish islands’ dispute and for the Houtis as an alternative to Saudi Arabia despite asymmetry in its relations with the parties.

Furthermore, J. Berridge claims that “some venues are chosen for negotiations because […] they are neutral ground”\textsuperscript{23}. Doha is a kind of such venues as a capital of an independent, impartial country.

The Arab Spring has been changing the perception of Doha as not a partial actor. It started to take sides in Libya by calling for military intervention against M. Qaddafi as well as in Syria by arming rebels. It can have a negative effect on Qatari future facilitation efforts. It also proves that mediation is only one strategy and one tool of the foreign policy of Doha. Soft power and influence by utilising opportunities are other two which have triggered more active and biased stance of Qatar in Libya and Syria. At the same time, the new Emir Sheikh Tamim endeavours to restore its image as an honest broker.

Thus, the success of conflict mediation highly depends on the presence of the window of opportunity, on consultations with second-tier stakeholders, on the perception of a facilitator as at least not an enemy, and on the inclusion of the main parties and their cohesion.

\textsuperscript{21} S.J. Hansen, op. cit., p. 28.
Reasons for the Failure of Conflict Resolution

A) Stalemate in conflict resolution

The discussion about the ripe moment, diplomatic momentum of third-party involvement reveals the complexity and uniqueness of each particular case. J.Z. Rubin points out that “third-party intervention can, in principle at least, occur at any point along the way”\(^{24}\). On the other hand, J.H. Barton and M.C. Greenberg cite William Zartman who indicates that successful mediation is possible only when “mutually hurting stalemate”\(^{25}\) is reached. I agree with J.Z. Rubin in the meaning of the mediation success as short-term tension reduction. However, for long-term conflict resolution, W. Zartman’s condition is crucial.

The most remarkable example in Qatari practice corresponding to this problem is the Yemen’s case. A. Saleh did not perceive the stalemate situation. He went to negotiate only to “placate domestic and international observers”\(^{26}\). Therefore, the struggle resumed again when “Riyadh has poured money into the Yemeni military and allied tribes”\(^{27}\).

In Lebanon, there was no stalemate in the conflict as well: Hezbollah was a winning side. However, the sheikhdom mediated the conflict management, which was sustained till 2010, due to the desire of the parties to prevent the escalation of a strife into a civil war. However, the conflict was not resolved as the final deal focused not on structural transformations but on the reapportioning of votes in the parliament.

Thus, a mutually hurting stalemate is a necessary element for conflict resolution, even though it is not one for its management.

B) Reward power

Another controversial issue in the theory and the practice of mediation is the use of reward and coercive power by a facilitator. Here the first one is emphasised as Qatar has only this one due to its enormous wealth. It is one of the six types of resources distinguished by John R.P. French and Bertram Raven, \textit{id est}, reward, coercion, referent, legitimacy, expertise, and information. J. Bercovitch and J.Z. Rubin admit the usefulness of the utilisation of rewards if the facilitator has


\(^{26}\) S. Barakat, \textit{The Qatari Spring: Qatar’s Emerging Role in Peacemaking}, Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States 2012, no. 24, p. 18.

\(^{27}\) M. Kamrava, op. cit., p. 551.
such kind of resources. However, J.H. Barton and M.C. Greenberg point out that even if “external pressure led to a successful short-term agreement [...] often the implementation of those agreements was problematic and required ongoing external pressure and enforcement”\textsuperscript{28}. If parties close a deal only because of anticipated benefits from the mediator, when the latter ends there is no more reason to keep to the terms of the agreement. It does not lead to conflict resolution which needs the change of perception of the object of conflict and the counterpart but it can be useful for tension reduction.

Qatar created 2 billion USD joint investment fund with Libya “to neutralize potential Libyan spoilers”\textsuperscript{29} and 2 billion USD investments for Darfur region. Qatar also pledged 500 million USD as reconstruction aid in Saada Province. It was the largest investor in the south Lebanon. It provided 300 million USD for reconstruction. In other cases, Doha also used this leverage.

Thus, the Qatari practice shows that reward power can assist in a successful conflict mediation but not in a long-term conflict resolution. In most cases, violence emerged again after some period of time.

\textbf{C) Absence of the follow-up mechanism}

The majority of authors agree that Qatar is lacking a follow-up mechanism. When the tension is reduced, Doha finishes its job. As a result, in the future, violence can appear again. It is not the only reason for the failure of conflict resolution. It is possible that violence will not appear again even without the follow-up, for example, if the object of the conflict has disappeared. However, it is more probable that violence is not a real alternative for the parties if there is a mechanism to follow up an agreement which also reveals the interest not only in conflict management but also in its resolution. The latter is absent in Qatari case as it was shown above.

\textbf{D) Personalised mediation without professionals’ enhancement}

As S.J. Hansen indicates the foreign policy of Qatar is influenced by “rulers, movers, spacers and tellers.”\textsuperscript{30} The most important are the first and, to a lesser degree, the second one. The state’s rulers has “relatively few domestic constraints”\textsuperscript{31}. It leaves a great margin of discretion, \textit{carte blanche} for emirs. It also explains the personalisation of Qatari modus operandi. In the cases analysed within this

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{28} J.H. Barton, M.C. Greenberg, op. cit., p. 366.
  \item \textsuperscript{29} S. Barakat, op. cit., p. 20.
  \item \textsuperscript{30} S.J. Hansen, op. cit., p. 1.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} S. Pulliam, op. cit., p. 3.
\end{itemize}
paper, Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (1995–2013), Prime Minister (2007–2013) and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1992–2013) Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber bin Muhammad Al Thani, Minister of State Ahmad bin Abdullah al-Mahmud were the individuals responsible and mainly involved in the process of mediation. D. Roberts admits a kind of division of labour. While the Emir operates “on international level” \(^3\) or macro-level, the Minister of Foreign Affairs on micro- or parties’ level. In Sudan, the role of A. al-Mahmud was important on both levels. This is a positive feature that facilitates both conflict management and its resolution. For example, during Lebanon six day trilateral negotiations, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim “played a key role in fostering a collegial and friendly atmosphere […] diffused tensions when the talks came close to collapsing” \(^3\). It also means a high priority of mediation. On the other hand, the lack of formally trained people in the mediation process decreases the contextual knowledge of the conflict, the availability of a mediator during a long period of time which is crucial for conflict resolution that needs a lot of time invested to transform the perception of each other by the parties of the dispute, to transform deep historical, ethno-racial, and sectarian roots of it.

Thus, the personalisation should be preserved but enhanced by the trained, experienced administrative, diplomatic apparatus which have and can devote more resources to conflict resolution. However, for tension reduction which is a short-term process, the latter is not as crucial even if it can make the process of facilitation easier.

**Conclusions**

There are many different motives that either a mediator or parties of the conflict have in order to initiate mediation. For Qatar, the specific motive is tension reduction as a type of conflict management which does not require conflict resolution. In a broader sense, mediation is only one of the strategies of Doha’s foreign policy, the main goals of which are security of the Lilliputian; i.e., the solution of the small state’s security dilemma and its influence increase.

Considering this context, the success of Qatari mediation can be understood more objectively with the comparison of results, reasons, and motives. The analysis of the Qatari experience in facilitation reveals the correctness of the aforemen-

---

\(^3\) D.B. Roberts, op. cit.

\(^3\) M. Kamrava, op. cit., p. 548.
tioned conclusion as well as the necessary conditions for the success of conflict mediation and reasons why the latter has not been transformed in a successful conflict resolution in the majority of cases.

The presence of the window of opportunity and the consultations with the interested second-tier stakeholders as well as the acceptability of the mediator who must be perceived as at least not an enemy by all disputants are crucial elements not only for the success of mediation but also for mediation itself in many cases. The participation by the main belligerents and their cohesion highly contribute to a successful conflict management.

Furthermore, despite parties’ desire to change their behavior to non-violent is enough to stop or contain conflict, the absence of the war-weariness and the understanding of the latter prevent the possibility to resolve the root causes of a strife. If an intermediary utilises reward power, when the promised benefits are finished, the disputants may renew their struggle which is not a *sine qua non* but nevertheless a possible condition. The absence of a follow-up mechanism and of the involvement of trained diplomats who have more time, expertise, and resources to invest in the process of facilitation also decreases the chances for the transformation of a short-term conflict management into its long-term resolution. Other conditions could be also vital. However, these are factors which are revealed on the basis of Qatari huge experience as a mediator.